T e l e g r a m m
(geh.Ch.V.)

Helsinki, den 19.Dezember 1939 - 14.45 Uhr
Ankunft:   "  19.   "      "   - 16.10  "

Nr. 428 vom 19. Dezember      C i t i s s i m e

1)  Hier wird in massgebenden Kreisen behauptet,
die deutsche Regierung habe der schwedischen Re-
gierung erklärt, Eingreifen Schwedens an Seite
Finnlands würde militärisches Vorgehen Deutschlands
gegen Schweden zur Folge haben.  Erbitte Drahtanwei-
sung, ob ich Behauptung dementieren kann.
2)  Höre ich, dass England und Frankreich auf schwe-
dische Regierung drücken zwecks Eingreifen zugunsten
Finnlands.  Finnischerseits wird vermutet, dass die
Westmachte im Norden Nebenkriefsschauplatz schaffen
möchten, möglichat mit Flugzeug-Basen in Süd-Schweden.
3)  Finnische Militärkreise wunschen, dass finnisch-
russischer Krieg von grossen Krieg isoliert bleibe
und dass Schweden auf finnische Seite tritt.
Bluecher

Document No. 473
(See p 558)


# 1918-1945

## BOARD OF EDITORS

UNITED STATES: Paul E. Sweet, Editor-in-Chief; Howard M. Smyth j James Stuart Beddie ; Norman Rich ; Arthur G. Kogan ; Fredrick Amdahl ; George Kent.
GREAT BRITAIN: The Hon. Margaret Lambert, Editor-in-Chief; K II. M. Duke; M. ii. Fisher; K. Eonau; D. C. Watt.
FRANCE: Maurice Bailment, Editor-in-Chief; Georges Bonnin; Andre Scherer; Jacques Grunewahl.
This list shows the composition of the Board of Editors at the time of the final editorial work of this volume. Former editors, with their terms of service, were :
UNITED STATES: Raymond James Sontnjr, Editor-in-Chief, September 3046 -July 1949; KernadoHe K. Hrhnnit, Editor-in-Chief, July It)!!) July 1952; JB. Malcolm Carroll, October 11)40 -August 1049; Jean Brownell Dulaney, December 194t>-April 1S51; Fritz Epstein, October 1940- July U)iN;Aniia Maria Herbert, April 1J)51 -August I95~; John Iluizengji, January 1947-September 195U; Otto Pflanze, January 1048-Au^u.st 1U4J); Joachim Keinak, December 11) 17- July U).Ti.
GREAT BRITAIN: John W. Wheeler-F.ennett, Editor-in-Chief, September IJHG-May 1948, thereafter Historical Ad\iser; James Joll, Editor-in-Chief, June-December 10 IS; General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, Editor-in-Chief, June 1048-January 1051; I;. Braimey, September KMO-July 1048; T. F. I). Williams, September 1047-September 1910; W. II. C. Frend, March 1947-Oetober 1951; K. K. Hramsted, January 1948-February 11)52; P. Kricsson, January 194S-May 10H2.
FRANCE: J(an Ksticnne, July 1947-April 1950; Leon de Gruer, July 1947- October 1050. in
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1918-1945

SERIES D (1937-1945)

VOLUME VIII
THE WAR YEARS
September 4, 1939-March 18, 1940

## CONTENTS

 Page PREFACE ix ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS xiii DOCUMENTS 1 APPENDICES:
 I. Letter From Under State Secretary Hencke to HelmuthLaux, January 28, 1941 939 II. Organization of the German Foreign Ministry 944 III. List of German Files Used 953 IV. List of Persons 962 V. Glossary of German Terms and Abbreviations 972 VI. Maps accompanying the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty, September 28, 1939.

PREFACE 1

In June 1946 the British Foreign Office and the United States Department of State agreed to publish jointly documents from captured archives of the German Foreign Ministry and the Reich Chancellery. Although the captured archives go back to the year 1867, it was decided to limit the present publication to papers relating to the years after 1918, since the object of the publication was "to establish the record of German foreign policy preceding and during World War IL" The editorial work was to be performed "on the basis of the highest scholarly objectivity." The editors were to have complete independence in the selection and editing of the documents. Publication was to begin and be concluded as soon as possible. Each Government was "free to publish separately any portion of the documents." In April 1947 the French Government, having requested the right to participate in the project, accepted the terms of this agreement.

In accordance with the understandings on the basis of which the project was originally undertaken, the editors have had complete freedom in the selection and editing of the documents.

The eighth volume of this series begins on September 4, 1939, the day following the entrance of the United Kingdom and France into the war; it ends on the eve of the Hitler-Mussolini meeting at the Brenner Pass on March 18, 1940, with a new active phase of the conflict immediately in the oiling. Because so many of the main strands of German policy during the war years are intertwined the chronological arrangement of documents begun with volume VI has been continued. A topical arrangement of the analytical list at the beginning of the volume is designed to ease the problem of those who wish to read on selected subjects.

German relations with the Soviet Union bulk largest in this volume. The newly achieved German-Soviet accord was tested severely, first in Poland, and then in the Baltic States and Finland; and the task of working out the details of the new political, military, and economic collaboration presented numerous problems. Many documents heretofore unpublished, particularly on German-Soviet economic discussions, are included in the selection. Next in importance, in terms of

1In each of the first four volumes published In the series there appears a "General Introduction." The editors have not felt it necessary to repeat this introduction in the present and succeeding volumes. Interested readers may wish to refer to it for information on the nature of the German Foreign Ministry archives on which this publication is based, their present condition, and some of the principles which have guided the editors in their work.

X PREFACE

active negotiations on significant matters, were German relations with Italy. Italian readjustment to the new facts of German policy was not easy, and a phase of tension is documented here; but by March 17 that phase was over, and Hitler and Mussolini could anticipate meeting at the Brenner in an atmosphere of cordiality.

Relations with Belgium and the Netherlands were dominated by German military plans for prosecuting the war in the West. In order to give a relatively adequate conception of the interconnection of military planning and foreign policy, all so-called Führer directives for the conduct of the war which fall in the period of this volume are being published, some for the first time. In Norway, not only the Navy, but the Aussenpolitisches Amt as well, shared in the formulation of policy. The topic is therefore noteworthy not only for its intrinsic interest, but because it illustrates the way in which foreign policy in the Third Reich was sometimes shaped by the competing pressures of various State and Party organs.

During this period German policy toward thti neutrals had two main objectives: to counteract the workings of the Allied blockade, and to discourage the neutrals from a closer alignment with Britain and France. These objectives are particularly evident in regard to the United States, Turkey, the Middle East, Latin America, and the smaller states of Europe, At the same time Germany sought to strengthen her ties with friendly powers, particularly Japan and Spain, and to overcome their unconcealed misgivings about German- Soviet collaboration.

The various countries occupied by Germany during the war years, beginning in this volume with Poland, present problems of peculiar difficulty to the editors. The amount of documentation on the occupied countries in the files of the Foreign Ministry varies greatly from one case to another, and it is often difficult to determine precisely where to draw the line between occupation policy and foreign policy. In general the editors intend to document where they can aspects of occupation policy which impinge significantly on foreign policy. In this connection, however, they are mindful of the fact that the documents published in connection with the trials at Nuremberg have a wider range. No attempt has therefore been made to duplicate the Nuremberg publications except in the case of documents which appear to be of overriding importance for an understanding of German foreign policy.

The documents in this volume were selected jointly by the American, British, and French editors. For the footnotes and other editorial matter the American editors have entire responsibility. The Division of Language Services of the Department of State produced the translations, which were then reviewed by the American editors, and the

PREFACE XI

technical preparation of edited copy for the printer was done by the Foreign Relations Editing Branch under the direction of Miss Elizabeth A. Vary.

Readers should bear in mind that it is as a source book for the study of history, and not as a finished interpretation of history, that these documents are presented. It has been the aim throughout to keep any interpretative comment out of the footnotes and to use them exclusively for the factual elucidation of the text.

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS1

BALTIC STATES
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
1939
Sept. 4 The State Secretary to the Legation in Estonia
Authorizes a formal declaration that Germany would respect the German-Estonian Non-Aggression Pact during the war.
3 3
Sept. 9 Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Ribbentrop has decided to have the Vilna question taken up with Lithuanian officials.
36 34
Sept. 9 Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop
Kleist reported discussing with Skirpa Lithuanian claims and possible Lithuanian action looking to occupation of Vilna.
41 38
Sept. 12 Memorandum by an Official of the Dienstetelle Ribbentrop
Kleist recommended to the Lithuanian Minister dividing the Vilna question into military and political phases, reserving the latter for later.
57 54
Sept. 13 The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry
The Lithuanian Commander in Chief has reiterated his country's interest in the Vilna question but has stated that he is reluctant to give up her neutrality.
58 55
Sept. 14 The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry
Zechlin notified Minister President Cernius that the imminent collapse of Poland made a decision on Vilna imperative; Cernius replied that Lithuania could not abandon her neutrality but hoped to register her claims to the territory.
65 62
Sept. 16 An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Legation in Lithuania
The Foreign Minister directs that Minister Zechlin drop the subject of Vilna.
76 75
Sept. 17 Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Woermann denounced as insolent the alleged Lithuanian complaints to Britain and France about German pressure in the Vilna question; the Lithuanian Minister replied that the story had already been denied in Kaunas,
84 83
Sept. 18 The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry
Kotze describes Latvian anxiety about Soviet intentions and requests instructions.
89 91

1 The documents in this volume have been arranged chronologically. For the convenience of readers who wish to trace topics through the volume the analytical list of documents is arranged alphabetically by countries, with the addition of four subject headings: "Directives for the Conduct of the War," "Peace Moves," "Propaganda," and "Sea Warfare."

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

BALTIC STATES--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
1939
Sept. 19 The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry
Frohwein reports that Estonian Foreign Minister Selter inquired about German support for the Baltic countries against possible Soviet expansion; Frohwein replied that there had been no change in German- Estonian relations as defined in the German-Estonian Non-Aggression Pact.
98 101
Sept. 20 The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry
Frohwein reports that the Soviet attitude in the incident of the Polish submarine Orzel and the favorable progress of Estonian-Soviet economic negotiations have eased tension in Estonia; he requests instructions as to the German attitude toward the economic talks.
107 107
Sept. 20 The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Latvia
Authorizes Kotze to make reassuring statements to the Latvian Government and to make reference to Hitler's speech of September 19 and to the communique of September 19 by the German and Soviet Governments.
110 110
Sept. 20 Outline of a Defense Treaty between the German Reich and the Republic of Lithuania 113 112
Sept. 21 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Instructions to clarify the Vilna situation in a friendly discussion with Molotov and Stalin; the German view is that this territory in to go to Lithuania.
114 113
Sept. 21 The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry
Frohwein describes the situation arising from the escape of Orzel from Estonian internment; Molotov has stated that the Soviet search for Orzel is not against Estonia.
119 119
Sept. 22 The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry
Zechlin reports that Foreign Minister Urbsys has repeated that Lithuania has national aspirations but wishes to achieve them by peaceful means.
121 121
Sept. 22 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Schulenburg quotes Molotov as saying that the Soviet Government will respect the agreements on the Vilna question but will consider it further in connection with the final Baltic settlement.
123 123
Sept. 25 The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry
The Estonian Government is studying the draft of a military alliance between the Soviet Union and Estonia as presented by Molotov; an early reply is expected.
130 129
Sept. 27 An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Forwards to Ribbentrop a telegram from the Legation in Estonia regarding the Soviet demand for a Soviet-Estonian alliance.
141 147

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

BALTIC STATES--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
1939
Sept. 27 An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Forwards to Ribbentrop a communication by Selter on the Estonian attitude toward the Soviet demand for a military alliance; Estonia intends to yield as little as possible and to maintain existing good relations with Germany.
142 147
Sept. 28 The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Hitler has ordered resettlement of the Volksdeutsche from Estonia and Latvia; preliminary measures are being taken but the actual arrangements will depend on Ribbentrop's current negotiations in Moscow.
153 162
Sept. 28 The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Himmler has suggested a procedure for resettling Volksdeutsche from Estonia and Latvia, with German protection if necessary.
154 162
Sept. 28 The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Expresses the need for an agreement in Moscow as to the treatment of the Volksdeutsche in case Russian troops march into Estonia.
156 164
Sept. 28 Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Woermann told the Lithuanian Minister he did not know whether negotiations involving Lithuania were proceeding in Moscow; Woermann had reports only of the Soviet-Estonian negotiations, in which Germany had no part.
164 169
Sept. 29 The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry
Estonian officials are expressing gratitude to Germany for a toning down of Soviet demands; Estonia will accept these, but wishes to continue good relations with Germany.
168 174
Oct. 1 Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
The Soviet Government has called for immediate negotiations with Latvia.
174 182
Oct. 3 The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry
Requests instructions as to how to answer statements that Germany has given up political influence in the area around Latvia.
181 198
Oct. 3 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Molotov says he intends to tell the Lithuanian Foreign Minister that the USSR is willing to give Vilna to Lithuania and also that Lithuania must cede a portion of its territory to Germany. Schulenburg fears this will make Germany appear a "robber" while the USSR appears a donor.
182 199
Oct. 3 The Director of the Political Department to the Legations in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
Instructions to make no statements on German-Russian relations and their possible effects on the Baltic States.
184 200
Oct. 4 The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry
Warns that disorders may follow publication of Russian demands on Latvia; requests protection and evacuation of Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsch.
190 206

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

BALTIC STATES--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
1939
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Instructions to request Molotov not to speak of the strip of Lithuanian territory.
The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry
In reply to anxious inquiries by the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry, Zechlin stated that Germany did not regard German-Lithuanian frontier rectification as pressing.
The State Secretary to the Legation in Estonia
Instructions to inform Estonian Government that Germany is assuming protection for Volksdeutsche and plans their orderly evacuation; their property must be safeguarded.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
The Lithuanian Minister expresses satisfaction that the German Government has withdrawn its claim to frontier rectification.
The State Secretary to the Legations in Latvia and Estonia
Instructions to proceed with the evacuation and to set up commissions to handle the details, particularly economic.
The Foreign Minister to tht Legations in Estonia, Latvia, and Finland
In strictest secrecy informs the German Ministers that the Moscow negotiations of September 28 delimited German and Soviet spheres of influence in Eastern Europe; these countries plus Lithuania fall outside the German sphere.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
The Soviet Government has expressed surprise at the impending "panicky" emigration of Germans from Latvia and Estonia; this would seriously compromise the action of the Soviet Government.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Instructions to reply to the Soviet Government that the evacuation in no way compromises Soviet actions; emigration is being carried out calmly on the basis of the Moscow agreements and will remove a source of possible friction.
The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry
Urbsys just returned from Moscow, quotes Stalin and Molotov as saying the Soviet Union desires no sovietization of Lithuania; Lithuanian troops will enter the Vilna territory on October 10; talks are continuing in Moscow on the Soviet garrison for Lithuania and on economic relations.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Molotov has asked that German naval operations be confined to the Swedish side of the Baltic, lest they be construed as a demonstration in Finland's favor.

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

BALTIC STATES--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Instructions to notify Molotov that the German Naval Command will defer to Soviet wishes in the Baltic and will notify the Soviet Government of future measures that may affect Russian interests.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Molotov was dissatisfied with a German communication on naval operations in the Baltic; the Soviet Government regards German operations in the Soviet sphere as contrary to the agreement and requests that they be kept west of 20° longitude.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Germany will take an accommodating attitude toward the Soviet request to refrain from naval operations east of 20° longitude but reserves all rights.
The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
Belgian popular sentiment is generally anti-German, but will be influenced by military events. The Government's neutrality policy reflects the wishes of the people.
The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
Shift of Belgian defense forces to the northern and eastern frontiers reflects the changed estimate of the situation after the end of the Polish campaign. The neutrality policy will be firmly maintained. A German invasion, the only one believed likely, would meet the resistance of a united nation.
The Embassy in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
The Chief of the Belgian General Staff inquired about concentrations of German armor and motorized troops around Cologne. He emphasized Belgian determination to maintain neutrality.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Belgium
Instruction to state that reports of German troop concentrations around Cologne are false, to express surprise at the transfer of Belgian troops from Belgian- French to Belgian-German border, and to call attention to anti-German tone of Belgian press,
The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
A member of the Belgian Senate informed Bulow of the proceedings of a secret session of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Senate at which Foreign Minister Spaak had vigorously defended the Government's neutrality policy.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
The Belgian Ambassador attempted to discuss possible violation of Belgian territory. Weizsacker evaded this discussion. The Ambassador was further disturbed about German press comments on the Belgian King's visit to The Hague.

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

BELGIUM--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
Reports having heard that the visit of King Leopold to The Hague was undertaken because of news received concerning German preparations for attack near the Belgian and Dutch border.
The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
Foreign Minister Spaak asked the reason for Germany's threatening actions toward Belgium in the face of Belgium's correct attitude.
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department
At the opening of economic policy discussions with Belgium the Germans protested against a Belgian policy which might restrict or cut off imports of raw materials from Belgium.
Nov. 17 The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
Following the recent panicky excitement caused by fear that a German invasion was imminent public sentiment has calmed down. The press had adopted a moderate tone. Strong suspicions of Germany's intentions still remain.
365 415
Nov. 18 Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department
The Belgian economic negotiator is informed that the Belgian conception of neutrality in the economic field was unsatisfactory to Germany and that Germany must reduce exports to Belgium to the extent that shipments of raw materials to Germany had been cut off. Preparation had been made to stop exports of German coal.
370 419
Dec. 15 Memorandum by the State Secretary
The Belgian Ambassador discussed the position in the pending economic negotiations, the sincerely neutral attitude of the Belgian King, and the prospects for an end of the war, which he viewed as very slight. Weizsacker maintained an attitude of reserve.
456 536
1940 Jan. 11 The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
M. Spaak discussed the remarks he had made in the Chamber on December 19, 1939, stressing the unity of the Belgian people in support of the Government's neutrality policy. Any attack on Holland would create a new situation requiring reexamination.
522 645
Jan. 12 Memorandum by the Head of Political Division II
The Belgian Counselor of Embassy presented a note verbale protesting against flights of German planes over Belgian territory. He mentioned also the plane which made a forced landing at Mechelen-sur-Meuse on January 10.
528 656
Jan. 12 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Belgium
Requests immediate detailed report of the conversation betweem Major Reinberger, one of the officers on the German courier plane forced down at Mechelen-sur-Meuse, and the German Air Attache. Requests also details of the destruction of the courier baggage.

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

BELGIUM--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
Major Rcinberger informed the Air Attache that he had burned the courier baggage except for unimportant fragments which he was prevented from destroying. Close watch will be kept to observe any Belgian military measures which might be taken in consequence of this incident.
The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
The Belgian Government announced that defense measures had been taken. It has not been possible to learn details of troop movements. It is assumed that measures were taken as a result of alarming reports reaching the Belgian General Staff lately.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
The Belgian Ambassador requested an interview with the State Secretary concerning flights of German aircraft over Belgian territory.
The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
Belgian Defense Ministry has ordered next to final mobilization step. Defense measures apparently occasioned by German flights over Belgian territory, reports of German troop movements near the frontiers, and the contents of the partly unburned documents carried on the courier plane forced down on Belgian territory.
Memorandum &|/ an Official of Political Division II
By the Foreign Minister's orders the Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe was contacted, who stated that there had been no substantial increase in flights over Belgian territory, but that in view of the political considerations such flights would be reduced so far as consistent with military requirements.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
The* Belgian Ambahsador discussed flights by German aircraft over Belgian territory, while Weizsacker asked the reasons for Belgium's defense measures directed against Germany.
Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
The Belgian Foreign Minister explained that defensive military measures had been taken because of reports of German troop movements toward the Belgian frontier and because of the nature of the documents found as a result of the German courier piano landing in Belgium on January 10. Belgium had no intention of calling in Britain and France" and would adhere to the policy of neutrality.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
The Belgian Ambassador stated that Belgian defense measures were justified by the documents found when a German plane had made a forced landing in Belgium on January 10. These documents conveyed the impression that Germany had aggressive intentions against Belgium. Weissaeker disclaimed adequate information for a discussion of the affair.

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

BELGIUM--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
1940
[Jan. 31] The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Belgium
Instructions to call on the Belgian Foreign Minister to state that reports of German troop movements against the Belgian frontier are false, that nothing was known in Berlin about the documents which fell into Belgian hands as a result of the forced landing of the courier plane, and to defend German military moves as justified by movements of British, French, and Dutch troops and stationing of Belgian troops on the German frontier.
585 722
Feb. 1 The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
The Rexist leader Degrelle requests support for a new newspaper which would advocate Belgian neutrality. The Ambassador favors a subsidy for an initial 3-month trial period.
587 724
Feb. 1 The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry
Called on Belgian Foreign Minister to present German views on Belgian military dispositions. M. Spaak affirmed Belgian intention to pursue a policy of neutrality and denied contact between the Belgian military command and French and British General Staffs.
588 725
Feb. 21 The Foreign Ministry to the National Socialiat War Veterans League
The Foreign Ministry desires that no support be given to young men from Eupen-Malmedy in escaping Belgian military service by flight to Germany. The flight of any considerable number would weaken the German element there.
632 807
 1939 Sept. 18 Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department The Bulgarian Charge d'Affaires handed in his Government's neutrality declaration and discussed what attitude Bulgaria should take if Russia should seize Bessarabia and simultaneously offer Dobruja to Bulgaria. 92 93 Oct. 10 The Legation in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry King Boris is afraid that Yugoslav interference with arms shipments from Germany to Bulgaria might compel him to obtain war material from Russia. 229 252 Oct. 12 Memorandum by the State Secretary The Bulgarian Minister informed Weizsacker that a proposal for a Russo-Bulgarian assistance pact, recently advanced by Molotov, was rejected by the Bulgarian Government. 247 277 Dec. 4 The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry King Boris expressed concern over Russian aspirations in the Balkans and inquired about Germany's views on that subject, particularly in view of Russia's offer of a mutual assistance pact to Bulgaria: Richthofen requests instructions for a reply. 415 484

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

BULGARIA--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
1939
Dec. 15 The State Secretary to the Legation in Bulgaria
In reply to the Bulgarian King's inquiries, Richtofen is to state that Germany could not support Bulgaria in a conflict with Russia, but that she did not expect such a conflict.
454 533
1940
Jan. 24 The Charge d'Affaires in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry
During his recent visit in Sofia Menemencioglu tried unsuccessfully to commit Bulgaria to a formula of strict neutrality and had to be satisfied with a reaffirmation of a common determination to maintain neutrality as expressed in the communique published.
564 694
 1939 Sept. 9 Memorandum by Ambassador von Hassell Describes his official visits to Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland to discuss problems of neutrality. 42 39 Sept. 14 The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry The Danish press argues that the nonaggression treaty with Germany and Hassell's assurances will allow Danish food exports to remain at their normal level. 66 63 Sept. 17 The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Denmark Instructions to inform the Danish Government that although Germany recognizes that Denmark's neutral rights, she also insists on her own belligerent rights. 83 82 Sept. 26 The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry Renthe-Fink told the Danish Government that Germany reserves the right to employ the same measures as Britain toward supplies from neutral countries; he warns Berlin, however, that actually to sink normal Danish transports would do almost irreparable political harm. 136 136 Oct. 10 Circular of the Foreign Ministry Describes the terms of a Danish-German agreement on Danish food and fodder cargoes to and from England; German consent is provisional, and may be revoked on due notice. 234 256
 1939 Sept. 9 Directive No. 3 43 41 Sept. 25 Directive No. 4 135 135 Sept. 30 Directive No. 5 170 176 Oct. 9 Directive No. 6 224 248 Oct. 18 Directive No. 7 276 316 Nov. 20 Directive No. 8 377 430 Nov. 29 Directive No. 9 399 463

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

FAR EAST
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

ITALY--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Ambassador Hitter to the Embassy in Itoly Neutral protests against Brittah awl I'rcnch hlockaflt measures having proved ineffective*, tformitny now rolltemplates comparable countwiiwasurw, mibjcct to Hitler's final decision; Italy fe to ix* given a Balkans, Turkey, Spain, Japan, and tho t'nitc*! State*; calls for closer cooperation between Germany nnii Italy, including a solution of the coal problem. Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Secretariat Ribbentrop delivered Hitier'fl letter of March H to Mussolini and underlined several points; (tTtnAny could provide 1 million tons of coal per month an

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

ITALY--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
XLV LATIN AMERICA Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX Political and economic measures taken by Germany with a view to the forthcoming Pan-American Conference at Panama. The Charg6 d'Affaires in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry Sentiment in Argentina is anti-German at present; the country will remain neutral as long as possible because of materialistic considerations. The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Spain Instructions to thank the Spanish Government for its efforts to promote neutrality of Latin American states; Spain has much to gain by such efforts. The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy Establishment of a closed zone around the Americas by the Panama Conference is disadvantageous for Germany; she will allow Great Britain and France to take the lead in rejecting it. The Minister in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry The Uruguayan Government has granted Graf Spee only 72 hours for repairs instead of the 14 days requested. The Legation in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry Captain Langsdorff of Graf Spee requests OKM decision on whether to scuttle the ship or accept internment, if a break-through to Buenos Aires is not possible. The State Secretary to the Legation in Uruguay Instructions to redouble efforts for extension of time limit for repair of Qraf Spee. Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I OKM has ordered Langsdorff to attempt to extend the time limit, authorized him to try to take Graf Spee to Buenos Aires, and forbidden him to allow her internment in Uruguay; Ribbentrop has ordered further representations to the Uruguayan Government.

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

LATIN AMERICA--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Bftte 1939 Dec. 16 Dec. 17 Deo. 22 Dec. 28 1940 Jan. 25 Subject The Minister in Untgwy to the Foreign The Uruguayan Council of Ministers will not grant more than a 72-hour period for repair* to Ornf *W*; Uruguay is being subjected to great pmmire from Great Britain and France; the Legation regards

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

MIDDLE EAST
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Date Subject Doc. No. Pago 1939 Sept. 6 Sept. 13 Oct. 17 Oct. 28 Nov. 14 Nov. 18 Doc. 12 Dec. 12 The Legation in Iran to the Foreign Ministry Iran wants to continue and expand her trade with Germany but the Soviets obstruct the transit of goods; the Gorman economic delegation at present in Tehran suggests the conclusion of an agreement with the Soviet Government to facilitate the transit of German goods to Iran. The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union A move to restore the exiled Amanullah dynasty to power in Afghanistan is under consideration; Schulenburg is requested to ascertain the Soviet Government's reaction to such a scheme, The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union At a suitable occasion Schulenburg is to feel out Molotov regarding Russia's intentions in Iran and Afghanistan, and he should also ascertain Russian views on Afghan internal affairs. Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department Iran is greatly concerned over Russia's general intentions toward her as well as over the specific difficulties arising from the transit through Russia of Iran's trade with the outside world which are intensified by a failure to arrive at a now economic agreement with the Soviets; the Iranians request that German influence be brought to bear on Moscow in favor of a netUoment of these problems. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Schulenburg discussed with Molotov the question of Soviet countermeatmres against the concentration of British, French, and Turkish forces in the Noar Kant. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Molotov informed Schulenburg that the Soviets intended to increase their troops in Transcaucasia and that Germany was free to exploit this fact in her propaganda; the Soviets had no objection to German plans to utilize ex-King Amanullah. Under Slate Secretary Habicht to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Instructions to arrange contacts with the Russian authorities for Dr. Kleist who is in Moscow on a special mission* Memorandum of the Aussenpolitisches Ami While the Aussenpolitisches Amt favors continued cooperation with the present Afghan Government, the Foreign Ministry has now adopted the view of Minister von Hentig that this Afghan Government must be eliminated by insurrections and the power of ex-King Amanullah restored. 14 13 60 269 312 56 307 353 353 369 404 419 445 449 521 527

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

MIDDLE EAST--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Data 1939 Deo. 18 Deo. 18 Subject j Doc. No. The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Mtmrtrv Molotov told Kleist who had proponed a KCIICIIM* of joint Russo-German operations in the Middle Kant that he -was favorably disposed toward the idea, but would need more detailed information. Memorandum of the Aussenpolitisches Ami Through a policy of cooperation with the pr<*xtitt Afghan Government, the Aussenpolitisches Ami ha* succeeded in establishing a strong German position in Afghanistan which, however, is being jwpardiwti by the present attempts of the German Foreign Ministry to restore to power former King Amamdiah in a revolution which would be supported also by the Soviet* ; it is suggested that the Foreign Ministry dcafct from such attempts and that instead Germany ought to pcrmiado the Afghan Government to assist preparations for an invasion of British India. NETHERLANDS 1939 Sept. 5 Sept. 10 Sept. 10 Oct. 7 Got; 18 Oct. 27 The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Afinistry The Netherlands Foreign Minister attked that inquiries be made in Berlin as to whether tht Xethcriamlti could secure antiaircraft artillery from Germany. Minister Zech favored granting the request if possible. The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in the Netherlands Germany is in principle prepared to supply the* Netherlands with antiaircraft artillery. It would tx domrablc to send personnel for instructional purposes &ino. Memorandum by the State Secretary The Netherlands Minister presented a note protecting the flight of a German military plane over Dutch territory. Weizsacker assured him that the flight must have been in error inasmuch a ordrH had Ixtrn issued against any violation of Netherlands territory. The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry The Netherlands Foreign Minister thought British reaction to the Fuhrer's speech showed a chance oxfot<*d for peace. It would be necessary to influence Britinh io opinion, possibly with detailed proposals for unent. Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Polity Department m The Netherlands Government waa interested in having Germany continue imports from the Netharlandu Indies and would encourage shipments via the Siberian railway and facilitate provision of foreign exchange. Possibility of such shipments is to be investigated. The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Netherlands defense measures are now pMriinmiasrtirlyy directed against Germany. A German attack, however, is believed unlikely as it would be contrary to (aennany's own interests, for it would unite the Belgians and French against Germany and antagonize the United States. 408 470 l*0re 648 650 44 47 210 271 308 42 45 236 314 349

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

XLDC NETHERLANDS--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Date Subject Doc. No. Page 1939 Nov. 2 Nov. 10 Nov. 22 Nov. 23 Dec. 12 1940 Jan. 11 Jan. 13 Jan. 13 Jan. 14 The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry 322 370 Rumors of German plans to invade the Netherlands have been spread by the British and French. Foreign diplomats have been told by the Netherlands Foreign Ministry that it considers these rumors groundless. Memorandum, by the Deputy Director of the Political 344 395 Department The Netherlands Minister presented a note protesting German seizure of two Englishmen and two Dutch citizens on Netherlands territory near Venlo on November 9. Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's 383 438 Personal Staff The F&hrer directed that in future all flights by German aircraft over neutral territory should be denied, unless they could be absolutely proven. Memorandum of a Conference of the Ftihrer With the 384 439 Principal Military Commanders, November #3, 19S9 The Führer in a speech outlines his thinking on military matters. Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy 447 523 Department ProBHure will be put on the Dutch in the course of economic negotiations by a threat to cut off shipments of commodities of importance so long as rubber and tin cannot be secured from the Netherland Indies. Armw deliveries are to be made only against ra\v materials. Memorandum by an Official of the Cultural Policy 523 647 Department Caution in liquidation of credits extended by the HollandRche Buitenlarid-Bank in Poland prior to the war is recommended, but retention of the Bank for further une as a camouflaged German corporate agent in other areaw is advised. Minute by the Director of the Economic Policy Depart- 535 662 meni Information had been received about the visit of former Netherlands Prime Minister Colijn to Rome for the purpoBo of exploring posnibilities of peace. Minute by the Director of the Economic Policy Depart- 536 663 ment The Netherlands Foreign Minister had expressed the hope that planes and antiaircraft guns under contract could be delivered even though new contracts were out of the question. The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry 539 667 An intelligence report states army leaves canceled. However, no alarm given, and up to 6 p. in. no troop movements from North Holland. 260090 54 4
Date 1940 Jan. 19 Feb. 12 Feb. 24 Feb. 25 1939 Sept. 25 Sept. 28 Sept. 30 Oct. 3 Deo. 11

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

NETHERLANDS--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Subject NORWAY Note of the Auzsenpolitisches Ami Quisling plans to visit Gormany soon; arrangements have not yet been made with Gdring. Memorandum by the Director of the Economic roticy Department Summary of an mterministerial conference on wartime trade relations with Norway, Suc*ienmark. The Charge" d*Affaire* in Norway to the Foreign Ministry German successes have impressed Norwegian jnihlie opinion; from fear of German and Hovfot countermeasures, Norway is unlikely to tolerate British violations of her neutrality. Retract from War Diary of the Naval The Naval Staff is to studv the advia ing bases in Norway and Denmark. tty of acquir- The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry Br&uer reports that Quisling is en route to Berlin to talk to German officials there; his visit has been prepared not by the German Legation in Oslo but by an unofficial agent (Noack) who should be reminded of the limitations of his authority. |>nr. No. Memorandum by the State Secretary The Netherlands Minister was asked at tout his Government's defensive measures, which Weixsftaker charged were directed one-sidedly against itfi>an // The Netherlands Legation presented a note, protesting nights of German planes over Hutch territory and a memorandum listing such violations from September 8, 1939, to February 3, 1940* (HI G85 772 The Legation in the Netherlands to the Foreign German economic negotiators nre warned of effect* of German submarine attacks on Dutch shuts on course of economic negotiations. German delay Iti promiseti deliveries of armament was also causing ttnnovnitcf* in the Netherlands. Settlement of both of the*e issues is urged. 633 635 808 811 105 171 188 441 133 170 178 204 515

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

NORWAY--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
LI Date Subject Doc. No. Page 1939 Dec. 12 Dec. 14 Dec. 15 Dec. 15 Dec. 17 Dec. 22 Dec. 23 1940 Jan. 3 Jan. 5 Report of the Commander in Chief of the Navy to the Fuhrer, December 18, 19S&, at Noon Raeder told Hitler of his conversation the previous day with Quisling and Hagelin; Hitler will consider Quisling's ideas and perhaps speak to him personally; Sweden and the Russo-Finnish conflict were also discussed. Minister Altenburg to Minister Brduer Noack has been instructed to abstain from "high policy" in Norway; Grundherr has persuaded Quisling to give up his plan to speak to Ribbentrop or Hitler. The State Secretary to the Legation in Norway Instructions to make discreet inquiries about Quisling's attitude toward Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry In the Russo-Fmnish conflict Norway indirectly supports Finland but strives to remain neutral; volunteers are allowed to join Finnish forces; Norway is concerned about Soviet intentions in the North and German in the South; Communist activity is reported in northern Norway. The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry Describes Quisling's career and ideas; he now attacks Bolshevism, favors collaboration of the Germanic peoples, and is disconcerted by German-Soviet cooperation. Stabsleitcr Schickedanz to Reichsminister Lammers Rosenberg told Hewel that German action in Norway could be explained as a safeguard for the Soviet Union in the Russp-Fmnish conflict, and promised to keep Ribbentrop informed. The State Secretary to the Legation in Norway Rosenberg has sent Scheldt of the Aussenpolitisches Amt to Oslo to consult with Quisling and his associates; Briiuer is instructed to maintain discreet contact with Scheidt and to come soon to Berlin for instructions. Memorandum by the Minister to Norway The Norwegian Government's strong will to neutrality might be undermined by aid to Finland but hardly by liritish proposals for bases on the Norwegian coast; at present strict neutrality is regarded as Norway's only effective armament. Memorandum by an Official of the Aussenpolitisches Amt Scheidt describes his trip to Norway, December 24-January 2; Swedish and Norwegian public opinion is visibly anxious about events in Finland; pro-British sentiment is strong in Norway and is not being properly countered by Germany; Quisling was alarmed that Brauer knew of his relations with Germany; a report that the Norwegian Government disavowed certain commitments by Hambro may be a calculated indiscretion. 443 519 452 453 459 532 533 539 466 480 483 503 511 546 562 569 603 620
LH

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

NORWAY--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Bate 1940 Jan. 11 Jan. 13 Jan. 23 Jan. 24 Jan. 24 Jan. 25 Jan. 25 Feb. 17 Feb. 17 Feb. 21 Subject Memorandum by an Official of the Ami Scheldt records various statements by Gnnxiherr minimizing the likelihood of British intervention in Norway and questioning the wisdom of German policy in the Russo-Finnish conflict. Extract From War Diary of the Naoal Staff "Study North" is being developed: Raoder thinks British occupation of Norway is imminent, but hia Operations Staff does not entirely agree; preliminary planning is necessary in any oaae. Minister Br&uer to Senior Counselor Grundherr Warns that Scheldt might be compromised by hie association with the former Nasi leader in Oslo, The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry Describes a conversation with Foreign Minuter Koht regarding Churchill's proposal that tho Kimipoiui neutrals join Britain and Franco in war againat Oor* many; Koht dismissed the proposal as provocative ami ?U?V^d 8tated ks Preference for the idea* exprewted by Halifax. The Minister in Norway to the Recommends Foreign Ministry replying to recent Norwegian notes in such a way as to strengthen Norway's neutral t*witftm: Koht stated that Norway was convinced Germany intended to respect her neutrality. y fiy PolUical DM* * ** *** Legation in Notification that the motor tanker Altmark probalit ******* i expected to entrr N *** The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Minittry in N^n^ een n + 1Aterfe nc wift German "hipping Norwegian waters and none is likely: should watch and support Norway's will the w.+K il!? r haR helwtl in Nor- wegian waters by a British destroyer; instruct* l**L thnakt .NNoorrwa^y'Tsvne^utVral^iotyrThagsiab?eeGnovveirolnamteedntanadt itnh^act* there is danger of further violations. * Memorandum by tte Naval Attachi in Norway Chronology of the Altmark incident, February 15- 17. Memorandum by an Official of the Aus*tnpoliti**ht* 6S 537 501 505 650 663 500 568 571 695 697 699 702 776 OIK 620 779 791

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

NORWAY--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Date Subject Doc. No. Page 1940 Mar. 1 Mar. 2 Mar. 17 Directive by the F&hrer and Supreme Commander of the Wrhrmacht Directive for Weser&bung (occupation of Denmark and Norway). Memorandum by the Minister to Norway Argues that Britain will probably abstain from intervention in Norway and that Norway will strive to defend her neutrality; concedes that 'external events might chance this likelihood; proposes continued pressure on Norway but no preventive measures for the present. The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry Notes Northern skepticism as to proposed British and French support for Finland- finds less concern as to possible Allied landings in Norway now that the Ru.sHO-Finnish conflict is settled; questions whether the Allies will violate Norwegian neutrality so long as Germany respects that of the various neutrals. 644 650 831 S46 682 932 PEACE MOVES l 1939 Sept. 2f> Sept, 26 Oct. 2 Oct. 3 Oct. 5 Unsigned Note KoHenberg reports the receipt of a communication from Baron de Ropp, with whom he had had conversations during August, asking whether a meeting could be arranged in Switzerland for the end of September. He requests instructions from the Fiihrer. Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat Dahlerua asked Hitler and GSring about prospects for negotiating with Britain; Hitler was skeptical of a Brit Jan will to peace, but did not reject Dahlerus' plan for an unofficial meeting in Holland; the question of Poland must be excluded from any talks but otherwise Hitler expressed willingness to join in guaranteeing the status quo in the rest of Europe. Memorandum by the State Secretary Pavignon spoke of Belgium's determination to defend her neutrality and possible diplomatic steps toward peace. Memorandum by the State Secretary The Spanish Ambassador stated his Government's readiness to offer its good oflices as mediator, provided promising proposals are made and a Rump Poland is provided for. Unsigned Note A member of the Aussenpolitisches Amt invited Baron de Hopn to come to Berlin for discussions. De Kopp replied that the Air Ministry did not consider it suitable for him to make such a journey. 134 138 179 186 203 134 140 195 203 224 1 Other documents dealing incidentally with peace moves will be found under geographical headings in this table.

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

PEACE Movus--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Date 1939 Oct. 10 [Oct. 11] Oct. 12 Oct. 14 Oct. 15 Oct. 19 Oct. 20 [Undated] Nov. 7 Subject Unsigned Note Memorandum of a conversation between Baron dp Ropp and a representative of Rosenberg in which tho war aims of Britain and Germany won* diftrtiwM! in general terms. De Ropp declared that tho British Air Ministry was not in sympathy with present British policy* Arrangements were made for further contact*. Memorandum of the Foreign Ministry Lists official and unofficial offers of mediation from Spanish, Italian, Dutch, Norwegian, Planish, Swedfch, and American sources. Circular of the Acting Director of the Press Department Chamberlain has outrageously rejected Hitler's constructive peace offer; the German people will now know what their enemies are after. The Ckargt d*Affaires in Norway to the F&rti&n Ministry The Scandinavian Kings are reported willing to wrva as mediators and would welcome an initiative from on

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

PEACE MOVES--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Date Subject Doc. No. 1939 Nov. 8 Nov. 9 Nov. 11 Nov. 14 Nov. 18 Deo. 19 1940 Jan. 11 Jan. 17 Mar, 1 Memorandum by the Slate Secretary Weizsacker toid Attolico that Halifax's speech of November 7 was obviously designed to head off the Belgian and Dutch offer of good offices or any similar move; that in Hitler's absence there was as yet no German reaction to the offer; and that the Low Countries must energetically maintain their neutrality. The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry Forwards a message from Dahlerus for G&ring requesting no definite action be taken on the Dutchftelgian mediation offer until Dahlerus has been able to ascertain British opinion. The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden The German Government is not interested in Dahlerus' sounding out British opinion, as Britain has already unequivocally rejected the German position. Memorawlum by the Foreign Minister pavignon handed over another note from Queen Wilheimina and King Leopold, independent of the previous peace effort, whose results Kibbentrop termed "catastrophic"; Kibbentrop warned that a pro-Allied attitude might be dangerous for Belgium. Circular of the Foreign Minister Instructions for possible conversations about peace moves; Allied intransigence has destroyed any chance of mediation; Germany has accepted the challenge and will fight to final victory. The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry On December 17 a Danish merchant, Pless-Schmidt. discussed a peace proposal with Halifax, who showed "lively interest'*; the plan entailed partial restoration of Poland and Czechia, return of German colonies, a European alliance excluding the Soviet Union, and a guarantee of Finland and the Baltic States; Ploss- Schmidt will be in Berlin shortly. Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat Attolico presented a memorandum on opinion in France; he attributed to Mussolini the view that some sort of restoration of Poland would deprive the Allies of their motive for war and thus logically lead to peace. Memorandum by the tftate Secretary Bishop Hcrggrav of Norway has discussed problems of peaces with various Protestant clergymen and with Halifax j the Bishop thinks a new initiative by Hitler, going beyond his October 6 speech to offer some hope for a federated Kuropc, might have fruitful results. Consul General Krauel to State Secretary Weizsdcker Reports from Geneva on various political matters: Burcfchardt's coming visit to Berlin; Allied disappointment that Germany has not taken the offensive in the West; Allied strategic views, etc. 336 387 337 346 356 373 472 388 397 407 424 557 524 550 645 648 679 833
LVI Date 1939 Sept. 8 1939 Deo. 15 1940 Jan. 31 1939 Sept. 11 Sept. 12 Sept. 14 Sept. 16 Sept. 19

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

PROPAGANDA
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Subject Command of the F&hrfr The Propaganda Ministry m tho central arnr.v for propaganda; other agencies shall work in genuine collaboration with it; disputes regarding foreign poliry propaganda shall be composed by tho Foreign MiniMter and the Minister of Propaganda, and preetitel to tho Ftthrer only by both Ministers. PBOTBCTOBATB The Representative of the Foreign Ministry in tht Protectorate to the Foreign Ministry Apolitical report points out that German policy ** the Protectorate as laid down by the Ktkliror will avoid provoking the Czechs but will crush Cxcch defiance ruthlessly; the Czech attitude is characterized a* "wait and see and take no risks/' The Representative of the Foreign Mwintry in the Protectorate to the Foreign Ministry A report on a conversation with Netarath on tlu* problems arising from the recent flight of two Cw^ch mmnbera of the Protectorate Government. RUMANIA The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Mminfry Foreign Minister Gafencu told Minfaitor Pabrieitm that in spite of rumors to the contrary, i'ltlfoh rtoltlier* and cabinet members who had froHwd into Uumanin were being interned and prevented from political activities. The Foreign Minister to the Legation in #umania Gafencu's statements on tho proponr tr*Atiurnt of Polish refugees in Rumania in not oomplHHy factory; Germany demands especially that tlu Kumanian border be closed, that refugee** lc in and that no armament ohipmentH pann thrcnigh Rumania. The Minister in Rumania to the Forrign fjruV/ry On behalf of the Rumanian cabinet, CSafcnru admired Pabricius confidentially that in dealing with the varittim groups of Polish refugees Rumania would maintain strict neutrality. TheMinister in Rumania to the Farfign Ministry Prime Minister Tatarescu offered Oennanv large scale deliveries of Rumanian products in return for large quantities of war material from the Polish booty. An Official of the Foreign Mini*ter*9 Secretariat to the Legation in Rumania The Foreign Minister requests Fabriciua to inform Se 4.5 mamaitl G vernnient of Germany's satisfaction that the gold 30 48 538 723 74 100 47 73 102

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

LVII RUMANIA--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Date Subject Doc. No. Page 1939 Sept. 20 Sept, 22 Sept. 29 Oct. 24 Nov, 12 Nov. 21 Nov. 28 Nov. 30 Dec. 6 The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Rumania Germany is prepared to supply Rumania with war material from the Polish booty in return for petroleum and feed grain; the Rumanians may draw up a list of the items desired. The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry In connection with the murder of Minister President Calinescu the Rumanian Government asked that members of the Iron Guard be prevented from leaving Germany and that the German press disassociate itself from the Iron Guard. The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry German -Rumanian economic negotiations were concluded which provided for an increase of about 100 million RM over the level of 1938 in the trade between the two countries. Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department Woermann told the Rumanian Minister of Germany's displeasure at peeing a reference to the Anglo-French guarantees to Rumania included in Turkey's recent pact with Britain and France. Memorandum, by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department The Foreign Minister ought to make it clear to General Keitel that war material from the Polish booty which is now being claimed by the Army rmist be delivered to Rumania to maintain that country's petroleum exports to Germany. Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department Although the Armv finally agreed to let Rumania have some war material from the Polish booty, it is not enough in Clodius7 opinion and the possibility of further concessions to the Rumanians will be discussed with the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry Gafencti said that Rumania had abandoned the idea of the neutrality bloc since Germany and Italy were opposed to it. The Director of the Kconomic Policy Department to the Legation in Rumania Concern is felt over the recent drop in Rumanian oil deliveries and the Rumanian Government should be asked to commit itself to deliver 100,000 tons of oil, the minimum reomred by the German economy; if necessary, certain German armament deliveries ought to be made contingent upon specific Rumanian oil deliveries. The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry The Rumanian Minister President promised to guarantee the delivery of specific amounts of oil in any event and offered to pay also in petroleum for any additional armament deliveries,- however, he remained strongly opposed to any increase in the exchange rate of the reichsrnark. Ill 120 166 296 350 111 120 172 337 401 380 435 392 402 457 467 422 493

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

RUMANIA--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Date 1939 Deo. 8 Deo. 14 Dec. 15 Deo. 25 Dec. 28 Dec. 30 1940 Jan. 3 Jan. 4 Subject of The Minister in Rumania io the Foreign Fabricius remained noncommittal whon iiru, stating that Rumania would fight for BesHarnbiA, inquired whether in such an event Ormany could nl least be counted upon to lend diplomatic sumwirt to Rumania and to supply her with arms; frahririus believes, however, that Germany Hhoulcl play an active part in arranging a territorial settlement lirtwecn Rumania and her neighbors instead of leaving to Italy the initiative in this matter. The Legation in Rumania to the foreign Mini*try In spite of Anglo-French prejwure and t!u frwi his advisers, King Carol has agreed to a 15 increase in the exchange rate of the reiehHiuark; though this meets German demands only in part, it wmiUi lie politically unwise to insist upon a larger increase. The State Secretary to the Legation in ftumania Fabricius should avoid a direct reply to Gftfwirii'ii questions about Germany's attitude in the event of a Russo-Rumanian conflict; instead ho nhould exj>re*w Germany's hope that suitable Rumanian coneeHrtioitB would lead to a peaceful settlement, without, however, giving the impression of having boon instructed to apply pressure or to attempt mediation. The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry Informed by Gafencu that the Rumanian (Tovernment for humanitarian reaaotm had agrwd to the departure for Switzerland of Polinh President Moneitki, Fabricius protested and called it an affront, The Foreign Minister to the Legation in ffnmania Bibbentrop approves Fabriciuft* attitude toward President Moscicki's departure and infttruct* him to threaten Gafencu with consequence* if nuc*h a cnao should occur again. The Foreign Minister to the Legations in Hungary, mania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia Minister Kiilinger has been aligned the tank tif watching and counteracting enemy organi/atiim* nmi enemy propaganda in the Balkan*; for ramonilnKe purposes he will work on economic and cultural matter*. Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Department A meeting under Gdring's chairmanship <*Hn< ,**- n length economic policies with regard to Umnama and considered, among other things appointment of a HIM*- cial commissioner to assure delivery and transportation of Rumanian raw materials. Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Field Marshal (ferine Ribbentrop objects to G6ring*8 criticinm of Foreign Ministry officials at the meeting on Rumania; he intends to send Clodxus to Bucharest as special ative for economic and transport question^ bructprheencwnitl-l be replaced by Neubacher eventually, 427 455 4H8 4D1 r>02 498 530 535 675 580 598 615

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

RUMANIA--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
LIX Subject Doc. No. Page 1940 Jan. 13 Feb. 8 Mar. 7 Mar. 16 The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania Neubacher is being Bent to Bucharest as "special representative for economic questions." Memorandum by the State Secretary Neubacher was authorized by Ribbentrop to state in Bucharest that the Foreign Minister did not anticipate a Russian attack on Rumania. The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry An interim agreement has been signed providing for German arms deliveries to Rumania in return for Rumanian oil. Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Field Marshal OSring The recent agreement with Rumania is economically very advantageous since it will provide Germany with large amounts of oil at low pre-war prices. 533 601 660 678 661 755 868 925 SBA WABPAKB 1939 Sept. 11 Sept. 15 Sept. 21 Sept. 27 Oct. 3 Circular ofthe Director of the Economic Policy Department Authorizes Missions to inform Governments of Oslo States that Germany is prepared to supply coal to replace that received heretofore from Britain and Poland. Circular of the Director of the Political Department Instructions to notify the Governments of the Oslo States thai Germany reserves full freedom of action to counter any acceptance by them of the rrstrictions on trading with Germany now reportedly demanded by Britain. Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department The Legation in Denmark has been instructed to deny that Germany has completely changed her position regarding neutral shipping; Germany still favors normal trade but cannot allow Britain to make exceptions in her own interest. Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department Records an agreement with the Navy to warn neutral governments that merchant ships which use their radio when ordered to step, or which zigzag or proceed without lights, expose themselves to danger; the Navy and Foreign Ministry will confer again before issuing orders to sink enemy merchant ships without warning; the Ftihrer will probably soon order unrestricted submarine warfare in a designated area; United States neutrality laws are being studied. Memorandum by the Director of the Politzcat Department Woermann has notified the Navy that because of peace efforts now in progress, the Foreign Ministry recommends a cautious policy of submarine warfare at present. 52 71 118 144 187 49 70 117 148 203 1 Other documents dealing incidentally witb sea warfare will be found under geographical headings in this table.
Date 1939 Oct. 14 Get, 17 Oct. 19 Oct. 24 Oct. 31 Nov. 13 Nov. 15 Nov. 17

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

SEA WARFARE--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Nov. 28 Subject Memorandum by the State Secretary Recommends that the OKW bo aakod certain technical questions regarding unreatricted Buhmarirto wnrfare; technical and political consideration* miwt bo balanced. Memorandum by the State Secretory Summarizes current practice in naval warfare and contemplated additional measures; decisions uill come only after further consultations. Circular of ike Stoic Secretary Instructions to inform neutral govornmont* that German forces will attack all ship* in Britlah and French convoys and that neutral merchant hi|M running without lights may be mistaken for enemy ahipn. Memorandum by the Slate Secretary Describes arrangements for daily consultation between Foreign Ministry and the Wehrmacht. Memorandum by the State Secretary A conference in G&ring's office agreed to request Hitler's permission for air attacks on enemy convoy**, including neutral vessels; Weixa&ckcr rccommeittfed that attacks be strong enough to dissuade neutral* oner and for all from accepting enemy convoy in the arcan involved. Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Mini*ter*t Personal Staff Intensification of submarine warfare is planned in the foreseeable future. Memorandum by an Official of Political Divition I Isolation of Groat Britain fa to bo Achieved not by proclamation but by gradual intensification of naval measures; Germany can use the danger aone fixccl by the United States. Memorandum by Ambassador Kilter The Navy intends to torpedo without warning, regardless of location, all enemy passenger vwvlti known to be armed as well ae all tankon* (except theme of tho mUnittheed dStaantgeesr, SzoovnieetfiUxneidonb,yIttahley,USnpiatiend, aSntdatJwa;patnh)e Foreign Ministry is inclined to approve thin dcwpite certain reservations for reasons of policy and International law. Memorandum by the State Secretary . DSS5Si the Jurisdiction of the Foreign Ministry and the OKW m the general conduct of the war. t>or. No. 270 21)5 317 IK* " * 286 307 319 33ft 362 352 3U 307 403 413 417 307 401

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

SLOVAKIA
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

TURKEY--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
rrscnr Date Subject Doc. No. Page 1940 Jan. 9 Feb. 5 Feb. 21 Mar. 1 Mar. 14 Mar. 17 Mar. 17 Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department German chromium needs are estimated to be 12,000 tons a month. There is a possibility of obtaining 40,000 tons of Turkish chromium via Hungary, if permission is granted to export 200,000 Hungarian time fuses to England. The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry According to information received, the French see no other way to win the war than by intensifying the blockade and by drawing the Balkans and Russia into the war, a view not shared by the British; these differences strengthen Turkey's bargaining position. The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry Papen reports on the difficulties arising in the economic negotiations with Turkey and requests instruction as to how badly Germany needs Turkish chromium. The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry The statement of the Turkish Minister President that his country could not be brought into the war by outside influences represents a success for Germany's policy, which, however, might even be enhanced by a Russian statement that would reassure the Turks. The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry Papon told Saracoglu he was prepared to ask Berlin to deliver heavy armament to Turkey if the Turkish Government would promise to defend Turkish neutrality against the Western Powers; by forcing Saracoglu to choose between loyalty to his allies ana the need to pacify Russia, Germany might be able to precipitate his fall. The State Secretary to the Embassy in Turkey Weizsacker expresses doubts whether the Turks would be willing to make political concessions to Germany of the kind suggested by Papen ; he also questions whether Germany has an interest in improved Russo- Turkish relations. Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department The Foreign Minister, on the basis of a directive by the Fuhrer, has approved delivery of three ahips to Turkey, provided Turkish chromium deliveries form a considerable portion of the payment. 517 635 595 625 638 674 742 790 S19 918 680 681 930 931 UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC* Continue*}
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Date Subject I toe. No. Pa* 1939 Sept. 5 Sept. 5 Sept. 6 Sept. 7 Sept. 9 Sept. 9 Sept. 9 Sept, 9 Sept. 10 Sept. 13 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Molotov deprecates premature military occupation of the Soviet sphere. Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Polity Department Schnurre recommends that Gating he reminded that the Foreign Ministry is In charge of economic negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry The sudden shift of Soviet policy toward Germany to reflected in the completely changed tone of organ* of public opinion; the population ia still bewildered bv Urn shift and fearful of war, but the Soviet Government ha* always previously been able to direct popular attitudm. The Deputy Director of the Kronomic Policy Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Instructions to notify the Soviet Government that Germany intends to have shipa dfecharge carKocm at Murmansk for rail shipment to Leningrad, whore other German ships will receive them. The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the fioriet Union Instructions to notify the Soviet Government of Germanproposal to send Schnurre to conduct economic negotiations with Mlkoyan in Moscow, The Foreiffn Minister to the Kmbatty in the Soviet Union Instructions to suggest again to Molotov the neod for information on Soviet military intentions in Poland. rsn ******* congratulations on German troops into Warsaw. tho entry of n *** Describes Soviet military preparations. * *** Sovit Unio* * ** Government was not prec^* ~~~L~~ "j~ "i"-**1 ,,^^* ******* victory; the Red Armv la ^*^*^Sii^^J53^ sasi^&aasMssR1- JSPWs Poland. ween Germany and 10 13 ia 15 34 35 37 39 46 14 20 33 34 35 36 44

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L2QQ UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Date Subject Doc. No. Page 1939 Sept. 14 Sept. 15 Sept. 16 Sept. 17 Sept, 17 Sept. 18 Sept. 18 Sept. 19 Sept. 19 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Molotov wishes to know when Warsaw will fall so that he may say Poland has collapsed and Russian minorities require protection. The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Warsaw is expected to fall in the next few days; suggests the text for a joint German-Soviet communique; states that the justification for Soviet military action suggested by Molotov would expose the two states as enemies before the whole world. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Molotov says Soviet military action is imminent; he sees no reason for a joint communiqu6; he requests that Germany accept the proposed justification of Soviet action in view of the difiicult position of the Soviet Government. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Stalin says the Red Army will cross the frontier today ; he alters the text of the note to be handed to the Polish Ambassador so that it is satisfactory to Germany. An Official of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Ribbentrop has reserved decision on the timing of Schnurre's trip to Moscow because of the political situation; a larger program of raw material deliveries from the Soviet Union is being considered. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Stalin doubts if German High Command will withdraw to the agreed line; Scnulenburg requests authority to dispel his doubts. Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in the Soviet Union Describes revision by Stalin of communique" proposed by Germany; Stalin considered the German version too frank; the German draft and Stalin's draft are appended. The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Instructions to tell Stalin that German agreements with the USSR will be kept; they are the foundation of friendly relations between Germany and the USSR. Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department Gdring has asked that an attempt be made to secure some sort of German control of the railway from Breslau to Rumania. 63 70 78 60 68 76 80 82 90 94 101 102 79 81 92 95 103 103

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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REFITBUGS Continual
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Pate 1939 Sept. 20 Sept. 20 Sept. 20 Sept. 20 Sept. 21 Sept. 22 Sept. 23 Sept. 23 Sept. 25 Sept. 26 [Sept. 28] Subject The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry An urgent request for clarification of the demarcation line between German and Soviet spheres; Molatov says that Stalin is astonished at an obvious violation of the Moscow agreement. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Molotov proposes negotiations in Moscow for a definitive Polish settlement. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Ministry A short delay in Schnurre's arrival would probably not offend the Soviet Government; Soviet ability to export raw materials is limited. The Ambassador in the Sonet Union to the Foreign Ministry The Soviet Government insists that tho upper Watt form part of the demarcation line in Poland; Molotov proposes a communique to this effect. The Foreign Minister to the Bmbaesy in the Soviet Ribbentrop accepts Molotov's proposed comimmiciii* on the demarcation line fn Poland: there arc uttlt certain details to he worked out, however. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Text of the communlqu* to Jjo Imed by tti Hoviot government on the demarcation line in Poland. raA{?** Minister to the Kmbfiaty in the ftwiVf Union WiUmgness to come to Moscow to effect a definitive' Polish settlement. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to ike Foreign Ministry * The Soviet Government welcomes Itibtotitrup'ii projected visit. r in *** S*"*** U** * *** Foreign **^ P P** that Germany waive claim to Lithu- ia in return for a larger part of PoliRh territory; lSSJ! 8^;?8 ^*!!? 11* to Imnwdl te solution t>f ifij problem of the Baltic countries. Minute by the State Secretary PniS, IZ^Ck ? r "f^?68 ^ he "StwftWon *t the Polish war for the forthcoming Moscow neoeontidatoifoitiha-e tetaZSHSffi ^TlSing ^^ GovennSimt ^ intervene in the Balkans so long as Britain doea nnt- he considers the question of a Rump Poland. ' d be nisfocroenivgenrsMaitniiosntrwyith Stalin Poland and Lithuania; he ud Bwnt 03a two P*>Poed territorial ;!**. NO. 103 104 108 200 115 222 124 125 131 137 152 104 105 108 109 113 122 123 124 130 137

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LXJO11 UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Bate Subject Doc. No. Pago 1939 Sept. 28 Sept. 28 Sept. 28 Sept. 28 Sept. 28 Sept. 28 Sept. 28 Sept. 30 Oct. 2 Oct. 4 Oct. 5 Oct, 5 German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty The text of the public treaty defining boundaries in the territory of Poland; interference by third powers will be rejected. Confidential Protocol Providing for exchange of nationals residing within the territories under the jurisdiction of the German and USSR Governments. Secret Additional Protocol Lithuania, except for territory in the southwest, is within the Russian sphere of influence; the province of Lublin and parts of the province of Warsaw are in the German sphere; economic agreements between Lithuania and Germany will not be affected by Soviet action. Secret Additional Protocol Both Germany and the USSR will suppress any Polish agitation. Declaration of September 8, 1939, by the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR Affirming that peace should be restored in Europe now that the Polish problem is definitively settled, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Chairman Molotov of the Council of People's Commissars An agreement to begin negotiations for a new economic treaty. foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Chairman Molotov of the Council of People's Commissars Confirming a Soviet promise to facilitate German transit traffic through the USSR with Rumania, Iran, Afghanistan, and the Far East; confirming also a Soviet agreement on the delivery of oil. Circular of the State Secretary Instructions to describe the German-Soviet agreements of September 28 as having eliminated forever any differences with regard to Poland. The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Instructions to inform Molotov that the Moscow agreements of September 28 have been discussed with Ciano. Supplementary Protocol Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics The new boundary in Poland. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Molotov says that he has already told the Lithuanians of the territory which must go to Germany, that the Lithuanians had been dismayed by the news, and that Stalin requests Germany not to insist on cession at this time. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Molotov proposes that Teriberka instead of Murmansk be used for establishment of repair facilities for German ships and submarines. 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 169 x 177 193 194 164 165 166 166 167 167 168 175 194 208 212 195 213

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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST RUPBTBLICS--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Date 1939 Oct. 5 Oct. 6 Oct. 8 Oct. 11 Oct. 12 Oct. 14 Oct. 15 Oct. 16 Oct. 17 Oct. 18 Oct. 18 Subject The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in th# Soviet Union The German Minister to Lithuania is to state that in the negotiations at Moscow Germany recommended the cession of Vilna to Lithuania, and reserved the right to a small strip of Lithuanian territory ; he in to ay that the Reich Government does not wish to ra! the latter question at this time; Schulenburg ia to inform Moloto v of the foregoing. Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department Schedule for negotiations at Moscow. The Chairman of the Council of Peopled CommitMr* of the Soviet union to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union If Soviet troops are stationed in Lithuania, t!iy will not occupy the strip reserved for Germany ; Germany will determine when the agreement concerning thin territory is to be implemented, The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign MinMry A progress report on the economic negotiations. The Commander in Chief of the Navy to the foreign Aft'n* ister Haeder urges that maximum cooperation with the Soviet Government be achieved to facilitate Gorman naval operations. The State Secretary to the Embassy in the ftovitt Union Instructions to discuss with Molotov proposed Soviet logistical support and bases for German naval operations. The Foreign Minister to the J?mfomp in the Soviet Uninn Instructions to invite Molotov to visit Berlin to ratify the Boundary and Friendship Treaty, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry The Soviet Government desirea ratification of the Boundary and Friendship Treaty on October 10, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Molotov regrets that urgent political buHinottt prevents his visiting Berlin at present. The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet f fa fan In a speech soon to be delivered on foreign affair?*, Ribbentrop wishes to refute the British claim that in Moscow he had asked for, and had been refuHed, Soviet military assistance; the text of this portion of the ftpeech is given; it includes a direct quotation of Stalin on the Soviet need for a strong Germany, and on the parallel interests of Germany and the USSR in case of war between Germany and the Western democracies, The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Hitter reports that the economic negotiations are proceeding slowly but not too unfavorably. Doc. No. 196 213 208 218 233 244 237 248 257 258 261 267 271 263 277 287 289 291 306 809 272 310

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OP SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS--Continued
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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST RKPOBLica-Continund
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Pate 1939 Nov. 23 Nov. 24 Nov. 27 Nov. 30 Dec. 1 Dec. 2 [Dec. 2] Dec. 5 Pec. 5 Deo. 6 Deo. 8 Deo. 9 Subject The Embassy in the Sonet Vnwn to the tornp* Reports estimates current among Military Attache* in Moscow as to Soviet troop dutpoHttioiitf and munitions regarding Finland and Rumania. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union lo the Foreign Ministry Germany has protested the change in railroad gaugr between L.w6w and Pramy61; transit traffic with Rumania should begin Decexn!xr 1. The Foreign Minister to the Kmbn**y in thr ftrirt f "i Instructions to invite Molotov to protvai rrrtaiu proposed British blockade measure*. The Foreign Minister to the Kmba**y til tkr NcwrVf f 'niori Cancels earlier instructions for Naval Attarhri to inquire privately about possible transfer of mihmartm** from Soviet to German navy. Circular Letter of the Foreign Ministry Schnurre distributes material on Soviot delivery orders in preparation for an intermintatt'rtnl mooting of December 2, Memorandum by the Chairman of the Economic />tlf~ gation to the Soviet Union Action taken bv interminiteril mooting rrgardirig the Soviet order hst of November 30* Unsigned Memorandum Questions in the German-Soviet economic negotiations requiring decision by Hitler. Memorandum by the State Secretary Keitel complains of friction along thc Soviet frontier, particularly in connection with the expuimon of Jew* into Soviet territory. Memorandum by the State Secretary Keitel again complains that Soviot dcniancitt for the delivery of German products are increasingly voluminous and unreasonable; the Foreign Ministry intend* to curb the Soviet demands. The State Secretary to the Bmba**y in the Soviet l?nion Quotes text of circular telegram instructing principal German Missions to express sympathy for Roviot attitude in Finnish-Soviet conflict and to strews British responsibility. Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter To provide 70,000 tons of iron per month to the Soviet Union as planned would necessitate major cuts elsewhere; Ritter states the choices; a Caring letter is appended. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign, Aftn- K*, X0. 3.H& 3K6 3)15 403 407 412 413 419 420 423 430 432 446 447 459 46g 472 481 488 489 490 494 602 606

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LXXVU UNION OP SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Bate Subject Doc. No. Page 1939 Dec. 10 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Forwards for Molotov's attention a DNB denial of reports that arms have recently been shipped by or through Germany to Finland. Dec. 11 Memorandum by the Foreign Minister In conversation with the Soviet Ambassador Ribbentrop protests the Tass report of German delivery of munitions to Finland; he also intimates that Soviet demands for military supplies are excessive. Dec. 11 The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry Details of Italian planes destined for Finland via Germany and Sweden. Dec. 11 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Molotov accepts German denials regarding alleged shipments of arms to Finland. Dec. 11 Ambassador Hitter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union The demands of the Soviet economic delegation in Berlin far exceed the terms previously agreed upon; Ritter is prepared to make some concessions but proposes to transfer the negotiations back to Moscow. Dec. 12 The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Italy Instructions to withdraw consent to shipment of Italian war material through Germany to Finland. Dec. 15 Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter Raeder is willing to sell the plans of Bismarck to the Soviet Union, provided the price is high enough. [Dec. 19] The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Ilitter has rejected Mikoyan's demand for German military deliveries as contrary to the Ribbentrop- Molotov exchange of September 28: he will seek to reopen negotiations on the basis of that exchange. Dec, 20 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Expresses approval of Ritter's rejection of Mikoyan's demand of December 19 and authorizes him to take up the matter with Molotov. Dec. 20 Unsigned Memorandum The Governor General of the General Government of Poland was informed of a Soviet complaint that Jews were being deported from the Government General to the Soviet Union by official organs of the Reich. He ordered such practices stopped to avoid disturbing necessary friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Dec. 23 Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in the Soviet Union Hilger's summary of a Schulenburg-Molotov conversation regarding unsatisfactory progress of the economic negotiations; conflicting interpretations of "industrial deliveries" were presented; Molotov admitted that Germany's involvement in war restricted her ability to deliver arms but charged that she was setting exorbitant prices; a meeting of Ritter and Schnurre with Molotov and Mikoyan was arranged. 435 438 439 440 442 444 457 474 476 477 508 512 514 514 516 521 537 558 560 560 484 570
IrXXVUI

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS Contin HIM!
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Date 1939 [Deo. 24 1940 Jan. 2 IJan. 2] Jan. 8 Jan, 10 Jan. 10 -Jan. 16 Jan. 25 Jan. 26 Subject The Embassy in the Soviet, Union to the Foreign In stating that the Soviet Union will not adopt German plane types at present, Molotov rt*frr* to "exorbitant" prices; negotiations on other point* will be resumed. The Director of the Legal Department to the Bmbatty in the Soviet Union Disputes Molotov's interpretation of "industrial deliveries1' in the Moscow negotiations. Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter Describes a conference in the Kremlin Dccemtwr 31. 1939, between the German and Soviet economic negotiators; Stalin insiflted on the reduced Soviet demands but for the first time used the exnreiwion "mutual assistance"; metal production, naval armament, machine tools, and airplanes were the principal inauca discussed. The Chief of th* High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Minister Keitel sends Ribbentrop a Wehrmacht memorandum on Germany's strategic and political objective* in the Balkans and the Near East, suggesting that Germany eNn^co*uraage g1^V*P*a8lon in lh* *lk*n and the ? Middl E*** to prevent a clash of Humian and Italian aspirations in the Balkans. The Foreign Ministry to the Embae&y in the Soviet Union Unknown to the Foreign Ministry, several carloads of war material for Finland were allowed to enter Oermany; three of these were inadvertently permittee) to continue. Memorandum by an Official of the m6atty in the Soviet Union r?^+^S^ Schlenburg' conversation of January 7 .with Molotov regarding definition of "a more ertended pertodof tlme^for German dever! to thJ t Memorandum Ambassador Ritter favwmble From th* BmtHuty in th, Sovitt meSnothuItnetnhbeuJrBgatlokladnsMoalnodtoNvetahTaltamsutch omfetdhetoexacrito- Memorandum by the Director of *A Political D*vartm*nt bA^^v n^^^t^^lS? Doe. Mo. 487 408 499 Pat* 574 587 588 514 519 520 540 541 543 575 572 709 579

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DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Date Subject Doc. No. Page 1940 Jan. 28 Jan. 30 Feb. 3 Feb. 8 Feb. 9 Feb. 11 Feb. 11 Feb. 26 Mar. 7 Mar. 14 The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Urges pressure on German firms to accept Soviet orders; the Russians are becoming suspicious of German willingness and ability to make deliveries. Memorandum by the Chairman of the German Economic Delegation in the Soviet Umon Describes a conference in the Kremlin in which Bitter presented the German replies to Stalin's questions of December 31: Stalin discussed the conflicting views on deliveries and proposed dividing the projected agreement into separate treaties for 1940 and 1941. The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Instructs Ritter to deliver to Stalin a personal communication by R-ibbentrop urging the German view on the deliveries question; Stalin is to be reminded of the political basis of the agreements. Memorandum by the Chairman of the German Economic Delegation in the Soviet Union Describes a conference in the Kremlin at which Stalin replied to Ribbentrop's personal message of February 3; Stalin proposed a single treaty calling for Soviet deliveries during 18 months and German deliveries during 27 months after signature; Ritter said that an agreement on this basis might be possible. The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Ritter reports that negotiations for an economic agreement are proceeding favorably and may be completed within a few days. Economic Agreement of February 11, 194 , Between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ^ ^ The Trade Representative of the Soviet Union in Germany to the Chairman of the German Economic Delegation Confirming that certain funds provided under the Credit Agreement of August 19, 1939, may also be used in connection with the Economic Agreement of February 11, 1940. ftt*, Memorandum by the Chairman of the German Economic Delegation to the Soviet Union Schnurre summarizes the promised deliveries of Soviet raw materials and emphasizes the sacrifices these deliveries will entail for the USSR; he tells of difficulties which were surmounted in the negotiation of the agreement, and of those which may arise in its execution; he concludes that the Soviet deliveries, and the transit facilities through the USSR, will decisively weaken the effects of the British blockade. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Reports protesting "intolerable* 1 frontier conditions to Molotov, who agreed to take appropriate action. The International Committee of the Red Cross to the High Command of the Wehrmacht Inquires about reports that Polish prisoners of war at Kozielsk, Russia, will be brought to Germany. 582 584 715 718 594 600 739 752 602 607 608 636 755 762 769 814 658 676 867 922

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIAMBT
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
Date 1940 Mar. 15 1941 Jan. 28 Memorandum by Ambassador Rittrr Babarin complained t hat Gorman firm* arc not replying to inquiries by hia trade mtofcm, Under State Secretary Htnckr to Httmitth t.ntfjr Transmits an article based on hi* t*\perionrw while a member of Ribbentrop's party visiting Miwww September 27-29, 1939. UNITED STATES 1939 Sept. 4 Sept. 7 Sept. 8 Sept. 12 Sept. 12 Sept. 17 Sept. 18 Memorandum by the State Secretary Weizsftcker summoned American Charge 1 d'Alfnir*'* Kirk to deny that the passenger ahip Athrnia wn* mink by German "naval forces. Memorandum by Ambatpadnr President Roosevelt is preparing American opinion for repeal of the arms embargo; the American |Hopl\ under a barrage of propaganda, are already overwhelmingly anti-German. The Charge d*Affaire* in the United Xintrs to the Forrign Ministry Despite the neutrality it stresses the American (Siivernment is preparing to seise German fund* in * tf war, is placing German firms and orgfttitxatitnifi tituh^r surveillance, and has refused asylum to

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UNITED STATES--Continued
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UNITED STATES--Continued
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UNITED STATES--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
LXXXV Date Subject Doc. No. Page 1940 Mar. 1 Mar. 1 Mar. 2 Mar. 4 Mar. 4 Mar. 5 Mar. 7 Mar. 12 Mar. 13 Memorandum by the State Secretary In a private talk with Weizsacker Welles warned that if Germany pressed for a military victory general ruin would result and the United States could not stand aside; he indicated that his further talks with Mussolini might produce some proposals. Memorandum by the State Secretary In a further record of his conversation with Welles, Weizuftcker notes that Welles has promised to transmit a memorandum on economic relations, a subject which he would also like to discuss with Schacht. Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat Hitler insisted to Welles that Germany's aim was peace whereas Britain and France were bent on Germany's destruction; after rejection of his peace offers, he now believed the war would have to be fought to a finish in defense of German interests. Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat Conversation between Welles and Gdring on March 3. Gdring in a broad retrospective survey stressed England's responsibility for the continuation of the war. Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff Welles said that he expected success for his mission if Europe remained quiet 4 or 5 weeks more; he indicated he hoped to see Ambassador Dieckhoff back in Washington soon. Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff The American bxisinessman, Mooney, who in a conversation with Hitler spoke of Roosevelt's friendly sentiments toward Germany and his willingness to serve as moderator between Germany and her enemies, seems to be sincere but misled. The Charge d*Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Roosevelt, apparently on prestige grounds, has publicly dismissed any thought of returning the American Ambassador to Berlin; the American attitude toward Germany shows no improvement in any way. Memorandum by a Member of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff A conversation of the Fiihrer with Colin Ross in which Ross described his travels in the United States and discussed American attitudes toward Germany. Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department Welles* memorandum on world trade policy Is only a restatement of Hull's often-repeated general principles for freeing world trade; the war will increase the trend to autarky, however, and worsen the American trade position. 642 643 649 829 S30 838 653 655 656 659 671 673 850 864 865 867 910 915

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UNITED STATES--Continued
DateSubjectDoc.No.Page
1940
1940 Mar. 18 1939 Sept. 11 Sept. 19 Sept. 21 Sept. 28 Oct. 22 Oct. 28 1940 Jan. 2 Jan. 23 Subject The Charg6 d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Despite the cool attitude displayed by American officials the visit of the Duke of Cofourg to Washington has been a considerable success. YUGOSLAVIA Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Department
The signing of the contracts for armament eielivcrie* to Yugoslavia has been put off on specific iiwtrttotionii from Goring; a change in this policy as su^gf**td by Minister Heeren would seem to roc^uiro a ctirctct intervention by the Foreign Minister with Goring. The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Yugoslavia
The Minister is requested to et the taxi of a nc!it British note to Yugoslavia anti in any caw to Hint** explicitly that any commitment by a neutral country to restrict its trade with Germany would iw* as aid to Germany's enemies. Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Department
Goring has given approval to a plan according to which Germany will deliver to Yugoslavia plant**, antiaircraft and antitank guns in return for Yugoslavia's entire output of copper as well a largo nhipmrntH of lead and zinc. The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
In a conversation, Prince Paul exprowcd his rmicwni over Russia's expansion toward the* \\Vnt and tin* increased influence of Communist Pan-Slavtern in Southeastern Europe. The Minister in Yugoslavia to the foreign A/I'M ton/ Hitler's recent reference to tho nnwttlwn^nt of nationalities in Eastern Europe ha* cauwrl tinrtwt in Yugoslavia; authorization is requited for a HtatrmtThe State Secretary to the Legation in Yugoslavia
Repatriation of German communities in Yugoslavia is not an acute issue and a public discussion of this problem in Southeastern Europe is not desired at the present time. in Yuffo*l. No. I****

No. 1 The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT ROME, September 4, 1939 6 : 40 p. m. No. 418 of September 4 Received September 49 : 20 p. m. With reference to your telegram No. 459 of September 3 x and my telegram No. 414.2

England's declaration which had brought on the state of war and which France had followed only with hesitation up to the last, was positive "idiocy", hatched by people who evidently had not even studied a map. For, what was to be the form of such a war? Obviously, it could be fought only on land, on the sea, or in the air. On land, breaking out from behind the Maginot Line and overrunning the

1 This telegram transmitted Hitler's letter of Sept. 3 to Mussolini. It is printed In voL viz as document No. 565* *Not printed (62/35543). Mackensen reported in this telegram sent on the evening of Sept. 3 that Mussolini would receive him at 9 : 30 a. m. the following day at which time he would deliver Hitler's letter. 1

2
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

West Wall was a hopeless undertaking which the Frem-h wort* unlikely to attempt. The navy, even if ours was but a modest fleet, could nofc in any event undertake anything decisive. The air fom would try to drop some bombs, perhaps would even destroy some installation or other, but that, too, would have no bearing on the final outroim*, especially if we were to confine ourselves to the defensive also in the air. In short, the Western Powers' challenge to light was an utterly absurd venture, for there remained only the (group garbled ) war, and .such a war would also hurt the side that started it.

Where the Führer's message stated that the Führer and the Duce were "now marching on separate paths*', he had to disagree quite emphatically. On the contrary, agreement was complete us to the road and the goal, and he had done everything, t^jHH'iaily in the military field, that the Führer now wished him to do, and was continuing his preparations in the most intensive manner. Septomi n*r would still be a critical month for him in Libya, but its end would find him prepared for effective defense there also. Already, his measures at the Alpine border and in Africa were containing more than 400,000 men on the enemy side* He would forward to the Führer through the Military Attache (who has been requested to call on General Pariani today) all particulars of his military measures,* together with maps, which he also showed to me and explained in detail. I shall leave it to the Military Attach^ to make a report on this. I whould only like to underline the Duce's statement that not only had there been no friction at all in carrying through the mobilization meaauree here, but that the spirit of the newly inducted soldiers was also excellent, as was that of their families, owing to the ample support provided for them.

The Duce, in conclusion, repeated his assurance of whatever assistance we desired, especially with respect to the question of workers* and (in response to a remark of mine) to the press. The Duce howed calm confidence.

No. 2 127/69861-52 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Mi**i*try Telegram MOST TTBCEBNT [Moscow,] September 4, 10398 : 10 p. m. TOP SECRET . 261 of September 4 With reference to your telegram No. 253 of September 8 * 1 Vol. TH, document No. 567.
SEPTEMBER 1939 3 At 5 : 30 p. m. today I carried out your instruction with Molotov. He promised to take up the question dealt with in the first part with the Soviet Government at once and to give a speedy reply. Concerning the question of the authority of the Soviet officers in Berlin, M. explained that Military Attach^ Purkayev was a man of importance and very considerable military experience, who, like the newly appointed Soviet Ambassador, was acquainted with the essential features of the German-Soviet agreements. Nevertheless, he requested that we continue to handle all of the more important questions directly through him as the final authority.
No. 3 406/214415 The State Secretary to the Legation in Estonia Telegram No. 14:9 BERLIN, September 4, 1939. zu Pol. II 3189.1 Drafting Officer : Senior Counselor von Rintelen. With reference to your No. 106 of September 2.1 Please reply to the Foreign Minister there as follows : It is correct that we have given Finland a declaration concerning observance of Finnish neutrality and likewise have given to Sweden and Norway [similar declarations 2 ]. We gave such declarations to neighboring countries first of all, and then also to Scandinavian countries with which we do not have nonaggression pacts. In view of the treaties of June 7 we thought we could refrain from giving such declarations to Estonia and Latvia.8 Tou are authorized, however, to declare formally that we will of course regard ourselves as bound by the treaty of June 7 during the war which has just broken out. ST[ATE] *Vol. vrr, document No. 548. *Not printed (52/35448-60). * See vol. vi, Editors' Note at June 7. No. 4 2422/511793 Memorandwm, ~by tlie State Secretary St.S. No. 676 BEtoisr, September 4, 1939. I asked the American Charg6 d'Affaires to see me today at noon in order to deny to him, too, that the British steamer Athenia (allegedly with many passengers, including a large number of Americans)
4
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
was torpedoed by German naval units. I told him that there is no German submarine in that particular area, and that, furthermore, our naval forces are under strict orders to refrain from any action contrary to international law and the agreement!* Htgned by the German Keich. Mr. Kirk wants to convey my statement to Washington by telephone and cable immediately. Arrangement* have been made to place at the disposal of the American Embassy, which has no direct means of communication with Washington, a wire through an American legation in a neutral country, 1 WttJEBAOKlR 1 At tbe Nuremberg trial WeissEcfcer testified that he gave *hi* abovo Htftt<*meat to the American Charg d'Affalres on the basis of Information rewiml from the German Navy. The Athento was actually sunk by the German m)hnmrin$C7-30, but this became known to the German command only when the jmbwarine re* turned to port at the end of September. Tlw faotH wtw not reval*l until the end of the war. See Trial of the Major War Criminate /*f/or* Mr Military Tribunal (Nuremberg, 1948), voL xiv, pp, 277-1278. No. 5 127./6084&-49 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to tfa F&r$ign Min& Telegram MOST URGENT [Moscow,] September 5f I98&2 ; 80 p. m* TOP SECRET No. 264 of September 5 With reference to my telegram No, 261 of Septemt>er 4,* Molotov asked me to call on him today at 12 ; 30 and transmitted to me the following reply of the Soviet Government : "We agree with you that at a suitable time it will be absolutely necessary for us to start concrete action. We are of the viiw, however, that^this time has not yet come. It is possible that we are mistaken, but it seems to us that through excessive haste we might injure our cause and promote unity among our opponents?. We understand that as the operations proceed, one of the parties or both partiea might be forced temporarily to cross the line of demarcation between the spheres of interest of the two parties; but such cases must not prevent the strict execution of the plan adopted." 1 Document No. 2.

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SEPTEMBER 1939 7 Inquiries made by Pol. I M with the High Command of the Wehrmacht had already shown that, in this regard, the military authorities were only waiting for a directive by the Foreign Ministry which, to be sure, had itself taken up this matter with the Hungarian Minister. I propose that the enclosed request 3 be sent through the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Foreign Minister. Herewith submitted to the State Secretary. 4 *Not printed (5571/B599595). In this document authorization was requested to inform the Hungarian Minister that the ban had been lifted. 4 On Sept. 7, Woermaim recorded telling the Hungarian Minister that the political explanations previously given for the ban on arms deliveries to Hungary were no longer valid, but that certain difficulties regarding deliveries had arisen which he, Woennann, was not competent to discuss (73/52018). On Sept. 18, Wiehl telegraphed Clodius, who had gone to Bucharest for economic negotiations, that the ban on exports of war material to Hungary still stood and that therefore Hungarian requests should be treated in a dilatory fashion (telegram No. 542, 5571/B399596). No. 10 Memorandivm, by an Official of the Economic Policy Department BERLIN, September 5, 1939. Ministerialdirigent Schlotterer of the Ministry of Economics has just informed me by telephone as follows : The Reich Defense Council held a session yesterday under the chairmanship of Field Marshal Goring and discussed, among other things, especially the question of the development of our commercial relations with Russia.1 Field Marshal Goring took the position that further expansion of our economic relations with Russia should be undertaken as quickly as possible. The question of sending someone to Moscow was taken under consideration. A committee consisting of the State Secretaries of the various departments was formed for the purpose of making further decisions. Proposals on the widening of our trade with Russia and the modus procedendi are to be submitted to this committee. It was pointed out at the meeting of the Council that the proposals should be cleared with the Foreign Ministry. End of Schlotterer's statement. 1 The basic secret and open files of the Economic Policy Department on the Soviet Union are missing for the period covered by this volume, as are the economic files of the Embassy in Moscow. The only economic files available to the editors were the personal files of Wiehl, Clodius, and Hitter, which are fragmentary and consist largely of documents on particular problems with which these men were engaged. There is also a State Secretary file dealing with economic negotiations connected with the Non-Aggression Pact.

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I should like to refer to my memorandum of September 2, u Pro|?r*m of Work for Russia," which was submitted to the Foreign Minister for Ids decision.2 I consider it urgently necessary to confirm once again my appointment as chief negotiator with Kussia and inform Field Marshal Goring accordingly* Otherwise, It can lie vxiwteci that our Bussian effort will be dissipated and the Foreign Ministry will loee control of it. 8 SCUNUBBB ' See vol. vii, document No. 557. *In a telegram of Sept. 7, the German Ambassador In Moarow wa to Inform Molotov and Mikoyan of the German desire to mml Krhnttrr* to Mo*cow to discuss the execution of the trade treaty and ttio further development of commercial relations (34/2408 SEPTEMBER 1939 9 [our] Ambassador on September 2, told me why he wished to speak to me, he expressed himself during the conversation, which lasted a good half hour, about as follows : The conclusion of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Treaty, as I knew, came as a hard blow to Japan and caused a great sensation there. S'ince that time Germany's friends have tried to offset this. He himself, as one of them, has always sought to induce the Japanese Government to conclude an alliance with us (and indeed with Italy as well.) This was the purpose of his mission here. Since this purpose has not been achieved, he has handed in his resignation and is now returning to Japan, for he believes that he can be of more use in this connection there than here.

5 On returning to his Embassy, Oshima .was told of his (Shiratori's) telephone call and thereupon reported to Tokyo that he 1 See vol. vi, document No. 270. 4 Ribbentrop's telegram to the Embassy in Tokyo about this conversation is less explicit than Shiratori's account. It is printed in vol. vi, document No. 538. 5 See vol. vn, document No. 329.
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DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
regarded a protest as inopportune* He was, nevertheless, instructed by Tokyo to lodge it. So far this has not happened.* As to the present status of Russo-Japanese relations here I come to the most important part of the conversation Mr. Shiratori said that the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow a few clays ago had received instructions to make the following propoeala to the llussiaa Government : (1) to regulate by diplomacy the dispute about tlw frontier between Mongolia and Manchukuo, where a regular war IUIH bwii going on for a long time. (2) to establish a commission to control the frontier questions there as a whole. (3) to conclude a trade treaty. If in the course of conversations about a trade treaty Russia should let it be known that she wishes to conclude a nonaggression pact with Japan, thru Ambassador Togo should immediately ask whether Russia would be inclined to refuse future aid to Chiang Kai-shek. He (Shiratori) regarded this instruction to the Ambassador in Moscow as unfortunate, even dangerous. Russia has of course never of herself proposed a nonaggression pact. Even the proposal for the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact came from us* In his view the only way to reach a nonaggression pact with Russia which he too thought thoroughly desirable was through German mediation, He had therefore, on his own, without instruction from Tokyo, also proposed to General Oshima that he ask for German mediation. All this took place a few days ago. General Oshima has not yet been able to see the Foreign Minister since the latter had had no time to receive him before leaving for the front with the KUhrer. The Führer before his departure received General Oshima, it is true, but this involved only a veiy brief visit in which the Fithrcr declared that Germany would keep up the old friendly relations with Japan, but in which Oshima had no opportunity to open the question of a German mediation between Japan and Russia. He (Otthima) would try to speak to the Foreign Minister after the latter's return to Berlin, Berlin has not yet been officially informed of these latest developments. He (Shiratori) wished to apprise us here and thought it also desirable for us to inform Berlin. When I observed that, as I understood it, he wished on his return journey to Japan to speak to the Reich Foreign Minister, Mr. Shiratori said that his travel plans were not yet set Presumably* he will return to Japan and naturally he would be delighted to talk to the * See document No. 9$. SEPTEMBER 1939 11 Foreign Minister if he so desired. I had the impression, however, that Mr. Shiratori did not wish to come right out, so to speak, and ask for an interview, also no doubt out of consideration for General Oshima who is, after all, in Berlin.7 In the course of the conversation Ambassador Shiratori mentioned that in connection with the Anti-Comintern Pact, a secret agreement was concluded between Germany and Japan to the effect that neither party might conclude a nonaggression pact with Russia.8 Since that time, however, developments in Europe had completely altered the entire situation, and no one could ask a country to commit suicide for the sake of a treaty. At one time Russia had appeared to us as well as to Japan as the arch-enemy. Now however England had become this for both countries in the further developments since the Tientsin incident 9 and must be vanquished unconditionally. Straightening out or improving Russo-Japanese relations is obviously of interest to us too, for in that event America would find a decision to enter the present conflict much harder. The goal of Japanese policy in China remains as before, the establishment of a new order there, and with this is connected the elimination of England from China. To achieve this goal, Japan hopes for financial help from America. We then came to speak of the present conflict. Mr. Shiratori thought that after Poland is knocked out an opportunity may perhaps offer itself for an understanding with France and England. Germany and Italy are not now in a position, and France and England are not inclined, to conduct war on a really large scale. If there had to be a general conflict, into which Italy, the United States, Russia, and Japan would necessarily be drawn, this would mean a catastrophe of immeasurable proportions. To a question by Mr. Shiratori about Italy's attitude I emphasized strongly that Italy is proceeding in closest agreement with us and that her attitude conforms in every respect to our intentions. PLESSEN 7 On Sept. 9, Mackensen telegraphed to Berlin that Shiratori had given up the idea of returning by way of Siberia to Japan. "He deeply regrets that he will not be able to see the Keich Foreign Minister again, but intends to ask Ambassador Oshima, who is coming in a few days to Home, to transmit to the Foreign Minister what he wanted to tell him personally." (174/136114) 8 See vol. i, document No. 463. 9 For this episode, see vol. vi, documents Nos. 735 and 762, and vol. vn, documents Nos. 25 and 110. 12 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No, 12 4448/33086703 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Fvrcfyt*. Mini*try Telegram No 272 of September 6 Moscow, September 6, 103012 : 45 p. m. A 20B4. The Finnish Minister 1 here expressed himself extremely satisfied by the changed attitude of Molotov, who spoke a few days a&o of the Soviet desire for a friendly development of Soviet-Finnish relations and an expansion of trade. The Minister attributes Molotov's friendly attitude to the conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact 1 A. S. YrJS-Koekinen. No. 13 3&8/211&6&--69 The Ambassador m the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 279 of September 6 Moscow, September 6, 1039 5 : 40 p. m. Beceived September 6 8: 15 p. m. Pol. V With reference to your telegram No. 267 of September 5,* Since anxiety over war, especially the fear of a Gorman attack, has strongly influenced the attitude of the population here in the last few years, the conclusion of a nonaggresHiem pact with Germany has been generally received with great relief and gratification. However, the sudden alteration in the policy of the Soviet Government, after years of propaganda directed expressly against the Gorman aj3fn*s9ors, is still not very well understood by the population. Especially the statements of official agitators to the effect that Germany IK no longer an aggressor run up against considerable doubt* The Soviet Government is doing everything to change the attitude of the population here toward Germany. The press is as though transformed. Attacks on the conduct of Germany have not only ceased completely, but the portrayal of events in the field of foreign politics is based to an outstanding degree on German news reports and anti-German literature is being removed from the book trade, etc. 'Not Printed (127/69824). A telegram by WeIzdH.eker stating that the Commander in Chief of the Army regarded full current ment of Bussian opinion toward Germany "as of deciinsfiovremvaatliuoen foonr tJhwedRdfenvgeltohpe- ? SS?;. situation". Welzsacker asked Schulenburg to cooperate closely with his Military Attach^ in keeping Brauchitsch fully informed. SEPTEMBER 1939 13 The beginning of the war between Germany and Poland has powerfully affected public opinion here, and aroused new fear in many quarters that the Soviet Union may be drawn into the war. Mistrust sown for years against Germany, in spite of effective counterpropaganda which is being carried on in party and factory and shop meetings, cannot be so quickly removed. The fear is expressed by the population that Germany, after she has defeated Poland, may turn against the Soviet Union. The recollection of German strength in the World War is still alive everywhere. In judging conditions here, it is important to realize that the Soviet Government has always previously been able in a masterly fashion to influence the attitude of the population in the direction which it has desired, and is not neglecting the necessary propaganda this time either. No. 14 2122/462449-50 The Le&ation in Iran to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 123 of September 6 TEHRAN, September 6, 1939 9 : 40 p. m. Received September 7 8 : 30 p. rtu 1. During the negotiations today, Bader expressed the desire of the Iranian Government to keep trade with Germany on at least the normal level of last year, even in war time, and if possible to expand it. The prerequisite for this, the Iranians agree, is the solution of the transportation problem. 2. Transportation is possible at the present only by way of Russia. On the basis of the Treaty of Friendship of 1921 a Iran has a claim on 2 for the transit of Iranian goods. Such transit has for a long time been impracticable because of Russian obstruction. Bader therefore asked that the transit question be solved through a German-Russian agreement. Iran will try to remove existing difficulties at the forthcoming economic negotiations with Russia. Iran is prepared, if necessary, to pay transit freight charges in foreign exchange. The delegation recommends that the Embassy in Moscow be instructed (a) to seek an agreement with the Soviet Government regarding the transit of German goods; (5) to lend support to the Iranian efforts, in cooperation with the Iranian Embassy at Moscow,. which will be instructed by their Government to that effect.8 1 Signed Feb. 26, 1921. See League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. ix, pp.. 383-413. 1 Unsigned marginal note : "Prolmbly 'Russia' missing." * See document No. 312. 14 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY Ter-Nedden,4 who will leave for Berlin via Russia on September 10, will probably be available in Moscow on September 15 for con* versations on the subject. 3. Iran requests positive assurance regarding (a) the delivery on the same scale as heretofore of pharmaceutical products, chemicals, especially dyes, spare parts, and paper; (&) the carrying out of orders already contracted for, especially capital goods. Particulars through Ter-Nedden orally. 4. With reference to telegram No. 130 of August 20.* Bader stated in reply to my inquiry that a British credit offer had b^en made. Iran has not yet announced her attitude on it. Bailer stressed that any decision would be made exclusively on economic grounds* "We shall be informed of it in advance so that a decision may l*e reached as to any possible German offer* 5. In the course of conversations about the political situation at a session of the delegation, Bader acknowledged tlw justice of Germany's claim to Danzig and the Corridor, and < vhara'terixod England's and France's attitude in regard to it us morally unjustified and unpopular among the neutrals. 6. Please telegraph instruction on points 2-4." RlFKBtf 4 Oberregiemngsrat Ter-Neddon of the* Economies Minintry. *Not printed (probably 2122/4(1^448); this wan n telegram from Chxlius informing the Legation that the British were ai to In* iiewrtintiitff in Tehran a commercial credit for the financing of Iranian purrhawK In Britain. *In a telegram of Sept. *), tht* Foreign Ministry replied that Germany would attempt to settle the transport problem through an umii'rstnmihw with IttiHwia, and also that everything would !>e dono to maintain the level of Uennun tieliveries to Iran (8535/E507663). A auhmMiiient tel*Kniui of Hipt. 12 cxiireHHt*l basic approval of a credit agreement ( 8535/KS971HJ4 ) . No. 15 aT81/H041444 TTie Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Telegram TDBGBNT BBRLIK, Sept-ember 8, 1939. [No. 279] 2U W 1611 (f Ang. 3X* Please convey the following communication to the Soviet Government without requesting a statement on its position : We intend to have more German merchant ships call at Murmansk and expect that the Soviet Government will provide facilities for ua- 1W 1611 g: Not fotmd. SEPTEMBER 1939 15 loading and rail transport of the cargoes to Leningrad, where they will be picked up by German ships. Report by wire how the communication was received.2 CLODITTS *On Sept. 8, Schulenburg reported (4461/E087092) that in answer to his statement the Soviet Government had notified him that German merchant ships could call at Murmansk and that facilities would be provided for transporting their cargoes to Leningrad. No. 16 96/107974 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Twrkey Telegram No. 257 of September 7 BERLIN, September 6, 1939. For the Ambassador personally. We have received strictly confidential but reliable information that you discussed Turkish-Italian relations also during your conversations with the Turkish Foreign Minister.1 It appears that the Italians have learned of this and have taken offense at your allegedly anti- Italian talks. Therefore please refrain from any discussion of Italian-Turkish relations in your further conversations there. Furthermore, please note, for the guidance of your conversations, that the Führer and the Duce have reached agreement on all details of Germany's relations with Italy and that the continuation of the policy of the Axis and of friendship for Italy in the future as well is completely clear. RlBBENTROP x Cf. vol. VIT, document No. 553 and The Ciano Diaries, entry for Sept. 4. No. 17 2872/5,65051-53 Memorandum of the Legation in Luxembourg * [September 6, 1939]. PRO MEMORIA I. On September 2, 1939, the German Minister by direction of his Government 2 informed Minister of State Dupong that the German *An entry in the secret diary of the German Minister in Luxembourg, Otto von Radowitz (8302/E589643-44), shows that he delivered this pro memoria to Dupong on Sept. 6, in the presence of Secretary of State Been and Counselor Wehrer of the Luxembourg Foreign Ministry-, It was drawn up on instructions conveyed by Wiehl in telegram 75 of Sept. 4 (2873/565045 49). 2 Conveyed in telegram No. 53 of Aug. 29 ; sent from Berlin, Sept. 2, 12 : 50 p. m., and received at Luxembourg, 2 : 45 p. m, (vol. vn, document No. 542). 16 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY Government could by no means be sntteftecl with I ho intent ion of the Luxembourg Government to close down the onir* ore aiul iron industry in the event of a conflict among the iHMtfhUorinK countries, Putting this plan into elfcct would mean not an oWn-ano* of the strictest neutrality, but on the contrary a uitilatoral art ion against German interests, difficult to reconcile with Luxinnlmur^fs notitrality, because in normal times Germany absorbs the major portion of the Luxembourg production. The Reich Government fooln entitled to expect that even in the event of a conflict Luxembourg will lit least ensure maintenance of normal deliveries to Germany. The Minister also announced that a plenipotentiary of the German Government on special mission would come to HriiHwls and then to Luxembourg in order to clarify the German position on the continuance of commercial relations.3 II. Ambassador Bitter, as Reich Special Plenipotentiary for Economic Affairs, carried out with Premier Pierlot on September 3 the demarche* announced under [paragraph] I regarding the continuation of commercial relations with the Beige-Luxembourg economic union as far as Belgium was concerned, but owing to transportation difficulties he regrets not being able to coiuo to Luxcmtxmrg ns well Accordingly, on September 8 the German Minister, by direction of the Eeich Government, will convey to Minister of Stata Dupong the following statement : "The general neutrality declaration in respect to Luxembourg recently pronounced by Germany also refers to neutrality in the economic field.5 Economic neutrality signifies the continuation of normal interchange and transit of goods between the neutral and tfce belligerent states. Continuation of normal economic relations is not only a right but also an obligation arising from neutrality, Germany will accordingly maintain her normal export of goods to the Beige- Luxembourg economic union and especially to Luxembourg, and will raise no objection against Luxembourg's continuing her normal interchange and transit of goods with respect to the powers hostile to Germany. Germany must accordingly also demand, however, that Luxembourg maintain the normal interchange and transit of goods with Germany. Should Luxembourg permit any unilateral changes detrimental to Germany to occur in" this regard, the German Government would have to view this as a breach or neutrality. If changes 'German views on economic neutrality w^re set forth In tho course of the special missions of Ambassador Bitter to the Netherlands aadi Belgium, aofl of Ambassador von Hassell to Denmark, Sweden, and Norway* For these missions see documents Nos. 18 and 42, pott, and vol. viz. documents Nos. 402, 042, 545, 552, and 68. * See vol. TO, document No. 573. B See vol. vn, document No, 272, SEPTEMBER 1939 17 in certain commodity groups should in the future become imperative, such changes could not be effected unilaterally, but only by way of negotiation and by mutual agreement. The conventional procedure for this would be the customary negotiations of the committees. "The Reich Government has made the above statement to all other neutral Governments, especially Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway." No. 18 2&73/565053 Memorandum, of the Legation in Luxembourg * LTJXBMBOTOG, September 6, 1939. With reference to the declaration conveyed today by direction of the Reich Government to Minister of State Dupong, the German Minister added that in the opinion of the Reich Government it followed from the general rules of economic neutrality already elaborated that the stoppage of normal exports of iron and steel to Germany by Luxembourg was not permissible, and that the Reich Government must insist on their continuance. If Luxembourg should raise the objection that France might perhaps stop the normal iron ore deliveries to Luxembourg, the answer to be given is that this would be a violation of neutrality on the part of France, which Luxembourg would have to settle with France. In any event, Germany was willing to continue the export of coke and other commodities to Luxembourg. If France, contrary to her obligation of neutrality toward Luxembourg, should stop the iron ore exports, Luxembourg would have to fall back on her own ore deposits or obtain the ore in some other way. Ambassador Ritter also discussed this contingency with Premier Pierlot in Brussels. Pierlot, while conceding on the one hand that Dupong's statements in response to the representations of the Reich Government were not in accord with the rules of economic neutrality, maintained on the other hand that the question of neutrality did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Belgo-Luxembourg economic union, but concerned the national sovereignty of Luxembourg. 1 This unsigned memorandum is from the files of the German Legation in Luxembourg. Marginal note in Radowite' handwriting: "Strictly confidential for the Minister of State." The entry in Radowitz' diary (8302/E589643-44) shows that he gave this memorandum to Dupong for "his personal and confidential use" on Sept. 6, together with document No. 17. 18 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 19 141/127271-7S TTie Ambassador in BelgHm, to the Foreign Telegram BRTJSSBI-S, September T, 198912 : 56 a, ECU No- 139 of September 6 Received September 72 : 45 a. m. With reference to your telegram No. 206 of September^. 1 The mood of the Belgian people is heavily charged with memories of the war period; sympathies are predominantly on the side of the British and the French, The community of language and also of culture between the Walloons, who are still the dominant element in the state, and the French is very close. The Flemish element, which has long been under Walloon-French influence, is in comparison not sufficiently independent or strong. Pro-German sentiment among the Flemings is limited, moreover, to rather small groups of Flemish nationalists, while large segments of the Flemish element likewise take a negative attitude toward Germany, though without having any great sympathies with France It may therefore be said that more than 90 percent of the Belgian people have no understanding for Germany and take an unfriendly or even hostile attitude toward her. Enemy propaganda will try more and more to stir up hatred against Germany. In view of the attitude of the Belgian people it will be easy to achieve successes in this direction, German counteraction will be extremely difficult, since the people have a strong distrust of us and show no readiness whatever to accept German propaganda. Sentiment will be decisively influenced by military events, German successes will not, to be sure, bring about any change for the better, but reverses will undoubtedly lead to further deterioration. In this connection the Western theater of war is decisive. The members of the present Government are probably without exception on the side of the enemy in their sympathies. The neutrality policy is nothing more than a consideration of expediency with any of the Ministers. The Bang is &aid to have sympathies with Germany; whether they will survive the outbreak of war, is difficult to say. It is said, however, that at the French Embassy here he is still called a "Bochtf** In spite of the unfavorable situation so far as the public mood is concerned, the policy of neutrality, whose strongest support comes from the King, is, nevertheless, sincere and corresponds to the wishes of the people who despite all their aversion to Germany would like 1 Not printed (1602/385296). SEPTEMBER 1939 19 to live in peace. There are already indications that the Government is determined to carry out the neutrality policy. The Belgians the day before yesterday forced down two French fighter planes which had happened to cross the border at Mons, and interned the fliers. Last night they also fired on planes of unknown origin over Louvain. In spite of the unfavorable sentiment, therefore, any pressure on the part of England and France would at present meet with firm opposition, and the passage of troops could only be forced by military measures. This may change, however, if enemy propaganda becomes stronger, if the enemy achieves successes in the West, and if the economic situation of the country deteriorates as a result of inadequate imports. The Military Attach-6 is of the same opinion. BTJLOW No. 20 1496'/37<0182^83 The Minister in Luxembourg to the Foreign Ministry Telegram LUXEMBOURG, September 7, 1939 10 : 45 p. m. No. 37 of September 7 Received September 8 1 : 25 a. m. wieoogEs. With reference to your telegram No. 75 (W 1541 g Us.) 1 and my telegram No. 34.2 Minister of State Dupong has just conveyed to me the following statement of the Luxembourg Government : "The Grand-Ducal Government has expressed its firm determination to maintain the strictest neutrality of the Grand Duchy in the conflict which has broken out in Europe. It will most scrupulously fulfill the international obligations undertaken by it. "In this spirit, the Grand-Ducal Government cannot agree with the view of the Reich Government that stoppage of the ore and iron industry in the Grand Duchy, if it should occur, 'would mean not an observance of the strictest neutrality, but on the contrary a unilateral action against German interests, difficult to reconcile with Luxembourg's neutrality.' "However, it is not planned at the moment to close down the ore and iron industry of Luxembourg. "The Grand-Ducal Government is animated by the firm desire as a neutral state to maintain as far as possible the normal interchange *Of Sept. 4, 1939 (2872/565045-49). See document No. 17, footnote 1. *In this telegram Radowitz reported that representations had been made to Minister of State Dupong as directed in telegram No. 75 at 11 a. m. on Sept. 6 and that an answer was promised for the morning of Sept. 7 (2872/565054). 20 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY of goods with foreign countries even during the hostilities. It caaanot be the purpose of the Grand-Ducal Government to effect unilateral changes in this situation detrimental to Germany. "The Grand-Ducal Government accordingly gives the Reich Government the general assurance that it will maintain the interchange of goods between the two countries as far as possible, an assurance which, according to the reports, has already been given Germany by the two Oslo States, Sweden and Denmark,* "The Grand-Ducal Government is in accord with the view of the Keich Government that the changes which inevitably become necessary with respect to nearly all commodity groups should be submitted to the existing government committees established between Germany and the Belgo-Luxembourg customs union* "It must be noted here that the export of goods from the Grand Duchy is determined on the one hand by state treaties existing bja- tween Belgium and Luxembourg, which unite the two countries in a customs union, and on the other hand by the economic conditions which will now necessarily result in Europe from the existing war situation in respect to the supplying of domestic requirements and the export potentialities of the countries of the economic I would suggest that the entire problem be lifted out of the domain of theory, and that the mixed commission be convened at the earliest possible date for action on the practical issues, since it can be taken for granted that Luxembourg will comply with our wishes as far as the practical significance of the situation in any way allowa* * Concerning the mission of Ambassador yon Hassell to the Scandinavian capitals to discuss trade relations of those countries with Germany, uch assurance* as he received there, and the statements published following his visits, see document No. 42, post, and vol. vix, documents Nos, 402, 552. and 568. * The Foreign Ministry replied in a telegram from Ministerlaldirefctor WSebl on Sept. 9 (2874/565104), that Germany still SEPTEMBER 1930 21 make personal contacts with the Commissariat for Foreign Trade and in particular with People's Commissar Mikoyan, which we should greatly have liked to do,, for both technical and personal reasons, in view of the newly-concluded Trade and Credit Agreement of August 19.1 We would like to make up for this and therefore intend to send Schnurre to Moscow to discuss with the authorities there the question of implementing the Trade Agreement and further expanding commercial relations. Schnurre is scheduled to leave at the beginning of next week after the preliminary work here has been completed. For your information : We should like to have Schnurre's trip actually take place so that we can try at that time to get the Soviet deliveries of raw materials off to a quick start and, if possible, have them increased. We should therefore wish to avoid being referred again to Babarin, who is totally unsuited as a partner for such negotiations. Hence it might be advisable to convey the above communication without requesting a statement on the matter. I request a telegraphic report on the execution of this instruction.* WBIZSACKE* * See vol. vii, document No. 131. * Schulenburg replied on Sept. 9 (4461/E087093) that the Soviet Government agreed "willingly" to Schnurre's trip and had notified its Embassy in Berlin accordingly. No. 22 B21/B005O9-2 Menwrand/wm ~by Anibassador Diedkhoff * BERTJOST, September 7, 1939. With reference to Washington telegram No. 317 of September 5.* I fully concur with the opinion of the Charg6 d'Affaires in Washington. The President doubtless intends to repeal the arms embargo * as soon as possible in order to be able to assist England and France with arms deliveries as well. He is only waiting until he can be sure of the support of Congress, which he will recall at the opportune moment, and is meanwhile preparing public opinion in the United States for it. Anyone who knows the President and his attitude cannot doubt that he is working toward this goal with all his energy. *Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff, named Amhassador In Washington in March 1987, was recalled after the American Ambassador in Berlin was summoned home for consultations following outbreaks against Jews in Germany in November 1938. Neither man had returned to his post. Not printed (B21/B005090-91). * American legislation embargoing the shipment of arms to nations at war was first enacted in February 1934. It was amended and expanded with related provisions designed to prevent American involvement fn war by further laws of Aug, 31, 1935 ; Feb. 29, 1936 ; and May 1, 1937. 22 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY From all available reports the American people, who are being continuously bombarded with anti-German proiMigancla by radio, press, lectures, and motion pictures, are overwhelmingly anti-German even now, so that the time is presumably not far away when the President will be able to come out in the open. Meantime we must expect that the American Uovt'rnnwitt will do everything to circumvent the present neutrality regulations ancl facilitate, especially through Canada, the delivery of arms, etc., to our enemies.* DJ&CKHOFF "Thomson had reported that the proclamation putting tho Neutrality Aet into operation had not named Canada as a belligerent. No. 23 58)8/242181 Memorandum *by the State Secretary St.S. No. 695 BERLIN, September 7, 1989, The Italian Ambassador remarked to me today that he had heard from several sources that the German public*, was criticising Italy's attitude. He wanted my personal advice as to whether it might not be well to publish the Führer's telegram to the Puce after all, so as to forestall such sentiment.1 Perhaps it would also be possible to accomplish what is necessary by word-of-mouth propaganda or by a consideration of Italy's attitude in the press.* 1 The message to which Ambassador Attoiico referred wa apparently one- sent on Sept. 1 In which Hitler told Mussolini that Germany would not need Italian military assistance. It is published in vol. v as document Ncx 5CX>. 3 The memorandum is marked "F[tthrer3" in Klbbentrop's handwriting indicating that the subject was to be taken up with Hitler. Oa Sept. 10, Paal Schmidt of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat returned the memorandum to Welss&cfcer with a cover note (83/242180) which read : "The Foreign Minister rjm*8fc* you to calm Attolico and to state that the feeling toward Italy in Germany is good, and that the criticism of the Italian attitude, of which Attolico has heard, has appeared only in isolated instances. The moment is not appropriate for publication of the Ftihrer's telegram to the Duce." 472/228644-45 ; 472/228648-49 No. 24 Ambassador MaoJeensen to State Secretary September 7, 1989* DEAR FRIEND: In my letter of August 29, 1 by which I sent you certain information provided by my confidential informant, I spoke of *Vol. vn, document No. 43& SEPTEMBER 1939 23 my apprehensions concerning relations with our Axis partner. How well-founded these apprehensions are, is borne out by the statements made to me by Dr. Kust, the Executive Secretary of the Liaison Office in Italy of the Foreign Section, German Labor Front, regarding a conversation he had yesterday with Under State Secretary Tullio Cianetti, whom you undoubtedly know personally from his frequent visits to Germany. Dr. Bust has communicated the substance of his conversation in a letter to his chief, Dr. Ley, a copy of which I enclose for your confidential information. Cianetti, according to my own observations, is right in stating that, for reasons explained by him, recent events have caused far-reaching disaffection among the Italian people, and especially in those circles in a position to be better informed. >/p> I believe that it is a matter of urgency to give thought to what may be done to counteract this. One way might be to give the Italians, particularly the Duce and Ciano, more advanced information on our plans than we have in the past. I am fully aware that this will always be practicable only to a limited extent ; but we ought regularly to go up to that limit. 2 With cordial regards and Heil Hitler, Yours, etc., MACKENSBK [Enclosure! September 7, 1939. To: Reichsorganisationsleiter of the NSDAP and Director of the German Labor Front, Party Comrade Dr. Ley. Submitted via the German Embassy at the Quirinal, Rome. GENERAL RELATIONS WITH ITALY REIOBCSLJEITER : Upon request of His Excellency, State Secretary Tullio Cianetti, I am bringing the following to your attention : In a talk which I had with him yesterday on some other subjects, His Excellency mentioned the general political situation and German- Italian relations. He expressed very plainly and frankly his great pain and disappointment over Germany's failure during the recent political developments to treat Italy as loyally as she had a right to expect. His Excellency's specific allegations were substantially as follows : 1. The current action against Poland was contrary to an agreement between the two Governments, to the effect that the conflict, which ' WeizsScker initialed this letter, which shows no date of receipt, on Sept. 11, and referred it to Ribbentrop. The latter marked it "F[iihrer]'% indicating that it was to he taken up with Hitler. The result was Ribbentrop's letter to Ley printed as document No. 68. 24 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY Italy, too, of course realized was in fact inevitable, should not be set off as yet on account of the Danzig question, 2. Italy had been left in total ignorance of the impending conclusion of the nonaggression pact with Russia, The Italian Government was not notified until after the pact was concluded. S"or had Italy been informed of the impending conclusion of the pact on the occasion of the negotiations between Reich Foreign Minister von Bibbentrop and Count Ciano in Salzburg, although farreaching agreement between the German and Kussian Governments must have existed already at that time* Cianetti further stated that, for his part, he had for years anticipated the pact and had welcomed it, but that this did not diminish the bitterness which Germany's slighting treatment of Italy had aroused in many Italians, and especially those who with the deepest conviction believed in the common destiny of Germany and Italy. This situation was particularly distressing for him, as he was one of the best known and most fanatical champions of the Axis. Even though German armament had already substantially outstripped the Italian, so that Germany believed she was no longer dependent on Italy, Italian pride was most deeply hurt. As a result of these events, widespread disaffection was to be noted among the Italian people, and especially in those circles in a position, to be better informed* Cianetti further emphasized that these developments naturally did not critically affect the Axis and its policy and that personally he believed in a happy outcome. He would ask me, however, to inform you, Eeichsleiter Dr. Ley, of these matters and to stress at the same time that he would also in the future remain Germany's loyal friend, as he had been an the past, Heil Hitler 1 DR* BUST No. 25 The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 977 of September 8 SAN SiaaASonuN, September 8, 1939. Received September 9 9 : 45 a. EGL The Spanish Embassy in Paris has reported to its Government that Bonnet, in view of the great unpopularity of the war in France, is still endeavoring to bring about an understanding as soon as the operations in Poland are concluded. There are certain indications that Ihe is in contact with Mussolini to that end. SEPTEMBER 1939 25 No. 26 B21/B005037-98 The CTiarge d?Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Telegram WASHINGTON, September 8, 1939 12 : 11 p. m. No. 331 of September 8 Received September 9 10: 10 a. m. For your confidential information only : With all the outward stress on neutrality, the attitude of this Government is characterized by the following measures directed exclusively against Germany : a) The Federal Securities and Exchange Commission has, with a large force of agents, begun to take an inventory of all the German assets invested in the United States with a view to seizure in the event of war, and is attempting to attain this goal by rigorous use of its right of subpoena with respect to banks, brokers, trustees, etc. Agents have intimated that in the event of war there would be no attachment, as in 1917, but expropriation. The campaign is not likely to be too successful, as for months already the Embassy has been pointing out to interested German parties the advisability of liquidating or transferring their assets to neutrals. Such action should be given urgent attention there also. b) The Federal Department of Justice is preparing- a list of all German firms, representatives, and organizations, as well as of their American agents, lawyers, etc., and is already placing them under postal, telegraph, and telephone surveillance. Aside from these measures, ascertained from dependable sources, it is also noteworthy that the Federal Securities and Exchange Commission and the New York courts are participating in the private attachment of local German assets on the basis of a 25 million dollar daim, as reported by the New York Consulate General, in order to get hold of as many German assets as possible. c) Moreover, 23 German crew members of the Dutch liner Rotterdam who wanted to obtain temporary asylum here for fear of British internment on the return voyage have, on flimsy pretexts, been refused permission by the Department of Labor to remain here, after initial approval by the State Department. They are forced to return to Holland on the Dutch liner Veendam, sailing tomorrow. Despite the most energetic representations by the Embassy and the reasonable State Department, the Department of Labor has refused to make the slightest concession. TBCOMSEN 26 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 27 174/136107-08 The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 416 of September 8 TOKYO, September B, 1939. Keceived September 8, llK'iD 1 : 40 p. m. With reference to your telegram No. 309 of September 5.1 The Foreign Ministry on September 7 handed mo the following note verbale in the matter of the signing of the trade agreement between Japan and Gterxnany : The trade agreement between Japan and Germany, initialed on July 28, 1939, in Berlin, was, in accordance with the exchnnge of notes of the same day, to be signed by October 1 , and was to enter into effect on the latter date.* Accordingly, the Imperial Japanese Government had already made various preparations with the inten* tion of carrying it out: thus, for example, stneo August 15, a portion of the import permits nad been issued as a preparatory measure. The Imperial Japanese Government unfortunately finds itself compelled to state that as a result of the outbreak of war in Europe, the present European situation makes it impossible to put the agreement into effect on October 1 as intended, despite the firm intention of the Imperial Japanese Government already mentioned. For this reason, the Imperial Japanese Government is compelled to express the desire that the signing of the trade* agreement be postponed until it can be determined that the actual circumstances nave developed in such a way as to make execution of the agreement again possible. This desire of the Imperial Japanese Government has resulted entirely from the realization that the pronent situation in Europe is by no means calculated to permit the agreement to enter into force and springs from no other considerations. The Imperial Japanese Government is ready at all times to proceed with the signing as soon as existing circumstances make possible the? smooth execution of the agreement I referred in the representations I twice made with the Ministerial Counselor of the Economic Division to the possible political consequences of the note verbale. The Ministerial Counselor stressed the fact that the Japanese Government at any rate had no political motives. The Japanese Government was constitutionally not in a position to obtain Imperial sanction as long as the implementation of 1 Not found. "For this period the working files of the Economic Policy Department relating to the Far Bast are missing. Although a number of papers on economic matters are to be found in the files of the State Secretary and other high offleials, particularly GLodins, the documentation on German-Japanese economic rotations duruig the war years remains fragmentary. Thcro Is an incomplete draft of the July 28 economic agreement in the files (198/140764-70) SEPTEMBER 1939 27 the agreement was made questionable by the war in Europe. I pointed to the conclusion of the note verbale, which, contrary to the usual practice, contained a guarantee by the Japanese Government that it would sign the agreement as soon as its practical execution was assured from the standpoint of payments and shipping facilities. The Foreign Ministry will, as a result of my representations, instruct the Japanese Embassy in Berlin to make a statement again to this effect. Request telegraphic instructions. OTT No. 28 96/107977 The Ambassador in. Turkey to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT ANBLA.RA, September 8, 1939. No. 276 of September 8 Received September 8 5 : 30 p. m. With reference to your telegram No. 257 of September 7.1 As stated in my telegram No. 257 of September 2, 2 Saracoglu spoke to me of the need to clarify Turco-Italian relations, and in this connection mentioned the question of the uninhabited islands located in the 3-mile zone of the Dodecanese, on which it had never been possible to reach any agreement with Italy. Since I inform the Italian Ambassador s very loyally about all my conversations and all the information I receive, I also immediately informed him of this conversation,4 adding that it was not I who had raised the question and that I had, of course, not entered into any detailed discussion of it. In my constant efforts to keep Turkey neutral I merely called attention to a Turkish error in judgment, which had driven her into the British coalition for fear of an Italian attack. I have furthermore emphasized throughout that Italy's present attitude was most gratefully appreciated by Germany. I regret to state, however, that the Italian Ambassador is not lifting a finger to support in any way my efforts to keep Turkey out of the war ; for if there is danger that Turkey will nevertheless yield to the very strong British pressure as the Swiss Minister again told me yesterday it is caused only by fear of an Italian attack or an Italian-British (group garbled) on Mediterranean questions. There is also no doubt that 1 Document No. 16. 2 Vol. vii, document No. 553. 8 Octavio de Peppo. 4 For the Italian Ambassador's report of the conversation, see J &octvmenU diplomatics italiani, series 8 (Rome: Libreria dello Stato, 1953), vol. xui, docitment No. 590. 26009054 8 2g DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY the Italian Ambassador looks most skeptically upon my efforts to maintain Germany's position in Turkey. A written report will follow.5 t ^ In the future I shall naturally reject any attempt by the Foreign Minister to discuss Turkish-Italian relations, PAPBH Not printed (3494/B3019843-44). No. 29 8189/B582179-80 The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Telegram TOKTO, September 8, 1939 9 : 10 p. uou No. 419 of September 8 Received September 8 8 : 45 p, m. Pol VIII 1478. At my first reception by the Foreign Minister y<*Htenlf*y General Abe told me twice that Japan was forced to remain neutral in the European conflict but would like to continue the development of friendly relations with Germany in spite of the disappointment over the conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact. I said that Germany, too, adhered to the cultivation of Japaneae-German friendship, as had repeatedly been pointed out. Japan's attitude toward the world situation reveals the following : Japan's main aim is necessarily an early conclusion of the China conflict. The power that aids her in that has the best prospect of a benevolent attitude on the part of Japan, and might evon obtain the abandonment of her neutrality at a later phase of the war. The old supporters of a policy oriented toward Germany, especially the Army, therefore see the possibility of further cooperation against England if we can dissuade the Soviet Union from supporting Chiang Kai-shek, Sentiment in this circle is inclining toward Germany again in consequence of admiration for her military successes. Becognition of the British as the common enemy is growing in military and activist circles. I am told by leading officials of the Foreign Ministry that the Government is determined to continue its China policy without consideration for England and is hoping soon to force the troops of the warring powers out of the Settlements.1 It is said that so far England has not made any new compromise proposals for the China conflict. *The word Is "sellement" In tte original. Thta apparently refers to the con- * Brltteh SEPTEMBER 1939 29 The forces hostile to England are increasingly opposed by business circles, which expect a tremendous increase in exports to Anglo-Saxon countries as a result of the European conflict. With the accrual of war profits their influence will be strengthened. There are already indications that the expected exports, the market prospects, and the hope of easy profits through war deliveries are threatening to undermine the willingness of the people to make sacrifices for the hard China campaign. Ambassador Togo is conducting negotiations with Russia (apparently concerning an easing of tension in the Manchurian area) which are said to be proceeding rather favorably. In conversations in political circles on the possibility of a Russian-Japanese nonaggression pact, the idea of making Manchukuo instead of Japan the treaty partner has recently emerged. In view of the decisive importance of the China conflict for Japan I see in a possible German offer to influence Russia in a sense favorable to Japan's China policy a promising means of committing Japan to an anti-British attitude. OTT No. 30 73/52020 TTie Foreign Minister to tTie Legation in Hwtigary Telegram No. 303 of September 8 BEKUN, September 8, 1939. For the Minister personally. My conversation with Csdky * was strictly confidential. The journey must not become known. So please do not speak of it. The object of the conversation was to clarify Hungary's attitude toward Rumania, since certain rumors were abroad that Hungary intended to attack Rumania. Csaky gave positive assurances and his personal word that Hungary had no designs on Rumania and would undertake nothing without first reaching an understanding with Germany. He went so far as to declare that if we considered it opportune he would be prepared to conclude a nonaggression pact with Rumania at any time. I replied that I would think the matter over and if I considered the conclusion of a nonaggression pact opportune I would so advise him. Please call on Cs&ky and tell him that on further consideration I do not believe the conclusion of a nonaggression pact opportune and that I ask him to leave matters as they now stand. On this occasion please 1 See document No. 30 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY tell Count Csaky that I am glad to see that Hungary, who is joined to us in a common destiny, is showing such a realistic attitude toward the situation. No. 31 419/216295-97 Oommand of the Filhrcr , September 8, sen Bk, 24578 A.* 1. Propaganda is an important instrument of the Leadership for forwarding and strengthening the will to victory and for destroying the enemies' morale and will to victory. In a war there are BO jurisdictional problems. What counts is the efficient use of the propaganda instrument. Compared with this, all other issues are ineonsequentiaL 2. The propaganda apparatus of the Propaganda Ministry, which has been built up over a period of years, is the central agency for the practical application of propaganda. Breaking it up during the war would be comparable to breaking up certain components of the Wehrmacht. 3. In cases where practical developments have caused analogous bodies with like purposes to grow up, such agencies shall b^ coordinated and shall carry out their tasks, however much alike, in genuine collaboration. 4. The conduct of propaganda at home, L e, 5 its psychological orientation, is the responsibility of the authorities entrusted with the administration of internal policies, except in cases where I reserve the right to give personal directives. The coordination of thene directives in their practical application to propaganda is the responsibility of the Propaganda Minister. 5. In the domain of foreign policy propaganda, i. e., that propaganda which is aimed directly or indirectly at foreign countries, the general policy and the directives are issued by the Foreign Minister, unless I see occasion for giving personal directions. The ent i re propaganda apparatus of the Propaganda Ministry is available for the practical application of these directives. In so far as similar facilities already exist in the Foreign Ministry, their continued functioning shall not be impaired. Their further expansion, however, is undesirable; rather, the tendency should be to recognise in all circumstances the value of the central propaganda machinery which is now in existence and to utilize it for the given propaganda tasks* ^Rk 24578 A: Not printed (419/216204); a cover letter for the document printed here, from Lammers to WeizsSicker, dated Sept* 10. SEPTEMBER 1939 31 6. To insure full coordination of the foreign propaganda effort through pamphlets, films, radio, press, etc., the Foreign Minister shall in person, if possible communicate his wishes and his directives to the Propaganda Minister. Any propaganda articles, pamphlets, radio addresses, etc., signed by the Foreign Minister himself or in his name, shall be accepted and used in unchanged form by the apparatus of the Propaganda Ministry in so far as the Foreign Ministry does not attend to the necessary dissemination through its own channels. 7. In order to insure the practical collaboration outlined here, the Foreign Minister shall assign the necessary, qualified officers from the apparatus of the Foreign Ministry as liaison to the Propaganda Ministry.2 Conflicts arising in the course of the actual work shall be clarified and settled exclusively between the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Propaganda. I forbid once and for all that I be approached on such differences of opinion or disputes at any time in the future unless the two Ministers come to see me together to present the case. By the same token I forbid that directives be put before me for signature unless they have been discussed jointly and the points of difference are brought to my attention. Therefore, I shall in the future not sign any submissions which have not previously been countersigned by the two Ministers. They are then laid before me by Minister Lammers who is being instructed in this sense. The Foreign Minister and the Minister of Propaganda shall make the required arrangements and report to me not later than 9 p. m. on September 8, 1939, the actual agreement reached regarding the execution of this directive. HITLER 'Those named by the Foreign Minister are listed in a note of Sept. 13 (419/216299). No. 32 HH/1SS5SO Memorandum by the State Secretary St.S. No. 697a BERIXN-, September 8, 1939. The Chinese Ambassador informed me this morning that he had been summoned home by his Government to make a report and would probably leave Berlin next Tuesday. In case any suggestions for his report were to be made, he would until then be entirely at our disposal. The Ambassador expressed the hope that he would in a very short time return to his post. 32 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister together with another copy of the memorandum of my last conversation with the Chinese Ambassador,1 and with the request that I be provided with instructions as to our present political line. Naturally it would be very encouraging to the Chinese Government if it was given to understand that a return of Ambassador Trautmanrx to his post at a later date is not altogether out of the question. 2 Of course, this would actually be possible only if Japanese policy proves unreliable in the near ftit ure. Such information might also be conveyed at the proper moment by telegram through our Charg6 d'Affaires in China, instead of through the Chinese Ambassador.8 WBIJS8AOKEE 4 * See vol. vn, document No, 327. "The German Ambassador to China was recalled in ,fni* Wis hecntme of Chiang Kai-shek's refusal to agree to the release of German military advisers employed by him. See vol. i, ch. iv. *On Sept. 9, the Chinese Ambassador informed Wc*l7.j4irkt*r that hi** < Government had instructed him to postpone his return to China UiH/iaSTiSt). Subsequent documents show that his return was postponed iiideSnitviy { 174/138592, 138598,138612). 4 A memorandum (191/138t582) from the Foreign MlniHtorV* FUn-wtarlnt to the State Secretary dated Sept. 10 stated :*The Foreign Ml niftier haa decided that Ambassador Trautmann is to remain In Germany and that n<* change In our present line toward China can be considered.** No. 33 683/242184-85 Memorandum, T>y the Director of the Economic Policy Department BEBUK, September 8, 1939. ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH ITALY It is necessary to adapt German-Italian trtule relations to the present situation as speedily as possible. The German and Italian Inter-governmental Committees for the regulation of German-Italian economic relations some years ago reached, and later continually supplemented, comprehensive agreements as to the extent to which deliveries of vital supplies could be effected between the two countries in the event of war.1 In view of Italy's neutrality these agreements now require a supplement to the effect that Italy must now be called upon to supply Germany with vital goods to a greater extent than she would have been if she were in the war herself. Conversely, exports to Italy of products which we can ill afford to spare must be refers to the Secret Protocol of May 14, 19&7 { 7im>/E5297$e~41 ) and *Je subsequent Protocols of Dec. 18, 1987 (vol. i, document No. 84) and Feb. 13, 1939 (vol. rv, document No. 451) .
SEPTEMBEB 1939 33

Curtailed as far as possible. We must, furthermore, in conjunction with the Italian Government, explore the means by which the most can be made of Italy's neutrality for importing to Germany, via Italy, goods from those neutral countries whose direct connections with Germany have been broken by the blockade.

Since these questions are of extreme urgency for Germany's supply of raw materials, I recommend that Herr Clodius, as chairman of the German Inter-Governmental Committee, should be sent to Rome immediately to conduct the necessary conversations. Since the Rumanian Government has requested that the opening of the negotiations in Bucharest, which has already been approved by the Foreign Minister, should be postponed until September 15 on account of the inability of the Economics Minister to be present, Herr Clodius could hold the first conversations in Rome as early as September 11 to 14.

2 Submitted herewith, via the State Secretary, to the Foreign Minister with the request for approval. * See document No. 149. No. 34 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Telegram TJKGENT BERLIN, September 9, 1939 12 : 50 a. m. TOP SECKEJT Received September 9 12 : 10 p. m. No. 300 of September 8 For the Ambassador personally. With reference to your telegram No. 261,1 We are of course in accord with the Soviet Government that the validity of agreements arrived at in Moscow is not affected by local extension of our military operations. We must and will defeat the Polish Army wherever we meet it. Nothing in the Moscow arrangements is thereby altered. Military operations are progressing even beyond our expectations. The Polish Army, from all indications, is more or less in a state of dissolution. In these circumstances, I consider it advisable that you resume the conversation with Molotov regarding the military intentions of the Soviet Government. It may be that the summoning of the Russian Military Attache to Moscow 1 Document No. 2.
34
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

On the forenoon of September 9, in the presence of General Pariani, I conveyed to the Duce the Führer's thanks for the data on [Italian] troop movements forwarded to him.1 The Duce expressed his deep gratification over the development of operations in Poland and declared that Polish resistance was crushed. The Polish Colonels' Government, which had pursued the wrong policy, had to resign. With a new government it would be possible to conclude a peace if an honorable offer were extended. This would impress the French people, who were undoubtedly prepared to defend their own soil but had no war objective unless they were attacked.2 Germany's attitude and propaganda with respect to France were good and would not fail to make an impression. France could not afford to make a great sacrifice

1 See vol. TO, document No. 507. 2 On Sept. 11 (456/223867), Mackensen reported a conversation with. Ciano in which the latter also stressed the favorable effects, especially in France, which would follow from a "generous settlement" by Hitler in Poland.
36
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

of blood. The Duce showed me a telegram from Burgos stating that 1,000 French deserters had crossed the Spanish border in the past week The British, to be sure, were set for a 10-year war, but alone their situation was unfavorable.

The Duce promised regular information on all intelligence about the enemy. As many as 500,000 to 600,000 Frenchmen were contained from Somaliland, through Tunisia and Corsica, to the Alps. If Italy were to intervene in the war now, the Turks and, in their train, the Greeks, the Jugoslavs, and the Egyptians would come to the aid of England. Such an extension of the contest would only benefit England and therefore must be avoided.

*Enno yon Rintelen was German Military Attach6 in Horn*? No. 39 84/23360 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT Moscow, September 9, 1089- $: 16 p. m. TOP SECRET Received September 9 10 : 15 p. m. No. 310 of September 9 With reference to my telegram No. 308 of September O.1 The Red Army has admitted to Lieutenant General Kostring that the Soviet Union will intervene. Moreover, external evidence is multiplying of imminent Soviet military action : the calling of a large number of reservists up to 45 years of age, in particular technicians and physicians, sudden disappearance of important foods, preparation of schoolrooms as hospitals, curtailment in issuance of gasoline, and the like. *I>ocument No. S7. No. 40 174/1S6111-18 The Foreign Minister to the Ambassador m Japan Telegram No- 3a5 September 9, 1939, For the Ambassador personally and exclusively, Within the last few days I have had a long confidential discussion with Ambassador Oshima on the future development of German- Japanese relations. I explained our position and our aims as foBows : SEPTEMBER 1939 37 The fate of Japan was now as in the past closely bound up with the fate of Germany. If Germany should be defeated in the present war, the Western democracies would quickly form an extensive world <;oalition which would oppose any expansion by Japan and, in particular, would again wrest from her her position in China. On the other hand, in the event of the German victory that we confidently ^expected, Japan's position, too, would be definitively assured, assuming that Japan maintained and further strengthened her present relations with Germany. Since our settlement and our understanding with Russia constituted an important factor in the present contest of forces, this rapprochement was also, properly understood, in the interest of Japan, to whom any strengthening of the German position should be welcome. This vras all the more true since we were entirely in a position, and on request also prepared, to mediate a settlement between Japan and Russia. If this succeeded, Japan would be able freely to extend her strength in East Asia toward the south and could penetrate further there. We were firmly convinced that this was the direction in which Japan's vital interests lay. It was fully in harmony with our rapprochement with Russia, and had been openly emphasized by me in Moscow, that for our part we would strive to cultivate our relations with Japan in the future, too. The idea of close cooperation between Germany, Italy, and Japan was therefore by no means dead. Such cooperation in conjunction with a Japanese-Russian settlement would, in keeping with the world situation, be exclusively directed against England and would thus bring the policy of the three Powers as well as of Russia into a uniform line corresponding to the real interests of all concerned. In this connection it was to be noted that the present attitude of Italy was determined in every detail and in complete agreement by the Fuhrer and the Duce. It was my intention to work vigorously and with the utmost speed to bring about, first of all, a settlement between Japan and Russia, and I hoped that the same political concept would now prevail in Japan as well. It was naturally important that this should come about soon, in order that the impact of the said combination, of powers might still be felt during our present struggle with England, which was so decisive for the whole world policy of the future. Oshima agreed with my statements on every point. He said that the Japanese Army was doubtless well disposed toward the idea of a settlement with Russia and that there was a definite prospect that .this idea would soon assert itself in Japanese foreign policy. Shiratori, who would soon return to Tokyo from his post as Ambassador in Rome, would also work toward this end. I 38 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY I request that in your conversations there you, too, advocate the ubove ideas in a suitable manner and that in particular you speak quite frankly and in my name with Prince Kanin, I further request that you bring out appropriately that it seemed of great Importance to me, for the policy contemplated by me, that Oshima remain as Ambassador in Berlin; that in past years I had collaborated very closely with Oshima and had always informed him frankly of the aims of our policy, so that he is in a better position to represent Japanese interests in Berlin than a new ambassador. He also enjoys, as he has in the past, the full confidence of the Führer and the German Army. KlBBENTROF No. 41 115/117609 Memorandum, T>y an Official of the Dimattttetle Ribbent-rop 1 BERUN, September 9, 1939. I went to see Skirpa this evening and told him that Inn ideas interested me very much and that I would especially like to pass along the map * which he had given to me, but that I would first have to know what and who is behind these ideas. iSkirpa said that he had submitted proposals to his Government, by telegraph and by telephone, to attack immediately under the slogan : "Hurl the Xeligowski * gangs from the Lithuanian capital." These proposals are at present the subject of discussions by the Government. Skirpa is of the view that the Government will accede to his proposals. In a speech to the military the head of the army, General Kit&tikis, has already spoken of the supreme challenge which the next day could bring. Skirpa asked whether, in view of the- difficulties of communication, an airplane to Kaunas could be put at his disposal if need arose. I told him I would look into the matter. After the conversation with me Skirpa gave an account of this talk to the Minister President, in order to alert him to the urgency of the Lithuanian decision. Skirpa has agreed to inform me immediately of any decision in Kaunas. He would be p-articularly grateful if there could be clarifi- 1 Mar*rinal note: "[For} FEtibrerl." 'Not found. '-Lueian Zeligowskl, the Polish general commanding the forces whlen seized vnn& in 1920. SEPTEMBER 1939 39 cation over the delimitation of Lithuanian claims, as well as over the German and Soviet Russian position.* KUEIST * Marginal note : '*! liave had Skirpa told that Lithuania should immediately take Vilna but not anything more. R[ibhentrop]." No. 42 2000.1/50580y Ambassador von. Hassell x , September 9, 1939. My visits in Copenhagen, Stockholm, Oslo, and Helsinki are described in the four telegrams 2 already received here as well as the four official communiques a which likewise are here. As for the latter, I want to point out that the Danish communique was written by us, the Norwegian one was composed jointly, and the Swedish and Finnish communiques were drafted by them and approved by us with slight changes. Since the Minister Presidents in Stockholm and Oslo do not know any foreign languages I carried on the discussions at those places mainly in Danish. Our reception was friendly everywhere. The nuances in reception can be characterized as follows: The Danes stressed strongly and unmistakably the desire to continue our economic relations on an intensive scale. Their main concern seemed to be the supply of fodder by sea, especially in the latter part of the year. In Sweden I had a stronger impression of a certain reserve and very great caution in formulation. This was confirmed by the fact that shortly thereafter an article was published by the former Minister, "Und&i ; though he is no longer in the Government, the article is not without significance because TJnden still plays a certain role. The Times immediately drew attention to this article. The article includes statements difficult to reconcile with the Swedish assertions regarding the maintenance of commercial traffic with Germany. After conferring with me our Minister, Prince Wied, spoke about this article to the head of the Cabinet. The latter said the Government had nothing to do with the article, but indicated that naturally Sweden is a sovereign state that could not be forced to regulate its economy according to instructions from outside. The idea behind this was that Sweden must retain her freedom of movement according 1 See document No. 17, footnote 3. * See vol. viz, documents Nos. 552 and 568. Telegrams No. 114 of Sept. 4 from the Legation in Norway (22/13679), and No. 167 of Sept. 5 from the Legation in Finland (51/33839-40) are not printed. * The Norwegian and Swedish communiques are not printed : (Oslo 22/13681/1- 81/2) ; (Stockholm 8281/E588291). File copies of those from Copenhagen and Helsinki have not been found. 40 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY to her own needs. It also seems to have been hinted that a reduction of the total volume of trade might be applied proportionately to the separate categories of goods. In reply the Germans took the position that good will to maintain trade as far as possible in its full volume must mean to do as much as possible in each category of goods. Care must therefore be taken that the concept of what is proportionate does not acquire a false meaning. Nevertheless, I should in general prefer to believe that on the Swedish side as well then* exists the earnest desire to continue economic relations with Germany us much as possible on the previous basis. In Oslo, understandably, the impression of dependence on England was the most pronounced. Both Ministers * stressed in a thoroughly convincing way the good will to continue intensive trade with Germany, but time and again nevertheless, the dependence on England resulting from Norway's geographic position made itself felt. Both for Oslo and for Stockholm the coal problem doubtless plays a decisive role, and we hold the trumps since the latest events in Poland, The news about German deliveries of coal which arrived while I was still in Stockholm is making a very good impression and has been given much publicity in the press; it was also immediately connected with the explanations which I gave, In Helsinki my reception was definitely of an officially friendly character. This was evident in all external things us well as in the fact that at the desire of the Finns two conferences were held, one with the Foreign Minister and the other with the Minister President, who had called in the Minister of Finance. The Foreign Minister also gave an improvised dinner in the evening, to which leading figures from industry were invited. Primarily, of course, this attitude reflects, aside from a certain still-existent sympathy for Germany, Finland's geographic situation. On the other hand, the Finns showed a lively interest in maintaining Finnish trade through the Oresund, a question on which I expressed myself with raserve, whereas the [German] Minister pointed out that we had given the exact location of the mined zones and had given notification of the available pilot ships. In Helsinki I spoke expressly not only of the full volume of German-Finnish trade but of at least the full volume. In all four capitals I gave special emphasis to the statements about possible conduct in violation of neutrality and about tolerating supervision of trade by the enemy. The other side did not go into these matters. The visit was given a good deal of publicity in the press everywhere, received favorable comment and was evaluated as a welcome gesture. VON HASSEUL. 4 Minister President Johan Nygaarflsvold and B\>reign Minister Halvdan Koht SEPTEMBER 1939 41 No. 43 858,9/E60i25e6-67 Führer's Directive CHBFSACHBJ BERLIN', September 9, 1939. TOP SECRET MILITARY The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht OKW/WFA No. 200/39 g.K Chefs. LI By officer only DIRECTIVE No. 3 FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 1. Operations in strength against the Polish army and air force are to be continued until it is safe to assume that the Poles can no longer succeed in establishing a continuous front which would tie down the German forces. 2. When it becomes apparent that parts of the Eastern Army and of the Luftwaffe are no longer required for this mission and for crushing resistance in the occupied territories, arrangements are to be made for their transfer to the West. Additional air defense units may be assigned for operation against our enemy in the West as the Polish air force loses more and more of its effectiveness. 3. Even after the irresolute opening of hostilities by Great Britain at sea and in the air, and by France on land and in the air, my express consent must be obtained in each of the following cases : a. Every time our ground forces cross the western borders of Germany. &, Every time one of our planes crosses the western borders of Germany, unless this is required to repulse enemy air attacks in force. o. For every air attack on Britain. The Luftwaffe may, however, be employed in the German Bight over the declared mine area in the West, and in direct support 01 naval operations. d. For the Navy the regulations laid down in Directive No. 2, 1 paragraphs 3a and 3b, remain in force. No offensive actions at sea are to be undertaken against France. ADOLF HITLER 1 Vol. TO, document No. 576. 42 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 44 6783/B513579 The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation m the Netherlands Telegram No. 234 BBRLXX, September 10, 1939 4 : 20 p. m, W 1688 g. With reference to your telegram No. 109 of September 5.* We are in principle prepared to supply the Netherlands Government with antiaircraft artillery in a quantity to be determined later, Please ascertain the specific wishes of the Netherlands Government and inquire whether the sending of accompanying factory personnel is desired for instructional purposes. For your information: We should like to have the Netherlands Government avail itself of our offer to send accompanying personnel. In case there should be any objections to this, wo would as a special concession consider training Netherlands personnel on the guns in Germany.* WIBHL 1 Document No. 7. * On Sept 11, Zeeh telephoned to say that the Netherlands Government wished to send a commission of three oflleers to Germany (tffKVKRUKiHft). The German Government agreed to tnis <788/K5i;WH) ami negotiation.** with the Reich. Air Ministry were thereupon scheduled to begin on St|it, 17 (07Hft/Br13503). No record of these negotiations has been found iu tht> ilkH of Ui German Foreign Ministry. No. 45 73/52021-2& The Minister in Hungary to the. Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT BUDAPEST, September 1C), liKU) 7:35 p. m. SECRET 1 Received September 1(> 11 : 00 p. nx No. 296 of September 10 The Foreign Minister delivered to me the following text of the reply which he had just transmitted by telephone to the Reich Foreign Minister : "The Royal Hungarian Government sincerely regrets that it is compelled to beg Your Excellency to desist from the request for the use x Unsigned marginal note: "To be kept strictly secret on special tostrttctioa by the State Secretary." SEPTEMBER 1939 43 of Hungarian railway lines for the purpose of transporting German troops toward Poland.2 "Consent to this action, as we have had the honor of explaining to Your Excellency on several previous occasions, could not, in the opinion of the Hungarian Government, be reconciled with Hungary's national honor. "At the same time the Hungarian Government has the honor to call Your Excellency's attention to the circumstance that one may anticipate with all but certainty that compliance with this request would result in an immediate declaration of war by three powers -a circumstance which would lessen the possibility of our giving assistance to the German Reich in its bitter struggle; on the contrary, within the foreseeable future Hungary would have to depend on the German Reich for assistance. "In the opinion of the Royal Hungarian Government the risk is much greater than the advantage to be gained, since the German troops could reach their objective in a short march without violating Hungary's territorial sovereignty. Moreover, the transit of German, troops via Kosice would be altogether impossible, if only in view of the well-known Slovak irredentist sentiment. "As in the past, so Hungary will strive in the future, too, to prove her friendship toward the German Reich by deeds as well. Snould (group garbled) German Reich appear endangered in its vital interests, or should she become aware of an intended attack from the rear, she [Hungary] would most earnestly consider the question of whether, by virtue of the existing community of interests, she (group garbled) would have to assume the most far-reaching risk. "The Royal Hungarian Government requests Your Excellency to inform His Excellency the Reich Chancellor of its standpoint, as it is convinced that he will understand it, since it is generally known, that the Reich Chancellor places the question of national honor on the same level with the question of being or not being." End of the reply. The Foreign Minister added that he felt that the German request had compromised him vis-Ji-vis the other ministers because of the pro-German line of policy which he had previously followed; they were reproaching Mm for the fact that they had first learned of his trip to Germany through the British radio, and they were violently attacking his German policy. Yesterday's sudden request, coupled with the request for a reply within one hour, was viewed by several ministers as an ultimatum. They were also astonished that, despite the statement made some time ago by the German military authorities that they were now responsible for the broadcasts of the 2 According to TJie Ciano Diaries, entry for Sept. 9, Kibbentrop had on that day made this request by telephone. No memorandum of the conversation has been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry. 26009054 44 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY Slovak radio stations, the Slovak Propaganda Chief Much had raised revisionist demands against Hungary only a fow days ago, I tried to reassure Csfiky, who claimed that he had handed in his resignation. KttDMAN NHDOIOT No. 46 12.7/69811-1S The Ambassador in the Soviet Union, to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT [Moscow,] September 10, 1939$>: 40 p. nou TOP SECRET No. 317 of September 10 With reference to my telegram No. 310 of September x and to telephone conversation of today with the Keich Foreign Minister.1 In today's conference at 4 p. m., Molotov modified his statement of yesterday by saying that the Soviet Government was taken completely by surprise by the unexpectedly rapid Gorman military successes. In accordance with our first communication, the Red Army had counted on several weeks, which hud now shrunk to a few days. The Soviet military authorities were therefore in a difficult situation, since, in view of conditions here, they required possibly 2 to 3 weekd more for their preparations. Over 3 million men were already mobilized. I explained emphatically to Molotov how crucial Kpeedy action of the Red Army was at this juncture. Molotov repeated that everything possible was being done to expedite matters. I got the impression that Molotov promised more yesterday than the Red Arrny can live up to. Then Molotov came to the political side of the matter and stated that the Soviet Government had intended to take the occasion of the further advance of German troops to declare that Poland was falling apart and that it was necessary for the Soviet. Union, in consequence, to come to the aid of the Ukrainians and the White Russians "threatened" by Germany. This argument was to make the intervention of the Soviet Union plausible to the masses and at the sumo time avoid giving the Soviet Union the appearance of an aggressor. This course was blocked for the Soviet Government by a DNB report yesterday to the effect that, in accordance with a statement by 1 Document No. 39. * No record of this telephone conversation has been found.
SEPTEMBER 1939 45 Colonel General Brauchitscli, military action was no longer necessary on the German eastern border. The report created the impression that a German-Polish armistice was imminent. If, however, Germany concluded an armistice, the Soviet Union could not start a "new war." I stated that I was unacquainted with this report, which was not in accordance with the facts.3 I would make inquiries at once. 8 In telegram No. 334, dispatched at 10: 10 p. m., Sept. 12, and supplementing the telegram printed here, Schulenburg reported : "After I had found out from the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry that the DNB dispatch cited by Molotov had been totally misinterpreted by the Soviets and in particular that there is no question of an armistice, I explained this to Molotov on the very same day. Since then, I have heard no more about it from Molotov." (127/69809) No. 47 173/83946 Memorandum "by the State Secretary StS. No. 700 BERLIN, September 10, 1939. The Netherlands Minister handed me today the attached note verbale l in regard to the alleged violation of the Dutch border by a German airplane described in detail. The Minister added orally that Holland had been lodging very energetic protests with the British Government and that it felt compelled in this instance to cajl our attention to the protest set forth in the Annex. I replied to the Minister that nothing was of greater interest to us than that the Netherlands Government should maintain and defend its neutrality with all its power. In this light I was also prepared to receive from the Netherlands Legation representations of the nature of the one in the Annex, in order that the facts in the case might be clarified. I would of course have to state even now that we had ordered the most scrupulous regard for the Dutch border. The whole matter therefore was probably a mistake* If however a German plane had actually by mistake crossed the Dutch border, the Minister could rest assured that anything of this nature was not at all in accord with our intentions. WEIZSACKER 1 The Netherlands note of protest (173/83947) is not printed. It was the first of numerous protests of violations of Netherlands territory by German aircraft.
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No. 48 73/52026 The Minister in Htmgary to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT BUDAPEST, Septemt>er 11, 1039 1 : 00 p. m, SEORBT Recei\red September 1 1 2 : 45 p. m. No. 298 of September 11 With reference to my telegram No. 296 of September 10.x The Foreign Minister told me that tine Hungarian Government was prepared to permit transportation of German war material on the railway line mentioned by the Eelch Foreign Minister, provided it took place in closed cars and without military escort. EHDMANNBDORFF 1 Document No* 45. No. 49 The Minister in Hwngary to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST TOGENT BtjDAPBST, September 11, 1939 6 : 50 p. m. No. 302 of September 11 Received September 12 8 : 00 a. m, The Foreign Minister showed me with very great agitation a note verbale handed him by the Slovak Legation and described as very urgent, The Slovak note states that the Slovak army, in view of its close relations with the German army, had to carry out certain security measures in eastern Slovakia. The Slovak Government therefore requested the Hungarian Government to permit the movement of military transports through Hungarian territory. The transports would be carried out over the railway line from . . . Ian . . . (two groups garbled) . . . via Hernadon-Kosice to Slaziec in Slovak trains with sealed cars and Slovak personnel, and without stopping on Hungarian territory. The Slovak military personnel would receive instructions to observe scrupulously all Hungarian regulations regarding the movement of this transport. In view of the good and friendly relations between Hungary and Germany the representative of the Slovak Government is convinced that the Hungarian Government will permit the transport of Slovak troops through Hungarian territory. The Foreign Minister told me that the Slovak Legation would be notified curtly of the rejection of the proposal by note verbale with the added statement that the Hungarian Government would consider
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SEPTEMBER 1939 49 No. 52 456/223847-48 Circular of the Director of the Economic Policy Department x Telegram BEKUK, September 11, 1939. e. o. W 1711 g. As you know, the representatives of the Oslo States are meeting today or Tuesday in Brussels to confer on their attitude toward the British blockade demands. In order to strengthen these States' power of resistance in this respect, you are authorized to tell the Government there that we are willing and in a position provided temporary transportation difficulties, where they exist, are overcome to replace such British coal deliveries to that country as may be discontinued, as well as the previous Polish coal deliveries. A telegraphic report is requested. WlETTTj * Copies were sent to the Missions in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. These countries with Luxembourg comprised the so-called Oslo States, which conferred periodically on matters of common concern. See vol. v, ch. iv. An annex to the telegram sent to the Embassy in Brussels suggested that the representatives of the Oslo States there be informed in a suitable manner. No. 53 657O/B3S99O6O-51 Memorandum l>y the Director of the Economic Policy Department BERLIN*, September 11, 1939. With reference to telegram No. 283 of September 10 * from Belgrade concerning Yugoslav complaints about the delay in closing the contracts for armament material. The credit agreement regarding the delivery of military aviation and artillery material to Yugoslavia was signed by our Minister in Belgrade on July 5, 1939, 2 after a long delay. The signing of the already prepared separate delivery contracts with the German supplier firms, which the Yugoslavs expected would follow, has since been delayed on instruction of the Field Marshal. Furthermore, no answer has yet been given to the Yugoslav Government in response to its insistent request that it be at least apprised of the total amount of the deliveries to be carried out under the credit agreement. The preliminary negotiations on the credit agreement envisaged 80 mil- 1 Not printed (230/152033). * See vol. vt, document No. 620.
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lionreichsmarks for military aviation material, and 120 million reichsmarks for artillery material. Accordingly, a total amount of 200 million reichsmarks was mentioned on the occasion of the visit here of the Prince Regent and the Yugoslav Foreign Minister.5 During the two months which have passed since the signing of the credit agreement, the Yugoslavs have applied pressure continuously through all channels at their command (Legations and Air Attaches here and in Belgrade). The Field Marshal, however, lias persisted in his refusal. To appease them, however, five modern Heinkel and Messerschmitt planes were delivered about August 20, although the delivery contracts for these had not yet been signed either. The only reasons given the Yugoslavs, as far as could l>e learned here, and conveyed by the German Air Attach6 was that difficulties had arisen which the Yugoslav Military Attach^ in Berlin knew about. Toward the end of August Consul General Neuhausen, on instruction of the Field Marshal, told the Yugoslavs that the armament contracts could now be signed, 4 but pursuant to another instruction from the Field Marshal they have to date not yet been signed. The Air Ministry stated with regard to the telegram received today that the Field Marshal's attitude was still entirely negative. Only yesterday the Yugoslav Air Attach^ was told at the Air Ministry that delivery of a few training and Fieseler Storch planes might possibly be considered, but modern combat planes could not be supplied under any circumstances. In view of the Field Marshal's attitude I have refrained so far from requesting the Air Ministry to be more accommodating about the Yugoslav wishes, as urgently recommended now by the Minister, in agreement with the Air Attache and Consul General Neuihausen, particularly since the reports on Yugoslavia's stand did not seem to justify such action. If the Field Marshal is to be approached once more in the sense of the Minister's recommendation, there would have to be an express instruction by the Foreign Minister to do so, or, still better, it ought to be done by the Foreign Minister himself. It could be pointed out at that time, as the Minister correctly emphasizes, that the possibility of dilatory treatment of the delivery remained open, even if the delivery contracts were to be signed now. Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with the request for instructions.* WDEHD " June 1-8, 1939 ; see vol. vr, document No, 474, * Sec vol. vn, document No. 240. Marginal notes: "[For] F[ufcrery T^5eatme] i t of Yu R[ibbentrop] ." &slavia should for the present continue to be dilatory.
SEPTEMBER 1939 51 No. 54 R21/B005107-09 The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Telegram WASHINGTON-, September 1S2, 1939 k: 40 a. m. No. 343 of September 12, 1939 Received September 13 4 : 50 a. m. Since Roosevelt, by inquiries in Congressional circles, has allegedly already made sure of a two-thirds majority for the repeal of the arms embargo, an early recall of Congress may be expected, although the decision is constantly being postponed.1 Roosevelt desires a brief session in which the embargo alone will be dealt with. Congress, however, would like to remain in permanent session in order not to part with its control over Roosevelt's dictatorial ambitions. The reversal of Congressional sentiment in the embargo question, even among many isolationists, is mainly due to the impression which Roosevelt made in predicting the danger of war. This did away with the main argument of the isolationists, that Roosevelt was seeing ghosts. Despite the resistance pledged by a group of determined isolationists led by Borah, it is very probable that the arms embargo will be lifted. Roosevelt's argument that the arms embargo constituted an unneutral act because it favored Germany one-sidedly has made a strong impression. For the time being Roosevelt believes himself able to keep the United States out of the war by strengthening the Allies5 chances of winning the war through unlimited exportation of arms, military equipment, and essential raw materials. But if defeat should threaten the Allies, Roosevelt is determined to go to war against Germany, even in the face of resistance in his own country. As a preliminary step, the Presidential powers from 1917 to 1919 are now being closely scrutinized in order to ascertain whether they are still in force and can simply be proclaimed by Roosevelt when an unlimited state of emergency is declared. The likelihood that the embargo would be lifted probably influenced Canada's declaration of war. The repeal of the embargo has two more immediate aims : 1. By means of expanded production for Allied requirements to step up the capacity of America's armament industry for her own mobilization. *On Sept. 13 tlie President summoned a special session of Congress to meet on Sept. 21. On that date he delivered to it a message asking for repeal of the arms embargo. The text is published in Department of State, Bulletin, 1939, vol. i, pp. 275-280. Legislation to this effect -was introduced immediately in both houses of Congress. See also document No. 294, footnote 1.
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2. To meet the urgent needs of the Allies for aircraft in order to attain air parity. Otherwise, owing1 to the inadequacy of British and French air armament, it is expected here that the Allies will be defeated. However, as the Air Attach^ has reported, the capacity to supply is limited. Both of these aims are being pursued with the utmost vigor fay both Britain and France and also by the armament industry. THOMSEN No. 55 4&6/2238fc0-57 The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania Telegram No, 482 BEHON, September 12, 1939. Drafting Officer : Senior Counselor von Rintelen, With reference to your telegram No. 504 of September 12 [I/]. 1 All indications here point to the fact that the remnants of the Palish Army, the Polish Government, and the High Command of the Polish Army intend crossing into Rumania. The statements made to you by the Rumanian Foreign Minister regarding Rumania's proposed treatment of the Polish refugees do not yet meet in all particulars the demands which we must make on Rumania in this respect on the basis of the Rumanian neutrality obligationa Our demands are that tte Rumanian Government shall : (1) not grant asylum in Rumania to the Polish Government and the High Command of the Polish Army but shall intern under strict confinement any members of these two groups who should nevertheless manage to reach Rumanian territory ; (2) close the border by military means to the entry of any Polish agencies, civilian or military ; (3) immediately disarm and intern troop formations and individual soldiers who have crossed the border ; (4) prevent the transit shipment of war material of any kind to Poland, because in the circumstances, as has already been emphasized, such shipments would unilaterally favor Poland and consequently be incompatible with the obligation of neutrality. I ask that you immediately and vigorously demand that the Government there commit itself by a binding declaration in this regard and telegraph the outcome at once. 1 Document No. 50,
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Lithuania's interest in the Vilna territory was as great as ever and that Lithuania still considered it Lithuanian territory today from both juridical and ethnic points of view. However, if Lithuania should openly abandon her neutrality at the present times this would greatly handicap her. He indicated that strong pressure was also being placed on Lithuania by England and France not to give up her neutrality in any circumstances. Moreover, an I have heard from other sources, the Soviet Union also seems to be working hero in the same direction. No. 59 12T/69805 The Foreign Mini&ter to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Telegram BERLIN, September 13, 1039 5 : 50 p. m. No. 336 of September 13 Received September 14. 1 : 10 a. m. For the Ambassador personally, As soon as the exact outcome is known in the great battle in Poland, now approaching its end, we shall be in a position to give the Bed Army the information it asked for regarding the various parts of the Polish Army. But even now, I would ask you to inform M. Molotov that his remark regarding Colonel General Brauchitsch's statement 1 was based on a complete misunderstanding. This statement referred exclusively to the exercise of executive power in the old territory of the Reich as regulated before the beginning of the CJerman action against Poland, and had nothing whatever to do with a limitation of our military operations toward the east on former Polish territory. There can be no question of imminent conclusion of an armistice with Poland. * See document No. 46. No. 60 458/223837 The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Draft telegram BajR&m, September 13, 1939. Pol. VII 2058 g Ks, In order to tie down large forces in India, a plan is tinder consideration to support a move designed to help the former Amanullah dynasty
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SEPTEMBER 1939 59 cessions they will try to obtain Japanese guarantees in suck matters as trade with China, shipping in Chinese waters, and recognition of their capital investments in China. With the present Japanese Government such guarantees seem all the more possible since in this field England will presumably have the full support of the United States, which through the denunciation of the Japanese-American commercial treaty 2 has obtained a weapon in the fight for these interests. It is to be assumed that there will be British-French-Japanese negotiations ; these will presumably last for some time and their outcome will determine the future attitude of Japan toward Germany. Submitted herewith to the Director of the Political Department through the Deputy Director. KNOLL, 3 On July 26, 1939. No. 62 8603/E597257U&8 Nvte ~by the Minister in Hwngary September 13, 1939. W III 8060. On August 14: of this year State Secretary Keppler informed me that he was ready to abandon the agreement on mineral resources generally, but that he attached the greatest importance to reviving the agreement in its previous form in so far as it applied to oil. On August 24 I replied to State Secretary Keppler that, according to information from Count Cs&ky, Minister President Teleki was ready to cooperate with us on the exploitation of oil but in a form not in conflict with Hungarian laws, and in particular, with the provision that rights to extract minerals are not transferable except by law. The Hungarian Government was ready to cooperate with us in exploiting the oil field of Jasina in the northeastern tip of the Carpatho-TJkraine. This could be done without asking the parliament since the Czechs had already started preliminary work there; so the provision about extraction rights would not thereby be violated. On August 31 State Secretary Keppler wrote me that it was incomprehensible to him that, according to Csaky's statement, the fulfillment of Minister President TeleM's promise would be in conflict with the laws. After all, it was generally known that Hungary had granted to foreign firms oil concessions covering very large areas. Why should this not be possible with respect to Germany as well? Cooperation in the oil field near Jasina was pointless. Although the Czechs had undertaken drilling operations there, no evidence for the 260090 54 10
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existence of an oil field had as yet bei?n supplied. The whole* geological structure of the Carpatho-Ukrume (fissured Flysch formation,) really permitted sensible efforts of exploitation only if largo areas were involved. Some time ago Professor Loci, head of the Hungarian National Geological Institute, expressed the opinion to State Secretary Keppler that the Curpatho-Ukrain was rather poor in mineral wealth. He, Keppler, was planning to approach the problem by entirely new geo-physieui methods in order to make experimental study of the possibilities for exploiting Flysch areas, although in doing so he had to run a considerable risk. Cooperation with Hungary could be considered only If the rights were not limited to the Carpatho-Ukraine but included at least the territory extending to the south of the Carpatho-Ukraine.1 ERDMANNSDOKOT 1 Attached to this document was the following note dated Budapest, Mar. 11, 1939: "The German Government proceeds from the assumption that in case certain Hungarian actions in the territory of the Carpfttho-TTIcraine become necessary, the Royal Hungarian Government will take into account the following necessities ; "1) During or after any occupation of the Carpatho-Ukraine German requirements with regard to transportation shall he taken Into account to a larjse extent. "2) The economic interests of the Reich and its <*ltizwm In the Carpatho* Ukraine will not he affected by the action. The KoytU Hungarian (Government will recognize treaties and agreements of an economic nature which were concluded, with the* Government of the Dtirputho-Ukraiue hy Gorman official and private institutions. "3) The Royal Hungarian Government will recognize the duly acquired rights of "Volksdeutsche in the Carpatho-Ukraine. "4) The members of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government, former Carpatho- Ukrainian Ministers and other leading personages in the political life of the Carpatho-Ukraine, such as, for instance, the leaders of the Defense Corps kitsch shall not face criminal prosecution or be persecuted in any other way on account of their political beliefs.1' Of. vol. rv, documents Nos. 140, 198, and 109. No. 63 127/698O&-08 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT [Moscow,] September 14, 19390 p. m, TOP SECRET No. 350 of September 14 With reference to your telegram No. 386 of September 13.1 Molotov summoned me today at 4 p. m, and stated that the Bed Army had reached a state of preparedness sooner than anticipated. Soviet action could therefore take place sooner than he had assumed at our last conversation (see my telegram No. 317 of September 10) .* 1 Document No. 59. * Document No. 46.
SEPTEMBER 1939 61 For the political motivation of Soviet action (the disintegration of Poland and protection of "Russian" minorities) , it was of the greatest importance not to take action until the governmental center of Poland, the city of Warsaw, had fallen. Molotov therefore asked that he be informed as nearly as possible as to when the capture of Warsaw could be counted on. Please send instructions. I would direct your attention to today's article in Pratoda, carried by DNB, which will be followed by a similar article in Z&vestia tomorrow. The purpose of the articles is to provide the political justification mentioned by Molotov for Soviet intervention. SCHULJBNBTTRGNo. 64 456/228933-84 The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT BUCHAREST, September 14:, 1939 7 : 00 p. m. No. 534 of September 14 Received September 15 1 : 30 a. m. With reference to your telegram No. 482 of September 12 a and to my telegram No. 398 2 of September 14. On the basis of decisions of the inner council of the Rumanian cabinet, the Foreign Minister has given me the following declaration which, by explicit request, he designates as confidential : Regarding point 1. In case the Polish Government and the Army High Command should cross over into Rumania, (a) military personnel will be disarmed and interned; (b) civilians, like other "political refugees," will be brought to prepared reception centers near Jassy and will be interned there; if, however, any of these civilians should desire to go to a foreign country, this could not be denied them because the moment they cross the border they are private individuals and no longer "members of a government95 and will not be permitted to engage in any kind of political activity in Rumania. Travel in Rumania, visiting Bucharest, in particular, is strictly forbidden. The same treatment also applies to other Polish civilians, in so far as they are admitted at all as political refugees. In any case, precautions have been taken to prevent Polish officers or soldiers in civilian clothing from possibly coming here as refugees and then continuing on to France. 1 Document No. 55. * Sic, not found.
62
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

Points 2 and 3 have been reported on.5 In regard to point 4 : The Foreign Minister remarked that Rumania would have to comply with the general provisions of international law. Germany was equally free to obtain war material from and through Rumania. However, (group garbled) precautions had been taken so that no considerable quantity of war material passed in transit to Poland; in actual fact practically nothing except petroleum had left the country to date. (This was confirmed to me by the Consul tit Cernuuti, who reported today that no war material whatever hud gone to Poland in the past few days. A few civilian airplanes arrived in Cernau^i and Bucharest from Poland yesterday (a total of 17 was reported to me). Thoy were taken into custody; the pilots and the Polish passengers will be interned in Moldavia, near Jassy, and have already been shipped off. In conclusion, Gafencu stated that Rumania was doing everything to maintain strict neutrality, and he reiterated his assurance in this regard. FABRIdtTS * Fabricius wired on Sept. 13 that the Rumanian Government had promised to disarm and intern Polish troops and that Rumanian troops had been concentrated along the Polish border (169/82750). No, 65 321/193129 The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Mmiatry Telegram KAUNAS, September 14, 1939 9 : 00 p. m. No. 133 of September 14: Eeceived September 14 11 : 25 p. m. With reference to my telegram No. 130 of September 13. 1 I again explained our viewpoint in the Vilna question to Minister President Cernius {several groups apparently missing) which was of a private nature, and pointed out that the rapidly approaching collapse of Poland made a decision imperative. Moreover, an advance of German troops could lead to an early occupation of the Vilna territory by us. Cernius, similar to RaStikis, declared that Lithuania could not emerge from her neutrality at the moment, but that she regarded the Vilna region as a territory "occupied" by Poland, which juridically and ethnically belonged to Lithuania. Armed action by Lithuania \vas not being considered at the moment He hoped to arrive at a solution of the problem by registering Lithuanian claims at a possible 1 Document No. 58.
SEPTEMBER 1939 63 peace conference or by having the Lithuanian population of the Vilna territory declare for joining Lithuania. He himself admitted, however, that the Lithuanians in the Vilna territory were still oppressed by Poland and were hardly in a position for that, while apparently nothing is being done here in this direction. I will continue my efforts to influence the Government. ZECEGLIN No. 66 51/a3858 The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry Telegram COPENHAGEN, September 14, 1939 10 : 45 p. m. No. 133 of September 14 Received September 15 12 :15 a. m. With regard to the expansion of the German contraband list, 1 the Danish press, at official instance, has adopted a unified attitude to the effect that the inclusion of foods as conditional contraband does not mean any change in the present situation for Denmark, on the one hand because of the applicable clause 2 in the N"on-Aggression Pact, and on the other hand, because of Herr von Hassell's sojemn assurance that the normal volume of Denmark's agricultural exports will be maintained.8 1 New German prize rules and a wider definition of contraband were promulgated on Sept. 12. See Afonatshefte -fur Ausuxirtiffe Politik, Sept.~Oct. 1939 (Essen, 1939), pp. 917-918. * See vol. vi, document No. 461, additional protocol. 1 See document No. 42. No. 67 73/52047-4)8 The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Hungary Telegram [No. 345] * BERLIN, September 14:, 1939. Euro RAM 474. For the Minister personally. With reference to your telegram No. 302.2 Please communicate the following to Count Cs&ky in my name : I gather from the telegram that the Hungarian Government takes the stand that it would regard the transit of sealed Slovak cars over *This number has been taken from the Budapest reply (73/52059). 2 Document No. 49.
64 DOCUMENTS OK GERMAN FOEKIGN POLICY the Hungarian railway system an act of military aggression and would act accordingly. At the same time Hungarian troops are being dispatched to the Slovak border. This Hungarian reply to the Slovak request, which was unknown to the Reich Government, has caused great astonishment here. I would therefore advise Count Csfiky to be very circumspect in his actions toward Slovakia, which is under our protection. Any unfriendly act whatever toward Slovakia would cause a corresponding reaction in Germany. With reference to Cs&ky's remark to the effect that he did not know whether Hungary's acquiescence to the transport of German war material on the railway line mentioned could be maintained under these conditions, please inform the Hungarian Government that the Reich Government has chosen not to take advantage of the offer for the transit of war material.8 RlBBBNTKOF * Erdmannsdorff reported on Sept, 16 that ho had carried out tnefi* instructions. Cs&ky had explained that he had reacted so strongly againnt the Slovak request because "shortly before the Slovakian Foreign Minister and the Propaganda Director had raised publicly the claim to Hungarian territory and th<* Rlovakian Government intended soon to expropriate landed property of Hungarians as well as that of Czechs and Jews." Csaky had added, however, that he had changed his mind about dispatching troops to the Slovak border and none had been sent (73/52059). No. 68 472/228650-54 Foreign Minister JRibbentrop to Reich$leiter Ley FUHHER'S HEADQUARTER September 14, 1939. STJRICTIrT CONFIDENTIAL. DEAR PARTT COMRADE LEY: Ambassador von Mackensen has Informed me of the letter in which Dr. Rust, the head of your liaison office in Borne, reported to you a conversation with State Secretary Cianetti.1 According to this letter Signor Cianetti asserted that Germany had not conducted herself loyally toward her Axis partner, first, because the operation against Poland was contradictory to the agreements made between the two Governments, and, second, because the Italian Government was not informed of the plan for a nonaggression pact with Soviet Russia until after conclusion of this pact. Both assertions are completely incorrect. 1, In the continuing exchange of views between Rome and Berlin, Germany never gave a binding promise and did not even state the opinion that we would in all circumstances avoid a military conflict over Danzig and the Corridor. Germany could not possibly have 1 Document No. 24. Weizsacker sent a copy of the Ribbentrop-Iiey letter to Ambassador Mackensen in Home on Sept. 18 (100/64566). SEPTEMBER 1939 65 given any such promise. For a great power can never commit itself patiently and quietly to tolerate the conduct of another power, like Poland, in all circumstances, especially when this conduct becomes the worst type of provocation. On the contrary9 we have always told the Italians that we hoped, to be sure, that the Polish Government might still come to its senses in the end and agree to a satisfactory settlement, but that we could, of course, not tolerate continued provocations. Even the possibility that the Western Powers might intervene in a German-Polish conflict could not change this. The Italians, especially the Duce himself, have always recognized this standpoint and emphasized the fact that the final decision as to one or another form for the solution in the German-Polish question was, of course, the prerogative of the Führer alone. Even if we had made an agreement in all circumstances to maintain peace this year which was not actually the case, however such an agreement would have been voided by the facts which became manifest during the last phase of the German-Polish crisis. For during the last days prior to the beginning of the German campaign, it became fully evident that England did not desire peaceful understanding but war. The final proof for this was when England simply rejected Mussolini's last offer of mediation, which had been accepted by Germany and France.2 All of this shows that it is completely wrong to say that our operation against Poland ran counter to a German- Italian agreement. 2. The Italians were informed about the idea of a rapprochement with Russia from the very moment of its conception. I discussed the possibility of such a rapprochement confidentially with Ambassador Attolico before we ever took any steps in this direction vis-a-vis the Russians. The entire preliminaries to the German-Russian Non- Aggression Pact then actually took place in a very short period. However, the Italians were always informed about the various phases, which followed one another in rapid succession. Thus, on the occasion of the visits of Attolico and Ciano at Salzburg I discussed with both of them the status of our contacts with Moscow at that time; the Fuhrer did likewise when he received Ciano at the Obersalzberg.3 To be sure, at that time it was by no means certain that an understanding with Moscow would really be reached. This was actually not decided until the last few days prior to my departure for Moscow. Then, however, immediately after receiving the message from Moscow that the Soviet Government approved of my trip, I informed Ciano by telephone. Moreover, from the very beginning the Italians greatly wel- * See vol. vn, documents Nos. 535, 563, and 565. * See voL vn, Editors* Note at date of Aug. 11 and documents Nos. 43 and 47. (56 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY comed an understanding between Berlin and Moscow, and indeed so unambiguously that in the course of the conversations on the Polish question they even said that such an understanding might create an entirely new situation in European politics. In these circumstances it is completely incomprehensible to me how Signor Cianetti can make these assertions and how he can say in this connection that many of the Italians who believe in a common destiny between Germany and Italy considered that Germany's present action disregarded Italy and that their pride had been injured* There is really not the slighest basis for such feelings on Italy'** part On the contrary, when Italy finally informed us of her decision not to participate actively in the war at the present time, the Führer showed such broad understanding for Italy's situation, ami conveyed it to the Duce, that no more loyal or more friendly conduct is conceivable. Indeed, this attitude on the part of the Fiihror ia compelling proof that he is determined to remain faithful to Axis policy in the future, too. For obvious reasons I consider it very important that assertions such as those made to your representative by Signor Cianetti are not left unrefuted and that no legend becomes firmly rooted in Italy that is false and injurious to our future relations. Therefore I would welcome your finding an opportunity in the near future to enlighten Cianetti along these lines. This, of course, should be done only orally. It would therefore be best if you would arrange a personal meeting with. Cianetti for this purpose and at that time would confidentially inform him of my above statements, suggesting to him that ho have Count Ciano himself confirm the accuracy of this account. I should appreciate your keeping me informed of further developments in the matter. With cordial greetings and Heil Hitler I Yours, RIBBENTROP No. 69 Pll/302r-04 Ambassador Papen to Foreign Minister Ribbentr&p TOP SECRET ANKAHA, September 14, 1939. DEAR HERE VON RIBBENTROP : The fact that the principles and objectives of Turkey's foreign policy have been shaken by the revolutionary events of the past few weeks suggests that we, too, should consider assisting in its reorientation even though from a long-raaage point of view. Please permit me to submit to you my ideas on the subject, which I would like to preface with the remark that I have, of course, not discussed them with anyone and shall not do so. SEPTEMBER 1939 67 Turkey's decision made in May x to ally herself with the Western Powers in order to protect her European possessions was based on the assumption that the encirclement of Germany planned at that time under British leadership would lead to active participation by Russia and would thus be rather sure to prevent a conflict. The conclusion of the German-Russian pact and the declaration of Italy's neutrality after the beginning of the conflict, have completely upset these assumptions. On the one hand Turkey would not at the present time like to renounce her far-reaching commitments made to England and France, because she does not want to expose herself to the loss of prestige attached to breaking her word, and because she does not know whether Italy might not intervene in the conflict after all. On the other hand it is clear that Turkey's commitment, which is not limited only to the protection of her own frontiers but envisages participation in any conflict breaking out in the Mediterranean, is so far-reaching that it is subject to very sharp criticism even though not openly within the Turkish camp itself. Quite aside from this, they are ignorant as to the scope of the German-Russian agreements. Only one thing is known : that Russia in no circumstances desires the appearance of the Western Powers in the Straits, and certainly not in the Black Sea. Between these possibilities Turkey is at present forced to engage in a seesaw policy of neutrality. The interests of Germany and the Axis in their struggle against England have always demanded a strong, independent, and neutral Turkey. Italian policy has perhaps not always correctly evaluated the importance of this position, because there exists between the two countries a deeply rooted antipathy of many years' standing. Nevertheless it is true in my opinion that as M. Gafencu said Albania is only a moderate compensation for the loss of Turkey. It should therefore be considered and this becomes imperative if the German-British war continues how Turkey can in the long run be detached from her present commitments and be brought within a framework of natural relations with the powers with whose interests she is also geographically connected. A Turkey whose possessions were equally guaranteed by Russia, Germany and Italy provided that these same powers would also defend the status quo in the Balkans would have no further reason to look to the Western Powers for protection of her existence. If such a combination could be realized and proposed to Turkey, no Turkish government, no matter how pro-British or pro-French a This refers to the Anglo-Turkish and Franco-Turkish declarations of mutual assistance of May 12 and June 23, 1939, respectively ; Documents on International Affairs, 1939-46 (London, 1951), vol. i, pp. 202-204. Qg DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY it was, would, in my opinion, be in * position to reject such an offer. The Turkish, people and the majority of the Turkish intelligentsia desire nothing but peace and security for the economic development which has been undertaken. At the same time such a combination woulcl be a moral setback of the first order to Anglo-French interests, It is interesting in this connection to observe how certain quarters in the Turkish press which are completely unknown to us constantly raise the subject of safeguarding German-Turkish interests. A case in point was the news of the conclusion of a German-Turkish treaty of nonagression, published the day before yesterday, which then had to be denied by the Government, I would be grateful if you would let me know some time how you feel about the possibility of putting my ideas into practice and whether you believe that Italy might be won over to such a policy always provided that in the future, too, we pursue only economic aims in Turkey, and that this "policy of security" would not mean interference in Italy's interests in the Mediterranean* With best wishes and Heil Hitler I Yours, etc., P. S. The Dutch Minister,* who is a friend of mine, told me today: "My Government, and especially the Queen, would be ready at any moment to put out feelers or act as intermediaries vis-i-vis England, if the Reich should so desire." Holland was hoping that after Poland's military defeat the peace of Europe might still be saved by a far-reaching German offer. * See document No. 242, footnote 5. No. 70 127/69788-90 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Telegram MOST URGENT BERLIN, September 15, 1930 8 : 20 p. m. TOP SECRET Received September 16 7: 15 a, m. No. 360 of September 15 For the Ambassador personally, I request that you communicate the following to M. Molotov at once: 1) The destruction of the Polish Army is rapidly approaching its conclusion, as appears from the review of the military situation of September 14 which has already been communicated to you.1 We count on the occupation of Warsaw in the next few days. 1 Not found. SEPTEMBER 1939 69 2) We have already stated to1 the Soviet Government that we consider ourselves bound by the definition of spheres of influence agreed upon in Moscow,2 entirely apart from purely military operations, and the same applies, of course, to the future as well. 3) From the communication made to you by Molotov on September 14, 3 we assume that the Soviet Government will take a hand militarily, and that it intends to begin its operation now. We welcome this. The Soviet Government thus relieves us of the necessity of annihilating the remainder of the Polish Army by pursuing it as far as the Russian boundary. Also1 the question is disposed ox whether, in the absence of a Russian intervention, a political vacuum might not occur in the area lying to the east of the German zone of influence.4 Since we on. our part have no intention of undertaking any political or administrative activities in these areas, apart from what is made necessary by military operations, without such an intervention by the Soviet Government, new states might possibly be formed there. 4) For the political support of the advance of the Soviet Army, we propose the publication of a joint communique of the following content : "In view of the obvious splitting apart of the nationalities living in the former Polish state, the Reich Government and the Government of the USSR consider it necessary to bring to an end the intolerable political and economic conditions existing in these territories. They regard it as their joint task to restore peace and order in these, their natural spheres of influence, and to bring about a new order by the creation of natural frontiers and viable economic organizations." 5) We assume in proposing such a communique that the Soviet Government has already given up the idea, expressed by Molotov in an earlier conversation with you, of taking the threat to the Ukrainian and White Russian populations by Germany as a ground for Soviet action.5 The assignment of a motive of that sort would indeed be out of the question in practice. It would be directly contrary to the true German intentions, which are confined exclusively to the realization of well-known German vital interests. It would also be in contradiction to the arrangements made in Moscow and, finally, would in opposition to the desire for friendly relations expressed on both sides make the two States appear as enemies before the whole world. 6) Since the military operations must be concluded as soon as possible because of the advanced season of the year, we would be gratified if the Soviet Government would now set a day and hour on which their Army would begin their advance, so that we on our part might govern * See document No. 34. * See document No. 63. 4 Ribbentrop had already prepared a message for Molotov on Sept. 11 (34/23356-59) in which he envisaged the possibility of a political vacuum in eastern Poland in case the Soviet Army did not occupy the Russian sphere of. influence. To avoid such an undesirable situation lor Germany, Ribbentrop suggested the creation of new states in eastern Poland which Russia could take over as a protectorate or in any other form. 9 See document No. 46. 70 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY ourselves accordingly. For the necessary coorciinat ion of military operations on both sides, a representative of each Government, along with German and Russian officers, should fly to some meeting place in the operations zone we propose Bialystok to agree on what must be done. I request an immediate reply by telegraph. The change in text discussed by Gaus with Hilger has already been taken care of, RIBBBNTROP No. 71 456/223949-51 GirwL&r of the Director of th* Political Department 1 Telegram BERLIN, September IS, 1939. e. o. W V 2368. I. According to available reports * the extensive note addressed by England to the Oslo States regarding trade with Germany contained essentially the following: 1. An increase in the normal volume of exports to Germany, L e., the equivalent of the average for the last 3 years, would be considered by England as a violation of netitrality. 2. The neutrals may no longer supply Germany with any raw materials at all that are important for warfare, such as petroleum, metals, coal, and others. The decrease in total exports occasioned by their elimination must not be compensated by an increase in other exports. 3. England will not tolerate the transit of goods for Germany through neutral countries and will, if necessary, put a stop to it by capturing such goods imported by sea into these neutral countries, II. According to a report from our Embassy at Brussels, 8 the Belgian note in reply stipulated four demands as a prerequisite for any kind of negotiations : freedom of the harbors, protection of the food supply, continuation of current trade relations with all countries, and *The telegram as printed here was sent to the Missions in the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Luxembourg. Pars, iv and v were sent to the Embassy In Belgium "with reference to your No. 171 of September 12 and No. 179 [-Z78] of September 13" (see footnotes 2 and 3). Pars. it n, and in were sent to the Legation in Switzerland, i and it to the Legations in Kumania and Yugoslavia. The markings showing the distribution of the various paragraphs appear on another copy (51/33851-53). * In telegram No. 171 of Sept. 12 (450/223872-73) . Bttiow-tfchwftnte transmitted extracts in French of an alleged British note to Belgium which had been given to him by the Chilean Charge" d' Affaires, * Telegram No. 178 of Sept. 13 (456/223917-18) . The Belgian Foreign Minister had informed Btilow-Schwante, without going Into details, that the British note to Belgium contained impossible demands. According to Spaak, a similar note had also been sent to the other Oslo States, and they intended to answer along the same lines as Belgium. SEPTEMBER 1939 71 release of the ships and cargoes retained by the British. At the outcome of the conference of the Oslo States in Brussels, Belgium and Holland wanted to answer with identical notes, Sweden in the same sense but with a different text, and the other Oslo States in a similar vein. The Swiss reply is said to deviate somewhat, since the British note was worded differently. III. Please try to determine the text of the note which the government there received from England and also that of its reply thereto.* IV. You are requested to make the following communication to the Foreign Minister there in view of the new meeting of the Oslo States planned in Copenhagen on Monday : From what has become known about the British demands on the neutral states for the restriction and control of their trade with Germany, there can be no doubt that we are here dealing with an attempt by England to force the neutral states into active participation in the economic field on the side of England and France. As may be recalled, immediately at the beginning of the conflict we for our part had informed the Government there of our opinion on the significance and scope of economic neutrality and felt obligated once more formally to call the attention of the neutral governments to the fact that we had to consider as support for the enemy countries and consequently as a violation of neutrality any commitment made by a neutral government with reference to England that would affect the normal exchange and transit of goods between Germany and the country concerned. By agreeing that we would not consider the continuation of normal trade with enemy countries incompatible with neutrality, we ourselves had shown that we were ready to respect the neutrality of the countries in question also in the economic sphere, and had for this reason refrained so far from making any demands for any kind of control measures and the like. Should the neutral governments in any way comply with the British demands, we would have to reserve for ourselves complete freedom of action to counter with all possible means such participation by the neutral countries in economic warfare against us. 4 The ChargS at Oslo telegraphed that he had learned confidentially that the Norwegian Foreign Office had received the British note, although this was denied by the Director of its Political Department. The Norwegian Government was said to be still considering what reply to make (3518/E021056). The Swedish Foreign Minister had refused to talk about the matter with the German Minister, remarking that as the representative of a sovereign state he discussed Swedish-German relations with the German Minister, not Swedish-British relations (205/141866). From the other states addressed came more conciliatory replies, but none of them confirmed the existence of a British note of the character described in the Brussels report These replies, not printed, are reported in the following telegrams: (The Hague 2862/563091) ; (Copenhagen 3447/ E017265-66) ; (Helsinki B18/B003042-43) ; Luxembourg S285/E588315-16). 72 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY V. An identical communication is being sent to all Missions in the Oslo States and Bern.* A telegraphic report is requested. Addendum for The Hague alone : VI. According to a confidential report front Brussels, the Dutch attitude at the conference of the Oslo {States is said to have been very pro-British. [Substitute paragraph III for Bucharest and Belgrade:] * Please &end telegraphic report in case any similar British note lias been sent to the Government there,7 The reply from Bern is not printed <4031/KOO(iB!f2). The Swim aid they had not received a British note on th<* ex<*itangt uf guodis "like tliat received by the Oslo States." *In the copy of the document printed here. th! paragraph was incorrectly addressed to Stockholm and Helsinki ; the corrwt aUlrw*w uVt taken from another earlier draft (61/83851-33). * From Bucharest came the reply that, according to a&ftunuiWR from the Foreign Minister, no British note had been givtn to Humanta (B282/UOM8296). For the Yugoslav reply see document No. 00, and footnote 2. No. 72 ee/io7989 Memorandum by the State Secretary St.S. No. 717 BERLIN, September 15, 1939. I told the Italian Ambassador today in reply to his question regarding the Turkish attitude that the Turks seemed to have calmed down a little and, in response to a distinct Russian influence, exhibited no inclination for adventures. WlttZSACKKR No. 73 45d>/223945 Memerandtcm 5y the State Secretary St.S. No. 719 BERWEN, September 15, 1939. During his visit today, the first since his trip to Italy, the Italian Ambassador also raised the question of p^ace. He first wished me to tell him whether there was any possibility that the idea going around about a German peace offer after the elimination of the Polish army might be realized. When I told Attolico that I knew nothing of this, he himself volunteered the following : From conversations with the Duce he, Attolico* knew that Mussolini nourished the hope that a really magnanimous offer of peace made SEPTEMBER 1939 73 now, after the defeat of the Polish armed forces, might still have prospects of success with the Western Powers. Attolico did not give any detailed definition of what Mussolini meant by "really magnanimous" ; he only said he thought it would have to be a proposal which appeared tenable and did not bear the character of far-reaching intentions of conquest. When I interjected that we practically had England's answer to such a proposal even now, before it was made, Attolico implied that Mussolini would nevertheless, and probably independent of possible direct results, consider such an offer politically useful and effective. Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister. WEIZSACKER No. 74 5556/E395413-14 The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry Telegram URGENT BUCHAREST, September 16, 1939 2 : 40 a. m. No. 54:9 of September 15 Received September 16 9 : 35 a. m. W 182T g. I. The Minister President * asked me to see him and inquired, referring to previous purchases from the Czechoslovak stocks, whether Germany could not supply Rumania with really large quantities of war material from either the new booty or any other surplus stocks. On the basis of such a preliminary arrangement, Rumania could, in addition to the current short-term delivery contracts, supply us with petroleum, grain, and other products of special interest to us on an even larger scale than heretofore and with commitment for a period of several years, thereby contributing decisively towards meeting our needs in the event of a war of even several years' duration. He stressed the political importance of such agreements at times like these and added that he wished by this offer to give Germany a token of his good will. The offer represents an extension of the large-scale economic agreement in the conclusion of which he had been instrumental2 I availed myself of the opportunity to call the Minister President's attention to the necessity for strict observance of the neutrality provisions and to outline to him the seriousness of the situation in the case of any violation.3 He again promised compliance with the assurances given. *Armand Calinescn. 3 See vol. vi, document No. 78. *The word Vorstoss ("advance") used here probably is a typograpliical error far Versto*8 ("violation"). 74 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY II. I have talked over with Minister Clodius the question of such long-term delivery contracts. Although it is reasonably certain, in view of the orderly development of the economic treaty during the past few years and the present attitude of the Rumanian Government, that the negotiations currently conducted here by Clodius would ensure the supply of large quantities of raw materials and grain by Rumania even in the absence of any such long-term obligation, still the long-term commitment proposed by the Minister President provided that war material deliveries from th booty are possible at all (group garbled) still be of great economic advantage because it would provide us with the necessary funds to pay for even increased deliveries over a prolonged period* I need not particularly point out the political importance of such an agreement at the present moment. I request telegraphic instructions*4 - FABRIOIUS * See document No. Ill* No, 75 174/186127 The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Telegram URGB3STT TOKYO, Keplcmlttr !f> 1939 5: 45 p, m. No, 460 of September 16 Received Sept ember 1(5 12 : 30 p. m. For the Foreign Minister personally. With reference to your telegram No. 835 of September i), 1 and my telegram No. 417 of September 8,* Key officials of the Foreign Ministry and Army have again confirmed to me that Ambassador Oshima will for the present remain in Berlin. The Cabinet, they say, has so decided at the insistence of the Army. Danger of his departure comes only from Qahima himself, who, from a Japanese (group garbled) responsibility, has repeatedly requested his recall I shall request Prince Kanin in the forthcoming audience to use his high authority personally to calm Oshima, On 1 Document No. 40. *Not printed (174/130059). SEPTEMBER 1939 75 No. 76 32V193130 An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Legation in Lithuania Telegram MOST URGENT [BERLIN,] September 16, 1939 7 : 45 p. m. BTo. 219 of September 16 e. o, RM 480. Teletype from special train Heinrich, September 16 (received 2 p.m.)- For Minister Zechlin. The Foreign Minister asks that you now drop the subject of Vilna ; please do not respond should it be taken up again by Lithuania, but rather cut short any conversation on the subject. ScmvoDT No. 77 174/136128-29 The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign, Ministry Telegram TTRGBNT TOKYO, September 16, 1939 8 : 25 p. m. SECRET Received September 16 5 : 45 p. m. No. 463 of September 16 For the Foreign Minister personally. With reference to your telegram No. 335 of September 9.1 In numerous conversations this week with leading personalities of the Foreign Ministry, the armed forces, commerce, political groups, and the press I have made extensive use of the Foreign Minister's line of thought and found increasing appreciation of the necessity for a settlement between Japan and Russia. Today's agreement over Nomonhan represents the first practical step. 2 From this I expect a far-reaching effect on Japanese sentiment in the direction of our policy. To impel Japan along this road against the opposition of the pro- British group, which is not to be underestimated, I see the following 1 Document No. 40. a On Sept. 16, following conversations in Moscow between the Japanese Ambassador and M. Molotov, It was announced that an armistice had been reached in the Manchukuo-Mongolia border fighting *n which Soviet and Japanese as well as local troops had been engaged throughout the summer of 1939. Both sides were to retain the positions held on Sept. 15 and a mixed commission was to delimit the disputed frontier. 260090 54 11 76 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY possibilities for German influence on the basis of the aforesaid conversations : 1. Influencing Russia to pve up her support <>f Chinmi; Kai-shek. My informants indicate that in return Japan ini^ht possibly recognize Russian Mongolia, Sinkian^uiul Tibet, its Russian spheres of interest. 2. Influencing Russia to meet Japanese wishes with regard to oil fields in Sakhalin through a lonjMenii agreement. Thereby the Navy's misgivings re^ardin^ a conflict with Kn^hnid \vouhl i>e substantially weakened,, 3. For the development of Russian-Japanese relations I consider it urgently necessary to send an influential Russian ambassador to the Russian Embassy here, which for months has been entrusted to an ineffective charge, If and when such a settlement with Russia will result in committing Japan against England will to a large extent depend on the development of the military situation in Europe. The idea of joint action with Russia against India is, to be sure, beginning to have a suggestive effect on activist circles ami prominent representatives of the Xuvy. However, since Japan has to cany on her struggle with England in China, for the time being and since there are increasing indications that England and France are ready to make tactical concessions there, I consider an unequivocal anil unreserved support of the tenacious Japanese efforts toward the creation and recognition of a Central Chinese government, extending even to the severance of our relations with Chiang Kai-shek, as an effective weapon of our Japanese policy that is denied other powers, Orr No. 78 The Ambassador in the Koniet I'fifan to the Foreign Telegram MOST URGENT Moscow, September 16, 1039 10: 20 p. m. TOP SECRET Received September 17 6 : 00 a, m, No. 371 of September 16 With reference to your telegram No. 360 of September 15.1 I saw Molotov at 6 o'clock today and carried out instructions. Molotov declared that military intervention by tlie Soviet Union was imminent perhaps even tomorrow or the day after. Stalin was at present in consultation with the military leaders and he would this a l>oeument No. 70. SEPTEMBER 1939 77 very night, in the presence of Molotov, give me the day and hour of the Soviet advance, Molotov added that he would present my communication to his Government but he believed that a joint communique was no longer needed; the Soviet Government intended to justify its procedure as follows : The Polish State had disintegrated and no longer existed ; therefore, all agreements concluded with Poland were void; third powers might try to profit by the chaos which had arisen ; the Soviet Union considered itself obligated to intervene to protect its Ukrainian and White Russian brothers and make it possible for these unfortunate people to work in peace. The Soviet Government intended to publicize the above train of thought by the radio, press, etc., immediately after the Bed Army had crossed the border, and at the same time communicate it in an official note to the Polish Ambassador here and to all the missions here. Molotov conceded that the projected argument of the Soviet Government contained a note that was jarring to German sensibilities but asked us in view of the difficult situation of the Soviet Government not to stumble over this piece of straw. The Soviet Government unfortunately saw no possibility of any other motivation, since the Soviet Union had heretofore not bothered about the plight of its minorities in Poland and had to justify abroad, in some way or other, its present intervention. In conclusion, Molotov urgently asked for an explanation of what was to become of Vilna. The Soviet Government absolutely wanted to avoid a clash with Lithuania and would therefore like to know whether some agreement had been reached with Lithuania regarding the Vilna region, particularly as to who was to occupy the city. SCHTJIJENBTJRG No. 79 472/228/T&6. : 472/228759-61 Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary WeizsacTcer Moscow, September 16, 1939. DEAR MR. STATE SECRETARY : I have the honor to send you herewith various memoranda of conversations I have had here, which are perhaps not without interest. I hope that I have conducted myself correctly toward Mr. Togo. I have had no detailed instructions in this regard. I have proceeded 78 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY on the basis of my judgment that it is more advantageous for us if during the war Japan favors our group rather than our enemies.1 With best regards and Heil Hitler ! Yours, etc. F. 1$ [Enclosure 11 Moscow, September 7, 1939. Yesterday and today I had two lengthy conversations with the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Togo, on Japanese-Soviet relations* From the statements of the Ambassador, it seemed to me that the following could be inferred : Mr. Togo is personally of the opinion that an improvement in Japanese-Soviet relations is desirable from the Japanese standpoint "although Japan has now got rid of England and Franco in the Far East and has a free hand in China*" (I interjected : "Another service, therefore, that we have rendered Japan.**) In Tokyo itself they seem to incline toward Mr. Togo's opinion but they have obviously not yet made a definite decision ; at any rate, the Ambassador has as yet no instructions that would permit him to approach the Soviet Government, Mr. Togo realizes that the first step toward an improvement of Japanese-Soviet relations must be the settlement of the border incidents on the Mongolian-Maztchurinn frontier, which, it is said, are still fraught with great dungare. Ho has already spoken about the subject with Deputy Foreign Commissar Lossovsky, so that the theoretical question as to whether these matters are to be negotiated by Japan and the Soviet Union or only by Outer Mongolia and Manchuria has already been decided in favor of the former view. I urged Mr. Togo to work earnestly for improvement of Japanese- Soviet relations and particularly the settlement of the Manchurian- Mongolian border incidents. The adjustment of existing differences would doubtless be very advantageous to both countries; 1 was convinced that he would not meet with a refusal on the part of the Soviets. I added that I was at his disposal if I could bo useful in the matter in any way. A condition for this was, however, as I saw it, the assurance that Tokyo shared the views and opinions of Mr. Togo. Mr. Togo thanked me very much for my helpful attitude but said that at present the inclusion of a third party could only complicate the matter. He would be grateful if I would, when the occasion presented itself, draw M. Molotov's attention to the advantages that an. *In his reply of Sept, 29 (472/228763) WeisssHcker said : "The line you have taken with Ambassador TOKO corresponds to our intentions here. We would welcome further progress toward a Russo-Japanese settlement, and would be prepared to assist the Japanese to that end, insofar as they desire our assistance."
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Should the Government there bring up the subject of the trip, I recommend that you point out the need for thoroughgoing, technical preparation. If occasion arises, please report by wire. 2. A large-scale program for raw material deliveries, exceeding many times the figures of the Agreement of August IS),* is being considered here for submission to the Russians, This program contemplates also the delivery of raw materials which the Soviet Union must in turn purchase in other countries, particularly non-ferrous metals. Please telegraph your opinion on the extent of the Soviet Union's export capacity at the present moment in view of her intervention in Poland, and what schedule the Embassy thinks could be proposed as the basis for negotiations. In doing so it should be kept in mind that compensation in the form of additional machine tool deliveries is out of the question. 3. The question of transport is particularly important for the agreements with the Soviet Union and the transit shipments. Please give your opinion on this point> too, SCHNOTRE 1 See vol. vir, document No. 181. No. 83 51/88857 The Director of the Economic Policy Department to thLegation in Denmark Telegram No. 270 BBKUN, September 17, 19S9. W V 2389. With reference to your No. 133 of September 14.1 From the previous telegram it is evident that even official Danish circles are unclear about the relationship between the applicable clause in the Non-Aggreasion Pact and HassclPs statements concerning economic neutrality on the one hand and the rules of naval warfare on the other. The clause in the Non-Aggression Pact represents merely an assurance to Denmark that we do not consider the continuation of normal deliveries to an enemy country as conduct violating neutrality nor would we apply any such interpretation to our relations with Denmark Hassell, too, merely stressed the principle of the maintenance of the normal exchange of goods by neutral countries with countries at war and gave assurance that we would observe this principle in relation to Denmark. Both of these assurances, however, 1 See document No. 66. SEPTEMBER 1939 83 naturally have nothing whatever to do with the right obtaining in the relations between enemy countries to cut off from one another certain supplies in accordance with the rules of naval warfare, even supplies coming from neutral countries. Naturally we cannot waive this right, particularly since England is known to be employing it to the fullest extent against us. It never even occurred to us to renounce tacitly this right by means of the two assurances, and Denmark could never assume that this was so. Any attempts on the part of Denmark to accord to the two statements such a, far-reaching and disproportionate significance should therefore hardly be taken seriously. Please make use of the above ideas at some convenient opportunity vis-a-vis the Government there, but not until after the pending meeting of the Oslo countries in Copenhagen.2 WTOECI* 'In a telegram of Sept 18 (247/163926-27), Benthe-Fink reported that lie and Walter had seen Foreign Minister Munch that day and had carried out the instruction printed above. Munch, "deeply impressed," argued that in the circumstances there was no occasion for Germany to extend her anti-blockade measures to normal Danish food exports to Britain, and also that this would not be in the spirit of the Danish-German agreement or of Hassell's statements. Then in telegram No. 149 of Sept. 19 (51/33867-68), Renthe-Fink reported that Secretary- General Mohr of the Danish Foreign Ministry had that day told "Walter that the Foreign Ministers of Norway, Sweden, and Finland agreed with Munch that the latest German statement constituted a complete change of position. The four Governments, whose Foreign Ministers were now meeting in Copenhagen, had interpreted HasselFs utterances as indicating German approval for normal exports, but now the whole system seemed to collapse. The Danes also explained the catastrophic effect on Danish economy should Germany cut Danish exports to England. Renthe-Fink reported that he and Walter agreed that the Danish anxieties were justified, and pointed out that such a situation would also increase Germany's economic burdens. No. 84 115'/117dl9-2O Memorandum *by the Director of the Political Department BERLIN", September 17, 1939. As directed, I informed the Lithuanian Minister of the following today : We had learned from a reliable source that the Lithuanian Ministers in the countries which are at war with us France and England had been told to communicate with them regarding certain confidential German-Lithuanian conversations on the Vilna question, adding and there was not a grain of truth in this that in these conversations we had subjected the Lithuanian Government to the strongest possible pressure. We could only term insolent the mere 84 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY fact of the communication, and especially the statements which were completely contrary to the truth. It was completely immaterial to us whether Lithuania received Vilna or not. If the Lithuanian Government took the stand which was indicated by this communication, then they should understand that we would have to draw our own conclusions. I added that our Minister in Kaunas had been instructed to make a communication of the same content to the Lithuanian Government and by that time had probably already carried out his instructions. M. Skirpa listened with smiling courtesy to this communication, which was made in a very grave tone, and then explained that he had just been informed by his Government that Minister Zechlin had made the following statement in Kaunas: The Reich Foreign Minister was very indignant about tin* information he had received to the effect that he had exerted pressure on Lithuania to break her neutrality and march into Vilna. IVI mister Zechlin had received the answer that this information could not come from a Lithuanian source and was completely incorrect. The Lithuanian missions abroad had not even been informed on the Vilna question. He himself could add that he, for his part, had also not received any information that Lithuanian Ministers abroad had been concerned with the matter. M, Skirpa said that the statement which I made went even further than the one given in Kaunas, to which I replied that in content the statements were no doubt identical. In addition, the explanation given in Kaunas did not seem to me correct, because I was sure that our source was incontestable. The Minister then requested information on the demarcation line between Germany and the Soviet Union. I told him curtly that I could not answer that question. I termed his further question whether there was not danger of a German-Russian clash completely misdirected [abwegig'] and broke off the conversation at that point/ As he left, I told the Minister that the communication was not directed against his person. WOERMANNT No. 85 241&/51127&-80 Memorandum "by the Director of the Political Department September 17, 1939. Immediately to Under State Secretary Gaus.1 The question of a demarche with the United States before Congress convenes has been discussed here with Ambassador Dieckhoff. He A marginal note states that the raemorandvira was transmitted by courier to Gatis, who was with the Foreign Minister on the latter*** special train near Hitler's headquarters at the Polish front. SEPTEMBER 1939 85 has the following objections, which are shared here, against a demarche especially concerned with the American neutrality policy : "President Roosevelt and the American Administration are advancing quite systematically toward their goal of aiding Britain and France. In view of the attitude of the President it cannot be expected that even the most impressive elucidation of the German point of view and of the threat to American-German relations resulting from a modification of the Neutrality Act would divert him from his policy. He has been pursuing his course consistently for years ; through his attitude he bears the main responsibility for the stiffening of British policy in recent months, and in view of this man's determination and stubbornness, a change in his stand is not to be expected. On the contrary, at this very moment when the British position appears endangered he will redouble his efforts to make United States assistance available to Britain as far as possible. "In view of the President's lack of scruples it may be expected that he would misuse such a friendly step by Germany, publicize it, and give it the character of German interference in internal American affairs, a German warning, or even a threat. A man such as Roosevelt would not find it difficult to misrepresent a step of ours in that direction. He would then be in a position to arouse his people against such German interference and thereby intensify the animosity against Germany already prevalent in broad sectors of the population. Furthermore, he would accuse his opponents in Congress of making common cause with Germany and thus compromise as pro-German men such as Borah, Nye, etc." This concludes Ambassador Dieckhoff's remarks. On the other hand it would be unnatural simply to let the relations between Germany and the United States deteriorate without at least making an attempt to check such a development. A demarche with the United States should therefore not deal with the neutrality policy, but should be of a more general character. Considering the conditions in Washington and especially the publicity the Americans would give to a step taken by Thomsen with Hull, it would be preferable to make the demarche in Berlin with the American Charg4 d'Affaires. A conversation with him, approved in this form by Ambassador Dieckhoff , might contain something like the following : 2 1. We have no war aims which threaten the United States, the American continent, or any other American interests in any way whatsoever. 2. With respect to the war at sea which, as experienced in previous wars, can play a decisive part in impairing relations between neutral and belligerent countries, the German intentions have already been stated before the whole world. We are conducting cruiser warfare in accordance with generally recognized international rules. Our original contraband list could not have been more favorable for the neutrals. Changes in the contraband list were effected by us only * No documents have been found to indicate that such a conversation took place. 86 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY when absolutely necessary and will also be made henceforth only when absolutely necessary in order to keep pace with measures taken by the enemy. We have already declared that we are willing to revoke orders issued in retaliation for British measures, if the enemy does the same. 3. We therefore see no reason why German-American relations should deteriorate, or even remain in their present unsatisfactory state. The way to prevent that would be an open and friendly discussion of all the differences of opinion that might arise in the course of the war. The German Government is prepared to engage in such a discussion, provided the American Government also desires to follow a policy not aimed at aggravating the political situation between the United States and Germany, No. 86 Memorandum "by the Head of Political Division IX BERLIN, September 17, 1939. Subject: Pan American Conference at Panama, Following an invitation from President Roosevelt, the representatives of all American governments will meet for a Pan American Conference at Panama on September 21 or, according to Chilean reports, on the 23rd. According to the draft program, which has been communicated by the Legation in Guatemala, the conference is to deal with measures to ensure the neutrality and the maintenance of peace in the Western Hemisphere, to guarantee legitimate* international trade and the communications of the American republics, and to protect their commercial and financial interests as well as their economic cooperation. It is to be anticipated, however, that the United States of America will greatlj enlarge the program and emphatically promote the policy which it initiated at previous Pan American Conferences. This policy aims at uniting North and South America as t o military policy through a military defense pact, and at coordinating the foreign policy of the Ibero-American countries with that of North America in respect to the European conflict. The ABC states, especially Argentina, will in all probability oppose this because they do not want the conclusion of any agreements that would debase the neutrality of the Ibero-American countries into some sort of preliminary state of war. It is therefore believed in Ibero-American circles that the wishes of the United States will meet with considerable opposition at the Panama Conference. Nevertheless, it may be expected in view of the far-reaching economic depend SEPTEMBER 1939 87 ency of the Central American countries on the USA that they are more likely to yield to North American pressure than are the economically stronger ABC states. The following measures have been taken on our part: I. Political: a. Our Missions in the Ibero-American countries have been instructed x to use all their connections to prevail upon the governments to insist on absolute neutrality even in the event that the United States should enter the war. &. A long article by Megerle in the Berliner Borsenzeitwig^ which expounds the German position on the neutrality question in relation to the Pan American Conference, has been circulated in Latin America by radio and cable. o. The Missions have been instructed 2 to make every possible use of Franco's radio address of September 4 in order to strengthen the neutral attitude. d. Demarches 3 have been made with the Italian and Spanish Governments to induce them to bring their influence to bear on the Ibero- American Governments in opposition to Anglo-American imperialism and any departure from strict neutrality. e. Minister Reinebeck and Secretary of Legation Leisewitz have been ordered to Panama for the duration of the conference. The Press Division has arranged to send Herr Zapp and Herr Sell* II. Economic: a. Argentina, as reported, 4 has reiterated her declaration, made at various Pan American conferences, that the supply of foodstuffs, etc. for the civilian populations of the belligerent states must not be interfered with. Our Missions in Latin America have been instructed * to give their full support to this Argentine stand and to induce the Governments in question to issue similar declarations. &. We have furthermore instructed 8 our Missions to declare to the Ibero-American countries that we are determined to continue our trade as much as possible. c. After our circular telegram 7 on the publication of the German contraband list our Missions in Latin America were advised that until we are compelled by England to adopt a different practice, we shall stop goods listed as conditional contraband only if they are destined for enemy armed forces or governmental agencies; that is, we are taking exactly the same stand as that which Argentina is attempting. a Not printed; Circular PoL IX 1893 of Sept. 13 (456/223903-05). 9 Not printed (8525/E597504W)5). Not printed (4497/E105438-40). 4 Telegram No. 347 of Sept. 9 : Not printed (8524/E597486) . "Not printed (S524/E597489-92). Not printed (8524/E597480-82, E597484). 7 Not printed (851S/E597426-31). 88 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY he missions will again be comprehensively instructed, tlirough ditional cablegram * with reference to the Panama Conference, ourage the Ibero-American countries to a strong stand against ossible conduct by England contrary to international law. Submitted herewith to the Under State Secretary. 'Not printed (8524/B597497-^9>. No. 87 1 1S SEPTEMBER 1939 89 the Foreign Ministry immediately and act according to its instructions should he come to me again in behalf of the Quai d'Orsay. In response to a question by me, Blanche said in strictest confidence that many people in France believed that England had dragged France into the most calamitous \Jatae~\ situation, and these people were beginning to exert pressure on the Quai d'Orsay to find an honorable way out of it, since they would regard intensification of the war between France and Germany as a catastrophe. Naturally at the moment, it was strongly desired in the Quai d'Orsay that such views not be expressed publicly and also that his mission be kept entirely confidential. I replied to Blanche that I would keep his visit strictly confidential and merely report it to the Foreign Ministry at once. I also told him I was not authorized to make any statements to him regarding our policy toward France going beyond what the Führer has repeatedly declared, namely, that we want nothing from France and would be very sorry if the youth of France were to smash their heads against our West Wall. Blanche left me with the remark that he would presumably return in a week.3 BADOWITZ " The secret diary of Radowitz in the files of the Luxembourg Mission has the following entries : Sept. 17 : " 'Weisse* conies to see me at 5. Then a most urgent report to State Secretary von WeizsScker is taken to Trier by Kurt Bauer and leaves Trier at 1 : 00 a. m." ( 8302/E589651 ) The entry for Sept. 25 states : "About 2 : 30 today 'Weisse' visited me again. Record of this visit goes to State Secretary von WeizsScker at 8 : 00 this evening through K[urt] B[auer]. By special delivery letter from Trier. In my sealed private file in the money safe. . . . At 10: 50 p. m. K['urt] B[auer] brings official mail from Trier. There is a letter from State Secretary WeizsScker (Weisse) . Put in my private file." (8302/E589659) Neither this letter nor anything further on the incident has been found. No. 88 B21/B005114^15 The Charge d?Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Telegram WASHINGTON, September 18, 1939 8 : 18 a. m. No. 382 of September 18 Received September 19 8 : 15 a. m. In addition to the sinking of American ships, it was the alleged German acts of sabotage in the United States of America which largely contributed to the entry of the United States into the World War. Through British and American propaganda it has become axiomatic with the American people to regard those acts of sabotage as dangerous German attacks upon American sovereignty in violation of 90 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY international law, regardless of any overriding interests of belligerent powers, and such acts are still fresh in their memory owing to the damage suits which until quite recently have constantly been in the public eye. 1 If Germany should permit the sabotage idea to revive in any form whatsoever, this would be promptly and extensively exploited by Eoosevelt, interventionist circles, and enemy propaganda as a fervently desired German provocation and a dangerous act of aggression by Germany against the United States of America. Roosevelt could thereby not only completely silence his domestic opposition, but the latter would even support his anti-Uermun policy. The New York espionage trial 2 has already shown how the anti-German propaganda in this country makes use of sabotage arguments. In view of the hostility toward Germany we alone would be blamed by the entire American people for any such attacks on American sovereignty, and they would not be considered the result of Roosevelt's policies. This would only rentier American public opinion the more responsive to the need urged by Roosevelt for vigorous assistance, also of a military nature, to Britain and France. In agreement with our armed forces uttuclrfs I therefore request that the possibility of German sabotage in the United States of America not be used either politically or for propaganda purposes in any manner whatsoever. I have instructed the Consuls to caution German nationals in their districts very emphatically against any ill-uclvi&ul actions, should this be necessary. For the purposes of German policy on the arms embargo, the following basic observations can be made : The sympathies of the overwhelming majority of the American people are with our enemies, and America is convinced of Germany's war guilt. The isolationists can therefore defend the arms embargo only if Roosevelt and their other opponents cannot accuse* them of supporting the German disturbers of the peace in opposition to general American opinion. The isolationists are avoiding the question of war guilt and concentrating their propaganda on the fact that America has * On June 15, 1J)39, after some 15 years of litigation, the German-American Mixed Claims Commission, following the withdrawal of the Gorman Commissioner earlier In the year and charges of false testimony by Germans, found Germany responsible for sabotage in the Black Tom Bock and Kingsland ammunition plant explosions of 1036 and 1017. On Oct. 30 the claimants were awarded damages then valued at about 50 million dollars A \%2r Germans were convicted in a New York Federal District Court on Dec. 2, 1938, on charges of military espionage and sentenced to 2-6 year terms of imprisonment. SEPTEMBER 1939 91 no vital interests in Europe, is not directly threatened by anybody, thanks to her geographic position, and therefore is able to keep out of the European conflict. We must thus avoid everything which might disturb this policy of the isolationists and create the impression that our interests are identical with those of the isolationists. Our radio and press should also bear this constantly in mind. This is especially necessary at present, since experienced political observers are convinced that Roosevelt will succeed in abolishing the arms embargo, although the effect on this question of Russia's invasion of Poland cannot yet be foreseen. As matters stand today, any strengthening of our position whereby the defeat of Britain and France is made to seem a real possibility will not diminish but rather will markedly increase America's desire and determination to intervene. It would therefore be regrettable if the possible defeat of the isolationists in the arms embargo question were to be exploited in this country as a defeat of our policy. THOMSEN No. 89 8514/33597401 The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 174 of September 18 RIGA, September 18, 1939 1 : 57 p. m. Received September 18 4 : 15 p. m. Pol. V 8961. Immediately after the Russian invasion [of Poland] was announced Munters called me to find out the position of the German Government. Excitement in official circles and the public is extraordinarily strong. Munters took it for granted that the Russians had made a previous agreement with Germany and asked whether I knew to what point it had been agreed the Russians would advance and whether "unintentional" violations of the Latvian and Lithuanian borders were to be expected. I tried to calm him by referring to the mutual nonaggression pacts and the Russian declaration to the Latvian Minister, but otherwise had to refuse to answer his questions because of lack of official instructions. He urgently requested further information in case I should learn more from my Government. Please send instructions, if possible, for guidance of my conversations. 26009054 12 92 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 90 103/111604 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT Moscow, September 18, 1930 8 : 59 p, m, TOP SECRET Received September 18 5 : 45 p, m. No. 385 of September 18 In the course of the conversation which I had last night with Stalin about the dispatch of a Soviet commission to Bialystok, as well as the publication of a joint communique, Stalin said, somewhat suddenly, that on the Soviet side there were certain doubts as to whether the German High Command at the appropriate time would stand by the Moscow agreements and would withdraw to the line that had been agreed upon (Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San) . I replied with emphasis that of course Germany was firmly determined to fulfill the terms of the Moscow agreements precisely, and I referred to point 2 of the communication made by me to Molotov on September 16 in accordance with the instructions of the Foreign Minister (see your telegram No. 360 of September 15 )* I declared that it would be suitable for the High Command to withdraw to the line which had been agreed upon since, in this way, troops could be made available for the Western Front, Stalin replied that he had no doubt at all of the good faith of the German Government. His concern was based on the well-known fact that all military men aro loath to give up occupied territories* At this point the German Military Attach^, Lieutenant General Kostring, who was present, interjected that the German armed forces would do just as the Führer ordered. In view of Stalin's well-known attitude of mistrust, I would be gratified if I were authorized to make a further declaration of such a nature as to remove his last doubts.* SCHULBNBTJRG 1 Document No* 70, *The draft (644/254854-56) of this telegram found in the fll** of the Moscow Embassy contained two sentences deleted before dispatch. The first preceded and the second followed the last sentence of the document an printed here: "Stalin declared he was reassured on this score. . . , Indicative of Stalin's mistrust is his comment that there may be p*K>ple in Germany who thought that the Soviet Union might make common cause with the defeated !N*h> against Germany." SEPTEMBER 1939 93 No. 91 103/111597 Memorandum by the State Secretary BERLIN, September 18, 1939. To the Foreign Minister's Secretariat with the request to transmit the following to the train for the Foreign Minister : Reaction to telegram No. 374 from Moscow regarding Turko- Russian assistance pact: 1 The matter should be discussed openly with the Italians. If they agree, the Soviet Government could be told that we concur in the basic idea, but parity would be preserved only if the Soviet Government were not obligated to action against Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria. WEIZSACKER 1 Document No. 81. No. 92 ,585/24(2483 Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department BERLIN;, September 18, 1939. The Bulgarian Charge d'Affaires, by the enclosed communication a to the Foreign Minister, gave notice today of the neutrality declaration of the Bulgarian Government. I thanked the Charge for the communication and told him we naturally assumed that Bulgaria would maintain an altogether benevolent neutrality toward us. The Charge replied that nothing further need be said on that subject. In the conversation that followed, M. Karastoyanov asked what attitude Bulgaria ought to take if the Soviet Union should occupy Bessarabia and at the same time offered Bulgaria Dobruja. He assumed that Rumania would then be wise enough not to imitate Poland's example and on the contrary would yield without a struggle. I replied that I did not see any indication of an imminent occupation of Bessarabia by the Soviet Union and that if such a contingency should arise, I believed the only right course for Bulgaria would be to trust us and get in touch with us. WOEKMCANN 1 Not printed (585/242484). 94 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 93 84/24084-86 Memorandum T>y t?ie State Secretary St.S. No. 734 BBRUN, September 18, 1939. The Japanese Ambassador today inquired of me at length about the situation, spoke of the visit of Take Ushi [sic] * congratulated us on the progress of the Polish campaign, etc. Finally, somewhat embarrassed, he produced the annexed document, dated August 26, regarding which he made the following statement : As I would recall, I had at the end of August dissuaded him (Oshima) from the idea of lodging the strong protest of the Japanese Government which he had been instructed to make because of the incompatibility between the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact and the secret agreement between Germany and Japan.2 Out of consideration for the German Government at that critical stage he had followed my advice. However, he could not act directly contrary to his Government. He had therefore simply wired his Government that its instruction had been carried out. In reality, however, he Oshima had postponed the demarche until now. Ho had waited until after the conclusion of the Polish campaign and was of the opinion that the step was now no longer of such gravity, especially since he had on his own authority toned down the instruction from Tokyo. He requested that the annexed note be understood in this light. I read the note, which in fact is no longer very significant, but accepted it for study only personally, and not officially. When he calls on the Foreign Minister in the near future, Oshima will himself explain the matter further. He will then add that, if we see fit, this paper may be allowed to disappear in the files. A discussion, especially of a legalistic nature, he would consider unwise and untimely. I told the Ambassador in conclusion that, as he knew, his view was not in agreement with ours, and I had hoped that the matter was finally disposed of. However, I was willing to prepare the Foreign Minister for the fact that he (Oshima) considered himself obligated to bring the matter somehow to a formal conclusion. 1 Colonel General Terauchi ; see document No. 182. "The conversation took place on Au#. 2& Weiaafceker's memorandum Is printed in vol. vn, document No. 329. The "secret agreement" WIIH the secret annex to the Anti-Comintern Pact of Nov. 25, 1936. It Included a clause that the two parties would "conclude no political treaties with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics contrary to the spirit of this Agreement without mutual consent." For the full text see vol. i, p. 734. See also document No. 11, ante. SEPTEMBER 1939 95 I did not consider it proper to refuse the Ambassador a study of the note, since Oshima is obviously trying sincerely to bring the matter to an end. WEIZSACKER [Enclosure] BuRUCtf, August 26, 1939. The Japanese Embassy has the honor, on instructions from the Japanese Government, to inform the Foreign Ministry of the Japanese Government's view of the recently concluded Non-Aggression and Consultative Pact between the German Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as follows : "The Japanese Government considers the recently concluded Non- Aggression and Consultative Pact between the German Government and the Government of the TJnion of Soviet Socialist Eepublics to be contrary to the Secret Additional Agreement to the Agreement against the Communist International." No. 94 127/69766-70 Hemoranditan T>y an Official of the Embassy in the Soviet Union Moscow, September 18, 1939. Subject: Publication of joint Soviet-German communique. On September 17 at 3 p. m., the draft of a joint German-Soviet communique was transmitted by telephone with instructions to obtain the consent of the Soviet Government to the publication of such a communique on September 18. The text of this draft is enclosed (enclosure 1) . On September 17 at 11 : 30 p. m., the Ambassador submitted the draft to M. Molotov for approval. The latter stated that he would have to consult with M. Stalin on the matter. M. Stalin, who was called to the meeting by telephone by M. Molotov, declared that in his opinion, too, a joint communique had to be issued, but that he could not entirely agree to the text proposed by us since it presented the facts all too frankly. \_da es den Tafbestand mit aH&u grosser Offenheit darlegeJ] Thereupon, M. Stalin wrote out a new draft in his own hand and asked that the consent of the German Government be obtained to this new draft. (See enclosure 2.) On September 18 at 12 : 30 a. m., I communicated to Under State Secretary Gaus the text of the Soviet draft. Herr Gaus stated that he could not take a stand himself on the matter and had to ascertain the decision of the Reich Foreign Minister. 96 DOCUMENTS OM GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY On September 18 at 12 o'clock noon, the Head of the Minister's Secretariat, Heir Kordt, telephoned and informed me as follows: "We agree to the Russian proposal concerning the communique and shall publish the communique in this form Tuesday in the morning papers. Ribbentrop." I immediately transmitted the above communication by telephone to M, Molotov's secretary. On September 18 at 2 : 05 p, m., Herr Kordt called up again and informed Counselor of Embassy von Tippelskirch as follows: "The communique will be published by us in some of the evening papers. Please advise the offices concerned." I Immediately apprised M, Molotov's secretary of the above-mentioned communication also. Two hours later the text of the communiqu6 appeared on the teletype and was also broadcast over the German short-wave radio. Respectfully submitted to the Ambassador; to the Counselor of Embassy. HILGEE [Note : *] : On September 18 at 7 : 15 p. m., Herr (IUUH called up and asked whether the communiqu. would be published today in the Eussian evening papers. If not, it should be broadcast today over the Soviet radio. The Reich Foreign Minister was very much interested that this be done. I told Herr Gaus that today, ixvausc it was the Russian Sunday, no evening papers had apjxMired ; that 1 would inform them further regarding the radio. At 8:00 p. in. 1 was able to let Herr Gaus know that the Soviet radio had broadcast the* communique several times since 4:00 p. m. HX[LGER] {Knclomire 1] DRAFT OF A JOINT GERMAN-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE In view of the internal incapacity of the Polish State and of the splitting apart of the nationalities living in- its fanner territory, the Reich Government and the Government of the XT. S. S. B. consider it necessary to bring to an end the intolerable political and economic conditions existing in these territories. They regard it as their joint task to restore peace and order in these, their natural spheres of interest, and to bring about a new order by the creation of natural frontiers and viable economic organizations. *A handwritten postscript. SEPTEMBER 1939 97 [Enclosure 2] * In order to avoid all kinds of unfounded rumors concerning the respective aims of the German and Soviet forces which are operating in Poland, the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the U. S. S. R. declare that the operations of these forces do not involve any aims which are contrary to the interests of Germany and of the Soviet Union, or to the spirit or the letter of the Non-Aggression Pact concluded between Germany and the U. S. S. R. On the contrary, the aim of these forces is to restore peace and order in Poland, which had been destroyed by the disintegration of the Polish State, and to help the Polish population to establish new conditions for its political life [die Bedingrungen seines staatlicTien JDaseins neu &u> re * A note in Schulenburg's hand reads : "Stalin draft. September 18, 1939." No. 95 2196/473,616^-17 Minister Erdmcvrmsdorff to State Secretary Wei&sacker CONITOENTIAI, BUDAPEST, September 18, 1939. DEAR HEKR VON WEIZSACKKR : Count Csaky told me today, on the occasion of a visit, that the Hungarian Minister to the Quirinal, who was here at present, had informed him that Mussolini seemed rather depressed during his latest conversation with him. He was not certain whether this was due to ill health, as had repeatedly been asserted, or to the fact that Mussolini felt isolated in Italy by his policy of unconditional collaboration with Germany. Qount Csaky expressed concern that if Rumania should persist in her opposition to a landing in Constanta,1 the troops standing by for embarkation in France might be landed in Salonika or even on the Dalmatian coast, in case Italy carried her neutral attitude to extremes. In this connection he was also concerned over the continuing army inductions in Yugoslavia, where close to 800,000 men were at present already under arms, as well as over the spirit of the memorandum by fifteen Yugoslav generals, which Count Csaky gave me and which is being sent to the Foreign Ministry by the same courier.2 For all these reasons Count Cs&ky, who has for a long time been personally very close to Mussolini, is considering going to Italy some time soon in order to orient himself. But being most anxious to avoid any possible misinterpretation of such a trip in Germany, he has asked 1 This refers to rumors about an impending landing in Rumania of Anglo- French forces. See document No. 50. a Not printed (3082/613360-63). 98 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY me to make unofficial soundings as to whether the Foreign Minister had any objections to such a trip* I would therefore request that you send me telegraphic instructions with regard to this matter,* Incidentally, Count Cs&ky told me that he had bwn called a German satellite by the Leftist Opposition in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Deputies and "German dog" by a section of the British press. When we discussed Hungarian-Rumanian relations he emphasized that he would rather die than break his word given to the Foreign Minister that Hungary would in no circumstances attack Rumania without Germany's concurrence. In accordance with the wish of the Reich Foreign Minister for the friendliest possible development of Hungarian-Yugoslav relations he hud said especially conciliatory things with reference to Yugoslavia in tho Fowign Committees of Parliament.4 With cordial greetings, Heil Hitler! Yours, etc. KUDMANNSDOKIT Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "IForJ 4 In a memorandum of S>t*j>t. 23 Paul Srhiuldt of tho Foreign Minister's Secretariat recorded the following: "TIio Foreign Mlnlxter l of the opinion tfcat no answer should bo matU* to Count <'wftky*s inquiry as to whothor thoro might be objections to such a trip Hinoo an aff!riuativ* roply might oiiviiy \w HilnuHed by Count Oaky in Home to justify certain BtopB not tioHired by Germany (2196/473618) No, 96 1571/880183-84 The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry Toh*gram MOST URGENT BOMB, September 10, 1930 2 : 50 p. nx No. 527 of September 19 Received September 19 4 : 50 p. m. During this morning's conversation Count Ciano held forth at some length on Italo-Greek relations. Because of its very grave concern over Italian troop concentration* at the Albanian frontier recently confirmed to me also by the Greek Minister here the Greek Government had some time ago approached the Italian Minister here for a talk on Greek-Italian relations, prompted by the desire to clarify and ease the situation. In doing so, Greece was obviously influenced to some extent by the realization of England's declining prestige. Discussions conducted in Athens had led to the result that a joint communique which had been drafted by the Greeks and still required the Duce's approval will probably be issued tomorrow along somewhat SEPTEMBER 1939 99 these lines : the Greeks acknowledge that in withdrawing troop units from the Albanian-Greek border (which troops, as Ciano added, will remain in Albania but be moved further north) the Italians had furnished proof that Italy's repeated assurances of her desire to live in peace with her neighbors need not be doubted, while the Italians take notice of the fact that the Greeks for their part are rescinding certain military countermeasures. Thus at the present moment of high political tension both countries are confirming the friendly character of their relations. This should not preclude further development, however ; on the contrary a pact of neutrality, nonaggression and consultation should follow in the near future. Some preparatory work had also been done in this regard. Since Italy did not wish to take the initiative, however, the Greeks had asked him to supply them with a draft of a treaty which they would then submit to the Italians. Ciano expects this move to have favorable effects, not least on Turkey's attitude. Italy could afford to accept a settlement of this sort because Greece was set not across Italy's course, but apart from her objectives in the Balkans, which were to be found rather in the direction of Yugoslavia. Besides, Greece was such a poor country that nothing was to be gained there. He added, smiling, that things might perhaps be different if that were not the case.1 1 In a telegram sent on Sept. 20 (583/242198) , Woerrnann inquired of Mackensen whether the Italo-Greek neutrality pact under consideration was to apply to the present war or to a future case in which either country should become involved in a war with a third power. Mackensen replied in a telegram of Sept. 22 (1848/421079), that Ciano's aim was a Greek commitment to preserve neutrality not only in the present war but also in any future war between Italy and a third power. No. 97 583/2421&S-94 The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT ROME, September 19, 1939 : 05 p. m. No. 528 of September 19 Received September 19 6 : 25 p. m. For the Foreign Minister. Count Ciano expressed himself in today's conversation with evident pleasure over the Foreign Minister's telephone call the day before yesterday. 1 He was particularly gratified to learn that Russia's action was entirely within the program agreed upon. The conclusion of the first phase of the war now was to be expected at any moment. x No record of this telephone conversation has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry ; but see The Ciano Diaries, entry for Sept. 17. 100 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY The second phase, which would open shortly, would soon decide whether there would be an wirly pewc% through a generous gesture by the Führer, or an otherwise inevitable general conflagration. The former appeared to him possible only after France had once been exposed to sharp German military action,3 For the rest, he added, we are working and will unremittingly continue to work toward providing against all contingencies. Trnnsj>orts to Libya were moving unhampered and Italy would have I85,(M)0 men there by the end of this month, while she would be adequately prepared also in Albania and the Dodecanese. Talks with the British and French Ambassadors, who were calling on him frequently of late under pretexts of every kind, had furnished no information of any consequence on. further developments.3 Daladier was intent on treating Rome in the most considerate manner. Count Cmno cited as an instance that Duladier had promptly complied with his request to leave, unmolested our Ambassadors and Ministers who hud departed on Italian ships calling at Cannes, and furthermore had without delay returned Italian and German diplomatic pouches and nmil bags recently found on Italian ships stopped by the French, this hitter, however, with the explicit request, that the matter he treated us strictly secret, since France could not make similar concessions to ships of other nations, As regards Franco's attitude, Ambassador Gambara had recently made a very affirmative report. The Cuudillo apparently had recovered from his initial dismay over German-Russian cooperation, which at first had caused him graves concern because* of its impact on the Spanish people, whose memory of the war against the Reds was still too fresh and whose church circles, moreover, always saw in Moscow the Antichrist, with whom there could be no compromise. Franco now was again solidly aligned with the Axis. This was evidenced also by the reinforcements ordered by him on the Pyrenees border and, to the great distress of the British, before Gibraltar. Moreover, lie had assured Gambara that he had concentrated so many troops in Morocco today that his strength there was equal to that of the French. MACKBNSEK Attolico, however, in a conversation with Wels&H&eker on Sept. 21, the view that "concrete peace plans" wotild find a hearing in France, Welzsacker recorded that he did not know whether the Ambassador, In these and other remarks suggesting a move for peace, was speaking on specific instructions from Rome, but thought it likely that they expressed the Italian Government's views. Attolico also argued that to have Riven the Soviet Union half of Poland robbed Germany of much of her bargaining power In a peace settlement (495/- 233416-17), * Weizsficker wrote in a memorandum of Sept. 10 (456/224075) that Attolico had taken occasion, without any inquiry on WelJBsacker's part, to explain that the visits of the French and British Ambassadors to Oiano were purely routine and that "there* existed not the shadow of diplomatic negotiations." Weiass&cker noted that these uwsurunces "apparently seemed necessary to the Italians." SEPTEMBER 1939 101 No. 98 4O6/21442T-28 The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 147 of September 19 TAIXINN, September 19 [1939] 11 : 48 p. m. Received September 20 2 : 45 a. m. The Foreign Minister * expressed great concern today over Soviet Russia's invasion of Poland. Considering the unpredictable nature of the Soviet Russians, one could not foresee whether that country's expansion in Europe would not likewise be directed against the Baltic countries. It was important to know whether Germany would still be willing and able to assist these countries in a given case. The Minister then read me a press report from Turkey, according to which Moscow circles had stated that Germany had recognized the need for annexing the Baltic countries and their ports to Soviet Russia. I immediately replied that the report surely emanated from British agents and was pure provocation, and pointed out, as I was authorized to do, that the recent events had not effected any change in Germany's relationship to Estonia as defined by the German-Estonian Non-Aggression Pact. Following instructions, the Soviet Military Attache here declared to the Estonian General Staff that the Soviet operation in Poland would have no consequences whatsoever for Estonia, with which the Soviet Union wanted to continue to cultivate good relations. Through diplomatic channels, on the other hand, Estonia received only the familiar circular note to all of the governments with diplomatic missions in Moscow. The General Staff takes a positive view of the declaration itself of the Soviet Attache, but points out that in spite of this, Soviet propaganda in Estonia has been intensified of late. The Military Attache* reports that for the last few days the General Staff has strongly entertained the fear that Germany had given the Soviet Union a free hand in the Baltic States, and [in spite of this] was looking for a pretext to exploit this opportunity. 2 In particular, the sharp Soviet declarations in the press concerning the escape of the interned Polish submarine are construed in this sense. The Foreign Minister informed me that for several days now economic negotiations have been going on in Moscow concerning a great increase in the Estonian-Soviet exchange of goods, with transit through Estonia likewise under discussion; so far the negotiations have gone well. 1 Karl Selter. a The words enclosed in brackets were garbled iu transmission. In the Tallinn draft (8511/E597373), this passage reads: "that the latter." 102 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 99 2812/484365 The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Yugoslavia Telegram MOST tntGENT B&KUN, September 19, 1939. [No. 381] e. o. W 1855 g. With reference to our telegram No. 361 of September 16,x According to reliable information, England had made a demarche also to the Yugoslav Government. If possible please obtain the text or contents of the note as well as the reply made by the Yugoslav Government. If it appears advisable tell the responsible authorities that we would have to consider any commitment entered into by a neutral country with England restricting normal trade and transit of goods between Germany and that country as aid to enemy countries and thereby as a violation of neutrality against which we reserve the fullest freedom of action,* WlEHL * See the circular printed as document No. 71. No. 8 WUH the version of tills clmilar sent to Belgrade. *On Sept. 28, Heeren reported that British and French notes concerning Yugoslavia's trade with Germany had indeed been presented (&il2/484tt SEPTEMBER 1939 103 in view of the formation of a new Polish Government, to have the Polish gold sequestrated, an action in which Rumania could perhaps cooperate. You are requested to suggest the latter idea informally, without mentioning the Foreign Minister.1 SCHMIDT Minister 1 Germany continued to press for an interpretation of Rumanian neutrality which would prevent Polish Government members from leaving Rumania. Ribbentrop instructed Pabricius on Sept. 22 to inform Gafencu that Rumanian permission for such a departure would be considered an unfriendly act and a violation of neutrality; the continued existence of a Polish Government would delay pacification and stabilization in this region and would thereby run counter to the interests of Germany and Russia (169/82797). On Oct. 11, a Bucharest telegram reported that King Carol had requested, as a personal favor, Germany's consent to his permitting Polish President Moscicki to go to Switzerland (1328/352230). A Berlin telegram of Oct. 14 made it clear that Germany remained unalterably opposed to Moscicki's departure (1328/352231). No. 101 103/111605 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Telegram No. 386 BERLIN, September 19, 1939.1 For the Ambassador personally. With reference to your telegram N"o. 385.2 I request that you tell M. Stalin that you reported to Berlin about your conference with him, and that you are now expressly directed by me to inform him that the agreements which I made on the authorization of the Führer at Moscow will, of course, be kept, and that they are regarded by us as the foundation stone of the new friendly relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. RTBBEKTROP 1 The telegram was sent to the Foreign Ministry from Ribbentrop's special train at 4 : 37 p. m. on Sept. 19. a Document No. 90. No. 102 Memorandum l)y the Director of the Economic Policy Department BERLIN*, September 19, 1939. During today's conference with Field Marshal Goring, the discussion came around to the serious difficulties of transportation in bringing Rumanian petroleum to Germany and the critical importance of the Cernau^i-Lw6w-Krak6w~Breslau railroad line from this point of view. The Field Marshal requested that Ambassador Kdtter and 104 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY I lay this matter before the Foreign Minister especially, although it was probably already being taken Into consideration in the course of the current deliberations. If we did not succeed i n establishing a common German-Rumanian boundary along the course of this railroad line, all possible arrangements ought nevertheless to be ma(je no matter under whose sovereignty any intervening territory might fall to bring the line under our administration, perhaps through an extraterritorial arrangement. Herewith respectfully submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary,* WIBHL * See document No. 2ST, footnote 4. No. 103 10&/111606-O7 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST XIRORNT Moscow, September 20, l(Ktt) 2: "22 a. m. TOP SECRET Received September 20 8 : 10 a. m. No. 394 of September 19 With reference to my telegram No. 385 of September 18 l Molotov asked me to call on him today at 7 : 00 p. m, and with evident agitation told me the following: Warlimont, Chief of Operations Branch [Chef Operationsabteilunff], yesterday showed the Soviet Deputy Military AttacM in Berlin a map on which the future German "Reich border" was drawn. It ran along the Vistula and passed through Warsaw, but then was plotted in such a way as to leave Lw6w on the German side, This line contradicted the agreements in Moscow made in the presence of the Foreign Minister, according to which the San had been decided upon tus the southern boundary of the two spheres of interest, with Lwow falling into the Soviet sphere. The Soviet Government and Stalin personally were astonished at this obvious violation of the Moscow agreement. He asked me to clarify the matter as soon as possible since it had caused great consternation here. I replied to Molotov emphatically that this could only be a misunderstanding and what the Soviet Deputy Military Attache had seen on the map shown him was surely not the Reich border but at most a tentatively contemplated line of demarcation regarding which the German officer sent to Moscow was now to negotiate, 1 Document No. 90, SEPTEMBER 1939 105 In view of the extraordinary import of the matter, I urgently request that I be authorized to relieve the Soviet apprehensions immediately. SCHTTLENBURG No. 104 103/111608 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Telegram TOP SECRET Moscow, September 20, 1939 2 : 23 a. m. No. 395 of September 19 Eeceived September 20 i : 55 a. m. Molotov stated to me today that the Soviet Government now considered the time has come to establish definitively, jointly with the German Government, the structure of the Polish area. In this regard, Molotov hinted that the original inclination entertained by the Soviet Government and Stalin personally to permit the existence of a residual Poland had given way to the inclination to partition Poland along the Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San Line. The Soviet Government wishes to commence negotiations on this matter at once, and to conduct them in Moscow, since such negotiations must be conducted on the Soviet side by persons in the highest positions of authority who cannot leave the Soviet Union. Bequest telegraphic instructions. SCHTJLENBTJRG No. 105 96/1079^75-98 The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry Telegram ANKARA, September 20, 1939 5 : 55 p. m. No. 316 of September 20 Received September 20 9 : 30 p. m. Saracoglu stated yesterday to the Party committee that negotiations for the conclusion of definitive alliance treaties were progressing. Minister Ali Fuad today told our informant that their scope was substantially limited as compared with the declaration in the Chamber on May 12.1 In case of a Mediterranean conflict between Italy on the one side and England and France on the other, Turkey would remain neutral and the casus foederis would enter into operation only if Turkey were herself attacked. England is pressing hard for sign- 1 See document No* 69, footnote 1. 106 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY ing before the trip to Moscow because she is afraid that additiona\ commitments might be imposed on Saracoglu there. The excitement here over the Russian attitude is as great as ever. At the same time the Foreign Ministry is greatly exasperated at us because we have spoiled Turkey's plan and Saracoglu is now sitting between all chairs. The urgent necessity of replacing him could be supported in Moscow by pointing out the fact that this Anglophile Minister offers little security for Russia as well. Rumania's neutrality with respect to Russia has made things much easier here. One can already hear from Foreign Ministry circles that if Russia should occupy Bessarabia the mutual assistance obligation arising out of the Balkan Pact 3 would not apply because Bessarabia is not part of the Balkans. I have heard on good authority that England sent Turkey a note demanding that she limit her foreign trade to her own immediate needs. The desire for a revision of the economic relations with. Germany prevailing among many people will in any case not be realized until after Saracoglu's return and after Turkey's position in relation to England and Russia has been defined precisely. Saracoglu is leaving Thursday night. The agreement between Italy and Greece 3 will greatly strengthen our position in the future. 'Signed by Turkey, Greece, YugoKlavIa and Rumania on Feb.f 1934. ITor the text see ttrftish and Foreign, State Paper*, 1937 (Ixmdon, IdGO), vol. cxu. pp. 712-714, * See document No. 9& No. 106 B1&/B003047 The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry Telegram HELSINKI, September 20, 1939 8 : 41 p. m. Received September 20 12 midnight No. 228 of September 20 PoL VI 2125. The Finnish Foreign Minister I told me that Molotov had ordered the Russian Ministry of Economics to begin Finnish-Russian economic negotiations. In doing so Molotov had stated, however, that he did not wish to bring up the Aland question * at present; he merely took cognizance of the fact that the island had not as yet been fortified. 1 J. Bljas Erkko. * See vol. v, eh. iv, and vols, vi and vxx.
SEPTEMBER 1939 107 The Foreign Minister was very desirous that the Aland question be settled. It was not necessary to have the consent of Russia, since she was not a signatory power; but Russia would have to drop her ob* jections, especially the demand for participation in the fortification. Finland did not wish to make a Gibraltar out of Aland. The question had less military than psychological significance. I have the impression that the Foreign Minister would appreciate it if Germany used her influence in Moscow toward a settlement of the question, and I believe that it would also be in the German interest if this point of difference between Finland and Russia were eliminated.8 1 In telegram No. 284 of Sept. 22, Weizsfccker replied as follows : "We do not intend at present to intervene actively in this question and must leave it to the Finnish Government itself to come to an understanding with the Soviet Government. If necessary, please explain that this attitude is based on the present circumstances." ( B18/B003048) No. 107 175-1 /40400-2-Ca The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry Telegram TALLINN, September 20, 1939 [11 : 05 p. m.] No. 152 of September 20 [Received September 21 2 :10 a. m.] x With, reference to my telegram report No. 14:7 of September 19.2 I have learned from the Foreign Minister that Molotov informed the Estonian Minister to Moscow in a friendly manner yesterday that Soviet-Russian naval forces had received orders to track down and liquidate [liguidieren] the escaped Polish submarine even in waters near Tallinn because of the menace it represented to Soviet Russian shipping ; the measure was in no way directed against Estonia. Thereupon the Minister had been instructed to give Molotov an exact account of the submarine's escape, which refuted yesterday's Tass report that Estonian authorities had intentionally permitted the submarine to escape. He had likewise been told to state that the Estonian Government was agreeable to the action of the Soviet fleet against the submarine and would support this action with its own naval craft; it considered the submarine as an armed vessel without a government sailing on its own responsibility. The Foreign Minister added that x The information in brackets is from another copy (116/66632). 'Document No. 98. 260090 54 13
108
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Estonia .would treat the Soviet Russian naval forces as belonging to a neutral power, so that their entry into Estonian territorial waters was admissible under existing regulations. On the basis of this feeler and the favorable reports from Moscow concerning the progress in the Estonian-Soviet economic and transit negotiations, the frame of mind here is somewhat less uneasy as to the designs which Russia is feared to have on Estonia. I hear quite confidentially that in their transit negotiations the Itussians had expressed a wish for extensive use of the port of Tallinn as a transshipment center for Soviet export goods, with repair facilities for Soviet vessels. Great significance was attached here to the effect of these plans on Estonian-Soviet relations. The wish to cooperate with the Russians did exist, but on the other hand there was also the fear that if they first gained a foothold this might be followed by the further extension of Soviet Russian influence and an intensification of Communist propaganda. I would be grat-eful for instructions on whether and in what sense 1 should exert influence on. the attitude of the Estonian government toward the Soviet demands.3 As the matter is treated here with strict secrecy, please do not inform the Estonian Minister there, FROHWVOT 1 In a telegram of Sept, 24, Schmidt of Bibbentrop's Secretariat replied a* follows : "The Foreign Minister aaks you to take an attitude dictated essentially by the new German-Soviet collaboration, which is of great value to Germany. If questions come up, as in the telegram in question [the document printed here]. be as reserved as possible." <116/de634) No. 108 1369/857059-00 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 401 of September 20 Moscow, September 20, 1 939 1 1 : 20 p. ra. Received September 21 12 : 20 p. DDL W IV 3574. With reference to your telegram No. 372 of September 17 (W IV 3500). * 1. Herr Schnurre's presence is desirable for technical reasons; a short delay is unimportant. It is not likely that the Soviet Government will be offended. 2. The export capacity of the Soviet Union is in itself limited since the increase in production lias failed for years to keep pace with the increased requirements at home. The Soviet Union has probably reached nearly the limit of its capacity in promising us raw materials x Document No. 82.
SEPTEMBER 1939 109

deliveries to a value of 180 million RM within 2 years. Owing to the recent developments, the Soviet Union's deliveries to some countries have ceased or become impracticable (e. g., lumber to England, ores and cotton to Poland, petroleum to Italy, etc.). Thus, additional quantities of raw materials are available for German needs; but the military intervention of the Soviet Union has probably greatly increased her own requirements.

3. The transportation situation is more strained than ever as a result of military requirements. Passenger traffic is already severely curtailed. At this moment it is extremely difficult to give any conclusive judgment on the probable development in the transportation question.

SCHtTLENBTTRG No. 109 108/111613-14 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT Moscow, September 20, 1939 11 : 46 p. nu TOP SECRET Received September 21 4 : 10 a. nu No. 402 of September 20 With reference to your telegram [386] of September 19.1 I spoke with Molotov this afternoon at 6:30. Our intention to withdraw to the agreed demarcation line between the two spheres of interest is no longer doubted. Molotov declared on the other handy after he had talked with Stalin several times, and although I had taken the greatest pains to convince him, that the Soviet Government could not agree to the Przemy^l-Turka-Uzok Pass line which we proposed,* but had to insist on the line of the upper San. The reason given was consideration for the Ukrainians, who claimed the entire area as far as the San as national territory and must not be disappointed by the Soviet Government. In return the Soviet Government was willing to let us have Suwalki and the surrounding country, together with the railroad, but not August<5w. 1 Document No. 101. The number is taken from the final draft of the telegramin the files of the Moscow Embassy (127/69739-41). a The files of the Moscow Embassy contain the following unsigned notation of a telephone conversation between Ribbentrop and KOstring at 11 : 45 a. m. Sept. 20 : "The German and Russian Governments have jointly determined the demarcation line between the German and Russian spheres of influence. This line runs along: the rivers Pissa, Narew, Vistula, [and] San up to and Including Przemysl and from there in a southerly direction through Turka to the U2ok Pass. Przemysl and Turlca, including the railroad and roads, are in the German sphere of interest," (127/69716)
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Molotov accordingly suggested the following communiqufi: "The German Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have established the lino of demarcation, between the German Army and the Red Army. The line of demarcation runs along the Pissa, Narew, Vistula, and San rivers." 1 thereupon pointed out that our proposal was concerned mainly with a line of demarcation and that the final determination of the political boundary had not yet been made and was reserved for further negotiations. Molotov nevertheless insisted that the military line of demarcation, too, must follow the upper San. Please send telegraphic instructions as to whether and, if so, when the communiqu6 proposed by Molotov should be published. No. 110 823/163763-64 The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Latvia Telegram No. 274: BERLIN, September 20, 1939. zu Pol. V 8961.1 With reference to your telegram No. 174 of September 18.1 For guidance of your conversation. I refer you to the Führer's speech of today * and the communiqu of the Reich and Soviet Governments published yesterday,8 as well as the comments on them in the entire German press. We are of the opinion that the question asked you by Munters primarily concerns the Soviet Government* Latvian fears based on recent developments seem to us unfounded, particularly e long a feke ocmduoi e Miftt (Sovormm1 nt iH"tan-i na oorroot r3ft4 friendly toward Germany/ We are convinced that, in accordance with the Russian nonaggression treaties with the Baltic countries and in accordance with the Russian statement to the [Latvian Minister, the Soviet Government does not intend to violate the borders of Latvia or of Estonia and Lithuania either, so long as by their actions these states give no occasion for this. Latvian Miniotor hero w*e moroly told^ * tuwwei* fca 4*fee quoofteked officially today alx>ui b*> demarcation few botwoon Gor Ruooiaix troopo, &*e according to youtorduy'n Gorman Army 1 Document No. 89. * Hitler's speech of Sept. 19 at Danzig Is printed in Monatshefte fUr Ausw&rtige Politik, Sept.-Oct. 1939, pp, 929-944. * See document No, 94. * The passages scored througn were deleted before the telegram was dispatched.
SEPTEMBER 1939 111 communique &ke Gorman troopa woro now approximately a* he Lwow Broot Litovok Btatyatok.5 * Further expressions of Latvian alarm about Hussion intentions and of desire for reassurance from Germany were conveyed in telegrams from Riga on Sept. 2O (115/117848-49; 323/193758). Kotze was thereupon informed that Ribbentrop wished him to "remain aloof" if such Questions were raised in the future "and simply to refer to the Non-Aggression Pact." (Telegram No. 278 of Sept. 21, 823/193759) No. Ill 6556/E395415-16 The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Rit/mania Telegram No. 560 BERLIN, September 20, 1939. zu W 1827 g. 1 We are willing in principle to turn over to Rumania captured Polish war material in exchange for long term delivery contracts.2 The weapons involved would for the most part be those of French, Polish, and Russian make, and a smaller amount of Skoda and Bofors material. Nothing can be said for the time being regarding the types and quantities of weapons, since so far there are no particulars available. Therefore please continue the discussions with the Minister President and suggest that he draw up a list of desiderata. Rumanian payment should consist principally of petroleum and feed grain deliveries on as long-term a basis as possible ; negotiations concerning the details should be held immediately.8 "W^IEHL. 1 W 1827 g : Document No. 74 *A preliminary list was sent by Fabricius in telegram No. 623 of Sept. 24 (5556/E595427). * According to a memorandum by Wienl of the previous day (2117/460843-44) , acceptance of the Rumanian proposal had been urged by GSring in a conference with Wiehl and Hitter, No. 112 Ill/1162a7 Memorandum, T>y the Director of the Political Department r, September 20, 1939. Ambassador Oshima told me yesterday evening that the most important point which he wished to discuss personally with the Foreign. Minister today was the following :
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It was still to be expected that within the next few days a new Chinese Central Government would he formed with the support of the Japanese. The psychological reorientation of the Japanese Army toward cooperation with the Soviet Union, which had not yet been effected and which was very difficult to effect, would l>e made considerably easier if the Soviet Government would recognize the new Chinese Central Government and thereby abandon Chiang Kai-shek. The Ambassador did not discuss the question of recognition by Germany. WOKRMANN No. 113 115/117621-22 Outline of a Defense Treaty Between the. German Reich and the Republic of Lithuania September 20, 1939. The Government of the German Reich and the Lithuanian Government, in view of the general political situation in Europe and in order to guarantee the interests of the two countries, which complement each other in every respect, have agreed as follows : Article I Without prejudice to her independence as a state, Lithuania stands under the protection of the German Reich. Article II In order that this protection may be realized, Germany and Lithuania are concluding a military convention with each other. Article III The two Governments shall enter into negotiations with each other at once for the purpose of establishing a close and comprehensive economic relationship between the two countries. of the Military Agreement 1. The strength, distribution, and equipment of the Lithuanian Army shall be regularly determined in close agreement with the High Command of the Wehrmacht. 2. For the practical execution of provision 1, a permanent German military commission shall be dispatched to Kaunas.
SEPTEMBER 1939 113 No. 114 821/198141 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Telegram No. 399 of September 21 BERLIN, September 21, 1939, RAM 487. According to a Russian Army communique Vilna has been occupied by Russian troops. In our agreement, Lithuania's interest in this area was recognized by both sides. We therefore assume that it is understood that in the final territorial reorganization in the East the Vilna area will be awarded to Lithuania in a form still to be arranged between us. 1 answered an informal inquiry by the Lithuanian Government a few days ago to the effect that we had no objection to an incorporation of the Vilna area into the Lithuanian national territory and that we had reason to believe that Russia took the same position. Naturally I did not hint in any way at the existence of secret agreements with Russia. In your next conversation with MM. Molotov and Stalin please bring up this point in a friendly way and clarify it. REBBENTROP No. 115 108/111615 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Telegram MOST URGENT BERLIN, September 21, 1939. No. 401 RAM No. 488. With reference to your telegram No. 402.1 1. We agree to the communiqufi in the form suggested by the Soviet Government and shall publish- the communiqu^ in this form in the Friday morning press. 2. According to the Moscow agreements the four-river line was meant only as the "approximate" boundary of the two spheres of interest. From the standpoint of a simplified border line it is not easy for us to accept the western bend of the upper San as a boundary. But we are willing to do so in consideration of the reasons stated by M. Molotov. In the interest of a practicable boundary, however, we 1 Document No. 109.
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in turn lay stress on having the sharp northern corner of Russian territory projecting between Lithuania and East Prussia eliminated by an appropriately clear line. We should accordingly welcome it if Russia would give up August6w and the surrounding forest If this cannot be obtained, it would be desirable at least to have the border run east along the lake and river line just north of AugustxSw. Please discuss this there at once in a friendly way and secure August6w and the forest for Germany if possible, RlBBBNTROP No. 116 The Foreign Minister to th# Eiriha&i*y in th& Soviet Union Telegram No, 407 * 2k>!*For, a September 21, 1939. [Sent September 2*2 5:08 a. m.] With reference to your telegram No. 3?4.8 We view the question of the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Turkey as follows : 1. If the Soviet Union concludes such a pact with Turkey it is a foregone conclusion that she must make the reservation in Germany's favor mentioned by Stalin. A RusBo-Turkish mutual assistance pact without such a reservation would be in direct contradiction to the new Russo-Germaii Non-Aggression Treaty. For according to this treaty Russia may not attack us in any war, whatever its nature, in which we are involved with a third power, and thus may not conclude any alliance with a third power which would commit Russia to lending assistance against Germany. 2. But even if the Soviet Government should make the reservation in favor of Germany, a Turko-Russian mutual assistance pact in our opinion is still a questionable matter, politically. As matters stand, it would tend to make it easier for Turkey, covered on the east by such a pact with Russia, to strengthen further her political ties with England and France, if this should be Turkey's intention, which seems probable in view of the commitments to France and England already entered into, though not yet completed. Nor can the Soviet Government, from the standpoint of its interests, desire or wish to promote 1 A note from Minister Schmidt Instructed tlie Foreign Minister's Secretariat to send to Ambassador Papen jtersonuHy eopit*** of this* t<*hk#ram and of Moscow telegram No. 374. 1 A Baltic resort near Danzig where Ribfoentrop's staff was located for a few days during the Polish campaign. 'Document No. 81.
SEPTEMBER 1939 115 this. For Russia's enemy in the Straits is and always will be England. This, in my opinion, is the decisive consideration for Russia. Furthermore, the treaty, if it contains the reservation in Germany's favor, would in practice be exclusively directed against Italy and Bulgaria. This would be undesirable for Germany, who is a friend of these two powers, nor would it make sense from the Soviet point of view. In our opinion it is in the interest of both Russia and Germany to bring influence to bear on Turkey with all available means to abandon her plans for an alliance with England and France and to align herself politically with Germany and Russia. Should Turkey be unable at this time to decide on detaching herself openly from England and France, there remains for her the course of neutrality toward the various groups of powers. In order, however, to bring Turkey back to this neutral course and to block the road to the definitive conclusion of her mutual assistance pact with England and France, the Soviet Government ought to make it unmistakably clear to Turkey that it would be considered an unfriendly act if Turkey should consent to the definitive conclusion of an alliance with France and England and that the Soviet Government is, in fact, counting on a reduction of Turkish commitments toward England and France. Such a condition of continuous Russian pressure on Turkey would be most desirable for the common German-Russian interests at the present time. 4. [sa'tf] Should the Soviet Government, in spite of the above-mentioned objections, be unable to avoid a mutual assistance pact with Turkey, then it is our opinion that in addition to making the reservation in Germany's favor mentioned under 1 it must insist at least that in concluding such a pact Turkey engage to refrain once and for all from definitely concluding a mutual assistance pact with England and France; such a pact, after all, has so far only been envisaged in a declaration. 5. The Soviet Government will perhaps also base its demand that Turkey refrain from concluding alliances with the two western democracies on the Russo-Turkish Neutrality and Non-Aggression Pact of 1925, 4 which is still in force, as far as we know. Under this treaty Turkey may not, for instance, conclude any alliance or agreement with a third country or group of countries if it is directed against the military and maritime security of the Soviet Union. Surely the Soviet Union will be able to take the stand that in the present political circumstances Turkish military and maritime cooperation with England in the Straits would be a threat to Russia's security. Please convey these viewpoints to MM. Stalin and Molotov, and possibly also M. Voroshilov, orally (do not read them), and ask these * See document No. 6, footnote 3.

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SEPTEMBEE 1939 119 No. 119 1761/403973-75 The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry No. 4859 TALLINN, September 21, 1939. Received September 29. Pol. VI 2177. Subject: Political relations between Estonia and the Soviet Union. With reference to my telegram No. 152.1 Foreign Minister Selter expressed to me his regret that the Polish submarine Orzel had succeeded in escaping from the internment imposed by the Government, despite the Estonian guard put over her. There would be a close investigation of this most embarrassing incident, and any person entrusted with guarding the submarine who might be guilty would be court-martialed. Unfortunately the Polish Legation here was evidently not entirely innocent of this escape. Minister Selter then put at my disposal for my confidential information the text of the instructions a translation of which is enclosed 2 which directed the Estonian Minister in Moscow to answer Molotov's communication on the action taken by the Soviet Navy against the Polish submarine that escaped from internment. The statement in the instructions that the Polish Legation claimed the vessel had suffered damage relates to the fact that according to the Estonian neutrality law (Section 2, Paragraph 5), with which the Foreign Ministry is acquainted, and which is based on the so-called Scandinavian neutrality regulations, a submarine of a belligerent state may put into an Estonian port if forced to do so by damage or heavy seas, on condition that she leave immediately on removal of the impediment. The investigation by the Estonian Government prior to internment accordingly had the purpose of ascertaining whether any damage had actually occurred which would definitely interfere with the use of the ship. The Commission answered this question in the negative, and internment was consequently imposed. The vessel broke internment during the disarmament operations which were carried out by her own crew under Estonian supervision. Of the Estonian guards, one non-commissioned officer and a sailor were overpowered and carried off aboard the vessel ; as was learned last night, these two 1 Document No. 107. "Not printed (8512/E597378-79).
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men have meanwhile been put ashore on Gotland by the mibmarine's boat. As already stated in my telegraphic report, Molotov's communication to the Estonian Minister, which was answered in accordance with the enclosed instructions, was in a friendly tone; it contained the explicit statement that the Soviet Union intended no action that was directed against Estonia ; if a unit of the Soviet Navy should by chance enter Estonian territorial waters in search of the submarine the Estonian Government should therefore not regard this as an intentional unfriendly act. On the part of Estonia the fact is appreciated that Molotov's statement and the Estonian answer have clarified the solidarity of the two Navies regarding the Polish submarine and that the tension between the two countries, which was originally feared on the basis of the Tass report, thus did not materialize. The Estonian Navy actually spent considerable time searching for the submarine^ which was, moreover, during her escape fired upon, by a coastal battery ; the Estonian naval vessels were then recalled, however, in order to avoid any incidents with the Soviet Navy. The Soviet naval forces have now returned to their base, according to a report received today ; only patrol vessels are still believed to be in the vicinity of the Estonian coast. I enclose a clipping from the Ileva2ft&h$Zgitung of September 21, containing a German translation of the Tass report in question and the semiofficial reply published by the Estonian press bureau ETA, together with a denial of the assertion published by a Finnish newspaper that the Soviet fleet was blockading the Estonian ports.* Enclosures not reprinted. No. 120 B028/5S96Q7 The Minister in Rumania, to the Radiogram TJRGENT BUCHARKHT, September 22, 1939. Unnumbered, September 22 Received September 22 10 : 50 a. m. Pol. IV 5214. The Court Minister 1 told me that the Rumanian Government was doing everything possible to stop rumors now being circulated in Rumania regarding German relations with the Iron Guard and the assassins of the Minister President.2 Yesterday's 1 Ernest Urdareanu. "Armand Calinescu was assassinated by members of tbe Iron Guard on Sept 21, 1939, SEPTEMBER 1939 121 radio announcement also served this purpose. Meanwhile the principal assassin, Dimitrescu, had stated that he had left Germany with the aid of a member of the Iron Guard by the name of Popovici ; he had crossed the Rumanian border from Hungary on September 17. The other assassins were well-known members of the Iron Guard here who had not been so closely watched of late. He asked us to take measures to keep a very close watch on any members of the Iron Guard who were still in Germany and to prevent their departure.3 He named Horia ( ? ) , Voghen, and Popovici. Furthermore, he expected it would have a particularly good effect on public opinion if the German press would dissociate itself from the Iron Guard, or if the measures taken were publicized. I referred him to today's statements in the German press, which could be made public here. At any rate, it appears expedient for the German press not to criticize the severe measures which the police here will certainly resort to once more against members of the Iron Guard. FABBICIUS * On Sept, 26, the Foreign Ministry sent a letter to the Office of the Reichsftihrer- SS? and Chief of German Police, and requested, with reference to this Bucharest telegram, an investigation into recent departures from Germany of Iron Guardl members which might reveal the identity of Calinescu's assassins; the Foreign Ministry also asked that Iron Guard members still in Germany be watched closely and prevented from leaving (3028/599608-09). A letter by the Gestapo sent on I>ec. 16 in reply to this communication admitted the possibility that a certain Dumitru Dumitrescu might have left Germany to commit the murder but expressed doubts that two other Rumanians identified as Alexandra Popovici and Victor Ion Vojen had been involved in the assassination. According to the Gestapo, close surveillance of Guardists residing in Germany was impractical but they had been summoned individually by the police and warned not to engage in political activities directed against Rumania. (3028/599632-34) No. 121 321/19&148 The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT KAUNAS, September 22, 1939 8 : 45 p. iru No. 157 of September 22 Received September 2211 : SO p. m. With reference to my telegram No. 155 of September 21.1 Along with TJrbsys' reply that he was extremely grateful for the Reich Foreign Minister's invitation to come to Danzig and would accept it, he also made political statements, obviously the result of the previous deliberations, as follows : Lithuania in the present situation wished to continue to cultivate friendly relations with her *Not printed (321/193142) : Notification that Zechlin had spoken to Foreign Minister UrbSys about a proposed visit to Danzig to take place possibly on Sept. 23. 122 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY neighbors and particularly with Germany. She also wished to continue her policy of neutrality, and to emerge free and independent from the present difficult international situation. Her goal was to enjoy good relations with all other states, too, but she gave primary enaphar sis to her relations with her neighbors. Lithuania had national aspirations, but, as Minister President Cernius had recently declared (see telegram No. 150), * she wished to achieve them by peace!ul means. Finally he asked that the thanks of the Lithuanian Government be conveyed to the German Government for the understanding that it had recently shown for Lithuania's national demands* Presumably these are also the (group garbled) that UrbSys received for tomorrow's visit to Danzig.* ZECHLIN *Not printed {321/103133-34). A Bhort summary of fieralus* radio address of Sept. 17. *On Sept. 22, Erich Kordt noted that at 0: 00 p. m. nt Rlhbpntrop'* behest he telephoned instructions for Zeehlln to ask llrbftyi* to delay bin visit for a few days {115/117626). On Sept. 28. Urbftyn wa stilt willing to make the trip ( 321/1 93140), but on Oct. 2 ht accepted MoIotovVi invitation to come to Moscow and did not return until O SEPTEMBEK 1939 123 2. I presented to Molotov our wishes regarding Augustow and the forest, forcibly and with detailed justification, emphasizing in particular the value attached by the Reich Government to the border line proposed by us. Molotov reserved decision until consultation with Stalin. SCHTJLENBURG No. 123 821/193144= The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Telegram Moscow, September 22, 1939 11 : 03 p. m. No. 412 of September 22 Received September 23 2 : 15 a. m. With reference to telegram No. 399 of September 21.1 Molotov told me today that the Soviet Government will adhere to the agreements reached 011 the Vilna question but does not believe that the time is ripe for discussing details. He had made a statement to the same effect to the Lithuanian Minister, too, adding that the Soviet Union would not be forgetful of Lithuania. Molotov indicated that the Vilna question was part of the entire Baltic-complex, and that it would have to be taken into account in the final settlement. SCHUUBNBURG 1 Document No. 114. No. 124 127/69721-22 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Telegram TOP SECRET BERLIN, September 23, 1939 3 : 40 a. m. No. 417 of September 22 Received Moscow September 23 11 : 05 a. m. For the Ambassador personally. With reference to your telegram No. 295 \396\ - 1 We, too, consider the time now ripe to establish by treaty jointly with the Soviet Government the definitive structure of the Polish area. The Russian idea of a border line along the well-known fourriver line coincides in general with the view of the Reich Government. It was my original intention to invite M. Molotov to Germany in 1 Document No. 104. 260090 54 14 124 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY order to formulate this treaty. In view of your report that the leading personages there cannot leave the Soviet Union, we agree to negotiations in Moscow. Contrary to my original purpose of entrusting you with these negotiations, I have decided to fly to Moscow myself. This particularly because in view of the full powers granted me by the Führer, thus milking it possible to dispense with, further consultations, etc. negotiations can be brought to a speedier conclusion. In view of the general situat ion, my sojourn in Moscow will have to be limited to 1 or 2 days at the most. Please call on MM. Stalin and Molotov and wire me earliest proposed date. RIBBENTTOOP No. 125 34/28899 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST XJBOKNT Moscow, September 2tt, 19S9 8 ; 45 p. m. TOP SECRET Received September *\ 9 : 35 p. m* No. 427 of September 23 With reference to your telegram No. 417 of September ^.l Instruction carried out. Completed at t> p. m. today at Molotov's oilice. The Soviet Government welcomes the projected visit of the Reich Foreign Minister. In view of the great .significance and extreme importance of the question, the Soviet Government feels several days would be needed for consultation and preparation. Molotov will advise me the day after tomorrow at the latent (tomorrow is the day of rest here) when the visit should take place. 2 SCHUIJfiNBUBG * Document No. 124. * At 10 : 15 p. m., Sept. 23, Molotov summoned Schuleuburg to inform him that Sept. 27 or 28 would be agreeable to the Soviet Government < 84/23391). No. 126 103/111603 Memorandum by the State Secretary StJ3. No. 753 BERLIN, September 23, 1939. TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO TUB FOKKZGN MINISTER I have read the telegraphic instruction to Moscow regarding iie assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Turkey,1 and state my views according to instructions as follows : 1 Document No. 116. SEPTEMBER 1939 125 Our most recent reports from Ankara 2 indicate that the Anglo- Turkish and Franco-Turkish assistance pacts are to enter into effect only in the event that Turkey should be attacked. If this information is correct, then Turkey has already withdrawn as far as we could desire. It would be useful, however, if Turkey were to promise the Russians in addition not to allow either her territory or the Straits to be misused by England and France. Such a promise would be equally in the interest of Russia and of Germany. The opportunity for a conversation with M. Molotov in this connection could in my opinion also be used for ascertaining whether the Russians [will] talk about Bessarabia with the Turkish Foreign Minister. We ought to make sure that we will not be taken by surprise by a Russian action against Bessarabia. WEIZSACKER * See document No. 105. No. 127 495/233418-19 Memorandum T>y the State Secretary St.S. No. 754 BERLIN, September 23, 1939. The Italian Ambassador called my attention today to the well-known recent article in Popolo dr ltalia^ which, although not written by Mussolini, is entirely in accordance with his views. It also presents the idea repeatedly brought forward here by Attolico that a peace effort should now still be made in order not to miss the political turningpoint marked by the transition of the war from the East to the West. Attolico now spoke for the third time about a generous gesture, which obviously would consist in our setting up a residual Poland. When I asked the Ambassador whether these ideas were really those of the Duce saying that Mackensen had not reported anything to us about this for a long time Attolico stated that the Duce and Ciano were somewhat wary after the various fruitless suggestions of the past weeks and did not wish to call forth any more refusals from us. It was clear, however, that time is pressing, that the French people were still receptive to peace proposals, and that the chance would be gone once the war really began in earnest in the West. By chance I had the opportunity to ask the German Military Attache in Rome, General von Rintelen, what he knew about these sentiments of the Italians. The General called on the Duce a week ago and heard from him almost word for word the same observations as Attolico presented to me again and again during his last visits. 126 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY It should also be added that Attolico recommends a generous offer even in case we could not count on a favorable response from the enemy governments. The psychological effect in France would in any case remain and continue to promote peace. I believe that this thought, which is urged upon us so strongly by Italy, should not be disregarded. Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister. (Please transmit by telephone and also send a copy,) WEIZSAOKBR No. 128 466/224102 Memorandum by the State Secretary StS. No. 755 BERLIN, September 23, 1939. During an earlier visit I had casually remarked to the Italian Ambassador that Italy could set a good example in dealing with British attempts to apply pressure to the economic policy of the neutrals and could in a sense act as the leader of the neutrals. Today Attolico reverted to this idea and said that the formation of neutral blocs as a defense against the British attempts was becoming a necessity. The Oslo States already had such a bloc. The Pan- American Conference showed similar intentions. Italy could probably assume leadership in the Mediterranean and the Balkans, Attolico wished me to tell him whether we favored such an idea, which was becoming all the more urgent as the maintenance of as large an element of real neutrals as possible might be important at the moment of the conclusion of peace. Italy wished to act only in the economic field, however, and wanted to know whether we had any objections. I told Attolico that our opinion concerning such action would depend on what opposition such a group of states would actually put up against the British acts of violence. Basically, in my opinion, there were no objections to the formation of such an economic group by the neutrals. I would, however, like to consult the Foreign Minister once more in the matter. Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister with the request for instructions.1 WEIZSACKBE * On Sept 29, Ciano Informed Mackensen that he had had a "very favorable" reaction from Ribbentrop as well as from Weizsacker (Rome telegram No,$97 of Sept 29:06/108027).
SEPTEMBER 1939 127 No. 129 B21/B005123-25 The Charge cPAfaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Telegram WASHINGTON, September 24, 1939 1 : 53 a. m. No. 416 of September 24 Eeceived September 25 8 : 00 a. m. With reference to your telegram No. 363 (P. 12147) of September 23.1 1. The American isolationists, who for well-considered patriotic reasons advocate the retention of the arms embargo, are being attacked with telling arguments by the opposite party. It is said that they are working for Hitler and the establishment of world domination by Germany, which will one day threaten America, too. We should therefore avoid anything that could be interpreted through the German [American?] press as a backing of the isolationists and German interference in America's day-to-day politics. Any conspicuous interest taken in the fate of the arms embargo plays into the hands of the British. 2. The American people as a whole are today a good deal more hostile toward Germany and also more united than in 1917. Their convictions are altogether unneutral; they want Britain and France to win the war and us to lose it. The great rift existing among the people involves only the method by which America can give all-out assistance to the Allies without being drawn into the war or having to send an expeditionary force. The isolationists hold the view that the retention of the arms embargo would diminish the risk of war for America. Their main argument is the unrestricted delivery of arms in the World War, as a result of which America became involved in the war. They are inconsistent and the opposite party is taking advantage of this in that they do not object to the delivery of raw materials and semi-finished goods essential for warfare, owing to their concern for agriculture and industry. The interventionists believe in helping the Allies to gain superiority by supplying armaments, especially aircraft, thereby shortening the war and forestalling active participation by America in the war through an early victory of the Allies. Forces frankly urging war are as yet working only behind the scenes, and in view of the basic attitude of the American people do not appear in the open. 3. In view of the vivid recollection in this country of the (group garbled) blunders committed through participation in the World 1 Not found.
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War, which is kept alive especially by the veteran's organizations, we should operate only with the following historical arguments in this contest of opinions over the ways of preventing America's entry into the war: The senseless ami useless sacrifice of lives and national wealth in the World War; the viwit burden of public debt due to participation in the war; the economic disintegration in the post-war period; the munitions industry as a war profiteer; Britain's cynical role as a debtor ; Britain's outrageous chicanery with regard to American trade and shipping; Britain's double-dealing in 19 1U {concealment of secret treaties) ; the results of the lying slogan "make the world safe for democracy"; America's refusal to ratify the Versailles Treaty. 4. It would be a mistake, on the other hand, to offer advice to the Americans as to how they should act in the present situation, which in view of the coming Presidential elections is also deeply involved with domestic politics. Any intrustion by Germany into the Congressional contest by means of press or radio |>o!eiuics weakens the prospects of the isolationists, which are poor in any case. Under the existing circumstances there is little probability that the isolationists will succeed in retaining the arms embargo. Isolationist petitions swamping the Congress, particularly from the Middle West, cannot conceal the true relation of forces. As matters stand today, a majority for the retention of the arms embargo cannot bo obtained either in the Senate or the House of Representatives. The sympathies for Britain and France and for Roosevelt's popular foreign policy are far too great for that. The defeat of the isolationists would amount to an outright setback for Germany, if we should have involved ourselves too deeply in Poland.2 All the effective arguments will be advanced by the isolationists themselves. 5. In whatever shape, whether with or without the arms embargo, and with the cash-and-carry clause, the Neutrality Act works to Germany's disadvantage in any event and was deliberately drawn up in that way from the beginning. Even if the arms embargo should be retained, public opinion would only permit it to be effective as long as Britain and France are not in danger of being defeated. For it is not possible to deceive oneself about the fact that in that event the will to intervene would gain the upper hand. 6. We can fight this latent will to intervene with some prospect of effectiveness only by repeating over and over again, if possible also in interviews by the highest authorities, that we have no intention of attacking America, that we respect the Monroe Doctrine just as we expect the Americans to recognize our sphere of influence, and that we have no territorial aims whatever on the American continent, and 9 An error in decoding appears to have been made here.
SEPTEMBER 1939 129 do not intend to meddle in the form of government in the American countries. 7. On this occasion I should like to point out that a too crude type of anti-British propaganda in the newscasts by German shortwave transmitters may easily produce in the pro-British majority of the American listeners the opposite reaction from that which is intended. In enlightening America with respect to Britain's true character, we should use principally American sources, of which there is an ample supply. The slogan coined in America, "England expects every American to do his duty," might be particularly effective. THOMSEN No. 130 406/214433-34 The Minister in Estonia to the Foreiffn Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT TALLINN, September 25, 1939 9 : 36 p. m. No. 162 of September 25 Received September 26 12 : 30 a. m. The Foreign Minister, who returned from Moscow this afternoon by plane, 1 has told me the following : Molotov presented to him the draft of a military alliance between the Soviet Union and Estonia. It provided that both countries obligate themselves to give each other military assistance in the event of an attack by a third country. To this end Estonia is to place naval bases and airfields at the disposal of the Soviet Union. Both countries further pledge themselves not to support a third country in an attack on one of the contracting parties. The treaty is to be for a duration of ten years, with the possibility of an extension for another five years. A supplementary protocol is to contain a pledge not to interfere in the internal situation of the other contracting party. The Minister explained that Molotov had insisted on an early answer, but did not set a definite date, adding, however, that the Soviet Union would find other means if the treaty were rejected. Estonia should not think that she would get any aid from Germany or England. In fact, he was convinced that Germany would approve of the agreement proposed by him. 1 On Sept. 25, Grundherr noted that Frohwein had telephoned him at midday to report that although Foreign Minister Selter had gone to Moscow to sign an Estonian-Soviet trade agreement, the signing had not taken place and Selter was already returning to Tallinn. The Estonian Foreign Ministry was accordingly "nervous" about Soviet intentions, and there were moreover a few incidents involving a Soviet ship and Soviet planes (406/214437).
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I asked the Minister whether the talk with Molotov contained any intimation that the Soviet Union was going to make similar proposals to the other Baltic States. His reply was negative. I took note of the information received and said that I would convey it to my Government. Tine Estonian Government, the Minister told me, will confer on the mutter today and tomorrow and make a reply at the earliest possible moment8 *On the morning of {Sept 20, Woennaim'H office rwivtnl a telephone message from the Legation in Kstonia that the Foreign MlnLster had told Frohwein the following ; "A. decision Is wanted today. We are inclined to accept1 * (400/2144&5) No, 131 103/111025 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST TTRGBN-T Moscow, September 25, 1939 10 : 58 p. m. TOP SECRET Received September 2(> 12 : 30 a. m. No. 442 of September 25 Stalin and Molotov asked ma to come to the Kremlin at 8 p. nu today. Stalin stated the following: In the final settlement of the Polish question anything that in the future might create friction between Germany and the Soviet Union must be avoided. From this point of view, he considered it wrong to leave an independent residual Poland, He proposed the following: From the territory to the east of the demarcation line, all the Province of Lublin and that portion of the Province of Warsaw which extends to the Bug should be added to our share. In return, we should waive our claim to Lithuania, Stalin designated this suggestion as a subject for the forthcoming negotiations with the Reich Foreign Minister and added that, if we consented, the Soviet Union would immediately take up the solution of the problem of the Baltic countries in accordance with the Protocol of August 23, 1 and expected in this matter the unstinting support of the German Government Stalin expressly indicated Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, but did not mention Finland. I replied to Stalin that I would report to my Government. 1 See vol. TO, document No. 220,
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SEPTEMBER 1939 135 No. 135 8589/EJ602571/1-73 Fuhrer*s Directive CHEFSACHE FuiiKER HEADQUARTERS, September 25, 1939* TOP SECRET MILITARY The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht OKW No. 205/39 g. Kdos. WFA/LI By officer only DIRECTIVE No. 4 FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 1. No final decision has yet been made regarding the political future of the erstwhile Polish territory between the line of demarcation and the German frontier. After the conclusion of the battles around Warsaw and Modlin, the line of demarcation is to be safeguarded adequately by less heavily equipped units. Sufficient Army and Luftwaffe units are to be left in the East to put a guicJc end to Polish resistance continuing behind the line of demarcation (San-Vistula-Narew-Pissa). I request a report regarding the strength of forces earmarked for both of these tasks. 2. I shall decide later, in accordance with the results of local attacks and attrition warfare, on whether Modlin and the part of Warsaw west of the Vistula are to be taken by a general attack before October 3. However, this attack is to be prepared. 3. The -flow of refugees from the east to the west across the line of demarcation is to be stopped immediately, with the exception of Volksdeutsch elements and Ukrainian activists, 4. The decision regarding the future strategy of the war will be made shortly. Up to that time the measures of the Wehrmacht with regard to organization and armament are to be such as will not conflict with any possible decision. The possibility must be kept open for an offensive in the West at any time. In East Prussia sufficient forces must be kept in readiness to occupy Lithuania quickly, even in the case of armed resistance. 5. a. On land the directives already given for the war in the West will, for the time being, remain in effect. b.1 At sea the former limitations are cancelled, and warfare on merchant shipping is to be conducted against France as well as Britain in accordance with prize law. 1 Marginal note: "Paragraph. 5, figures (b) and (c) superseded by Directive No. 5 [Document No. 170] figures 4 and 5."
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In addition the following operations may be carried out : Attacks upon French naval and air forces, French merchant vessels in convoy, and all troop transports; mining operations off the North African coast (embarkation points) ; 2 war on merchant shipping by naval air units, in accordance with prize law. As heretofore, no attacks are to be made on liners or large steamers which are evidently carrying passengers in large numbers in addition to goods. c. In the air, in the West, the limitations hitherto prevailing remain in force. Flights beyond the German border are permitted only for short-range or combat reconnaissance and for attacks upon artillery fire-control planes and captive balloons. The Luftwaffe may also carry out operations in the German Bight, in the western declared mine areas, and in direct support of naval operations against British or French naval units. Permission for long-range reconnaissance will be given at a later date. 6. With regard to submarine warfare, from now on only the following designations are to be used : For submarine warfare in compliance with prize law: Warfare against merchant shipping [Handelsferieg*}. For unrestricted submarine warfare: Naval siege of the British Isles \Belagerwng Englands zur See]* 7. British merchant vessels 8 which are armed beyond any doubt may be attacked by submarines without warning. ADOLF HITLER "Marginal note: "Should read: North French coast (debarkation points). " 3 Marginal note: "Superseded by Directive No. 5." No. 136 51/33889 The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry Telegram COPENHAGEN, September 26, 1039 7 : 36 p.m. No. 168 of September 26 Received September 26 8 : 45 p. m. With reference to the telephone instructions of September 21 from Ministerialdirektor Wiehl 1 and our telegraphic report No. 167 of September 25.2 The sinking of Swedish and Finnish ships by our submarine has occasioned lively concern here for the Danish food transports to England. Although the reports of the Government circles here are re- * See document No. 118. 1 Not found.
SEPTEMBER 1939 137 served, this reserve by no means reflects the actual attitude; rather it is due to directives of the Government dictated by considerations of foreign policy. The Foreign Minister told me of his serious alarm yesterday. As instructed, I pointed out to him once more that we must reserve the right at all times to employ the same measures against British supplies from the neutral countries as the British themselves use against our supplies from neutral countries. But I believe that at the present stage at least almost irreparable damage would be done to our interests politically if normal Danish transports should actually be sunk by German forces. No. 137 84/2339^400 Minute 'by the State Secretary BERLIN, September 26, 1939, THE FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS IN Moscow I. The war with Poland is concluded; in the West, German offensive plans are not yet ready; thus foreign policy again comes to the fore. Our political interests are : (a) to keep the theater of war as small as possible, (6) to stimulate the desire for peace in the enemy and among the neutrals. The enemy has no concrete peace ideas. We, however, are in possession of conquered territories and able to announce war aims. JParticularly, we should give the French food for thought through real hopes for peace and should promote the process of their inner detachment from the English. II. In Moscow, in my opinion, two things should therefore be said : (a) Russia should not disturb the peace in the Balkans and not take action in Bessarabia as long as England does not interfere militarily in the Balkans. (&) In order to aid the peace party in France, we wish to inject the following program into the discussion : Essentially, Germany claims the boundaries of 1914. Beyond that, the future of Rump Poland a depends on whether the Western Powers should now say they are willing to come around. Should the Russians prove obdurate against a Rump Poland [including territory] on both sides of the present demarcation line, we would then have a free hand in our territory and could announce a separate solution for it. 1 Typewritten marginal note: "Concerning Rump Poland see enclosed memorandum toy Ambassador von Moltke."
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( SEPTEMBER 1939 139 A Polish state extending to the Grodno-PrzemygL line in the east would include only areas settled wholly by Poles and, depending on how the western boundary is drawn, should have from 12 to 15 million inhabitants. It would prevent the emergence of a common border with the Soviet Union arid be strong enough to serve as a buffer state. If this state has as its western boundary the old border of the Reich and if the areas left within Germany should, by a thoroughgoing exchange of population, attain a wholly German composition, one might even count on the growth of Irredentism's being prevented and on Poland's being more or less satisfied with this national territory. Still, it would be necessary to impose firm restraint upon the new state, in order to keep its foreign policy permanently amenable toward us. II. If the residual state which is to be created must be confined in the East to the Vistula-San line, the formation of a government able to negotiate will not be possible. There would no longer be the incentive of a last chance to save the territories in the East. Instead of accepting such a sweeping dismemberment of the country, the Poles would prefer to wait and see whether final victory will not yet fall to the Western Powers. If, for all that, certain elements were prepared to form a government under such conditions it would only be a sham government ; it would not have sufficient authority either at home or abroad and could not hope to be recognized as the successor of the old government. Foreign policy actions which might lead to a basis for peace negotiations with the Western Powers could not be expected of it. Moreover, we must recognize the impossibility of Poland's being altogether satisfied with such a territory reduced to 9 or 10 miljion inhabitants. After the resurgence of Polish nationalism during the last 20 years of independence and the quickening of chauvinism in this era, the struggle for the restoration of a state comprising all the Poles will burst forth more ardently than after the partitions in the eighteenth century, although it is possible that the Irrendentist movement will turn more toward the East in accordance with the far greater losses of territory which occurred there. In view of this nationalist mentality it is not likely that politicians of standing would make themselves available for the formation of a government. This will be even more pronounced if the restraints to be imposed to guide the foreign policy of the Polish residual state should give it the character of a protectorate. Herewith submitted to State Secretary Freiherr von Weizsacker. VON Mbl/FKS 260090 54 1 5
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No. 138 66/46603-i9 Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministers Secretariat BERLIN, September 26, 1939. MEMORANDUM OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FUIIRER AND M. DAHXERUS x IN THE PRESENCE OF FIELD MARSHAL, GORING M. Dahlerus pointed out, by way of introduction, that the British, were such great egoists that they were now deliberating, in view of the difficulties of the present situation, how they could extricate themselves from the whole affair. He had told Forbes 2 in Stockholm that, after the speeches of Churchill and Chamberlain, negotiations between the British and the German Governments were probably out of the question. Forbes denied this and, on the contrary, took the view that the British Government could very well conduct such negotiations with Germany if only a formula were found which assured to the peoples of Europe their territorial integrity and their freedom by means of a treaty among the great European Powers. Poland was considered lost, so they took the position that it was now a matter of at least saving their own skins. The Führer replied that the worst of it was that the British had always considered everything pure bluff and immediately interpreted all restraint and patience on his part as weakness. Because he (the Führer) had for years put up with certain things from the Poles, because there was not always immediate resort to shooting, England had come to the false conclusion of mistaking for weakness the considerateness and forbearance of the Führer. The British were now trying something similar with their declaration of a 3-year war. If Germany declared that this threat was a matter of indifference to her, that, too, would be considered bluffing. But they should not let themselves be deceived about the Führer; he would soon wage the war toward the West, also, in such a way as to stun the British. He had destroyed Poland in 3 weeks. The British should stop and think what could happen to them in 3 months. 1 Birger Dahlerus, a Swedish civil engineer and mamifacturer, whose efforts as an unofficial intermediary between Britain and Germany during the weeks before the outbreak of war are described in his Sista f&rsdket, London-Berlin, sommaren 1939 (Stockholm, 1945), translated as The Last Attempt (London, 1947). See also vol. vi, document No. 783, and vol. vn, document No. 312. Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, Counselor, British Legation in Norway, September 1939-February 1940. Dahlerus testified Mar. 19, 1946, before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg that his meeting with Ogilvie-Forbes took place in Oslo, not Stockholm, on Sept. 24, 1939. Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. rs, p. 473. Dahlerus had been in contact in Berlin with Ogilvie-Forbes, who was Counselor of the British Embassy until the outbreak of war.
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prepared for it, for she needed peace in order to cultivate the newly acquired areas in the East that had formerly belonged to the German cultural sphere. This would require at least 50 years. The Führer intended to reincorporate into the Reich the former German and former Austrian sections of Poland, as well as strategically important territories. Besides this there was to be a "reshuffling" not only by reuniting once more inside the Reich by large-scale resettlement the scattered Germany minority groups, but also by effecting an adjustment between the thickly populated west, with a population density of 140 persons per square kilometer a condition that could not last and the thinly populated east with a density of only 35 people per square kilometer. To carry out these great plans would require 50 to 100 years, particularly if one considered the tremendous backwardness and demoralization of Poland, in comparison with which Czechia looked like a veritable paradise. It was insolence for such a debased country as Poland to dare to turn against a country like Germany. M. Dahlerus mentioned in this connection a statement of Lipski, who had declared that the Poles would not yield to Germany, for he knew Germany very well and within a week a revolution would surely break out and force Germany to back down. The Führer then described further his awful impressions of Poland during his trips to the front. The Vistula, supposed to be Poland's great river, was silted up everywhere and navigable only by rowboat. And now for this wretched country millions of Englishmen and Germans were to lay down their lives ! , M. Dahlerus stated in this connection that it depended on only one thing : how the British could save face. The Führer pointed out that the Poles had deceived the British, that they had had absolutely no basis for opposing Germany, as they had led the British to believe. M. Dahlerus then brought up the question of the Jews. The British were considering where the Jews were to stay, whereupon the Führer replied that if he should reorganize the Polish state, an asylum could also be created for the Jews. Someone had to see that there was order in the East \Ostra!um\ and convert the condition of complete disorganization into an orderly one. In addition to this there would be the above-mentioned reshuffling of peoples : Germans would be settled in the thinly populated areas in order at least to increase the population density from 35 persons per square kilometer to 80. The aim was to create a sensible regional distribution of nationalities as well as a sensible economic structure in the Polish area. M. Dahlerus again brought up the question of peace and said that the main problem for the British was to find a formula by which peace would be assured in the future. At the Führer's suggestion that the
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SEPTEMBER 1939 145 remarks by saying that he was referring to the complete conversion of the economy to wartime requirements. The world would be amazed when once it perceived what Germany was producing in the way of airplanes, arms, ammunition, submarines, and E-boats. So if peace was wanted, one would have to hurry somewhat. A way could then perhaps be found. At the same time, of course, the honor of a victorious army would by all means have to be respected. He, the Fuhrer, could simply not expect certain things of his generals and of the German nation, which was a nation of soldiers, and had to repeat that he was skeptical with regard to the British will to peace and the possibilities of realizing the will. M. Dahlerus replied in conclusion that he would nevertheless do his best and would go to England the very next day in order to send out feelers in the direction indicated. SCHMIDT Minister No. 139 2422/511803 The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry No. 182 ROME, September 26, 1939. Received September 30. Pol. IX 2034. Subject : Anti-war sentiment of leading Catholic circles in the United States. With reference to the instruction of August 19 Pol. IX 1565.1 I have the honor to transmit the enclosed copies of several reports 2 brought to my attention by clerical circles emanating from the National Catholic Welfare Conference, which, as you know,J .supplies news to the entire Catholic press in the United States. They are characteristic of the anti-war sentiment of the leading Catholic circles of the country. Worthy of particular note is the report from Brooklyn, dated September 8, regarding mass meetings which the International Catholic Truth Society organized in the larger cities of the United States under the slogan : "What can you do to keep the United States out of the war?" Worth noting among the proposals put forward by the Society is a bill before the American Congress stipulating that any declaration of war would first have to be decided by a plebiscite. 1 Vol. vn, document No. 129. 3 Not printed (8107/E579533-37).
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The reports of the N. C. W. C. indicate the large extent to which sentiment against involvement in the war already exists among American Catholics and is promoted by influential individuals in these circles. Under these circumstances and in consideration of the present situation it therefore seems to me neither necessary nor profitable to bring influence to bear on the Vatican in the sense suggested by Generalissimo Franco. This is all the more true since under the present circumstances the Vatican will most scrupulously avoid exercising a political influence with respect to the re-election of Roosevelt. BERGEK No. 140 174/136154 The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry MOOT URGENT TOKYO, September 27, 1939 9 : 00 a. m. Na 512 of September 27 Eeceived September 273 : 50 p. m. For the State Secretary. In response to the news of the Reich Foreign Minister's Moscow trip, 1 the General Staff requested in a demarche, made today to the Military Attach^ and twice repeated, that in the course of the Moscow negotiations an appropriate gesture in favor of Japan be made by the Germans 2 and, if possible, also by the Russians, since in case of still closer ties between Germany and Russia, the stubborn fight for a settlement between Japan and Russia, which the Army is determined to continue in all circumstances, would experience a serious setback. The chief argument of the opponents of Russia was that Russia was supporting Chiang Kai-shek and was thus an enemy of Japanese policy in China. The instruction I received from the Foreign Minister in telegram No. 335 of September 93 3 to work for an agreement between Japan and Russia, prompts me to transmit this request from the General Staff for favorable consideration. OTT 1 See document No. 152, footnote 3. a A copy of this document in a secret file of the Moscow Embassy carries Sclralenburg's comment of Sept. 30: "No! There is no action to be taken," (166/131761) 3 Document No. 40.
SEPTEMBER 1939 147 No. 141 108/111637 An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassym the Soviet Union Telegram MOST URGENT BERLIN", September 27, 1939. No. 435 Euro RAM 500. For Reich Foreign Minister personally. Telegram from Tallinn No. 163 of September 26 for High Command of the Army, Attache Section : The Estonian Chief of Staff informed me of the Russian demand for an alliance. He stated that a naval base at Baltiski and an air base on Estonian islands were demanded by Russia. The General Staff recommended acceptance of the demands as German aid was quite out of the question, hence the situation could only become worse. On September 25 and 26, Russian aircraft carried out extensive flights over Estonian territory. The General Staff gave orders not to fire on aircraft in any circumstances in order not to prejudice the situation. Rossing. Frohwein. BRTJCEJLMEIER No. 142 103/111639-40 An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Telegram MOST URGENT BERLIN, September 27, 1939. No. 437 Hiiro RAM 498. For the Reich Foreign Minister personally. Telegram from Tallinn No. 164 of September 26 : The Foreign Minister conveyed a request to inform the Reich Foreign Minister of the following, if possible before his departure for Moscow : The Estonian Government, under the gravest threat of imminent attack, is prepared perforce to accept a military alliance with the Soviet Union. Minister Selter with staff will fly to Moscow tomorrow, Wednesday, to negotiate. The aim of the negotiation: to frame a treaty in such a manner that the sovereignty and internal security of the country are preserved and the Estonian Non-Aggression Pact is kept intact. Hence they intended to propose a mutual assistance obligation of the contracting parties without prejudice to existing nonaggression pacts with third countries. Furthermore they will
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attempt to have naval and air bases made available only in case of war, when the assistance obligation comes into play ; in peacetime so far as possible preparation of the bases only. The Russians first demanded Tallinn as a naval base, but seem prepared to agree to Baltiski or a port on Osel [S'aare]. The Estonians wish if possible to grant air bases only on an island. The general tendency is to meet the demands only as far as necessary to prevent an attack, and to maintain existing good relations with Germany. Frohwein. BRUCKLMEIER No. 143 An Official of the Foreign Ministers Secretariat to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Telegram MOST URGENT BERLIN, September 27, 1939. No. 436 Biiro RAM 499. For the Reich Foreign Minister personally. Telegram from Helsinki No. 245 of September 26 : The Foreign Minister notified me of demands made by Russia on Estonia 1 and observed that Finland was prepared to improve her relations with Russia, but would never accept such demands and would rather let it come to the worst. I pointed to the difference between the position of Estonia and that of Finland and advised the Foreign Minister to seek the security of his country in good relations with Germany and Russia. The Foreign Minister agreed and emphasized complete elimination of English influence from the Baltic area. Bliicher. BRUCKJLMEIER * See documents Nos. 130 and 141. No. 144 1182/323298-300 Memorandum T>y the Director of the Political Department IMMEDIATE BEBMN, September 2T, 1939, As instructed, I took up with Admiral Schniewind today the questions pertaining to naval warfare discussed in the letter of the Naval Staff of September 26.1 He had called in Captain Fricke, 1 Not found.
SEPTEMBER 1939 149 Captain Neubauer, Marineoberkriegsgerichtsrat Eckhardt and Captain . . . . 2 The Naval Staff will draw up a memorandum of the conversation* Agreement was reached on the following points : 1. Enemy and neutral merchant vessels which use their radio after steps have been instituted to stop them, as well as such vessels which zig-zag or proceed without lights, can be sunk without warning. All neutral countries will "e notified to this effect. The text will be drawn up in the Foreign Ministry and will be telegraphed to all our Missions today,3 following approval by the Naval Staff (Eckhardt). The notification will not mention torpedoings but serve only as a warning that ships will expose themselves to dangers by certain actions. I did not discuss the question of limiting these measures to definite zones, as was provided in annex 1 * of the Naval Staff communication for one of the cases. It would be desirable to incorporate such a restriction so that the Americans cannot say that we are engaging in such activities off their coasts. This might be taken into consideration in drafting the notification. 2. After a date still to be fixed, British and French merchant vessels can be sunk without warning since they can be assumed to be armed. No notification is to be given. To begin with, an intensive propaganda campaign lasting about 4: days is to be carried on concerning the arming of enemy merchant vessels. Before the final orders are issued the Naval Staff and the Foreign Ministry will once more consult with one another. The Naval Staff as well as the Foreign Ministry is to investigate at once whether in the present legal situation in the United States American citizens can travel on enemy merchant vessels only at their own risk or whether they are entirely forbidden to do so. If no such legislation exists, I have reported the desire of the Foreign Ministry that the measure be postponed until such American legislation is concluded, but did not put this wish in the form of a condition. 3. Agreement was reached that neutral merchant vessels should if possible not be torpedoed in the Baltic Sea and the eastern portion of the North Sea. Admiral Schniewind said that in view of the commitment of submarines no absolutely binding promise can be given in this respect. 4. There was agreement that food, with the exception of fruits and vegetables, should in practice be treated the same as absolute contraband. This will be done in the expectation that by the time the prizecourt decisions are issued more unequivocal information concerning the British and French attitude in the matter will be available. 5. The question of the Italian, Japanese, Spanish, and Soviet Russian merchant vessels was not discussed. At any rate, the notification * The name was left blank in the original. * A circular telegram en clair by Weizsftcker, dated Sept. 29 (8280/E588260-66) , contained instructions drawn up along these lines. 4 Not found.
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SEPTEMBER 1939 151 joined by Bulgaria in return for political concessions.1 These endeavors had nothing to do with the above-mentioned Italian project ; on the contrary, Italy intended to forestall them by her activity in the said economic field. WEIZSACKER 1 In a circular telegram of Sept. 28, WeizsScker furnished further information on this subject: The Bulgarian Minister President had informed the Cterman Minister in Bulgaria that Turkey, supported by Rumania and Yugoslavia, was proposing a Balkan bloc for joint defense of neutrality "toward the north." The Legation in Sofia had been instructed that such a move would be counter to the German interest, but that a bloc to preserve economic neutrality would! be useful. This circular telegram went to Rome, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, Athens., and Ankara: (96/108026). No. 146 96/108022 Memorandum T>y the State Secretary StS. No. 763 BERLIN, September 27, 1939. At today's reception of the new Turkish Ambassador * the Führer in a friendly manner spoke at length about German-Turkish relations. To be sure, he twice brought up certain unfriendly tendencies in the Turkish press, but explained to the new Ambassador, by referring to historic events and certain ideological parallels, that good political and especially economic relations between us were advisable and rich in prospects. WEIZSACKER 1 R. Htisrev Gerede. No. 147 179&/40.8&27-30 The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry No. 2653 HELSINKI, September 27, 1939. Received September 30. Pol. VI 2184. POLITICAL REPORT Subject: Finland and the War. The last few weeks have brought with them changes of such extensive scope and such rapid tempo for Finnish foreign policy as the Finnish people have never before experienced since the beginning of their independence. The factors which Finnish foreign policy has
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for the last few years been counting on as constants have almost all collapsed. The dominant position of England in Finnish economic life disappeared from one day to the next. The undeniable economic prosperity of Finland, which was based on exports, has suddenly been jeopardized. Through the collapse of Poland the system of eastern buffer states has disintegrated at the point where it was seemingly strongest. The security which was sought through alignment with Scandinavia has become more than doubtful, since a country which has almost three times as many inhabitants as all Scandinavia was overrun in less than three weeks. The antagonism between Germany and Russia, which created a sort of equilibrium in the region of the Baltic, has disappeared from the political arena. Russia, which people liked to regard as a sleeping bear, has awakened, and her urge for expansion has been directed toward the West. As a result of the military striking power which Germany showed in the Polish campaign, the power relations on the Continent have been completely altered. It is no wonder that the significance and the extent of this political earthquake has penetrated only slowly into the comprehension of the Finnish people. Many still allow themselves to be guided in foreign policy by their personal opinion on the war guilt question and by ideological convictions. Many still think along the lines of the past and believe that by maintaining a strictly neutral policy Finland can remain completely aloof from the earthquake. But its vibrations are becoming noticeable even in this country. Trade with the countries outside the Baltic region has been cut off. A noticeable lack of gasoline, coal, and sugar has set in. Foreign exchange is becoming scarce. Large factories are limiting their production. The fear of Russia, which is deeply embedded in the subconscious mind of every Finn, has been aroused since the penetration of the Red Army into Poland, and a nervousness is evident which is quite out of keeping with the calm nature of the Finns. This nervousness extends even to the military command, where Field Marshal Maimerheim is its exponent. From my numerous conversations with the Foreign Minister I have obtained the impression that he understands the meaning of the present hour. If I may be permitted to reduce the previous attitude of M. Erkko to a very brief formula, he was, upon assuming office, an Anglophile and Russophobe at heart. He knows now that in the face of the present situation there is no room in Finnish foreign policy for either Anglomania or Russophobia, that the ideological affinities with the Western Democracies as well as the economic relations with these countries are at the moment unproductive, and that Finland cannot at the present time afford an anti-Russian policy.
SEPTEMBER 1939 153 Obviously he is also taking into particular account the fact that Finland is situated on a sea which is dominated by Germany, that Germany has become the strongest military power in Europe, and that the German influence is no longer counterbalanced by the Russians. M. Erkko, in my opinion, realizes that in these circumstances Finnish policy is no longer free to maneuver between the three great powers, Germany, England, and Bussia, that it must now deal only with Germany and Russia, and that these two powers can no longer be played off against each other. Moreover, I have the impression that M. Erkko is prepared to draw the necessary conclusions from this. He has told me that he wishes to improve relations with Russia. He hopes that the Finnish-Russian economic relations inaugurated in Moscow may lead to a positive result. He is also thinking of the possibility that Finland might offer to serve as a transit country for German-Russian trade during the period when the Leningrad harbor is frozen over. He would like very much to settle the Aland question and, in the event that the Russians offer an acceptable equivalent, he is not even averse to meeting the Russian wishes for the acquisition of the islands of Seiskari and Lavansaari.1 As for relations with Germany, M. Erkko has since the beginning of the war personally seen to it that the press follows a neutral policy in its editorials and in the selection and arrangement of news reports. He is doing his part to keep up and stimulate commercial intercourse with Germany, and vis-a-vis England he courageously maintains the position that "Finland will keep up its normal trade with belligerent nations." 2 In conclusion I should like to say : There can be no doubt that in the war against Poland the sympathies of the Finnish people were not on our side. But the official attitude of the Finnish Government and the attitude of those in authority in the country give evidence of realistic political thinking [realpolitische'm I>enken\ and on the whole have not given us any cause for complaint. We should utilize the favorable position we have automatically won vis-si-vis Finland through international political developments so as to make full use of the economic potentialities of the country and develop our position so that it will be maintained even after the war. In this connection we must, however, always take into account that influential Finnish economic groups will do their utmost not to encumber their relations with England in such a way as to impede, after the conclusion of peace, the resumption of exports to England, which are indispensable 1 See vol. vi, document No. 257, footnote 3. 2 This sentence is in English in the original.
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No. 149 2290/483419-21 Ambassador Mackensen to [State Secretary Wei&sacker} BOMB, September 27, 1939. DEAR FRIEND : I am sending you the enclosed carbon copy of a report of September 26 No. 7531 * dealing with the importation of foreign goods via Italy. I am directing your attention to this matter because the decision requested by me also has political implications. The question involved is the following: Large quantities of goods important for the war effort, which are already German property, are still warehoused in neutral ports or the country of origin. We have the understandable desire to get them to Germany in so far as possible through Italy. This can be done only in case they are bought by an Italian firm and shipped to Italy in Italian or neutral vessels for forwarding from here to Germany. The Italian Government declared orally to Herr Clodius in the trade negotiations of September 11 to 13 that it would support such transactions as far as possible. 2 The procedure described above can be carried through only as long as Italy's imports by and large continue unhampered. This would change if England, some day, should prevent Italy from any largescale importation of goods in excess of her own needs. In this case Italy would no longer be able to lend herself to importing certain commodities for Germany with the obligation to forward them, because Italy would otherwise jeopardize the supplying of her own needs and perhaps become involved in serious trouble with the British; that, if I judge the situation correctly, is far from being in our interest at this time. Even then, however, Italy might be willing to accept and keep such commodities, although perhaps not all of them, for tlxe Italian economy.

At this point arises the question which to my mind is important whether we should undertake transactions of this kind only on condition that transfer to Germany is assured, or whether we should let Italy have these goods if it should no longer be possible to forward them to us. I think that the latter solution is the correct one. If strategic commodities originally destined for us cannot be shipped to Germany, they should at least bring some benefit to the economy of our ally. I am convinced that Italy would be glad if Germany were to give this kind of support to her increasingly apparent resolution to

1 Not printed (2290/483422-24). a See document No. 33.
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get the country ready for war economically, too, within the shortest possible time. I recommend this solution all the more because it entails no economic drawbacks whatsoever for Germany.

With cordial regards, Heil Hitler ! Yours, etc., v, MACKENSEN No. 150 233/156148-49 The Charge cFAffaires in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry Telegram BUENOS AIRES, September 28, 1939 12 : 35 a. m. No. 488 of September 27 Received September 28 8 : 30 a. m. From numerous talks which I initiated with leading figures in Argentine politics and business, the following may be useful for an evaluation of Argentine neutrality: Very large groups stress the wish for maintaining and defending neutrality as well as continuing trade with Germany; in doing so they are thinking primarily of Argentina's own economic interests. In this connection an alleged statement by President Ortiz is cited, which indicates that Argentina's neutral position in relation to contraband questions will be brought out clearly at the Panama Conference ; it also makes reference to the intensified diplomatic exchange between Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay during the past few days which is said to point to joint action especially in respect to the export of foodstuffs to belligerents and neutrals. The great majority of these same groups and of the public, which has long been worked upon by the local press and radio, are, however, politically opposed to us notwithstanding the outwardly correct observance of the principles of neutrality. One frequently encounters here the foolish but accepted notion that expansionist ambitions would make Germany a territorial and general threat to South America after the victorious conclusion of the war. There is general failure to understand Germany's policy, which usually is represented as disruptive of peace, except among a few intellectuals in the army and in business who are reasonably familiar with European issues. In particular the anti-British sentiment of the younger generation must not be construed as being pro-German. The great sympathy for France, which is expressed almost without exception, is the fruit of clever cultural propaganda carried on for many years. German culture continues to be highly regarded by its friends, but it is not identified with the new Germany which is viewed as anti-cultural if only because of its supposed threat to the Catholic Church ; it must be
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remembered in this connection that the leading intellectual layer is strictly Catholic. Many officers admire Germany's military achievement in Poland quite frankly or in anonymous articles in the press. By order of the Minister of War, however, all active officers are prohibited from expressing opinions on military questions involving the belligerents as being inconsistent with neutrality ; and in general the Government, especially the Foreign Ministry, is endeavoring to maintain a rigorously neutral attitude in all outward manifestations, and is prohibiting all demonstrations bearing on war issues. These efforts were also clearly evident in my talk with the Foreign Minister yesterday (cf. telegraphic reports Nos. 480 l and 482 of September 26 ), 2 although it is known that both Foreign Minister Cantilo and the present Under State Secretary at the Foreign Ministry have always been markedly pro-French. Overall sentiment in Argentina is at present anti-German for ideological reasons and as a result of enemy propaganda, but [the country] will remain neutral as long as possible because of materialistic considerations. Identical text to Santiago, Rio de Janeiro, and Panama. 1 Not printed (S520/E597448-S1 ) . 'Not printed (8524/E59750Q). No. 151 B21/B0051SO-31 The Military AttacJie in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Telegram TTRGENT WASHINGTON, September 28, 19B9 2 : 04 a. m. No. 427 of September 27 Received September 28 1 : 10 p. m. Top Secret. Top Secret Military. For the High Command of the Wehrmacht, Foreign Branch, and Attache Section, Army General Staff Officer for Intelligence. In agreement with the ChargS d'Affaires I have frequent conversations with the General Staff, where my visits are all the more welcome since the Allied Powers obviously inform them only from the propaganda standpoint and therefore very inadequately from the military standpoint, and since my previous statements have been confirmed by the outcome of the Polish campaign. I have based the conversations on German radio reports and utilization of the newspapers here. It would be of considerable help in the cultivation of these relations if I could get reports of an operational nature and information going beyond our public announcements or anticipating them information which should or could be brought to the attention of the General Staff and, through the Staff, to the Administration. It is not a question of
SEPTEMBER 1939 159 reports broadcast by the German radio which are received here at once anyway. They were especially grateful for detailed information on the German generals mentioned in our reports, all of whom I know personally. This is all the more important since British influence is directed toward disparaging the quality of German leadership, the Germany Army, and the German will to fight, despite or precisely because of our successes, and also toward circulating the assertion that there is antagonism between the political and military leaders in Germany. The General Staff reports directly to Roosevelt and the State Department on the war situation and is consulted on the political and strategic evaluation of the world situation. While the influence of the American General Staff, our contacts with it, or the possibility of obtaining intelligence should not be overestimated, the experience of the past few years has shown that it is advisable to make use of and cultivate these relations, which have proved their value.1 I hear from a very good source that Lindbergh's important radio address against America's entry into the war 2 was influenced by a high-ranking General Staff officer. BOTTTCHEK 1 On Nov. 22, Btftticher telegraphed a similar appeal to the Operations Staff of the Luftwaffe for information on German air operations "which can be used confidentially." (B21/B005282) "Charles A. Lindbergh, the American aviator, took a prominent role in the discussion of American foreign policy at this time. The speech referred to was delivered on Sept. 16. No. 152 34/23401-05 The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry x [Moscow, September 28, 1939]. For the State Secretary : Please submit immediately to the Fuhrer. The conversation with Stalin and Molotov, lasting 3 hours, was friendly throughout in tone. As a result, the following possibilities for a solution have emerged : (1) The river lines of the Pissa, Narew, Vistula, San, as agreed upon, are to stand. Furthermore, Lithuania is to remain in the German sphere of influence in accordance with the Moscow Protocol. 1 According to a retrospective account by Hencke entitled "With the Reich Foreign Minister in Moscow," the text of this document was dictated by Kibbentrop and taken by Hencke at 4 o'clock on the morning of Sept. 28, 1939, to the code room of the Embassy. (See Appendix I.) After the document was put in code it appears that it was then transmitted by telephone in code to the Foreign Ministry. (Oral statement of Jan. 23, 1953, to the editors, by Gustav Hilger, who further states that no other record was made of the Stalin-Molotov Ribbentrop conversation.)
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(2) We are to yield Lithuania to the Russian sphere of influence and receive in return an area east of the Vistula, bounded on the north and east by the Bug River to about Krylow and from there westward, crossing approximately at Tomasz6w, to the San River. The Soviet Union would further cede to us from its present sphere of influence the tip around Suwalki to the line just north of Augustww, approximately in the line of the Seeplatte-Augustow Canal* Stubborn efforts on my part to improve the second proposal by establishing a line from Brest Litovsk westward past Grodno to the Memel [Niemen] River, west of Kaunas, in a straight line up to the southern tip of Latvia, failed because of even more stubborn resistance on the part of Stalin. Nevertheless, a certain improvement on the second proposal, first by drawing the boundary from Krylow, via Tomasz6w, to PrzemyH, and further from MaJkinia on the Bug River through Ostrow-Ostrdteka to the East Prussian border, seems to me difficult but not entirely out of the question. Furthermore, I insisted in advance of the discussion on an extension, even though limited, of the border of East Prussia into Lithuanian territory, approximately on a line from the eastern boundary of the Suwalki tip, via Marijampolfe, and on in an arc to the southern tip of Latvia. In the end Stalin did not appear to oppose this so much as iny first suggestion for expansion, but it is questionable whether even this boundary correction can be obtained in view of Stalin's great obstinacy. Stalin argued in favor of his second proposal that splitting the territory with a purely Polish population appeared to him a dubious procedure. History has proved that the Polish people continually struggle for unification. To partition the Polish population would therefore easily create sources of unrest from which discord between Germany and the Soviet Union might possibly arise. To my proposal that the oil district of Drohobycz and Borysiaw be relinquished to Germany, since Russia already had rich oil resources, while Germany lacked them, Stalin replied that he could not accept this. The Ukrainian people had strongly pressed their claim to this area. He was willing, however, to promise us as compensation deliveries of oil to the extent of the whole annual production, amounting today to 300,000 tons, but which he hoped to increase to 500,000 tons. In return for this, Germany could supply coal and steel tubing. I also made certain proposals to Stalin aimed at strengthening German-Russian friendship, to which he will reply tomorrow. My suggestion that the definitive treaty establishing the future boundary of Poland be concluded tomorrow was accepted by Stalin and Molotov. The question as to whether solution (1) or (2) is the one we should strive for is hard to decide. Solution (1), in my opinion, would have the advantage that, Lithuania being ours, the area of German
SEPTEMBER 1939 161 settlement would be extended towards the northeast. Furthermore, a clear four-river line would mean the shortest possible military frontier and relieve us of the necessity of supplying a few million [tons] of coal. The argument against solution (1), however, is the fact that the partition of the Polish settlement area might possibly lead to friction between Germany and Russia. Besides, tinder solution (1), Germany might be forced, in view of the Russian action impending in Estonia and Latvia, to conclude, in her turn, a treaty of protection with Lithuania in the next few weeks which the world would interpret as veiled annexation. This very night an Estonian-Russian mutual assistance pact seems about to be concluded, which will provide for the posting of one Russian infantry division, one cavalry brigade, one armored brigade, and one air brigade on Estonian territory, without, however, abolishing the Estonian system of government at this time. A similar pact will be concluded with Latvia shortly. Even if the objections that can be made to a corresponding German-Lithuanian protective relationship are not decisive, the reproach that Germany is pursuing an imperialistic policy cannot be used against us as propaganda. The argument in favor of the second proposal is that, by the incorporation of the entire Polish population, Polish intrigues for disturbing German-Russian relations might possibly be eliminated, and, further, that the Polish national problem might be dealt with as Germany saw fit. Finally, the territories east of the Vistula falling to Germany in the event of solution (2) are according to expert opinion more valuable agriculturally than the territories west of the Vistula, The argument might be made against solution (2) that in world opinion Russia would so to speak be relieved of the Polish problem. I said I would take time to think it over until 12 o'clock German time on Thursday when I would give Stalin my reaction to proposal (1) or (2) , and thereupon proceed to the drafting of the treaty. I would appreciate it if the Führer would let me know by telephone before this time whether he prefers proposal (1) or (2), since it is impossible from here to be fully cognizant of details, such as military and other considerations, with their full implications. 2 RlBBENTROP s 2 No record of Hitler's reply has teen found. See Etencke's notes printed as Appendix I. The agreement actually reached is printed as document No. 159. 'The timetable of Bibbentrop's visit in Moscow is set forth in the following unsigned and undated memorandum found in the papers of Hencke (838/281527) : "September 27, 1939 : Arrival at airport 6 p. m. First meeting 10 p. m. to 1 a. m. September 28, 1939 : Meeting resumed 3 to 6 : 30 p. m. I>inner at Kremlin. One act of ballet (Swan Lake) ; Stalin meanwhile negotiated with the Latvians. Meeting resumed at midnight. Sieving at 5 a. m. Afterwards reception for the delegation at Ambassador's till about 6 : 30 a. m. September 29, 1939 : Departure by air 12 : 40 p. m."
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No. 153 215/14658O The State Secretary to the Em&attAy in the Soviet Union Telegram URGENT BRRWN, September 28, 1939. No. 443 of September 27 Transmitted in code by telephone. For the Foreign Minister. GruppenFührer Heydrich informed me that the Führer and Chancellor has ordered that evacuation of the Volksdeutsche from Estonia and Latvia be taken up at once. Heydrich and I agreed that preparations within Germany, such as arranging for shipping space, shall be started right away in conjunction with the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, but that nothing shall be divulged outwardly and in no case shall any initiative be taken in Estonia and Latvia without the Foreign Ministry. I told H. that carrying out of these measures at all and, if occasion arises, the actual time must depend on the course of the Foreign Minister's negotiations in Moscow. In that case it would be desirable to reach agreements with the Soviet Union on an orderly evacuation with safeguards for property interests. The Volksdeutsche in Estonia are estimated at 16,000, in Latvia 70,000. If haste is indicated, please wire instructions. WBIZSACKER No. 154 215/146578 The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Telegram MOST URGENT [BERLIN, September 28, 1939]. No. 4:56 of September 28 Received September 28 6 : 10 p. m. For the Foreign Minister. With reference to our telegram No. 443 of September 27.1 The ReichsFührer-SS suggests, by way of Behrends, that the question of the resettlement of Volksdeutsche from Estonia be handled as follows : 1) In case of a quiet development concerning resettlement, agreements with guarantee of property rights. 2) In case of anarchy in Estonia (a) immediate declaring of Volksdeutsche to be Reichsdeutsche, with their persons and property under 1 Document No. 153.
SEPTEMBER 1939 163 German protection; (b) immediate taking of Volksdeutsche without exceptions on German transports, which will be accompanied by naval vessels to ensure safe passage. In case of need corresponding steps for Latvia. Request further agreement that the Legation in Riga be instructed to demand of the Latvian Government martial law and every protection for Volksdeutsche in case disorders threaten to occur. The property of Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche in Estonia is estimated at one and a half million reichsmarks. WEIZSACKER No. 155 5670/BJa9905-66 TJie Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry Telegram URGENT BELGRADE, September 28, 1939 9 : 15 p. m. No. 362 of September 28 Received September 29 12 : 30 a. m. W2081 g. Following a luncheon in a small circle today the Prince Regent expressed keen satisfaction at the fact that the German armament deliveries were getting under way. He had now ordered that every available means should be utilized to bring the Bor copper mines and Trepca lead mines under state management. The exchange of goods with Germany must be promoted in every way. Whatever the outcome of the war, Yugoslavia would always remain a neighbor of Germany and never be a neighbor of England. Then the Prince Regent spoke of Russian expansion toward the west, which caused him concern. As I knew, he was an enemy not only of Bolshevism but also of Pan-Slavism. On that account he feared a strengthening of Soviet Russian influence in Southeast Europe, which might operate here, in Yugoslavia, in the guise of Pan-Slavism. He felt the profoundest distrust for Stalin's policy and was convinced that in the last analysis it was directed toward promoting the world revolution through touching off a world war. He was well aware that Germany had been driven into Russia's arms by British policy. In any case, however, the cheap laurels which Stalen had now been able to pluck in Poland signified a further strengthening of the Bolshevist regime. He hoped that he was too pessimistic about this, but he could not dismiss these fears. At the close the Prince Regent inquired about the health of the Führer and the Field Maxshal.
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No. 156 45^/224241 The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Telephone Message en ciair * IMMEDIATE BERLIN, September 28, 1939. Extremely urgent, to be given to the Reich Foreign Minister immediately. With reference to our telegrams. I assume that in case Russian troops march into Estonia an agreement could be reached there [in Moscow] with the Soviet Union regarding the treatment of the Volksdeutsche, including protection of their property rights. Resettlement of the Volksdeutsche should probably be considered in any case. It would perhaps be best if a three-sided agreement could be reached there, in which a date would be set in the not too distant future when German ships could begin to remove the Volksdeutsche. It is impossible to judge from here whether similar negotiations should be initiated for Latvia at this time.2 WBIZSACKER 1 Marginal notes: "Dictated over telephone by Under State Secretary Woermann." "Original given to Herr Brticklmeier [of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat] at 3 : 50 p. m. Sept. 28." 'The copy of this document in the files of the Moscow Embassy (215/146577) records that this message had been given the telegram number 4(tt, and was received in Moscow at 6 : 30 p. m. A marginal note by von TIppelskirch states : "The Ambassador talked to Herr von Weissacker around midnight and asked him to await the return of the Foreign Minister, since the matter does not appear to be so urgent as was assumed." No. 157 F2/0332r-0331 German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty Moscow, September 28, 1939. The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR consider it as exclusively their task, after the disintegration of the former Polish state, to re-establish peace and order in these territories and to assure to the peoples living there a peaceful life in keeping with their national character. To this end, they have agreed upon the following : Article I. The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR determine as the boundary of their respective national interests in the territory of the former Polish state the line marked on the
SEPTEMBER 1939 165 attached map,1 which shall be described in more detail in a supplementary protocol. 2 Article II* Both parties recognize the boundary of the respective national interests established in article I as definitive and shall reject any interference of third powers in this settlement. Article III. The necessary reorganization of public administration will be effected in the areas west of the line specified in article I by the Government of the German Reich, in the areas east of this line by the Government of the USSR. Article IV. The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR regard this settlement as a firm foundation for a progressive development of the friendly relations between their peoples. Article V. This treaty shall be ratified and the ratification shall be exchanged in Berlin as soon as possible. The treaty becomes effective upon signature. Done in duplicate, in the German and Russian languages. For the Government By authority of the of the German Reich : Government of the USSR : V. RlBBEKTROP W. MOLOTOW * See Appendix VI. a Document No. 193. No. 158 F2/031& Confidential Protocol Moscow, September 28, 1939. The Government of the USSR shall place no obstacles in the way of Reich nationals and other persons of German descent residing in its sphere of influence if they desire to migrate to Germany or to the German sphere of influence. It agrees that such removals shall be carried out by agents of the Government of the Reich in cooperation with the competent local authorities and that the property rights of the emigrants shall be protected. A corresponding obligation is assumed by the Government of the German Reich in respect to the persons of Ukrainian or White Russian descent residing in its sphere of influence.1 For the Government By authority of the of the German Reich : Government, of the USSR : v. REBBENTROP W. MOLOTOW 1 An agreement implementing this Protocol was signed in Moscow on Nov. 16, 1939 (6314/E470970-90).

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No. 159 Secret Additional Protocol Moscxw, September 28, 1939. The undersigned plenipotentiaries declare the agreement of the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR upon the following : The Secret Additional Protocol signed on August 23, 1939,1 shall be amended in item 1 to the effect that the territory of the Lithuanian state falls to the sphere of influence of the USSR, while, on the other hand, the province of Lublin and parts of the province of Warsaw fall to the sphere of influence of Germany (cf. the map attached to the Boundary and Friendship Treaty signed today).2 As sooix as the Government of the USSR, shall take special measures on Lithuanian territory to protect its interests, the present German-Lithuanian border, for the purpose of a natural and simple boundary delineation, shall be rectified in such a way that the Lithuanian territory situated to the southwest of the line marked on the attached map falls to Germany. Further it is declared that the economic agreements now in force between Germany and Lithuania shall not be affected by the measures of the Soviet Union referred to above. For the Government By authority of the of the German Reich : Government of the USSR : v. REBBENTROP W. Morxyrow 3 See vol. VH, document No. 229. a See Appendix VI. No. 160 F3/0829 Secret Additional Protocol Moscow, September 28, 1939- The undersigned plenipotentiaries, on concluding the German-Russian Boundary and Friendship Treaty, have declared their agreement upon the following: Both parties will tolerate in their territories no Polish agitation which Affects the territories of the other party. They will suppress in their territories all beginnings of such agitation and inform each other concerning suitable measures for this purpose. For the Government By authority of the of the German Reich : Government of the USSR : V. RlBBBKTROP W. MOUXTOW
SEPTEMBER 1939 167 No. 161 F2/03SO Declaration of September %8, 1939, by the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR* Moscow, September 28, 1939. After the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR have, by means of the treaty signed today, definitively settled the problems arising from the disintegration of the Polish state and have thereby created a firm foundation for a lasting peace in Eastern Europe, they mutually express their conviction that it would serve the true interest of all peoples to put an end to the state of war existing at present between Germany on the one side and England and France on the other. Both Governments will therefore direct their common efforts, jointly with other friendly powers if occasion arises, toward attaining this goal as soon as possible. Should, however, the efforts of the two Governments remain fruitless, this would demonstrate the fact that England and France are responsible for the continuation of the war, whereupon, in case of the continuation of the war, the Governments of Germany and of the USSR shall engage in mutual consultations with regard to necessary measures. For the Government By authority of the of the German Reich : Government of the USSR : V. RlBBENTROF W. MOLOTOW 1 This statement was released to the press. No. 162 388/21 15 9-6-9 7 Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Chairman Molotov of the Council of Peoples Commissars Moscow, September 28, 1939. MR. CHAIRMAN: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter * of today in "which you communicate to me the following : "With reference to our conversations, I have the honor to confirm herewith that the Government of the USSR is willing, on the basis and in the sense of the general political understanding reached by us, to promote by all means the trade relations and the exchange of goods between Germany and the USSR. To this end an economic program will be drawn up by both parties, under which the Soviet Union will supply raw materials to Germany, for which Germany, in turn, will make compensation through deliveries of manufactured goods over * Not printed (F2/0320).
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a more extended period of time [auf Idngere Zeit\. Both parties shall frame this economic program in such a manner that the German- Soviet exchange of goods will again reach the highest volume attained in the past. "Both Governments will at once issue the necessary directives for the implementation of the measures mentioned and arrange that the negotiations are begun and brought to a conclusion as soon as possible." In the name and by authority of the Government of the German Reich, I ain in accord with this communication and inform you that the Government of the German Reich in turn will take the necessary steps for this purpose. Accept, Mr. Chairman, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration. VON RlBBENTROP No. 163 F2/0322-21 Foreign Minister Rittentrop to Chairman Molotov of the Council of People's Commissars coOTiDENXiAii Moscow, September 28, 1939. MR. CHAIRMAN : I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter * of today, wherein you communicate to me the following : "Implementing my letter of today about the formulation of a common economic program, the Government of the USSR will see to it that German transit traffic to and from Rumania bv way of the "Upper Silesia~Lw6w~Kolomyja railroad line shall be facilitated in every respect. The two Governments will, in the framework of the proposed trade negotiations, make arrangements without delay for the operation of this transit traffic. The same will apply to the German transit traffic to and from Iran, to and from Afghanistan, as well as to and from the countries of the Far East. "Furthermore, the Government of the USSR declares that it is willing, in addition to the quantity of oil previously agreed upon or to be agreed upon hereafter, to supply a further quantity of oil commensurate with the annual production of the oil district of Drohobycz and Boryslaw, with the proviso that one half of this quantity shall be supplied to Germany from the oil fields of the aforesaid oil district and the other half from other oil districts of the USSR. As compensation for these supplies of oil, the USSR would accept German supplies of hard coal and steel piping." I take note of this communication with satisfaction and concur in it in the name of the Government of the German Reich. 1 Not printed (F2/0324-23).
SEPTEMBER 1939 169 Accept, Mr. Chairman, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration. VON BlBBENTROP [EDITORS' NOTE. The texts of the Soviet-Estonian Pact of Mutual Assistance of September 28, 1939, and the Soviet-Latvian Pact of Mutual Assistance of October 5, 1939, are printed in English translation in Department of State, Bulletin, 1939, volume I, pages 542-544. Similarly, an English text of the Treaty on the Transfer of the City of Vilna and Vilna Province to the Lithuanian Republic and on Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and Lithuania, signed October 10, 1939, appears on pages 705-707 of the Bulletin. German texts of the Estonian and Lithuanian treaties, plus a short summary of the Latvian treaty, are printed in MonatsJiefte fur Auswartige Politik, November 1939, pages 992-995.] No. 164 115/117630 Memorandum ~by the Director of the Political Department BERLIN, September 28, 1939. The Lithuanian Minister called on me today in considerable anxiety and wished to know whether negotiations were being conducted in Moscow regarding Lithuania or any of the Baltic states. He referred to the conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister, in which the latter had promised him that Germany would take a sympathetic attitude toward Lithuanian aspirations, and he referred also to the willingness of Foreign Minister Urbsys to come to Germany in response to the invitation addressed to him.1 I told the Minister that I did not know whether Lithuania was being discussed in Moscow. I had reports only on the negotiations between Estonia and the Soviet Union, that would doubtless lead to certain military privileges for the Soviet Union in Estonia. In reply to a further question on this point, I said that I did not know whether the Soviet Union was contemplating something similar for Latvia. I told M. Skirpa, as I did other envoys, that Germany had no part in the negotiations of the Soviet Union with Estonia, but, that, on the contrary, this was a purely Soviet-Estonian matter. See document No. 121.
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No. 165 3072/612881-84 Memorandum 'by the Director of the Economic Policy Department SECRET BBWLIHT, September 28, 19S9. No. 32 No. W. H. A. 738. SESSION OF THE COMMERCIAL, POLICY COMMITTEE SEPTEMBER 28, 1939 * 1. Norway Eeichsbankdirektor Ludwig 2 reported on his negotiations in Oslo. The Norwegians believe that they will be able to keep up their trade with both sides and are prepared to maintain the volume of their exports to Germany, including the German imports of whale oil from the Norwegian catch, at the average level of the years 1936-38. Herr Ludwig has rejected this for the time being as unsatisfactory, but thinks that the over-all ceiling could perhaps be raised by barter transactions (e. g., coal for fish) . A Norwegian steamship company believes that it will be able to maintain the movement of goods in both directions. The negotiations are to be continued in Oslo oa October 8 or 10. Herr Ludwig will then make written agreements, if possible on the basis of the imports of the past few years. The Commercial Policy Committee declares itself in agreement with this procedure. 2. Denmark and Sweden Ministerialdirektor Walter s reported on his negotiations in Copenhagen and Stockholm. The basic orientation of both the Danish and the Swedish viewpoint is this : "If you (Germany) interfere with our trade with England, it will be impossible for us, because of the internal structure of our economy, to maintain our exports to Germany on the normal level." They consider that the measures taken by our naval vessels against the maritime trade of the Scandinavian countries with England represent a change in the German position as expressed in the statement by Ambassador von Hassell.4 At the outset, Sweden's attitude with regard to the maintenance of normal exports was positive, although Herr Walter's question, how much ore we would get and whether we could count on getting the same quantities as in 1 In addition to Wiehl, those present included representatives of the principal departments concerned with economic affairs and the Ministers to Sweden and Denmark. a Ludwig was present as a representative of the Ministry of Economics. 8 Ministry of Food. 4 A reference to HasselTs statements of Sept. 2 about maintaining the normal volume of Danish agricultural exports. See documents Nos. 42, 66, and 83, ante, and vol. vn, document No. 552.
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Ministerialdirektor Wiehl presented a survey of the development of me stand taken by the Foreign Ministry and its practical effect on our naval operations. The discussion was then suspended pending clarification of the position of the political and military authorities. No. 166 169/8.28,16-19. The Legation in RumMWiia to the Foreign Ministry Telegram URGENT BUCHAREST, September 29, 1938 : 00 p. m. No. 673 of September 29 Received September BO 1 : 40 a. m. The negotiations have just been concluded.1 The most important results are as follows : 1. Grain deliveries. 1,000,000 tons of corn, 400,000 tons of wheat, 200,000 tons of barley. In regard to corn there is the reservation that returns of the harvest make possible delivery of this amount while maintaining the most urgent deliveries to otner countries necessary to ensure that Rumania's own requirements of raw materials are met. Furthermore, the delivery of 200,000 hogs and 80,000 cattle is provided for, among other things. 2. Petroleum deliveries have been assured for the foreseeable future to the utmost limits of transportation facilities. 3. The contract for the deliveries of Polish war materials has still to be concluded. The term of payment is to be from 2 to 4 years, depending on the amount involved. Deliveries by the other party are to be made exclusively in petroleum and grain. 4. In order to facilitate further purcnases in Rumania and above all to assure petroleum purchases, the Rumanian Government has promised at our suggestion to assume a state guarantee to the banks , for the period of one year amounting to the equivalent of 40 million RM in lei. After the conclusion of the purchase contracts in accordance with the war materials agreement on the basis of point 3, (group garbled) guarantee in the amount of this annual installment of the payments from the war materials agreement will be granted. 5. The total volume of exports and imports has been fixed at 300 million RM in round figures, i. e., an increase of 50 million RM as compared to the plan for 1938, and an increase of about 100 million RM in each direction as compared with the exchange of commodities in 1938. The interests of finished-goods export are protected by maintaining the previous ratio between exports of finished goods and capital goods, as well as by the recently-established schedule of minimum quotas. 6. Rate of exchange. Insistence ugon an increase in the rate of exchange of the reichsmark is not feasible at the moment because the 1 The protocols and exchanges of notes signed on Sept. 29 at the end of the sixth session of the Government Committees were in two sections: Secret (5556/ B395432-39) and Confidential (8496/B597034r-074). The former dealt with the principles which would govern the delivery of captured Polish equipment. SEPTEMBER 1939 173 Rumanian Government attaches extreme importance to awaiting at least for a short time the result of the new foreign exchange regulations beginning October 1. Insistence on an increase in the rate of exchange is also not advantageous at the present moment for political reasons, because the government of Minister President Argetoianu, 2 who has been known for years as a friend of Germany, cannot begin its activity with an increase in the rate of exchange of German currency. Argetoianu told me definitely this morning that he would set about finding a solution for the problem in the very near future and would see that there was an appropriate increase in the rate of exchange. A corresponding agreement was reached with the- Court Minister and the Minister of Economics to the effect that thismatter should be regulated as soon as possible; the Court Ministerpromised his vigorous support. 7. Our old demand, which is of particular importance for the* Reich Germans here, to the effect, that Reich Germans who have been, residing here since January 1, 1932, shall be granted residence and work permits, has been fulfilled by an exchange of letters with the* Minister of Labor. 8. The contract for the lease of forests has been signed. 9. Agreement regarding the issuance of Rumanian treasury notes in connection with the war materials transaction has been signed* CLODITTS FABRICITJS 9 Constantine Argetoianu had been appointed Minister President on Sept. 28; 1939. No. 167 103/111654 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Telegram No. 467 af September 29 BERUN, September 29, 1939 [8 : 47 p. mJ e* o. KM 505. For the Ambassador. Please inform Molotov immediately that in the last few days, according to very accurate reports received in Berlin, Turkey initialed the pact with France ; consequently Saracoglu misinformed Stalin.1 The correctness of the reports is supported by indubitable evidence. Foreign Minister Saracoglu furthermore expressed the view to foreign diplomats that the passage of war material and troops in merchant vessels through the Straits is permissible and authorized under the terms of the Montreux Convention.2 1 Saracoglu had arrived in Moscow on Sept. 25. a For the official text of the Convention, see League of Nations Treaty Seriesr vol. CLXXIU, pp. 21&-241. See also vol. v, ch. vn. 174 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY Please inform Molotov that in my opinion it is in Germany's and Russia's greatest common interest to obtain the assurance from Turkey in the form of a treaty that she will prevent any passage of Anglo- French war material or troops. RlBBBNTROP No. 168 406/214456-57 The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 180 of September 29 TALUNW, September 29, 19399 : 05 p. m. Received September 30 1 : 45 a. m. The military agreement between Estonia and Soviet Russia, the main points of which became known here last night, has caused immense relief in Government circles. Soviet Russia's (group garbled) to put a garrison of 25,000 troops into Estonia had been felt to be an extremely grave threat to the very existence of the whole State. Government circles attribute the sudden toning down of Soviet Russia's demands, which became apparent yesterday, to the Reich Foreign Minister's intercession with Molotov and Stalin ; this has awakened a deep sense of gratitude toward Germany, manifesting itself, among other ways, in a call which the Deputy Foreign Minister paid me this morning at the Legation in order to give expression to this sentiment. Talks with him and with other personages in the Government and the armed forces indicate that Estonia signed the military alliance only under great pressure in order to avert the threat of obliteration, and that despite the resulting one-sided commitment to the Soviet Union the country still attaches the greatest value to good (group missing, probably "relations") with Germany. Informed persons the public does not 'know the Soviet Russian demand made the day before yesterday regard Germany as the only power which by its weight saved the country from Soviet Russian pressure and which is alone capable of giving this protection in the future as well. Nonetheless, some are afraid that Russia might soon impose additional demands, particularly if Germany should be tied up or weakened in the West. A supplementary agreement fixes at a maximum of 25,000 the total number of troops which Soviet Russia can maintain at the military bases. It is doubted, however, that this maximum will ever be reached, because of housing difficulties alone. The areas for the Russian bases are to be clearly demarcated and evacuated by Estonian residents. No concern is felt here about the possibility of communistic contami SEPTEMBEK 1939 175 nation of the adjoining Estonian population, because the districts concerned, especially Taga Bay on Osel [Saare] Island and Dagerort on Dago [Hiiu] are scarcely inhabited. The press is giving the agreement the greatest publicity with the comment that it was impossible [not] to take account of the old Russian desire to have the Soviet fleet released from being bottled up in the farthest corner of the Gulf of Finland ; the important thing was the full preservation of the sovereignty of the Estonian State. FROHWEIN No. 169 Circular of the State Secretary a Telegram BERLIN, September 30, 1939, For guidance in your discussions of the German-Soviet Russian agreements you will note the following in addition to the four points * which the Reich Foreign Minister gave the Tass Agency and which were telegraphed to most of the missions : The German-Russian agreements are a permanent settlement of the relations between the two countries in the sense of a definitive resumption of their historical friendship. The ideologies of the two countries remain unchanged and are in no wise affected by the agreements. The territorial delimitation of the state interests of the respective Governments leaves the national-Polish area entirely within the German sphere of interest, with the task, as defined in the preamble to the Boundary and Friendship Treaty, of assuring to the peoples living there a peaceful life in keeping with their political character. This settlement eliminates once and for all any future differences between Germany and the Soviet Union with regard to Poland. WEIZSACKER 1 The list of addressees has not heen found, * The four points as listed in a DNB Moscow despatch In Woermann's file (34/23411) were as follows: (1) German-Soviet friendship is now conclusively established; (2) the two nations will allow no further interference in Eastern European questions; (3) both states desire that peace will be restored and that England and France will cease the utterly senseless and hopeless war against Germany ; (4) but if the warmongers in these countries retain the upper hand, Germany and the Soviet Union will know how to- deal with them. See also document No. 161. 176 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 170 8589 /E6O2574.-77 Fuhrer's Directive CHEFSACHE BERLIN, September 30, 1939. TOP SECRET MII/ITAKT The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht OKW No. 171/39 g. K. Chefs. WFA/LI By officer only DIRECTIVE No. 5 1. After concluding the Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, 1939, with Russia, it is intended to regulate the political organization of the former Polish territories within the German sphere of interest according to the following guiding principles : a. The new political frontier of the Reich in the East will, in general, include the former German-colonized area and, in addition, those territories which are especially valuable for reasons of military expediency, war economy, or communications. The final demarcation line has not yet been settled in detail. I request that suggestions on this subject be submitted to me through the OKW. b. The present line of demarcation (Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San) will be constantly strengthened as a military security belt towards the East. The required garrisons are also to be permanently located beyond the German political frontier. I likewise request suggestions regarding location of this security line in detail, to be submitted to me through the OKW. c. The line laid down according to the Russian Boundary and Friendship Treaty, the details of which are expected to be settled by a supplementary protocol, is to be considered the limit of the German .sphere of interest as far as Russia is concerned. d. I myself shall set up the political organization of the territory between this line and the new political boundary of the German Reich. 2. First of all, the entire territory of the former Polish state, up to the line established in the Russian Boundary and Friendship Treaty and including the Suwalki triangle, will be organized under a Military Government controlled by the Commander in Chief, Army, I request the Commander in Chief, Army to submit to me at an early date the measures required for bringing about the following: a. The pacification of the territories to be occupied. The time will be settled after the conclusion of the Moscow agreements. b. The occupation of the security line along the former line of demarcation. SEPTEMBER 1939 177 c. The occupation of the entire territory by occupation troops. This mission is to be accomplished east of the military security line with minimum forces after pacification has been completed. The Commander in Chief, Air will leave in the East the forces required by the Commander in Chief, Army for this mission. d. The subdivision of the military government territory into districts or else the extension of existing military government districts to include the newly acquired territories. 3. On the basis of the latest political developments, the troops intended for East Prussia in accordance with Directive No. 4, 1 paragraph 4, last sentence, do not need to be held in readiness. 4. The restrictions hitherto prevailing for naval warfare against France are cancelled. The war at sea is to be fought against France just as against Britain. The war against merchant shipping is, on the whole, to be fought according to prize law, with the following exceptions : Merchantmen and troop ships recognized beyond doubt as hostile may be attacked without warning. The same applies to ships sailing without lights in the waters around the British Isles. Armed force is to be employed against merchantmen which use their radio transmitters when stopped. As before, no attacks are to be made upon passenger vessels or large steamships that appear to be carrying passengers in' large numbers as well as goods. 5. For air warfare in the West the restrictions in force until now will remain in effect. Flights across the Reich border are permitted for short-range and combat reconnaissance, for attacks upon artillery fire-control planes and captive balloons, and, to a limited degree, for long-range reconnaissance for the Commander in Chief, Air. The Army's requests for long-range reconnaissance are to be handled through direct cooperation between Army and Luftwaffe. Furthermore, the Luftwaffe is authorized to carry out offensive actions in the North Sea against British and French naval forces at sea, and to carry on the war against merchant shipping according to prize law. 6. The orders under paragraphs 4 and 5 will replace paragraphs 5b, 5c, and 7 of Directive No. 4 for the Conduct of the War. ADOUT HITOER countersigned : EJBITEI, CMef of Staff, OKW * Document No. 135. 178 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 171 352/202871-73 The Charge d*Affaires in Norway to the Foreign Ministry Osix>, September 30, 1939. Pol. VI 2199. Subject : Public sentiment in Norway. The profound difference between public sentiment in Norway in this war and the World War has already been reported. 1 It goes without saying that Norway is not wholeheartedly on the side of the Reich even today, but the country has cast off its former bondage to England to a degree that should be heartening to us. Norway no longer believes in the omnipotence of British prestige. The total crushing of Poland, which is here acknowledged as a masterpiece of strategy, especially by the military, has opened Norway's eyes not only to Germany's might but also to England's impotence, and there is the tendency to recognize the justice of Germany's demand that the Western Powers, England in particular, keep out of Eastern European affairs. Even the Labor Party no longer talks of the "rape of the weak nations," as it did at the time of the Czechoslovak affair; on the contrary, its representatives, in private, express unqualified pleasure that with Poland the last "feudalistic etate" has disappeared from Europe. There is full recognition of the political significance of the negotiations between the German Foreign Minister and the Russian Foreign Commissar in Moscow, but it should not be concealed that here and there a certain fear is creeping into the hearts of the Norwegians that the Northern States, too, might be drawn into the orbit of power radiating from Berlin and Moscow. But apart from this the negotiations in Moscow are here taken for what they are : an agreement between the Reich and Russia on the order in Eastern Europe, which is to form the sound foundation of the peace. It is hoped that England and France will accede to the peace proposals made by Berlin and Moscow so as to put an end to this "senseless war of prestige", but no one believes that England is 'as yet ready to recognize her obvious defeat. Should war go on, however, people are convinced that in no case will it end in defeat for the Reich. The blockade, with which England in 1918 finally brought Germany to her knees a Germany without political leadership has in Norwegian opinion lost a good deal of its force owing to the fact that Germany can now draw on Russia for a large proportion of her raw materials and other needs. *Neuhaus had telegraphed in this sense on Sept. 17 and 18 (22/13683. 13684). OCTOBER 1939 179 German submarine warfare is, of course, not popular in this maritime nation, but people are honest enough to admit that the intensification of German submarine warfare is merely a reply to the English blockade measures so that the responsibility accordingly falls back upon England. Unfortunately, indications are not lacking that the Norwegian shipowners, just as in 1914-18, do not hesitate to endanger their ships and crews to gamble for profits or squeeze out high insurance rates. After the consolidation of the bloc of Oslo States and the tremendous decline in England's prestige, there is little likelihood that Norway will tolerate British violations of her neutrality. It is recognized that any toleration of British violations of neutrality would immediately call forth reactions not only from Germany, but probably also from Russia; that is a risk no one wants to incur in any circumstances. VON NETJHATTS No. 172 B21/B004939-42 The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Telegram SECRET WAsmsrGTXHsr, October 1, 193910 : 48 a. m. No. 453 of October 1 Received October 211 : 15 a. m. Subject : Opinions and measures of the American General Staff after the first month of war. For the High Command of the Wehrmacht, Foreign Branch, and Attache Sections, Army and Air. 1. The Pacific Ocean and the need of adequate defense preparations occupy the foreground. The question of organizing expeditionary troops for Europe has been shelved entirely. The previously reported uncertainty with regard to Japan and possible developments in Japanese-Russian relations led to a setting up of the American system of defense in the Pacific in deep echelon. Strengthening of the long-range reconnaissance units, which have been advanced to Manila, with 14 long-range reconnaissance bombers. Transfer to Hawaii of an "advance guard" of the fleet and strengthening of defenses, particularly of the air bases there. In California, concentration of the striking power of the fleet. Some preparations for the establishment of the long-contemplated air base near Fairbanks as a requisite for the defense of Alaska. Strengthening of the garrison at Panama. On the American continent, speedy organization of a small highly mobile land force of five infantry divisions which can be rapidly mobilized 180 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY and sent to threatened points, such as Alaska, Hawaii, Newfoundland and can be used as a basis for the policy of defense of the Western Hemisphere. Finally, pressure upon industry in order that the proposed goal of increasing the Army Air Force to 5,500 planes by the middle of 1941 may be reached by the end of 1940. All of these are defense measures. The General Staff, which seems to be prevailing more and more against the politicians, is thinking now neither of preparing an expeditionary army for Europe nor of shelving its own armaments requirements for the purpose of making priority deliveries of military equipment and raw materials to the Allies. In the General Staff it is now considered that the picture of the fighting will become clearer toward the end of June. The possibilities of German-Italian-Russian- Japanese operations are being studied. British power is seen as menaced and, in contrast to some politicians, the conclusion is being drawn that America must avoid any alliance and keep out of the war, but must as soon as possible provide for a defense force corresponding to her own position as a Great Power. Lindbergh and the famous flyer Rickenbacker are advocating this. Over against the vicious propaganda of hatred for Germany, nurtured by England and France, there is admiration for German leadership and operations which the General Staff regularly discusses with me. The General Staff is doing its best to counteract this foolish propaganda. There is annoyance with England and France, from whom inadequate information regarding military measures and details is received. Particulars: Both published and confidential reports confirm the inadequate military preparations of the Army and the inability of the Navy to launch an attack against Japan. I refer to earlier reports, according to which the organization of an expeditionary army would require a long time. 2. Pressure upon the aviation industry to speed up deliveries does not alter the previously reported fact that before the late summer of 1940 the employment of appreciable numbers of Air Force units in Europe would not be possible. 3. So far, as a basis for the formation of an army of millions, the standard field army is to be completely reorganized, namely in troops of the army command (mechanized cavalry brigade, tank regiment, etc.) a corps headquarters staff with corps troops (three artillery regiments, 155 mm. howitzers or 155 mm. guns, a motor-transport group, a signal battalion, engineers, etc.). Also, five infantry divisions (each consisting of three infantry regiments, a light artillery regiment with three battalions armed with 75 mm. guns, a heavy artillery regiment with two battalions armed with 155 mm. howitzers, OCTOBER 1939 181 one engineer battalion, one signal company, etc.) . Peacetime strength of the division, 365 officers, 7,600 men. Wartime strength, 548 officers, 10,837 men. Organization of the troops in the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, and in the National Guard remains (group garbled) unchanged. Strengthening the Army to 280,000, increasing as well the National Guard, and further requests of money for arms are in preparation. The date for the conclusion of the reorganization is not yet set. Recruiting is proceeding slowly. The youth are little inclined to war service. The production of necessary war material requires considerable time. BOTTICHER No. 173 The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 1385 of October 1 MADRID, October 1, 1939. Received October 2 12 : 00 noon. I had a prolonged conversation with Franco today on the occasion of the third anniversary of his appointment as Generalissimo. Franco first expressed his gratification over Germany's brilliant military successes and told me that he had foreseen the swift annihilation of the Polish Army already on the second day of our advance. For that reason he had made still another personal attempt in Paris and London to prevent the spread of the war, unfortunately, in vain. Franco then immediately spoke of the menace that in his opinion was threatening from Russia, a menace that was becoming acute for Europe because of the westward advance of Russian influence. I availed myself of the opportunity to explain to the Generalissimo in detail what changes Stalin's regime had recently undergone and how it was that national, and not international-revolutionary, motivations had been decisive for the present Russian attitude. I further told Franco that our attitude toward Communism had not changed in any way, and that on the contrary we had made this plain to Stalin at all stages of the German-Russian negotiations. My emphatic explanations seemed to give some reassurance to Franco- Still greatly interested in the Russian question, he inquired, however, whether we would set up a Polish buffer state, which would lessen the danger of a direct contact with Rlissia. I replied that I had not yet been informed as to what our plans were in this regard, but that we could 182 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY assume that further development would depend on the attitude of the friends of Poland, England in particular, which had driven that country to disaster. In reply to my question as to how he judged the prospects of OUT peace offer, 1 Franco answered in a vague and doubtful manner. He stated that according to the report of the Duke of Alba from London, America, and in particular American Jewish circles, were agitating in England for continuance of the war and were meeting with response. In England's present situation, a moderating influence by America would on the other hand greatly enhance the prospects for peace. In regard to our peace move, the Foreign Minister declared that he did not consider the prospects for immediate success to be very great, but that he was firmly convinced that France would at most be able to sustain the "futile attack" on the walls only a few months longer and then would have to give in. STOHREB 1 This refers to the Ribbentrop-Molotov declaration of Sept. 28, 1939. See document No. 161. No. 174 lift/117853 Memorandum 7>y the Director of 'the Political Department T, October 1, 1939. Minister von Kotze telephoned from Riga at 6 : 45 p. m. and said the following : The Soviet Government informed the Latvian Minister in Moscow during the night of September 30 that it wished to enter into immediate negotiations with plenipotentiaries of the Latvian Government, Nothing was said about the subject of the negotiations, nor is it known to the Latvian Government. Foreign Minister Munters will accordingly fly to Moscow on October 2.1 The news is be announced by radio tonight and will appear in the morning papers tomorrow (October 2) . However, the Latvian Government wished to give advance notice thereof to Germany, her partner in the Non-Aggression Pact. Minister von Kotze asked the Latvian 1 Similarly on Oct. 2, Zechlin sent to the Foreign Ministry a telegram (321/ 193150) stating that UrbSys had just told him that he had received an invitation the previous day to visit Moscow, and would fly to Moscow via Riga Oct 3. He added that Molotov said Russia did not contemplate sovietizing the border states. OCTOBER 1939 183 Government whether it planned to take special measures for maintaining law and order. The Foreign Ministry answered in the negative, stating that no disturbances are anticipated. Minister von Kotze will postpone the projected official trip to Berlin until the situation has been clarified. No. 175 103/111659-60 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Telegram No. 475 BERLIN, October 2, 1939. [Sent October 32: 52 a. m.] Biiro BAM 508. For the Ambassador. Please inform Molotov at once that according to reports I have received the Turkish Government would hesitate to conclude the assistance pact with France and England if the Soviet Union emphatically opposed it. In my opinion, as I already stated several times* it would also be in the Russian interest on account of the question of the Straits to forestall a tie-up of Turkey with England and France. I therefore attach especial value to the Russian Government's taking action to that effect in order to dissuade Turkey from the conclusion of the assistance pacts with the Western Powers, and to having this settled in Moscow at once. No doubt, the best solution at the moment would be the return of Turkey to a policy of absolute neutrality, while confirming existing Russo-Turkish agreements. Final and prompt diversion of Turkey from the projected Anglo- French treaty, said to have been recently initialed, would also be wholly in line with the peace offensive agreed upon in Moscow, as thereby another country would withdraw from the Anglo-French camp.1 RlBBENTROP 1A copy of this telegram was also sent to the Embassy in Turkey as No. 352 (103/111660) with the following additional instruction: "I request that you, for your part, likewise do your best to forestall the final conclusion of the assistance pact between Turkey arid the Western Powers. In this matter you might also point to the strong Russian aversion to a onesided commitment by Turkey and explain that the conclusion of the assistance pact under present war conditions would necessarily be viewed differently by Germany than before the outbreak of the war." 184 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 176 F18/O43-010 Memorandum by am. Official of the Foreign Ministers Secretariat BERLIN, October 2, 1939. CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FXJHREK AND COTJNT CIAKO IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER, ON OCTOBER 1, 19S9, AT THH REICH CHANCELLERY 1 The Führer expressed his pleasure over the opportunity to have a personal conversation with Count Ciano. It would not have been possible for him to leave Berlin during the few days that he was spending in the capital, and he was therefore grateful to Count Ciano for having come to Berlin. Count Ciano in turn thanked the Führer for the opportunity for this conversation. Difficulties similar to those experienced by the Führer prevented the Duce from leaving the capital. The Italian Government had scheduled a number of Cabinet meetings at which important economic and military measures were to be adopted and the presence of the Duce was required. Moreover, a meeting between the Führer and the Duce at the present moment would be a sensation which might better be reserved for an occasion when definitive and conclusive decisions would be taken. The Führer replied that he wished, through Count Ciano, to give the Duce a picture of the past development of events and of the present situation. He had put this conversation off until the conclusion of the first phase of the present conflict, that is, until the annihilation of the Polish forces. Only now was it possible to form a conclusive picture of his future plans and of the disposition of his forces. Much as he (the Führer) had been convinced that Poland would be defeated in very short order, a war always contained certain unpredictable elements, and he (the Führer) had therefore waited for the end of the first act of the conflict to inform the Duce of the plans for the future. Militarily, as he had said, the first act of the conflict was ended as of this day; German troops had begun marching into Warsaw last night and thus were occupying Poland's capital. The fortress of Modlin had likewise surrendered, and surrender negotiations had been in progress with Admiral von Unruh on the Hela Peninsula since this evening. From the military standpoint, therefore, the Polish -question had been conclusively settled. a Ciano's own memorandum of this conversation is printed in English translation in Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, edited by M. Muggeridge (London, 1948), pp. 309-316. The original Italian version appears in ZSEuropa verso la vatastrofe (Milan, 1948), pp. 466-477. OCTOBER 1939 185 Poland could have been conquered even more swiftly if Germany had been willing to sacrifice more lives. But there had been no intention of sacrificing even a single man unnecessarily in the East, since there was better use for every one in the West. Warsaw had not made the heroic stand that was being spoken of everywhere. The first bombardment of the city and the first attack had taken place on September 25. On the 26th this attack had been carried further, and on the 27th the city had capitulated. There had been no bombardment before September 25, only a siege of the city. One could not speak, therefore, of any heroic stand. The Warsaw garrison was- already demoralized after a short time, just as was true of the Polish Army in general. The Führer then gave a summary of the relative numerical strength, of the forces and of the losses sustained. Germany had entered the battle with 121 divisions, to which must be added a certain number of border defense divisions. Of the 70 divisions allocated to the East, only a part had been actually committed against the enemy. The combat and operational losses of materiel were extremely moderate and amount to only one eighth of the advance estimate. Casualties were far fewer than had been expected. As of September 26, 5,200 dead, 22,000 wounded, and a few thousand missing had been counted. Of the latter, strayed groups had turned up again at various places. It had to be assumed, however, that some had been ambushed and massacred by the Poles. It could be expected that the total of fatal casualties would reach 6,000. In consequence of these relatively light losses, it had been possible to form immediately a great number of replacement divisions, the activation of which had been scheduled for later on, so that Germany could at the moment count on 152 divisions of 20 to 22,000 men each, to which a large number of corps troops must be added. Even as early as September 10, while the operations in Poland were in full progress, the transfer of troops back to the West had begun. The reason for the light German losses was to be found in the new .and modern individual training of the infantry. The favorable results of the campaign were attributable not only to the new infantry tactics but also to the use of heavy infantry weapons, as well as to the effective employment of armor and the Luftwaffe. Poland, by the way, seemed to have received operational advice from the French, but it had been far from convincing and effective. The bravery of .some elements of the Polish Army could not be denied. The Poles had been poorly equipped and led, however, and the non-Polish, contingents had gone into battle very unwillingly, falling back as soon as they had lost their leaders. Nevertheless, the Polish Army must ,be described as a modernly equipped Army which, given better leader 186 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY ship and training, would doubtless have accomplished more. Pojand had had 35 regular divisions. In addition to this, there were 36 regiments of cavalry (about 11 cavalry divisions) which had in some instances undertaken very foolish attacks, Poland, moreover, also had at her disposal 15 second-line reserve divisions with relatively good equipment. Then there were supposed to have been another 15 thirdline divisions which probably had for the most part fought in civilian clothing. What happened on the Western front was a farce. The attacks of the French which received so much sensational publicity in the enemy press were solely of token character. Nowhere had the enemy come near the German defense lines. Patrols had pushed forward only in areas where the German fortifications were 15 to 20 kilometers behind the border. At no point had the German combat outposts been pushed back, Artillery fire had also been extremely moderate. Valuable installations and open cities had been bombarded by neither side. Today was the first time that a shell had fallen on a German bunker, without, however, causing any appreciable damage. Thus Germany could regard the battle in the West so far as of no consequence whatsoever. It had been easy for her to hold her combat outposts. Moreover, neither France nor England had either the manpower or the materiel for any large-scale attack on the Western front. To be sure, the state of relative quiet there would not last forever. The war on the seas had in the main consisted of the so-called blockade, to which Germany had replied with submarine warfare. Notwithstanding the "chivalrous methods" she had pursued, Germany had by September 28 sunk 290,000 tons. The moment Germany gave the submarine war a more serious character, enemy losses would, of course, mount very considerably. The German submarines would then no longer consent to first stopping the enemy ships, then searching them carefully, and finally even assuring themselves that the lifeboats were in order, as they were now doing, but they would simply torpedo the ships without warning. Nevertheless, even with the present methods they had sunk the aircraft carrier Courageous and, from our observations, another one, the Ark Royal, the sinking of which Churchill would not admit only because no neutral ships had been present as witnesses, as there had been in the former instance. In addition, two destroyers had also been sunk. In the air war in the West, the British had thus far made a bombing attack on Wilhelmshaven. Of 24: bombers, 11 had been shot down. The day before yesterday the British had attacked two German destroyers. Of six attackers, five were shot down. Otherwise, Germany had been spared any bombing attacks. Merely leaflets had been OCTOBER 1939 187 dropped at night, from an altitude of 5 to 6 thousand meters which were remarkable for their stupidity and innocuousness. They were stupid because their authors had believed that they could precisely at this present moment incite the German people to defection from their government ; if dropped in larger quantities, they could at most be regarded as additional paper supply. Count Ciano observed at this point that the people would never allow themselves to be separated from a leader who was always the winner. The Führer continued that on the Western front itself everything was being shot down that came into view. Thus 14 planes, 12 British and 2 French, had been shot down yesterday. The ratio of total losses of planes was 1 to 9 in favor of Germany. One German fighter wing alone had brought down 44 planes, while losing only 4 of its own. In principle, therefore, Germany was in a position to withdraw her troops from the East, allow them a short rehabilitation period, richly deserved after the formidable long-distance marches ; the time could also be used for the reconditioning of materiel, and then they could be shipped to the West. Germany was therefore prepared and able at all times to become active in the West. This announcement by the Führer made an obvious impression on Count Ciano. He inquired once more to make sure he had understood correctly that Germany was prepared at all times to become active in the West, and the Führer confirmed this. The Führer further remarked that Germany was not in fact interested in forcing a war in the West if such a war could be avoided. After the Polish victories it was unnecessary to continue the war for reasons of military prestige. Nor were there other reasons for doing so. But if peace was not attainable, then Germany would give the war in the West another character. On the subject of the agreements with Russia, the Führer observed that their purpose was to define the spheres of interest in the newly acquired territories. In a generally difficult time it was not in Germany's interest to have a hostile neighbor at her back, and so she had reached agreements with Russia that were absolutely clear-cut and completely ruled out any possibility of misunderstanding or conflict in the future. In the territory east of the line which was known to Count Ciano, the shaping of the political and economic organization was an exclusively Russian matter, while west of the line Germany pursued her own interests with the same exclusiveness. It was important for the Duce to know that Germany had two things in mind in this territory west of the line : first, to wipe out the Versailles Treaty boundaries and establish a new boundary that was acceptable to Ger- 260O90 54 18 188 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY many from the ethnographic, historical, and economic standpoint; and second, to give the remaining territory of Polish nationality a political organization that would rule out for all time to come any threat to the Reich from that direction. Furthermore, both Russia and Germany wanted to prevent any element of intrigue apt to sow discord between Germany and Russia from arising out of this settlement at any time in the future. The Führer declared that in every other respect he wanted the German Reich to be encumbered as little as possible with the responsibility for the existence of the Polish residual state. The permanent form that this residual state was to have would be wholly determined by the effort of pacification and of restoring orderly political and economic conditions. The timing of the execution of this plan depended on whether the war was ended or would go on now. Naturally, no final decisions on this matter could be taken until hostilities were concluded. Count Ciano asked for a more precise definition of the form envisaged by the Führer for organizing the Polish residual state. The Führer declared that the Polish residual state had to be so organized that it would no longer constitute a military threat to Germany, could not engage in political intrigues between Germany and Russia, and would absolutely ensure protection of Germany's economic and political interests. Count Ciano asked whether it would be a sovereign state or a protectorate controlled by Germany. The Führer replied that he could not yet say anything final on that point. In principle, he wished to burden Germany as little as possible with the Polish residual state. On his visits to the front he had found Poland in so run-down and rotten a condition that he wanted to have as little to do with it as possible. He believed that the Western nations, if they could see it with their own eyes, would not fight another day for this totally bankrupt country. It would take from 50 to 100 years to colonize the areas that were to be annexed to Germany. Finally, Germany was pursuing the additional objective of a thorough cleanup of the nationality problem in the course of which the various ethnic elements scattered over the entire territory would be consolidated into larger nationality groups. In this connection, a climatically and topographically suited area was to be set aside for the resettlement of the Southern Tirolese. Similarly, he planned to settle German minority groups from Hungary and the entire East in this new territory, in order to put an end, for all time, to any friction that might arise from the existence of German minorities. Count Ciano asked how large the Polish residual state was likely to be. OCTOBER 1939 189 The Führer replied that this was difficult to say at the moment, because much depended on the ethnographic reorganization and because there were still many national minorities on Polish territory which had preserved their identity in the face of all oppression. Thus there was still a German minority of S70,000 in the country around Lodz. Count Ciano thereupon asked what the probable population of the Polish rump state would be* The Führer gave an estimate of a minimum of 8 to 10 millions. He remarked in conclusion that the ideas which he had just expressed could, of course, be carried out only after peace was restored. Count Ciano asked whether the Führer would mention these ideas in his speech before the Reichstag as the conditions for peace. The Führer replied that as a matter of fact he did intend to state them before the Reichstag with all appropriate caution. He had told them to Count Ciano at this time so that the Duce could be informed in advance, but for the rest would ask that they be treated in strict confidence. Apart from this, the Führer continued, there were also other important European problems which had emerged in connection with the present conflict and which could not be settled unilaterally, but only in a generally calm atmosphere by means of a conference or by general agreements. In his Reichstag speech in the coming week he would emphasize Germany's readiness for such solutions but did not believe that this would make a deep impression on the enemy. He was doing it only in order to place the enemy in the wrong. If the enemy obstinately rejected any thought of a peaceful settlement, he (the Führer) was determined to settle the score with him in another way. He would then conduct the war in an entirely different manner from that imagined by the British and French. He believed, moreover, that the Duce could accomplish an important mission by rallying the neutral world, which was suffering great hardship by reason of the present state of war, and desired peace. If the Duce assumed the leadership of the neutral world, its influence would thereby be greatly increased. Apart from this, however, it was necessary to realize that not only the future of Germany, but also that of Italy, would be at stake in a final showdown between Germany, on the one hand, and England and France, on the other. The Führer expressed his unshakable conviction that in this showdown Germany would emerge triumphant, since the military situation today was quite different from that 25 years ago. A defeat of Germany, however, would at the same time mean the end of Italy's great aspirations in the Mediterranean. 190 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY The German Foreign Minister referred in this connection to the Moscow agreements and their economic advantages for Germany. He said that he wondered whether, in these circumstances, it was not perhaps better, on the whole, if the showdown with the Western Powers took place now, since it was bound to happen some time in any event. The Führer elaborated this by saying that many people in Germany were of the opinion that it would be best coldly to settle accounts with the British and French right now, and added that if Italy were at Germany's side now as a military ally he would not doubt for a second that the present moment was the most favorable for the showdown with the Western Powers : for he was convinced that if Germany and Italy went into the battle together, England and France would be so completely crushed that many of the still unsettled problems would be solved once and for all. The Führer in this connection came to speak of the dangers of the air war, stating that the best protection from enemy air attacks lay not so much in the anti-aircraft guns, which could not, of course, be very effective at night, as in the enemy's fear of reprisals. Count Ciano asked whether the Führer would confine himself to a cautious expression in his Reichstag speech of the ideas he had just presented or whether he would in addition undertake an initiative for peace, or have others, Italy, for instance, do so. The Führer replied that he would confine himself to his Reichstag speech and await what Mussolini had to say after the speech, in the light of the reaction to it in other countries. Count Ciano, referring to the Führer's suggestion that the Duce could accomplish a great mission if he put himself at the head of the neutral world, replied that Italy had not hitherto undertaken anything of the kind. Nor had she taken any outright neutral position, having merely declared that she would not take any military initiative in the West. This had been done at a time when Germany wanted to go to war in the East and the Führer had announced his intention of localizing the conflict. Had Italy resorted to armed intervention at once, she would have thwarted this intention because the conflict would then immediately have become generalized. Italy had never made a neutrality declaration and had no intention of doing so. She was, however, convinced that it would be advantageous to rally those countries that were the chief targets of British and French propaganda. Because of the close tie between Germany and Italy, these countries would thereby be drawn away from England and France and automatically brought closer to the Axis. Italy was of the opinion, moreover, that her present attitude was more advantageous to Germany than direct military intervention would have been. If she had taken such a step, Italy would have exposed herself to direct OCTOBER 1939 191 attacks from the air and the sea by the French and British, especially in the colonies. The Piihrer replied that, in his opinion, England would not have signed her final treaty with Poland if she had not previously learned what Italy's attitude would be. However, this had not in any way altered the military situation in Poland and besides it must be admitted that Italy's attitude had in point of fact worked out favorably. Count Ciano denied that England had had previous information on Italy's attitude, but did not go into the matter further ; he merely pointed once more to the advantages that had resulted for Germany from Italy's attitude. At the close of the first phase of the conflict, the score was 1 : in favor of Germany. If Italy had intervened actively, the result would not have been as favorable, for even if Italy had not been dealt a mortal blow by England and France, she would, nevertheless, have been struck very severely. This would have entailed serious psychological disadvantages. Count Ciano then went on to speak of the formation of the neutral bloc, and stated that Italy, if she was not to tie her own hands for all time, could not easily, for geographic and other reasons, take a neutral position. It was difficult for Italy to remain neutral to the end, and an effort was therefore being made in Italy to be prepared against all eventualities. At the Alpine border, in Africa and elsewhere in the Empire, Italy was already tying down 800,000 French troops, 300,000 in Tunisia alone. The Italian forces in Libya had been increased by 150,000 men, and Italy no longer had to fear a French attack there. Italy's weak point was the deficiency in anti-aircraft artillery, coupled with the fact that the armament industry was concentrated on the Tyrrhenian coast, in Genoa, Spezzia, and Livorno, and could therefore be reached in 30 to 40 minutes flying time by French bombers from Corsica. Italy, however, had not reconciled herself to remaining neutral if the war should go on (Vltalie ne s'est pas ad&ptee a Tester neutre, si la guerre continue) . She had, as he had said before, worked extremely hard to build up her preparedness. Moreover, her relations with England and France could hardly be called correct. All rumors to the contrary were made up entirely of thin air. To be sure, he (Ciano) had on several occasions before the crisis talked to the French and British Ambassadors on the subject of Italian mediation. Since then, however, their meetings had become considerably less frequent. Only current "administrative" matters were taken up in them. There had been no political consultation of any kind with the Western Powers. The Führer replied that it was quite clear to him personally that Italy's attitude, considering the course which events had taken, had worked out to advantage. It induced the French to proceed with caution. The Duce's last speech, which had been addressed to Party 192 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY representatives near Bologna, had by its veiled threats caused Paris to exercise even greater caution. Count Ciano mentioned in this connection that wide circles in France, including many generals, for example. General Colson, would greatly welcome Italy's active intervention and considered the Duce*s attitude vis-a-vis France a clever move. The Führer remarked that the German people also looked upon the whole matter as a very subtle bit of teamwork between Italy and Germany. The conversation then turned to the reception that the Italian mediation proposal had had in France. It turned out that Daladier had not expressed himself at all on the Italian proposal. Only Bonnet, Foreign Minister at the time, took a more positive attitude. To be sure, he too stated that the British would on no account agree to the Italian proposal for an armistice that left the German troops where they were, and that France could therefore not accede to this proposal either. Bonnet, however, did inform Home at 2 o'clock in the morning, through the Italian Ambassador in Paris, that he believed that France could agree to the Italian proposal if the German troops were withdrawn, at least symbolically, by the withdrawal of a single "flag or gun." In the further course of the conversation the Führer came back once more to the subject of Russia. Germany wanted to live in peace with Russia, as she had often done in the past for a hundred years at a time. The realization of this wish would be aided by Russia's traditional fear of too close a contact with the West and its superior culture and standard of living. Thus, in this instance again, Russia, because of her old, traditional attitude, had been willing to limit her own advance to the West. Poland, on the contrary, had persisted in striking at Germany on every possible occasion. Already in the years 1936- 1937, Poland had been active in this way. The Reich Foreign Minister pointed out in this connection that the Polish Foreign Minister, on the occasion of the occupation of the Rhineland, had counseled a preventive war against Germany and had offered Poland's participation. In the further course of the conversation, Count Ciano inquired about the situation in the Balkans and spoke of the possibility of forming a group of neutral Balkan countries. He showed concern about Rumania. The Führer replied that Rumania was in no danger so long as she remained really neutral. Should she, however, compromise her neutrality, she would probably be attacked from all directions. The Fxihrer then spoke of his endeavor always to create clear-cut relationships. It was for that reason that he had clearly defined Germany's interests to both France and England. In his conversa OCTOBER 1939 193 tions with the Duce also, he always had been governed by this desire for clarity and had made it plain that the Mediterranean was exclusively Italy's sphere of interest. He had similarly pursued a policy of a clear-cut demarcation of spheres of interest with respect to Russia. This was the only way to restore stability and peace. The result had been concretely demonstrated by the relationship between Germany and Italy, which had indeed been possible only because of the clear-cut separation of interests. The Duce had recognized Germany's interests in Austria and Czechoslovakia, while Germany most liberally left the Mediterranean to Italy as her exclusive domain. Germany had rejoiced over all of Italy's successes, because each one, in the last analysis, also benefited the Axis as a whole. The Führer then stated once more that if the conflict should be continued, both air and submarine warfare would be waged by Germany in an entirely different manner. Moreover, Germany did not believe that the Maginot Line, which consisted of groups of installations with large gaps in between, was invincible. In reply to Count Ciano's question regarding America's role, the Führer replied that America could only come to the aid of the West if she had sufficient tonnage at her disposal. Submarine warfare would here play an important role. Replying to Ciano's question as to whether Japan also should be included in the neutral bloc under the leadership of the Duce, the Führer said that Japan was surely waiting for England to receive the first severe blow, when she would be able, free and without hindrance, to gain her objectives in East Asia. The Reich Foreign Minister pointed out in this connection that Japan at the moment had a middle-of-the-road government, but that in the event of German victories the spirit of the Japanese Army would come to the fore and establish a new government which, with the backing of the Japanese Navy, would enable Japan to take advantage of the greatest opportunity of her political existence. Referring to the announcements of the British that they would wage a 3-year war, the Führer declared that he was preparing for a 5-year war. Germany had shown in Poland how she waged war in practice, and he was certain that France and England would suffer severe blows from Germany. Count Ciano replied that the armament of Germany's enemies obviously had a rather weak basis, because Italy, through a variety of devious channels had received requests for delivery of even the most elementary articles of equipment, such as field glasses and the like. Italy had, of course, refused to make such deliveries. The Führer stated that this information was corroborated by recently discovered documents which showed how trifling were the de 194 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY liveries that England and France intended to make to Poland in October. Thus Poland was to receive twelve 48mm anti-tank guns, twenty 25mm guns and six tanks. Count Ciano also mentioned a conversation he had had with Frangois-Poncet, to whom, wishing to frighten him, he had pointed out the fatal risks incurred by France. Frangois-Poncet had admitted that the situation was difficult at the moment with respect to materiel. Referring to America, however, he had added that in the spring France would receive enormous deliveries of airplanes from America. France was counting on several thousand planes. Besides, France always lost in the first 6 months, to win the more resoundingly in the succeeding 6 months. To that Count Ciano had replied that there was no telling whether the war would last more than 6 months, and perhaps there would be no time left at all for any winning. In reply to another question by Ciano, the Ftihrer declared that iix his Reichstag speech he would not only speak of Poland in the manner previously stated, but would also present his ideas regarding the settlement of general problems at a conference. The Führer explained in reply to another question from Ciano that he had no detailed program for this as yet. He would only speak of disarmament, general security, and removal of trade barriers. In reply to a further question by Ciano, the Führer stated that the date for the Reichstag session was not yet lixed, as he wanted to visit Warsaw first.2 After a duration of 2% hours, the conversation ended at about 9 : 15 p. m. Submitted herewith, in accordance with instructions, to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop. SOHMUXP Minister 9 Hitler delivered his Reichstag speech on Oct. 6. See Editors' Note, p. 227. No. 177 463./225812 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Telegram No. 478 BERLIN, October 2, 1939. Euro RAM 509. For the Ambassador. Please inform Molotov that, in keeping with the existing German- Ttalian Alliance, we have discussed with Ciano a the world situation *See document No. 176. OCTOBER 1939 195 as modified by the Moscow Agreements. The possibilities of restoring peace as a result of the joint German-Soviet peace declaration were also discussed in this connection. RlBBENTROP No. 178 Bl&/B0'03i055 Memorandum ~by the State Secretary St.S. No. 769 BEKUCN-, October 2, 1939. The Finnish Minister today requested me to clarify the significance of the arrangement of spheres of influence between Germany and Russia; he was particularly interested in knowing what effect the Moscow agreements might have on Finland. I reminded the Minister that a short time ago Finland, as is well known, had rejected our proposal to conclude a nonaggression pact. 1 Perhaps this was now regretted in Helsinki. For the rest, now as then it is the wish of Germany to live with Finland on the best and most friendly terms and, particularly in the economic sphere, to effect as extensive an exchange of goods as possible. If M. Wuorimaa felt uneasy about Finland because of the Estonian incident and M. Munters' trip to Moscow, announced today, I would have to tell him that I was not informed as to Moscow's policies vis-a-vis Finland. But I felt that worries over Finland at this time are not warranted. The Minister then spoke of the Ciaiio visit.2 In this connection I remarked that after liquidating the Polish campaign we had undoubtedly arrived at an important juncture in the war. The announced convocation of the Reichstag pointed to a statement from the Government in which the idea would surely be expressed that we regarded as senseless any opening of real hostilities in the West. Of course, should the Western Powers fail to seize the opportunity for peace, one would probably have to resign oneself to a bitter struggle. WEIZSACKER 1 See vol. vi, document No. 391. a See document No. 176. No. 179 2177/4715:98-600 Mem^orandum, 1>y the State Secretary St.S. No. 770 BERZJOST, October 2, 1939. The Belgian Ambassador called on me today after having reported to the Belgian Minister President * and the Bang in Brussels. *M. Hubert Pierlot. 196 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY In his usual manner, Davignon had neatly prepared in advance what he was going to say. He introduced his talk with the assurance that Belgium was more determined than ever to defend her independence and neutrality and had used plain language vis-k-vis English pressure, with success. Belgium was on that account not at all popular in France at present; Paris had the idea that in 1914 Belgium had joined France for France's sake, a fallacy from which the French could not be dissuaded. Then the Ambassador discussed two problems : 1. The peace question* Speaking apparently on the basis of official information, Davignon stated that England is obstinate but that in France the Cabinet even now still contains a number of pronounced friends of peace. But France is unable to assert herself vis-&-vis England. Nothing makes any impression on London but what Washington says. In Washington, in turn, only Mussolini can raise his voice successfully. If there is any chance at all it is only through the diplomatic channel Kome- Washington-London, and perhaps parallel with it the direct channel Borne-London. A public peace appeal, which apparently is impending here, would escape being harmful only if it were not worded so bluntly as to block England's possibility of withdrawal. The Ambassador, whose words clearly showed Belgium's desire for peace, thought it would be best if the public appeal were preceded by a diplomatic step sufficiently far in advance. 2. The subsequent 'prosecution of the war if the peace effort should fail. If a peace is not realized now, Count Davignon visualizes two different possibilities for the prosecution of the war : either a delaying action such as that on the Western front to date, which proves increasingly, the longer it lasts, the senselessness of this state of war and must eventually dispel France's determination to fight; or else all-out war. In case of the latter, which worries Davignon especially, the Ambassador obviously sought to make me realize what a fateful mistake it would be if Germany launched an offensive through Belgian territory. Davignon, however, clothed his arguments in a description of the misfortune that would overcome France if she for her part should invade Belgium. The terrific moral shock of such a treaty violation would cost France the sympathy of the entire world, especially America. As was generally known, the French military leaders would like a wider theater of operations to enable them to make their superiority in material felt and so as not to be wedged in at our West Wall as they were at present. However, France would find herself confronted by the well-equipped Belgian OCTOBER 1939 197 Army of three-quarters of a million men, determined to give battle, &nd a series of fortifications. The moral and physical factors would cause France to lose the war should she venture a forced passage through Belgium. I did not contradict Count Davignon's statements. I referred him, however, to certain reports launched by the Western Powers, from which one might infer such intentions on the part of France. I told him at the end that while the Western Powers had an interest in widening the theater of operations, we, as was well known, wanted to preserve the circle of neutrals. It would of course be a serious matter if the chance of peace existing today were wantonly thrown away by the Western Powers, because then the soldier would again have the initiative. Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister. WEIZSACKEB No. 180 2177/4T1595-97 Memorandietm by the State Secretary St.S. No. 772 BERLIN, October 2, 1939. The Italian Ambassador repeated to me today in the automobile the telegraphic report from the Italian Ambassador in Paris * about the peace inclinations within the French Cabinet. Attolico later sent me the text of the Paris report which is enclosed. Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister. WEIZSACKER [Enclosure] BERUK, October 2, 1939. The Royal Italian. Ambassador in Paris has sent the following information : Minister Ciano's visit to Berlin 2 has excited great interest and expectation in Paris. Any proposal regarding peace negotiations which Italy might make to France would be received with sympathy provided it was not a mere communication of "decisions already definitely taken." One of the most distinguished members of the French Government has confirmed to me that the question of form is the most important consideration. France and England would at first insist on Poland's presence at any proposed conference, but would in the end be content with a discussion of the Polish question at the conference. 1 Raffaele Guariglia, November 1938-May 1940. a See document No. 176. 198 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY It is earnestly hoped here, however, that a peace conference would lead to the resurrection of a Polish state, even if only on a modest scale and of a more or less symbolic character. The argument about the nullification of the so-called moral purpose of the war, advanced by Mussolini in his speech, 8 has made a deep impression here since Bussia's entry upon the scene. It would now be a question of enabling France and England to save face. On that account the success of any peace appeal that we might undertake would depend primarily on the form in which it is presented. The foregoing are the views of the majority of the Cabinet members. Up to this evening, however, Daladier had not yet gotten in touch with Chamberlain; he will probably do so Monday morning before the British Minister delivers his speech. * In Bologna on Sept. 23. See Scritti e discorsi di Benito Mitssolini (Milan, 1939 ),xn, pp. 224^226. No. 181 823/193764 The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry Telegram RIGA, October 3, 1939 1 : 04 p. m. No. 206 of October 13 I>&?] Received October 3 2 : 20 p. m. Munters informed me the day he left that the Estonian Foreign Minister had told him that the great concessions made to Russia were unavoidable because Germany had refrained from exercising any political influence on the negotiations and had not replied to the Estonian request made on the basis of the Estonian-German Non- Aggression Pact that she state her position. This is contrary to the statement of the American Minister,1 who returned from Tallinn yesterday. According to him, Tallinn had been prepared for the worst after Selter's first trip because of the lack of clarity in the Russian demands, and had welcomed the later agreement, in which limits had been set to the demands through the efforts of the Reich Foreign Minister, with a certain sense of relief and even of gratitude towards Germany. In high, pronouncedly Latvian circles here there are signs of growing mistrust of the "half-Latvian" Munters, who before his departure yesterday received rather broad powers to conclude an immediate agreement. Munters will in turn probably try to render tolerable the concessions which he makes by stating to the local public that Germany had given up all political influence in this 1 John (X Wiley. OCTOBER 1939 199 part of the Baltic and had thereby exposed the little country of Latvia to seizure by the Russians. In order to be able to oppose this in time, it seems to me that authentic instructions are necessary on whether and how Germany has exerted or will exert influence upon the present Russo-Latvian settlement. Please send telegraphic instructions. KOTZH No. 182 IDS-/ 111663.-64 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT Moscow, October 3, 1939 7 : 04 p. m. TOP SECRET Received October 3 11: 10 p.m. No. 463 of October 3 Molotov summoned me to his office at 2 p. m. today, in order to communicate to me the following : The Soviet Government would tell the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, who arrives today, that, within the framework of an amicable settlement of mutual relations (probably similar to the one with Estonia) , the Soviet Government was willing to cede the city of Vilna and its environs to Lithuania, while at the same time the Soviet Government would let Lithuania understand that it must cede the indicated portion of its territory to Germany.1 M. inquired what formal procedure we had in mind for carrying this out. His idea was the simultaneous signing of a Soviet-Lithuanian protocol on Vilna and a German- Lithuanian protocol on the Lithuanian area to be ceded to us. I replied that this suggestion did not appeal to me. It seemed to me more logical that the Soviet Government should exchange Vilna for the strip to be ceded to us and then hand this strip over to us. M. did not seem quite in accord with my proposal but was willing to let me ask for the viewpoint of my Government and give him a reply by tomorrow noon. Molotov's suggestion seems to me harmful, as in the eyes of the world it would make us appear as "robbers" of Lithuanian territory, while the Soviet Government figures as the donor. As I see it, only my suggestion can be considered at all. However, I would ask you to consider whether it might not be advisable for us, by a separate secret German-Soviet protocol, to forego the cession of the Lithuanian strip of territory until the Soviet Union actually incorporates Lithuania, an idea on which, I believe, the arrangement concerning Lithuania was originally based* SCBTOIJ&'N'B'DRG 1 See document No. 159. 200 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 183 96/108036 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Telegram URGENT Moscow, October 3, 11)39 8 : 08 p. m. TOP SECRET Received October 3 11 : 10 p. nu No. 464 of October 3, 1939 With reference to your telegram No. 475 of October 2.1 I explained in detail to Molotov the contents of your instruction* Molotov stated that the Soviet Government shared our trend of thought and was proceeding in that direction. However, it appeared that Turkey had already become rather closely involved with England and France. The Soviet Government would continue to try to rectify or "neutralize" matters in our sense. The Afghan Ambassador, with whom I spoke today, claimed to know that the Soviet Government was demanding of Turkey absolute neutrality and the closing of the Straits. Molotov himself said that the negotiations were still under way. When I mentioned the rumors that England and France intended to assault Greece and overrun Bulgaria in order to set up a Balkan front, Molotov asserted spontaneously that the Soviet Government would never tolerate pressure on Bulgaria. SCUXJIJEKBTJRG 1 Document No. 175. No. 184 4143/E071651 The Director of the Political Department to the Legations in Estonia^ Latvia, and Lithua/rda Telegram MOST URGENT BERLIN, October 3, 1939. e. o. PoL VI 2210. To Tallinn, No. 241. With reference to your No. 180 of September 29 * To Riga, No. 303. With reference to your No. 206 of October 3 * To Kaunas, No. 249 For the Minister. The Reich Foreign Minister requests you to be most discreet in dealing with German-Russian relations and their possible effects on the Baltic States and to make no statement on this subject. * Document No. 168. * Document No. 181. OCTOBER 1939 201 Supplement for Riga only : This answers the question asked at the end of your telegraphic report No. 206. WOERMANN No. 185 7a/52077>-8<* Memorandwm, by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department , October 3, 1939. CONVERSATION WITH HUNGARIAN MINISTER PRESIDENT COUNT TEIUEKI IN BUDAPEST ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1939 After a general discussion of the political situation Count Teleki expressed the urgent wish that Germany might continue in the future as she has in the past to expedite the delivery of war material to Hungary and especially to speed up as much as possible the shipment of the orders already contracted for.1 I in turn gave Count Teleki a broad outline of the status of the German-Hungarian economic negotiations and specifically raised the following three questions : I. Mineral resources in the Carpathian area* The German Government had to insist that the Hungarian Government keep the promises, made prior to the restoration to Hungary of the Carpathian region, to safeguard the German economic interests in that area.2 This held especially for the exploitation of mineral resources. We were willing to waive full exploitation of the concessions granted us but wished at least to obtain control of exploration and exploitation in regard to petroleum. Count Teleki reiterated hliiss view, previously explained to Minister von Erdmannsdorff, that the statement he had made at the time to the Minister and Herr Altenburg had referred only to actually existing economic interests and not to extensive concessions of this kind, which would apply a partial renunciation of sovereignty. Moreover, he had not been aware of these concessions at the time he made the statement. Actually there was no reason for bringing in German specialists and German firms, since the Hungarian geologists were particularly well trained and able to solve the problems in question themselves. The most Hungary could do was to promise Germany participation in the eventual exploitation of any petroleum deposits that might actually exist. Not until I declared very definitely that the German Government could not be satisfied with this did Count Teleki promise to reconsider whether the Hungarian Government could make us other proposals which went further. See document No. 9. See document No. 62 and footnote 1. 202 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY IX, Economic aid for Slovakia. I pointed out that Hungary had continuously denied our repeated requests to normalize economic relations with Slovakia and especially to send to Slovakia large-scale shipments of farm products, particularly fats. Count Teleki justified this refusal on the ground that it was impossible for Hungary to enter into closer relations with Slovakia unless the latter changed her political attitude toward Hungary and above all ceased persecuting the Hungarians in Slovakia. I replied that we were concerned not with the adjustment of political relations between Hungary and Slovakia, but, as we saw it, with Hungary's obvious duty to aid Germany by doing everything in her power to supply Slovakia, which was Germany's friend, had fought against Poland at the side of Germany, and constituted the hinterland for the German troops. After a prolonged discussion Count Teleki stated that they would find a way to meet the German wish by furnishing food and even fats to Slovakia through individual compensation transactions. As for the restj Hungary was already supplying Germany to the limits of her capacity and there was nothing to keep Germany from passing these supplies on to Slovakia. Following this conversation Minister von Nickl 8 promised me that thirty to forty carloads of fats would be made available for direct delivery to Slovakia through a compensation arrangement in the near future. He made a point, however, of asking that the Slovaks not be informed of this as yet. III. The question of the rate of exchange. I told the Minister President that Germany positively could not resign herself to the devaluation of the reichsmark by about 11 percent, as effected indirectly through the increase in the rate of exchange of free foreign currencies, especially not at the very moment of the outbreak of war. Count Teleki said that he recognized our political interest in this question but that he could not judge its technical aspect. He would discuss the question at once with the president of the bank of issue and then inform us of the position of the Hungarian Government. In the Minister President's waiting room I met the president of the bank of issue and discussed the question directly with him. He reiterated his familiar argument that the increase in the rate of exchange of the free currencies had been imperative in order to provide an incentive for export to the countries concerned. When I kept insisting, he even went so far as to tell me that I could, to be sure, demand his resignation, and also obtain it, but that I could not force him to follow a different exchange rate policy. The Governmental Committee Protocol * signed the next day accordingly stated that no agreement could be reached in this question and that the German Government would soon discuss the matter again. 8 Of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4 Not printed (8502/H597157-65). 'Clodius submitted this memorandum to the State Secretary with a cover note of the same date (73/52076). Olodius said that he had recommended to Ribbentrop that war material deliveries to Hungary be resumed on a full scale basis. Bibbentrop said he intended to submit the question to the FUhrer. OCTOBER 1939 203 No. 186 136/73902r-03 Memorandum by the State Secretary St.S. No. 773 BERLIBT, October 3, 1939. The Spanish Ambassador made the following statement to me today with respect to the peace question : The Spanish Government believes that the present moment offers a measure of promise for concluding peace. The Spanish Government is prepared, if the German Government so desires, to offer its good offices as mediator. There are, however, certain substantial prerequisites to this. a. The proposals made must be worthy of respect and calculated to ensure peace for a long time to come. l>. Without provision for a rump-Poland nothing can be done, because France and especially England must be given the chance to save face. As regards the methods used, he said that in public discussion it is essential to spare the domestic prestige of the English and French Governments to such an extent that they are able to come down from their present intransigent theses. The substantive discussions proper would be reserved to the diplomatic mediation. I thanked the Ambassador for his demarche and referred him to the imminent session of the Reichstag,1 naturally making no comment on the matter at hand. But since the Ambassador was speaking by instruction of his Government and otherwise calls on me very seldom, it is a step to which I believe we ought to react in some way for courtesy's sake. Incidentally, it is striking how closely the ideas of the Franco Government parallel statements which have reached us through other channels. Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister. WEIZSACKER * See Editors' Note, p. 227. No. 187 51/33805 Memorandum J>y the Director of the Political Department BERLIN, October 3, 1939. With reference to the enclosed communication of the Naval High Command of October 2, 1939 (1/Skl. 9592/39 geh.). 1 1 Not found. 26009054 19 204 - DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY I communicated the following to Admiral Schniewiiid today : 1. We were still of the opinion that the order to attack all merchant vessels definitely identified as enemy ships should not be given at the present time, especially in consideration of the peace efforts now in progress. 2. We had no objection to the order communicated [to us] permitting the immediate use of arms against merchant vessels definitely recognized to be armed or against merchant ships which on the basis of reliable information are known to be armed. We believed, however, that the submarine commanders still might consider the above formulation as an instruction to take action against all enemy merchant vessels, and asked that this point of view be taken into account in making another formulation. Furthermore, it might be well to make it clear that the previous order not to attack passenger ships is not affected by the present order. Admiral Schniewind showed understanding for these statements and promised to look into the matter. Submitted to 1) the State Secretary, 2) the Deputy Director of the Political Department, 3) the Deputy Director of the Legal Department, and 4) Herr v. d. Heyden-Rynsch. WOERMANX No. 188 Nuremberg document No. 122-C Exhibit GB-82 Extract From "War Diary of the Naval Staff * [Extract] OHEFSACHB [BERLIN,] October 3, 1939. TOP SECRET MILITARY By officer only 5. The Chief of the Naval Staff 2 considers it necessary that the Führer be informed as soon as possible of the opinions of the Naval Staff on the possibilities of extending the operational base to the North. It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases in Norway under the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving fundamentally our strategic and operational position. The following questions must be given consideration. a. What places in Norway can be considered for bases ? 6. Can bases be gained by military force against Norway's will if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting? 1 The German text of this document is printed in Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. xxxiv, pp. 422-424. * Grand Admiral Raeder. OCTOBER 1939 205 c. What are the possibilities for defense after occupying? d. Will the harbors have to be developed completely as bases, or have they possibly decisive advantages already as supply positions ? (Commanding Officer, Submarines, already considers such harbors extremely useful as equipment and supply bases for Atlantic submarines to call at temporarily.) 3 e. What decisive advantage would exist for the conduct of the war at sea in gaining a base in North Denmark, e. g., Skagen ? In a memorandum of Oct. 9 to the OKM, D5nitz designated Trondheim as the Norwegian port best suited for use as a German naval base, and recommended that a base be secured there; Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. xxxiv, document No. OQ5-C, exhibit GB-83, pp. 159-161. On Oct. 10, Raeder carried this recommendation to Hitler who decided to consider the matter; "Führer Conferences on Na\al Affairs, 1939-1945," Brassey's Naval Annual, 1948, pp. 45-47. See also Kaeder's retrospective memorandum of Jan. 30, 1944, the German text of which is printed in Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. xxxiv, document No. 066-C, exhibit GB-81, pp. 276-282. An English translation is given in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. vi, pp. 887-892. No. 189 0-6/1-OS03T-38 The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 361 of October 4 ANKARA, October 4, 1939 3 : 47 p. m. Received October 4 8 : 00 p. m. In pursuance of instructions in your telegram 352 of October 2 * I had an hour-long discussion with the Minister President 2 who is acting as a substitute for the Foreign Minister. All arguments which favor Turkey's return to a policy of absolute neutrality were received by him with obvious understanding. I emphasized most strongly that the conclusion of any pact with the Western Powers would be considered an open sabotaging of our peace efforts and that we expected from Turkey, on the contrary, that she would lend active support to the German Government's efforts to achieve peace, which were in her own interest. The Minister President received with special interest my statements on the re-establishment of historical German- Russian cooperation. I also suggested to him how Turkey could, in our opinion, get rid of her obligations under the Assembly declaration of May 12. When I asked whether I could inform the Reich Government that Turkey was willing to support the peace offensive by an appropriate adjustment of her policy, the Minister President answered that he could not reply until after Saracoglu's return and a new consultation on the situation as it would then exist. In his opin- 1 See document No. 175, footnote 1. "Heflk Saydam. 206 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY ion Chamberlain's speech 3 left the door open for negotiations, provided that the German peace proposal contained guarantees, in a psychologically acceptable form, for the preservation of the Polish and Czech nations. Turkey, at any rate, had a very great interest in the establishment of peace. I further asked him to arrange a meeting for me with the President, so that I might explain to him this German view of the situation. With reference to the attitude of the press the Minister President said that the Turkish Ambassador to Berlin had reported on the Führer's protests * and that he was continuing his effort to make the reporting more objective by means of the new commission set up in the office of the Minister President. From a demarche by the Iranian Ambassador here I have learned that Russian troop concentration on the Caucasian border has been confirmed. The Iranian Ambassador has instructions to demand a Turkish policy aimed at establishing peace, since Persia might otherwise become the battlefield for a Russo-British conflict. 3 In a speech in the House of Commons on Oct. 3, Chamberlain had given the British position on the Russo-German declaration of Sept. 28 about the "liquidation of the war." For the text, see Parliamentary Debates, fifth series, vol. 351, pp. 1855-1861. 4 See document No. 146. No. 190 18OT/411596 The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT RIGA, October 4, 1939 1 : 00 p.m. No. 209 of October 4 Received October 4 8 : 00 p. m. Pol. VI 2225. It is known to the Latvian Government that the Russian demands (naval bases at Libau and Windau Riga is questionable plus 50,000 troops distributed throughout the country) have to be accepted by this evening. Since the effect upon the public of the terms, which are so far kept secret, is unpredictable, and outright paralysis of the government appears imminent, 60,000 Volksdeutsche and 3,000 Reichsdeutsche are in immediate danger of their lives. Please send detailed information regarding the promised assistance as soon as possible. As for the date, I take the liberty of reserving this for a later telegraphic report. Adequate tonnage is desired, 75 percent of which should be directed to Riga, the rest to Libau. Provision of OCTOBER 1939 207 armed protection for unhindered embarkation and also food and surgical dressings seems necessary. KOTZE No. 191 103/111665 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Telegram TOP SECRET BERLIN', October 4, 1939. No. 488 With reference to your telegram No. 463.1 I, too, consider inopportune the method Molotov suggested for the cession of the Lithuanian strip of territory. On the contrary, please ask Molotov not to discuss this cession of territory with the Lithuanians at present, but rather to have the Soviet Government assume the obligation toward Germany to leave this strip of territory unoccupied in the event of a posting of Soviet forces in Lithuania, which may possibly be contemplated, and furthermore to leave it to Germany to determine the date on which the cession of the territory should be formally effected. An understanding to this effect should be set forth in a secret exchange of letters between yourself and Molotov. EEICH FOEEIGK MINISTER [Notes :] As directed by the Reich Foreign Minister, this telegram is being dispatched at once with his signature. GATJS, October 4. I telephoned the contents of the telegram in veiled language at 11 a. m. to Count Schulenburg. He fully understood the instruction. G[ATTS], October*. 1 Document No. 182. No. 192 683/242217 Memorandum* T>y the Director of the Economic Policy Department BEKLIN, October 4, 1939. Minister Funk has agreed vis-t-vis Minister Clodius to an increase of at least 2,000,000 tons a year in coal deliveries to Italy. The quantity previously agreed upon amounts to approximately 9,200,000 tons. Since the acquisition of the mines in the former Polish part of Upper Silesia, the satisfaction of Italian coal requirements by Ger 208 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY many is no longer a question of production but merely a question of transportation. In this respect everything possible to assure delivery is being done in cooperation with the Reich Economics Ministry and the Reich Transportation Ministry. WIEHI, To be submitted to the Foreign Minister via the State Secretary. WEBHL No. 193 P15/024r-021 Supplementary Protocol Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics * October 4, 1939. The undersigned, being duly empowered thereto by the German Government and the Government of the USSR, pursuant to article I of the Boundary and Friendship Treaty concluded in Moscow on September 28, 1939, between Germany and the USSR,2 have agreed upon the following : I The boundary line between the respective national interests in the territory of the former Polish state shall have the following course : Beginning at the point located on the Igorka River at the mouth of a nameless brook which comes before the village of Pschetok and which flows into the Igorka River at a distance of about 2,300 meters northeast of the intersection of this river with the Shondowy- Kopzewo road, the boundary shall run in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the point located on the Tschernaja Gantscha River opposite the northwestern edge of the village of Shondowy. Thence the boundary ascends along the Tschernaja Gantscha River to the mouth of the Marycha River. From this mouth the boundary shall follow a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the northern shore of Jedryno Lake. Thence the boundary shall follow a straight line to be determined to the point located opposite the mouth of the Wolkushanka River on the Tschernaja Gantscha River, and further, ascending this latter river, to the point lying south of the village of Ostrynske. Thence the boundary shall run at first in a southwesterly and then in a northwesterly direction along the ravine to its northwestern end and then, on a straight line 1 The spellings of all Polish place names in this document are those used in the printed German text. "Document No. 157, and Appendix VI. OCTOBER 1939 209 to be determined, running in a northwesterly direction to the point lying at the northeastern edge of the village of Tscharny Brud. From here the boundary shall run in a northwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the railroad bridge across the Blisna River at the northern edge of the village of Schtschebra so that the village of Schtschebra shall be on the USSR side and the village of Blisna on the German side. Continuing, the boundary shall descend the Blisna River to the junction of the roads Suwalki-Schtschebra II and Ratschki Schtschebra II, so that the fork of the road and the village of Schtschebra II shall remain on the German side and the village of Schtschebra I on the USSR side. Thence the boundary shall continue in a northwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point located north of the village of Topilowka and then shall bend slightly in a southwesterly direction and run, on a straight line to be determined, to a point located on the former Russo-German Reich border, which is located at a distance of about 900 meters southwest of the village of Pruska Mala, which shall remain on the German side. Thence the boundary shall continue generally in a southwesterly direction along the former Russo-German border up to the point where the latter intersects the Pissa River. Thence the aforesaid boundary shall descend along the Pissa River to its confluence with the Narew River and then descend this river to the mouth of a nameless brook which flows into the Narew River between the town of Ostrolenka and the village of Ostrowa. Thence the boundary shall ascend the brook to the eastern edge of the village of Lawy (South). From the eastern edge of the village of I*awy (South), the boundary shall continue in a southeasterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the southern edge of the village of Sussk, and continue, also on a straight line to be determined, to a point situated on the Troschyn-Rabendy road approximately 400 meters southwest of the edge of the village of Troschyn. Thence the boundary runs in a south-southeasterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the crossroads south of the village of Stylengi and then shall turn towards the southeast and continue, on a straight line to be determined, to a point on the Osh River south of the village of Butschin, so that this village shall remain on the USSR side, and the village of Saoshe on the German side. Thence the boundary shall ascend the Osh River to a tributary on the lei't which flows into the Osh River between the villages of Sokolowo and Rogowek, then along this tributary to a point located 1,200 meters east of the village of Malinowa-Stare. Thence the boundary shall continue in a southeasterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point on the Ostruw-Masowezka-Schabi 210 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY kowo road, approximately 700 meters south of the brick works, so that the Salesze estate, the village of Lubejewo-Nowe and the aforesaid brick works shall be on the USSR side ; the village of Salesze, the village of Pshiimy and the village of Lubejewo on the German side. Thence the boundary shall continue in a southeasterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, up to a point on the Brotschisko Biver, approximately 500 meters northwest of the western edge of the village of N"owa Zolotorija, s ^at ^e village of Ugnewo shall remain on the German side. Thence, the boundary shall continue in a southeasterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point on the road, approximately 350 meters south of the village of Petzki. Thence the boundary shall run in a southeasterly direction to a point on the Sapadnyi Bug River approximately 1,500 meters east of the edge of the village of Nadbushne. Thence the boundary shall ascend the Sapadnyi Bug River to the mouth of the Solokija River. From the mouth of the Solokija River, the boundary shall run along this river to a point located opposite the northwestern edge of the village of Ugnuw. Thence the boundary shall continue in a northwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the southern edge of the village of Chodywantze, so that the village of Pschedno and the village of Nowossjulki shall remain on the USSR side and the village of Mysljatin and Chodywantze on the German side. Thence the boundary shall continue in a northwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point located approximately 1,300 metres north of the northeast edge of the village of Shurawze. Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point located on the Krinitza Brook, opposite the southeastern edge of the village of Shilka. Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the southeastern edge of the village of Bshesina, then the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point approximately 800 meters northwest of the village of Pisuny. Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, up to Luwtscha Brook and shall reach this brook opposite the southwestern edge of the village of Garby and thence shall ascend along this brook up to the Sigly farm. Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwestern direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point on the Gnoinik Brook OCTOBER 1939 211 opposite the southeastern edge of the village of Gorajetz and shall then descend this brook to its intersection with the Gorajetz-Zetschanuw road. Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the eastern edge of the village of Zetschanuw. Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the western edge of the village of Dachnuw, so that the Novy farm shall remain on the German side. Thence the boundary shall continue in a southwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to the southeastern edge of the village of Futory and thence approximately westward, on a straight line to be determined, to a point on the northwestern edge of the village of Sabjala, so that the Ljatoschin farm and the village of TJschkowtze shall remain on the USSR side. Thence the boundary shall continue in a northwesterly direction, on a straight line to be determined, to a point on the Pschikopa Brook opposite the northwestern edge of the village of Dobtscha, so that the village of Milkuw shall remain on the USSR side and the village of Degelnja on the German side. Thence the boundary descends the course of the Pschikopa Brook to its confluence with the Pschiluben River and then follows this river downstream to its confluence with the San River. Thence the boundary shall ascend the course of the San River to its source, so that the Sjanki and Ushok railroad stations shall remain on the USSR side. Note 1 : At nonnavigable rivers and brooks the boundary line shall be the middle of the main branch of such rivers and brooks. At navigable rivers, the boundary line shall be the middle of the main channel of navigation. Note 2 : Those portions of the boundary which have been determined by lines to be agreed upon, shall be defined in detail at the demarcation of the boundary. Note S: The boundary line determined by this protocol has been entered in black upon the attached Russian map to the scale of 1 : 100,000. II The boundary line determined in section I of this Protocol shall be marked on the ground by a mixed German-Russian commission. The commission shall erect boundary monuments, prepare a detailed description of this line and enter it on a map to the scale of 1 : 25,000. The commission shall commence its work on October 9 of this year. 212 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY The description of the course of the boundary prepared by the foregoing commission and a map of this line shall be confirmed by both Governments.8 Ill This Protocol, which is subject to ratification, takes effect immediately upon signature. The exchange of ratifications shall take place in Berlin within the shortest time possible. This Protocol has been done in four copies, of which two are in the German and two in the Russian language, both texts being equally authentic. Signed in Moscow, on October 4, 1939. By authority of the For the Government Government of the USSR : of the German Reich : W. MOLOTOW F. SCIIXJI,ENBURG ' In a note verbale of Oct. 8, the Embassy in Moscow Informed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that Germany would be represented by a delegation headed by Hencke and including three other officials representing the OKW and the Ministries of Interior and Transport (2426/512656). On Oct. 10 the People's Commissariat replied that the director of its Central European Department, A. M. Alexandrov, would head the Soviet delegation which would include three other members, all officers (2426/512657). The commission held Its first session Oct. 10, 1039, and continued to meet until Aug. 17, 1940, when agreement on the main points was reached (2362/488025-28), even though some details remained to be worked out (see vol. xi). The files of Political Division V relating to the Central Boundary Commission, its six subcommissions, proposed changes in the boundary line, and various questions and disagreements connected with establishing its exact course on the ground have been filmed in serials 2426-2430 inclusive, 8426, 8427, S430, 8431, and 8432. No. 194 84/28430 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT Moscow, October 5, 1939 12 : 10 a. m. TOP SECRET Received October 5 i : 55 a. m. No. 470 of October 4 With reference to my telegram No. 468 of October 3,1 Immediately after Under State Secretary Gaus' first telephone call," I transmitted to Molotov this morning the request not to divulge to the Lithuanian Foreign Minister anything regarding the German- Soviet understanding concerning Lithuania, M. asked me to see him at 5 p. m. and told me, that, unfortunately, he had been obliged yesterday to inform the Lithuanian Foreign Minister of this understand- 1 Document No, 182. * See document No. 191. OCTOBER 1939 213 ing, since he could not, out of loyalty to us, act otherwise. The Lithuanian delegation had been extremely dismayed and sad; they had declared that the loss of this area in particular would be especially hard to bear since many prominent leaders of the Lithuanian people came from that part of Lithuania. This morning at 8 a. m., the Lithuanian Foreign Minister had flown back to Kaunas, intending to return to Moscow in 1 or 2 days. I said that I would immediately notify my Government by telephone, whereupon I called Herr Gaus.3 An hour later Molotov informed me that Stalin personally requested the German Government not to insist for the moment upon the cession of the strip of Lithuanian territory. SCHUUBXBURG- * No record of this call lias been found. See, however, document No. 196. No. 195 34/23441 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Telegram SECRET Moscow, October 5, 1939 3 : 30 a. m. No. 471 of October 4 Received October 5 6 : 05 a. m. Today Molotov brought up again the wish expressed by the Foreign Minister for establishment of repair facilities for German ships and submarines at Murmansk. Molotov stated that Murmansk was not isolated enough for that purpose. The Soviet Government considered the port of Teriberka, east of Murmansk, more suited because it was more remote and not visited by foreign ships. The particulars of its utilization, the shipment of war material there, etc., could be discussed with Foreign Trade Commissar Mikoyan.1 1 According to Bitter's penciled notes, the question of the submarine base at Teriberka was discussed with Mikoyan on Oct. 10 (8435/E593980-84) . No. 196 127/69687-89 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Telegram MOST nuGENT BEEUE3ST, October 5, 1939 3 : 4:3 a. m. TOP SECRET Received October 5 11 : 55 a. m. No. 497 of October 4 With reference to today's telephonic communication from the Ambassador.1 1 See document No. 194, footnote 3. 214 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY The Legation in Kaunas is being instructed as follows : 2 1) Solely for your personal information, I am apprising you of the following: At the time of the signing of the German-Russian Non- Aggression Pact on August 23, a strictly secret delimitation of the respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe was also undertaken. In accordance therewith, Lithuania was to belong to the German sphere of influence, while in the territory of the former Polish state, the socalled four-river line, Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San, was to constitute the border. Even then I demanded that the district of Vilna go to Lithuania, to which the Soviet Government consented. At the negotiations concerning the Boundary and Friendship Treaty on September 28, the settlement was amended to the extent that Lithuania, including the Vilna area, was included in the Russian sphere of influence, for which in turn, in the Polish urea, the province of Lublin and large portions of the province of Warsaw, including the pocket of territory of Suwaiki, fell within the German sphere of influence. Since, by the inclusion of the Suwalki tract in the German sphere of influence a difficulty in drawing the border line resulted, we agreed that in case the Soviets should take special measures in Lithuania, a small strip of territory in the southwest of Lithuania, accurately marked on the map, should fall to Germany. 2) Today Count von der Schulenburg reports * that Molotov, contrary to our own intentions, notified the Lithuanian Foreign Minister last night of the confidential arrangement. Please now, on your part, inform the Lithuanian Government, orally and in strict confidence, of the matter, as follows : As early as at the signing of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, in order to avoid complications in Eastern Europe, conversations were held between ourselves and the Soviet Government concerning the delimitation of German and Soviet spheres of influence. In these conversations I had recommended restoring the Vilna district to Lithuania, to which the Soviet Government gave me its consent. In the negotiations concerning the Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, as is apparent from the German-Soviet boundary aemarcation which was published, the pocket of territory of Suwalki jutting out between Germany and Lithuania had fallen to Germany. As this created an intricate and impractical boundary, I had reserved for Germany a border correction in this area, whereby a small strip of Lithuanian territory would fall to Germany. The award of Vilna to Lithuania was maintained in these negotiations also. You are now authorized to make it known to the Lithuanian Government that the Keich Government does not consider the question of this border revision timely at this moment. We make the proviso, however, that the Lithuanian Government treat this matter as strictly confidential. End of instruction for Kaunas. I request you to inform M. Molotov of our communication to the Lithuanian Government. Further, please request of him, as already * The text of telegram No. 252 of Oct. 4 to Kaunas is quoted verbatim liere <115/117631-32). * See document No. 104. OCTOBER 1939 215 indicated in the preceding telegram, 4 that the border strip of Lithuanian territory involved be left free in the event of a possible posting of Soviet troops in Lithuania and also that it be left to Germany to determine the date of the implementing of the agreement concerning the cession to Germany of the territory involved. Both of these points at issue should be set forth in a secret exchange of letters between yourself and Molotov.5 RlBBENTROP * Document No. 191. * In a telegram of Oct. 5 (127/69685) , Schulenburg replied as follows : "Instruction carried out. Molotov promised to submit our proposal to his Government and indicated that it would surely be agreed to." For the resulting exchange of letters see document No. 218. No. 197 321/193159-60 The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT KAUNAS, October 5, [1939] 7 : 55 p. m. No. 175 of October 5 Received October 5 10 : 30 p. m. With reference to telegram No. 252 of October 5 [4] - 1 Bizauskas 2 sent for me today even before I could ask for an appointment with the Foreign Minister as instructed in telegram No. 252 ; he first made excuses for M. Urbsys, who was completely occupied today with continuous discussions in the Cabinet and therefore unfortunately could not speak with me himself. He then informed me that Molotov had told Urbsys that Germany had laid claim to a strip of Lithuanian territory, the limits of which included the city and district of Naumiestis and continued on past the vicinity of Mariampole. This had made a deep and painful impression on Lithuania, and Urbsys had flown back to Kaunas partly because of this information, which he had not wished to transmit by telephone* The Lithuanian Government has instructed Skirpa to make inquiries in Berlin.3 I told him that in the Moscow discussions on the delimitation of the German and Soviet spheres of interest, the Reich Foreign Minister had advocated giving the Vilna area to Lithuania and had also ob- 1 See document No. 196, footnote 2. 1 K. Bizauskas, a senior official of the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry. 1 See document No. 200. 216 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY tained the Soviet Government's agreement in the matter.4 While Lithuania had the prospect of such a great increase in territory a difficult and impracticable boundary in the vicinity of the Suwalki tip had come into existence because of the German-Soviet border division. Therefore the idea of a small border rectification at the German- Lithuanian frontier had also emerged in the course of these negotiations; but I could inform him that the German Government did not consider the question pressing. Bizauskas received this information with visible relief and asked me to transmit the thanks of the Lithuanian Government on this score to the Reich Government. Furthermore he asked on his part that the matter be kept strictly secret, which I promised him. I might add that since the fixing of the German-Soviet frontier became known, political quarters here have had great hopes of obtaining the Suwalki tip from Germany. ZECHLIN 4 In a later telegram of the same evening (321/193161), Zechlin added that Bizauskas had stated that the Soviet Government had further Informed UrbSys of its willingness to cede to Lithuania the city of Vilna and the part of the territory actually inhabited by Lithuanians, but not the entire so-called occupied territory. The Lithuanian Government expressed its gratitude to Kibbentrop for the Vilna arrangement The Soviet Government had also proposed a mutual assistance pact with Lithuania, similar to the Soviet-Bstonian pact. No. 198 The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 550 of October 5 TOKYO, October 5, 1939 8 : 40 p. m. Received October 5 5 : 55 p. m. Pol. VIII 1590. (Group garbled) Tlie Abe Cabinet's formula for agreement, according to which Japan intends to keep absolutely out of the European conflict and to concentrate on ending the China enterprise, could not prevent the old conflicts between political power groups from reappearing, first of all in the struggle for position in domestic politics. The opponents of the course pursued by the Army are seeking to weaken further the Army's influence, which has already been impaired by the effects of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact here. The foreign policy success of General Abe and of the Army in regard to the armistice at Nomonhan * is not sufficient to paralyze 1 See document No. 77, footnote 2. OCTOBER 1939 217 the opposition forces. The strengthened position of the Minister President in the Cabinet, which the Army has been demanding for a long time and which has now been brought about by imperial decree on the basis of the mobilization law, should serve to increase the influence of Abe, exponent of the Army, on the decisions of the Cabinet. A State Councilor who had been by-passed in the matter and who was obviously under pressure from opponents of the Army, reproached the Government with having violated the Constitution. In the argument which ensued the Minister President himself was forced to minimize the practical importance of his increased power in order to avert a grave Cabinet crisis. The decision of the Cabinet in the last few days to establish a Ministry of Foreign Trade, which has likewise been favored by the Army for a long time, aroused similar tensions. Foreign Minister Nomura 2 approved the plan in spite of the most violent opposition by the Foreign Ministry against the further decrease in its sphere of authority inherent in the plan. The action of the Foreign Minister aroused deep dissension in the Foreign Ministry. The greater part of the officials there are opposed to the Foreign Minister, The Director of the Economic Department and a number of division heads have decided to resign. 3 These difficulties doubtless mean a serious weakening of the policy of the Foreign Minister. Since his appointment was put through in order to divert Japanese policy in the direction of an adjustment of Japanese and American interests in China, this development can be advantageous to us and might provide further points of departure for my continued efforts to effect a Japanese- Russian agreement. In any event, far-reaching foreign policy decisions in one direction or another are not to be expected in the near future, in view of the evidences of internal Japanese weakness described. OTT 2 On Sept. 23, Adm. Kichisaburo Nomura was appointed Foreign Minister In the Abe Cabinet. Abe liad assumed office on Aug. 30, 1939, in the wake of the Cabinet crisis brought on by the German-Soviet Pact. In a telegram of Sept. 24 (174/136145-46), Ott commented that the Nomura appointment was the result of a compromise between pro-British circles which wanted to name Shigemitsu, former Ambassador in London ; pro-German circles, especially in the Army, who wanted the Minister President to keep the post ; and a small group which wanted Shiratori, former Ambassador in Rome. 8 On Oct. 16, Ott telegraphed that not only the Director of the Economic Department but Masayuki Tani, the Deputy Foreign Minister, as well had so decided (8141/E582195) . In a subsequent telegram of Oct. 28, however, Ott reported that Court circles had successfully interposed against Tani's resignation and he had been reinstated in his post (8142/E582199). 218 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 199 lie/6664a-4S The State Secretary to the Legation in Estonia* Telegram MOST TOGENT BERLIN, October 5, 1939. No. 246 L Please inform the Government there emphatically as follows : 1. In view of the development of the situation, we find, ourselves compelled to place Volksdeutsche under the special protection of the German Belch. 2. We expect that the Government there will take all necessary measures at once in order to protect the lives and property of Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche. 3. We expect that the Government there will permit all Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche who intend to leave Estonia to leave at once and will without further ado also act generously in its administration of the customs and foreign exchange regulations. II. With regard to the fate of the Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche, the following line should be adopted : We want, if possible, to avoid panic and see that property does not have to be abandoned or liquidated in a precipitate way. If the situation becomes more critical, however, those who remain in the country will do so at their own risk. We shall send a number of transport ships to Tallinn. III. For your personal information : We intend to send warships into the waters of Estonia and Latvia for the protection of the entire operation; another telegraphic instruction will follow regarding ports to be visited, number of ships, and when they are to be announced. I wish to point out as a matter of precaution that Germany has not recognized the 24-hour clause for warships in neutral ports. Further instructions will be sent regarding the general organization of the return transport. For the present there will be an increase in personnel for the work of the Legation. The Head of the Auslandsorganisation will make available to you suitable persons from the Landesgruppe. The Landesgruppenleiter is being given a similar instruction. Since we have arranged with the Russians that in the Russian sphere of interest the property rights of the emigrating Volks- *A similar instruction, almost identical in wording, was sent to the Legation in Latvia (407/215024-25). OCTOBER 1939 219 deutsche shall be protected, please take organizational measures for the safeguarding of the property left behind. We are in touch with Moscow on these questions. 2 WEIZSACKER *In telegram No. 499 of Oct. 5, Weizsiacker told Schulenburg to inform the Soviet Government of the measures being taken to protect and evacuate Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche in Latvia and Estonia. The telegram concluded with these sentences: "We shall hold the Estonian and Latvian Governments responsible for the safety of Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche. We expect that the Red Army will respect our special interest in the Volksdeutsche in the areas assigned to it. Please report by wire concerning a promise to this effect." (406/214470) No. 200 506/235040-41 Memorandum, "by the State Secretary SECRET BERLIN, October 5, 1939. St.S. No. 786 The Lithuanian Minister called on me this evening in order, as was expected, to inquire ahout German claims to a strip of land in southwestern Lithuania. M. Skirpa, however, even when he entered, had a friendlier appearance than was to be expected. For Minister Zechlin had in the meantime delivered information in Kaunas as instructed, 1 so that I did not need to go any further into the questions put by M. Skirpa. I restricted myself to a brief mention of today's telegraphic instructions to Herr Zechlin. Since M. Skirpa expressed to me the satisfaction of his Government that we had withdrawn our claim, I stressed that the announcement of our needs was "not at the moment pressing." (It is noteworthy that M. Skirpa knew and traced exactly on the map of Poland that happened to be spread out before us the line agreed upon by us in our secret protocol with the Russians.) The Minister then gave the further information that the Russians expected to get an assistance pact with Lithuania as well as permission to station Russian garrisons, at the same time agreeing in principle to the joining of Vilna and environs to Lithuania. M. Skirpa asked me if I had any ideas or suggestions to give in this regard. I stated that I was not informed and added that in connection with our negotiations in Moscow German interests had not been claimed beyond the Russo-German boundary line in the east known to M. Skirpa. 1 See document No. 196. 260090 54 20 220 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY In conclusion the Minister asked to be given any possible suggestions. M. Urbsys was still remaining in Kaunas today and tomorrow; he himself Skirpa was at the disposal of the Reich Foreign Minister at any time. WEIZSACKEB No. 201 2931/566989-92 MeniorancL'Wffi ^>y the Head of Political Division VIII BERLIN, October 5, 1939. Pol. VIII 1645. CONVEESATIOK WlTH TUB CHINESE COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY Mr. Ting stated at the outset that he was setting forth his own personal opinions and proposals, but that they were shared by his Ambassador. He also had reason to believe that the Chinese Government in Chungking was in agreement with what he had to say. For the present, therefore, it was a question of a confidential feeler, the result of which should be to enable the Embassy to take further steps in Chungking. So far the Embassy had been successful in Chungking in having the Ambassador retained in Berlin; at the present time there was a very friendly attitude toward Germany in Chungking. Then Mr. Ting again elucidated his mediation project. He explained that Japan could not expect to gain anything from further warfare in China. Under war conditions it was not even possible to exploit the Japanese-occupied territory economically. There were doubtless many sensible Japanese who were of the opinion that it was now advisable to conclude a face-saving peace with China. The Japanese could save face by eliminating British and French influence from China. It would probably be possible to obtain recognition of Manchukuo by China, as well as special economic rights for cooperation in North China. If Chinese sovereignty were fully respected, China was prepared for sincere friendship with Japan. The Marshal was not at all anti-Japanese ; he had been forced into the fight with Japan against his will. He would welcome any reasonable solution. If, however, proposals were made to Japan by the Chinese it was certain that they would be rejected. Consequently, they must come from a third party. To him, Ting, it seemed better by far if they came from Germany, rather than from the Americans or the Russians. Germany was also interested in the reestablishment of peace in the Far East, for then Japan's attitude would become unequivocally anti-British. The Japanese wanted to get Australia and British Borneo. These territories were not only easier to conquer, but, above all, easier to hold and to exploit than China. German mediation would also give Germany a OCTOBER 1939 221 strong position in Chinese economic life in the future. This was all the more true as the Marshal had remained very pro-German, which had also been shown by his attitude at the time of the withdrawal of the German military advisers. He, Ting, could imagine that efforts at mediation, which would retain for Germany the friendship of both the Japanese and the Chinese, would be in line with German policy. He also believed that the influence of Oshima was still strong enough, and that if Germany sounded him out or put forth a feeler in Tokyo the cause of peace in the Far East could be promoted. What he asked of us was that we declare, without any obligation on our part, that we were prepared in principle to sound out the Japanese discreetly so that he could inform Chungking accordingly. It was possible that he might fly to Chungking later and bring back a negotiator with full powers. I asked him whether in his opinion one condition for concluding peace would be the complete evacuation of Japanese troops from China. He replied that they would have to evacuate the Yangtze Valley, but perhaps not necessarily North China. I asked him further whether he considered the present moment favorable, when the Japanese Government obviously was staking its hopes on Wang Ching-wei.1 He replied that for the present it was only a question of soundings, that 2 or 3 months would probably elapse before any such plans could be set in motion and that by that time the whole Wang Ching-wei bubble would have burst for good. I also pointed out to him that the Chinese Foreign Minister had recently indicated to the press that he would welcome American mediation. Ting replied that the Embassy had found out the true facts ; the Foreign Minister had been questioned by an American journalist and had merely answered the question in the affirmative. That did not mean much. But he, Ting, was trying to bring about German mediation precisely because he did not think much of the Americans. Finally, I also asked him whether the Marshal was not morally obligated to England, and whether he was prepared, if necessary, to take a stand against England. Ting replied that there were no ties of any sort with England. The Anglo-Japanese negotiations at Tientsin 2 had annoyed the Marshal very much and it could certainly be anticipated that he was prepared to carry on an anti-British policy together with Germany and Japan. Regarding Russia, Ting stated that the 1 See vol. vi, document No. 526, and vol. ni, document No. 368. In furtherance of his ends, Wang Ching-wei had held a secessionist "Kuomintang" Congress in Shanghai in August and September. The German Consulate in Shanghai had reported on Wang's difficulties with the provincial governments in Nanking and PeMng as well as with the Japanese because of his tendencies toward centralization and his attempts to secure some degree of independence for his government (226/154006-15; 8137/E582153, E582154). a See document No. 11, footnote 9. 222 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY attitude of the Russian Ambassador had always been pro-Chinese. Russia was supporting China by means of volunteer aviators. He believed that Russia would welcome peace on the basis set forth by Ting, because Russia did not wish to see Japan become too powerful on the continent. Ting requested that a reply be given to him as soon as possible,. stating whether we were willing in principle to sound out Japan. Herewith submitted to the State Secretary, with reference to the oral instruction of October 4. No. 202 Memorandum l>y the Chief of Protocol BERLIN, October 5, 1939. THE FIRST VISIT OF THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR, M. GEREDB, WITH TUB FOREIGN MINISTER ON OCTOBER 5, 1939 Today the Foreign Minister received the newly appointed Turkish Ambassador, M. Gerede, on the latter's first visit. At the beginning of the conversation the Foreign Minister inquired about the Ambassador's personal affairs and asked him where he had acquired his good knowledge of German. M. Gerede explained to the Foreign Minister that he had lived in Germany for some time and that his wedding had even been held in the Kaiserhof Hotel in Berlin. Therefore he was especially happy to have come to Germany, for which he had a special liking. He considered it his task to contribute to the further consolidation of good German-Turkish relations. The Foreign Minister remarked that he was happy to take cognizance of this statement of good will ; he had already heard in the presence of the Führer that the Ambassador interpreted his mission in this manner. The Foreign Minister then asked whether the Ambassador had not been a soldier. When M. Gerede answered in the affirmative, the Foreign Minister continued as follows : I myself am a former soldier and went through the war. I can discuss German-Turkish relations more frankly with a soldier than I would with another diplomat. Frankness is very useful for our relations. German-Turkish relations have not developed evenly of late. I understand that Turkey initialed a pact with England and France during the past few days. I was somewhat astonished when I heard of these negotiations some time ago, without the former Turkish Ambassador having informed us thereof in any manner. The first I learned of it was through the papers. Moreover, I cannot understand OCTOBER 1939 223 why Turkey wishes to conclude a pact with the Western Powers, a pact which was bound to be directed against Germany also. I should like to discuss it with you even more frankly. I know that the pact is primarily directed against Italy. Several times during my various visits to Italy I discussed Italian-Turkish relations with the Duce, who assured me that Italy had no interests whatsoever in Turkey and that consequently Italy was far from having any intentions to attack. Germany has no wishes or demands of any kind vis-a-vis Turkey. If certain statesmen of the Western Powers have asserted something to this effect, then it is pure invention, for Germany does not even have the possibility of getting into a conflict with Turkey. The world is now facing great decisions. In a very brief thrust Germany ended the war that was forced upon her in the East. She is ready to make peace if the Western Powers so desire. The mood in Germany is calm and confident. The nation has boundless confidence in its leaders. It does not desire war but is firmly resolved to wage this war with all its strength if forced to continue. The German army that was in Poland is itching to measure its strength with the Western Powers. But this victorious army at the Eastern front is only a small part of the whole German Army. By far the greater part was stationed at the Western front from the very beginning. If peace were concluded today, many people in Germany would be disappointed. The feeling is growing more and more in the German people that the score with England must be settled sooner or later. Behind Germany stands the big Russian nation ; our relations with it have been unequivocally clarified. For a while I myself did not believe it possible that National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union could get together. But I have seen that it is altogether possible. The Soviet State is for the Russians and National Socialism is for Germany. Neither of the two systems can be transferred to the other country. The leader of the Soviet Government, M. Stalin, is an outstanding personality. He did not permit the British and the French to lead him around by the nose ; he did not fall into the same error which Russia committed in 1914 by going to war against Germany. As far as the difference between the systems is concerned, it was Turkey herself, after all, which gave the first proof that friendly relations are possible between a state committed to the idea of the nation and the Soviet Union. Turkey's position at the entrance to the Black Sea requires an especially well-planned and resolute policy ; it will be assured by absolute neutrality. I do not at all wish to appeal to our former comradeship in arms, for I know very well that the relationship of two countries cannot always be the same and cannot be guided by sentiment. I am convinced, however, that the relationship between Turkey and Germany can be a most friendly one 224 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY and that an alignment with the Western Powers, for which there is no inner motivation, must disturb this relationship. Unfortunately there was frequent news of unfriendly remarks made about Germany in the Turkish press. Here the Ambassador interrupted the Foreign Minister by saying that he had already made representations to his Government on account of the unfriendly attitude of the Turkish press. The Turkish people harbored very friendly feelings toward the German people. He, the Ambassador, was not fully informed of the latest developments ; he could only give the assurance that Turkey did not intend to take any action against Germany. On the contrary, it was his Government's desire to cooperate with Germany on a friendly basis. He would do everything to support this policy. The Foreign Minister replied to this that he was happy to hear this statement and that he himself, too, hoped for good cooperation with the Ambassador. Then the Foreign Minister asked the Ambassador a few personal questions. M. Gerede mentioned in this connection that he had last held a post in Japan. He had great admiration for the Japanese people- The Foreign Minister agreed with M. Gerede, saying that Germany, too, had had especially friendly relations with Japan for some time past. The German people were watching with admiration the heroic determination and national energy of the Japanese nation. Thereupon the Foreign Minister dismissed the Turkish Ambassador. Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister. DORNBERG 1 1 Marginal note : "I told the Ambassador that we would Judge the Turk [word illegible] actions. If they concluded an alliance with our enemies England and France, then friendly German-Turkish relations would hardly be conceivable. R[ibbentrop]." No. 203 7438./BJ533980-81 Unsigned Note BEKLIK, October 5, 1939. In accordance with instructions a member of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP went to Montreux to invite Baronet [sic] W. de Eopp a to Berlin. Surprised by this far-reaching possibility, on which he had not counted at all, de Kopp declared that in this extraordinary situation he must first make inquiry of his own Ministry. 1 See document No. 134, OCTOBER 1939 225 The Ministry informed him that in the present situation, it did not believe that in the interest of the matter it ought to sponsor such a journey with the reception which would be involved. Because of the war psychology prevailing in England and the weak position of Chamberlain it was beyond the power of the Ministry at the moment to make use, in the desired direction of a termination of hostilities, of the opportunity which had thus been offered. It requested, however, that the opportunity be postponed to a more suitable time. It considered that this moment would only come about through considerable losses on the part of the British air forces and the related effects on the unity of the Empire. It believed that then the views represented by the Air Ministry would have to be taken more into account, since the Empire could not permit its air strength to be reduced beyond a certain point. For these reasons the gentlemen in the Air Ministry believe that it would be only then that they could make use of an authoritative statement on Germany's intentions. A corresponding request would be made at the appropriate time. No. 204 3471/13017942-43 The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry No. 6641 MADBID, October 5, 1939. Received October 8. Pol. II 3960. Subject : The Spanish Minister of the Interior and Marshal Petain on Spain's attitude in the war. Geheimrat Schlosser, the Embassy's liaison officer at Burgos, has reported as follows : "The Spanish Minister of the Interior, Serrano Sufier, is reported to have had a rather long talk with the French Ambassador on the occasion of the swearing-in ceremonies at Las Huelgas. Marshal Petain is said to have made some allusion to Spain's position in the present international conflict, to which Senor Serrano Sufier replied that Spain's course was traced for her by the developments of the past 3 years and that she could not depart from the direction she had taken. Moreover, he believed that the Government of France had embarked on a wrong course and had done so against the will of a large portion of the population which carried with it the threat of a popular uprising against the Government. The Ambassador then asked what attitude Spain would take in such an event, and Senor Serrano Sufier replied : Spain would then be just as "sincerely" noninterventionist as France had been during the Spanish civil war. "As a sequel to this conversation, Petain stayed away from the celebration in honor of Franco on October 1, chiefly at the insistence 226 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY of the Counselor of Embassy, M. Armand Gazel. His alleged indisposition, which was given as an excuse, was a fiction. "M. Gazel, moreover, reproached his chief for having greeted the German Ambassador without embarrassment and in a friendly way that day at Las Huelgas. "I present this account with every reservation. The source which supplied it is usually reliable. 'The story was told me quite spontaneously." v. STOHRER No. 205 2290/483385-86 The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign. Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT ROME, October 6, 1939 1 : 00 p. m. No. 637 of October 6 With reference to your telegram No, 697 of October 4.1 The Duce, to whom, in Ciano's presence, I gave the text of today's speech by the Führer, asked me to transmit his thanks. He would study the speech at once and also, of course, listen to it on the radio. In the subsequent conversation he mentioned the Eastern question in passing, remarking that he had been especially happy about the drawing of the frontier between the German and Russian spheres of interest, which contained the Russians behind the Bug River and did not permit them to advance, for instance, to the Vistula. Like the Fuhrer he realized that Bolshevist remained Bolshevist and one could therefore not trust them too far. The aim of Bolshevism always remained the same. Stalin, who had begun his career as a bank robber, did not differ in this respect from the others. This did not exclude playing politics with Russia, however, as he himself had done even before us. Turning to Italy's situation, he remarked that it had already considerably strengthened as compared to September 1. Every additional 24 hours was a gain, for he was utilizing not only every day but every hour for increasing Italy's preparedness. The armament factories were working at full speed; according to the report made only yesterday by the Chief of the Forest Militia, the lumber requirement was covered more than adequately ; even the darkest point, the question of the gasoline supply, was developing favorably. In Libya, where the picture had been rather dark on September 1, with only 100,000 inadequately equipped men available, the critical point had 1 Not printed (2290/483383). The telegram informed Mackensen that a copy of Hitler's speech to be delivered on Oct. 6 would reach Borne by plane Oct. 5. He was to hand it to Mussolini only on the evening of that day with the request that the contents be kept secret. A following telegram (2290/4S3384) ordered that delivery of the text to Mussolini be postponed until Oct. 6 at 8 : 30 a. m. OCTOBER 1939 227 been passed, because 183,000 men with full equipment were now there. Transports to Libya had been made completely undisturbed, and to save fuel he had recently even waived naval escort for the transports. At times the amount of war material shipped had been so great that Marshal Balbo had had to request slowing down in order not to jeopardize orderly unloading. With reference to the general situation the Duce finally remarked that the change in British sentiment in the past few days was considerable; for the British it was today a question of saving face in some manner or other. The inclusion of the Polish problem in a comprehensive general settlement might serve this purpose. [EDITORS' NOTE. On October 6, 1939, Hitler delivered an address before a special session of the Reichstag. He dealt with the Polish campaign, the problems of Eastern Europe and other aspects of German policy, and the question of whether the war in the West need be continued. With regard to the possibilities of peace he said : "Two problems are ripe for discussion today. "1. The settlement of the problems arising from the disintegration of Poland, and, "2. The problem of eliminating those international difficulties which endanger the political and economic existence of the nations. "What then are the aims of the Reich Government as regards the adjustment of conditions within the territory to the west of the German- Soviet line of demarcation which has been recognized as Germany's sphere of influence ? "1. The creation of a Reich frontier which, as has already been emphasized, shall be in accordance with existing historical, ethnographical, and economic conditions. "2. The disposition of the entire living-space according to the various nationalities; that is to say, a solution of the problems affecting minorities which concern not only this area but nearly all the States in the south and southeast of Europe. "3. In this connection: an attempt to reach a solution and settlement of the Jewish problem. "4. The reconstruction of transport facilities and economic life in the interest of all those living in this area. "5. A guarantee for the security of this entire territory, and "6. The formation of a Polish State, so constituted and governed as to prevent its becoming once again either a hotbed of anti-German activity, or a centre of intrigue against Germany and Russia. "In addition to this, an attempt must immediately be made to wipe out or at least to mitigate the ill-effects of the war, that is to say, the 228 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY adoption of practical measures for the alleviation of the terrible distress prevailing there. These problems can, as I have already emphasized, perhaps be discussed t>ut never solved at a conference table. If Europe is really sincere in her desire for peace, then the states in Europe ought to be grateful that Russia and Germany are prepared to transform this hotbed into a zone of peaceful development, and that these two countries will assume the responsibility and bear the burdens inevitably involved. For the Beich, this project, since it cannot be undertaken in an imperialistic spirit, is a task which, it will take from fifty to one hundred years to perform. The justification for this activity on Germany's part lies in the political organizing of this territory as well as in its economic development. In the long run, of course, all Europe "will benefit from it. "The second, and in my opinion, by far the most important task, is the creation of not only a belief in, but also a sense of European security. "For this it is necessary "1, that the aims in the foreign policy of the European States should be made perfectly clear. As far as Germany is concerned, the Beich Government is ready to give a thorough and exhaustive exposition of the aims of its foreign policy. In so doing, they begin by stating that the Treaty of Versailles is now regarded by them as obsolete, in other wo*rds, that the Government of the German Beich and with them the whole German people no longer see cause or reason for any further revision of the Treaty, apart from the demand for adequate colonial possessions justly due to the Beich namely, in the first instance, for a return of the German colonies. "This demand for colonies is based not only on Germany's historical claim to the German colonies, but above all on her elementary right to a share of the world's resources of raw materials. This demand does not take the form of an ultimatum, nor is it a demand which is backed by force ? but a demand based on political justice and sane economic principles. "2. The demand for a real revival of international economic life coupled with an extension of trade and commerce presupposes a reorganization of the internal economic system, in other words, of production in the individual states. In order to facilitate the exchange of the goods thus produced, however, markets must be organised and a final currency regulation arrived at so that the obstacles in the way of unrestricted trade can be gradually removed. "3. The most important condition, however, for a real revival of economic life in and outside of Europe is the establishment of an unconditionally guaranteed peace and of a sense of security on the part of the individual nations. This security will not only be rendered possible by the final sanctioning of the European status, but above all by the reduction of armaments to a reasonable and economically tolerable level. An essential part of this necessary sense of security, however, is a clear definition of the legitimate use and application of certain modern armaments which can, at any given moment have such a devastating effect on OCTOBER 1939 229 the pulsating1 life of every nation and hence create a permanent sense of insecurity. In my previous speeches in the Reichstag I made proposals with this end in view. At that time they were rejected maybe for the simple reason that they were made by me. I believe, however, that a sense of national security will not return to Europe until clear and binding international agreements have provided a comprehensive definition of the legitimate and illegitimate use of armaments. "The Geneva Convention once succeeded in prohibiting, in civilized countries at least, the killing of wounded, the ill-treatment of prisoners, war against non-combatants, etc., and just as it was possible gradually to achieve the universal observance of this statute, a way must surely be found to regulate aerial warfare, the use of poison gas, of submarines, etc., and also so to define contraband that war will lose its terrible character of a conflict waged against women and children and against non-combatants in general. The growing horror of certain methods of modern warfare will, of its own accord, lead to their abolition and thus they will become obsolete. "In the war with Poland I endeavoured to restrict aerial warfare to objectives of so-called military importance, or only to employ it to combat active resistance at a given point. But it must surely be possible to emulate the Red Cross and to draw up some universally valid international regulation. It is only when this is achieved that peace can reign, particularly in our densely populated continent a peace which, uncontaminated by suspicion and fear, will provide the only possible condition for real economic prosperity. "I do not believe that there is any responsible statesman in Europe who does not in his heart desire prosperity for his people. But such a desire can only be realized if all the nations inhabiting this continent decide to work together. To assist in ensuring this, cooperation must be the aim of every man who is sincerely struggling for the future of his own people, "To achieve this great end, the leading nations of this continent will one day have to come together in order to draw up, accept, and guarantee a statute on a comprehensive basis which will ensure for them all a sense of security, of calm in short, of peace. Such a conference could not possibly be held without the most thorough preparation, i. e. without exact elucidation of every point at issue. It is equally impossible that such a conference, which is to determine the fate of this continent for many years to come, could carry on its deliberations while cannons are thundering or mobilized armies are bringing pressure to bear upon it. "If, however, these problems must be solved sooner or later, then it would be more sensible to tackle the solution before millions of men are first uselessly sent to their death, and milliards in property destroyed. The continuation of the present state of affairs in the West is unthinkable. Each day will soon demand increasing sacrifice. Perhaps the day will come when France will begin to bombard and demolish Saarbriicken. The German artillery will in turn lay Miilhausen in ruins. France will retaliate by bombarding Carlsruhe and Germany in her turn shell Strassburg. 230 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY "Then the French artillery will fire at Freiburg, and the German at Kolmar or Schlettstadt. Long range guns will then be set up, and from both sides destruction will strike deeper and deeper, and whatever cannot be reached by the long distance guns, will be destroyed from the air. And that will be very interesting for certain international journalists, and very profitable for the aeroplane, arms, and munition manufacturers, etc., but appalling for the victims. And this battle of destruction will not be confined to the land. No, it will reach far out over the sea. "Today there are no longer any islands. And the national wealth of Europe will be scattered in the form of shells, and the vigour of every nation will be sapped on the battle fields. One day, however, there will again be a frontier between Germany and France, but instead of flourishing towns there will be ruins and endless graveyards. Mr. Churchill and his companions may interpret these opinions of mine as weakness or cowardice, if they like. I need not occupy myself with what they think ; I make these statements, simply because it goes without saying that I wish to spare my own people these sufferings. If, however, the opinions of Messrs. Churchill and followers should prevail, this statement will have been my last. Then we shall fight. Neither the force of arms nor the lapse of time will conquer Germany. There will never be another November, 1918, in German history. It is infantile to hope for the disintegration of our people. Mr. Churchill may be convinced that Great Britain will win. I do not doubt for a single moment that Germany will be victorious. Destiny will decide who is right. One thing only is certain. In the course of world history, there have never been two victors, but very often only losers. This seems to me to have been the case in the last war. "May those peoples and their Leaders who are of the same mind now make their reply. And let those who consider war to be the better solution reject my outstretched hand. "As Führer of the German people and Chancellor of the Eeich, I can only thank God at this moment that He has so wonderfully blessed us in our hard struggle for what is our Right, and beg Him that we and all the other nations may find the right way, so that not only the German people but all Europe may once more be granted the blessing of peace. 3 ' Text of the speech is in VerJiandlungen des Reichstags, volume 460, pages 51-63. The translation into English which is given above is the official translation as released by the German Ministry of Propaganda. A translation transmitted by the Associated Press and differing in minor particulars was published in the New York Times, October 7, 1939. The same translation appears in International Conciliation^ No. 354 (New York, November 1939), pages 495-524.] OCTOBER 1939 231 No. 206 B18/B0030'68-69 The Minister in, Finland to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT HELSINKI, October 6, 1939 6 : 44 p. m. No. 270 of October 6 Received October 6 10 p. m. [Pol. VI 2251]. The Foreign Minister informed me most confidentially that Molotov had told the Finnish Minister in Moscow yesterday that, considering the situation which had arisen as a result of the war, the Russian Government would like to exchange views with the Finnish Government on political questions.The Russian Government hoped that the Foreign Minister or some other plenipotentiary of the Finnish Government would come to Moscow as soon as possible. After what had occurred in the Baltic states the Finnish Government was alarmed and completely in the dark concerning Molotov's plans. The Foreign Minister remarked that if the Russian plans were directed toward Viipuri or Aland, as rumors had it, the Finnish Government would have to reject them and prepare for the worst. The frontier guard had already been mobilized since last night. If the Russians had in mind only the islands of Seiskari and Lavansaari and were prepared to give adequate compensation, the matter could be discussed. The Foreign Minister pointed out that if Russia should occupy Aland or some important Finnish harbor [Arilegeplatz] , the strategic situation in the Baltic would change basically, to the disadvantage of Germany. He discreetly intimated that he would like to know whether Finland would find any support from Germany in the event of excessive Russian demands. In this connection he repeated a previous statement of mine that there were now only two great powers in the Baltic : Germany and Russia. The Foreign Minister is not going to Moscow himself but will send the Finnish Minister in Stockholm, Paasikivi, at present staying here-, who was the chairman of the Finnish delegation at the Dorpat peace negotiations. 1 I remained noncommittal and request telegraphic instructions for guidance in my conversations.2 BLTJCHER 1 The Treaty of Dorpat was signed June 8, 1920, between Finland and the Soviet Union. See Survey of International Affa,vrst 1920-1928 (London, 1925), pp. 245-258. a Marginal note in WeizsUcker's handwriting : "We must leave it to Finland to come to terms with the Russians. We recommend an amicable settlement, if at all possible." 232 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 207 84/24102-03 The State Secretary to the Legations in Latvia and Estonia Telegram To Riga, No. 319 BERON, October 6, To Tallinn, No. 251 The move to resettle the Volksdeuteche and Reiehsdeutsche from the Baltic countries is not due to the arraiiegenicnts of these countries with the Soviet Union ; it is based on the desire of the Reich to utilize the valuable German element in Reich territory proper (see the Führer's speech of today).1 Consequently the action is to be carried out with all energy, without regard to the current internal vacillations in the Baltic countries. You are requested to contact the Government at once and transmit the wish of the Reich Government that the speedy emigration of the Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche be facilitated : a. by granting the right of free departure, relaxing police and customs regulations, and affording protection in case of need ; 2>. by making possible a sensible liquidation of the assets to be left behind. The wish of the Reich that the resettlement should be initiated and carried out with the greatest dispatch should at once be communicated to the Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche in a suitable manner. For handling the technical aspects of the emigration and the liquidation of assets, a commission is to be formed under your chairmanship,, which will be composed of representatives of the Auslandsorganisation and representatives of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle or the Volksgruppenfiihrung. At the same time it should be investigated to what extent certain individuals should be tirged to remain for the time being in order to preserve important German economic assets, especially those of importance to the war effort. In so far as Volksdeutsche are involved in this, they are, if possible, to be given special protection by being issued German passports; it is recommended that they request naturalization for this purpose. The transport vessels will enter the harbors there within the next few days. The Government there should be informed to this effect. Immediately after loading, the ships are to head for Germany. For your personal information : German naval units are lying in readiness at Danzig in order to protect the operation if necessary. 2 WEIZSAXJKER 1 Editors' Note, p. 227. *Much of the substance of this telegram was also transmitted to Moscow on Oct, 6 with instructions that Molotov was to be informed (406/214477). OCTOBER 1939 233 No. 208 1369/35705 234 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 5. The remaining balance of ca, 500 million RM would be liquidated by capital goods deliveries over a period of several years. A plan for large-scale capital goods deliveries has been drafted.1 III. Joint German-Soviet economic planning. German technical assistance in raw material production and industrial expansion, agricultural conversion (soybeans), forest leases, fisheries at Murmansk, etc. IV. Transport and transit questions. V. Execution of the agreement of August 19, 1939. SCHSTUBBE a This may refer to enclosure 3 (not printed: 13G&/357060-66) to the document printed in footnote 2 of document No. 82. In this draft the following items were listed: railroad rolling stock (deliveries beginning 1943), railroad installations, extension of other forms of transportation, road building machinery, locomotive and automobile factories (deliveries beginning 1943), equipment for port development, mining and metallurgical facilities, chemical plants, war materials and planes, synthetic rubber factories, telephone and telegraph installations, technically-equipped clinics, irrigation systems for cotton, sheep for breeding, etc. No. 209 4.63/22S&82 The Charge d?Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 482 of October 7 WASHINGTON, October 7, 1939 1 : 38 a. m. Received October 7 11 : 59 p. m. The press and radio here are giving wide circulation to Associated Press and United Press reports from Berlin stating that semi-official German spokesmen indicated the German Government's willingness to accept a truce proposal by Roosevelt and, if need be, even participate in a peace conference at Washington. In the event that Roosevelt should be prepared to mediate, the German Government would submit additional peace proposals. Without indicating any connection with these reports, Pittman, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that Roosevelt would not be disposed to undertake such mediation until the belligerent powers have shown a sincere desire for coming to an understanding. Roosevelt was not very likely to undertake anything at the present moment, since an unsuccessful intervention might possibly be interpreted so as to place upon him part of the responsibility for the continuation of the war. I would appreciate guidance for my conversations. THOMSBK OCTOBEE 1939 235 No. 210 173/869*75' The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST TiRGEisrT THE HAGUE, October 7, 1939 2 : 57 p. m. STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL Received October 7 4: 15 p. m. No. 332 of October 7 The Foreign Minister said to me today that British comment on the Führer's speech, both because of its careful formulation and because of the fact that Poland was not mentioned, seemed to him to be leaving the door open for a peaceful settlement. In his opinion it was now a question of easing the way for a possible shift in the position of the British Government by conditioning British public opinion. The large British newspapers were more intransigent than (group garbled) and it would be difficult to induce them to change their attitude. In his opinion the best way to alter public opinion in England would be to push the disarmament question quite prominently into the foreground, making detailed proposals as early as possible, and thereby dispel the strong British suspicions of the ultimate objectives of German policy. He could imagine that if an adroit person sent by Germany were to appear in London with disarmament proposals, such a step would make a great impression on public opinion in England and also facilitate a change of attitude on the part of the British Government in the Polish question, which he believed caused the greatest difficulty at present. He did not wish to make any proposal regarding the person to be entrusted with such a mission. He did not know of anyone in Holland suitable for it. Under present conditions it might perhaps be best to choose an Italian. At any rate he considered it of crucial importance that something be done as soon as possible along the line he had suggested in order to keep matters in flux and not let them first become solidified. ZECH 260090 54 236 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 211 10S/111680-&1 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Telegram IMMEOXCA'XE BERLIN, October 7, 1939 [9 : 25 p. m.] MOST URGENT No. 518 I am receiving reliable reports from Istanbul * to the effect that Kusso-Turkish negotiations apparently are leading to the signing of a mutual assistance pact. Hence I request you to call on M. Molotov immediately and to emphasize strongly once more 2 how much we would regret it if the Soviet Government were unable to dissuade Turkey from concluding a treaty with England and France and to induce her to adopt an unequivocal neutrality. In the event that the Soviet Government itself cannot avoid concluding a mutual assistance pact with Turkey, we would regard it as quite obvious that she would make a reservation in the pact whereby the pact would not obligate the Soviet Government to any kind of assistance aimed directly or indirectly against Germany. Indeed, Stalin himself promised this,3 Without such a reservation, the Soviet Government, as has been previously stressed, would commit an outright breach of the Non-Aggression Pact concluded with Germany, It would, moreover, not suffice to make this reservation only tacitly or confidentially. On the contrary, we must insist that it be formally stipulated in such a manner that the public will notice it. Otherwise a very undesirable impression would be created on the public, and such an act would be apt to shake the confidence of the German public in the effectiveness of the new German-Russian agreements. Please take this opportunity to inform yourself on the other details concerning the status of the Russo-Turkish negotiations and to find out what is to be agreed upon between the two Governments in regard to the question of the Straits,4 Report by wire. (FOREIGN MINISTER) * In telegram No. 362 sent to Ribbentrop personally on Oct. 4 by Albert Jenke, his brother-in-law, who was assigned to the Embassy (96/108039-40). Jenke reported on the basis of conversations he had with influential Turkish personages that Saracoglu was expected to bring back from Moscow a nonaggression pact. a Cf. document No. 116. 8 See document No. 81. 4 Unsigned note : "I communicated the contents of the foregoing instruction to Count Schulenburg this afternoon by telephone. The transmission was very good. Count Schulenburg said he had just come from Molotov, who had told him that he had not talked with the Turkish delegation since Sunday. Hence our warning certainly arrived in time. I replied that Count Schulenburg should nevertheless lose no time, as it was a matter of decisive importance, and the reports received here pointed to a rather advanced stage in the negotiations. Accordingly, Count Schulenburg is to call on Molotov again tomorrow morning." OCTOBER 1939 237 No. 212 The Ambassador m Japan to the Foreign Ministry Telegram URGENT TOKTO, October 7, 193910: 15 p. m. No. 558 of October 7 Received October 7 6 : 55 p. m. PoL VIII 1616. For the State Secretary. With reference to my telegram No, 550 of October 5.1 The following reasons contributed to the granting of Ambassador Oshima's repeatedly submitted requests to be allowed to resign. The increasing influence of the new pro-British Deputy Foreign Minister 2 (group garbled) has intensified the effort to remove supporters of the policy of German-Japanese alliance from key positions. This development has been accelerated by the revolt in the Foreign Ministry reported in the telegram cited above, which gave the Foreign Minister the further pretext, under the guise of "maintaining the authority of the Government," to undertake sweeping personnel changes. The Army could not maintain its previous opposition to Oshima's desire to resign, because its political influence has decreased considerably as a result of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact and the military reverse at Nomonhan, The publication which the Army was forced to make of the high casualties at Nomonhan (18,000) made a deep impression on the public. The Army is at present in the process of being removed from politics, in which connection all leading and politically active officers are being shifted to new assignments, as, for example, General Machijiri, who has been very active in working for the alliance. The recall of the Berlin Military Attache is likewise imminent (see telegram No. 559 of October 7 from the Military Attach^). 3 Finally, the General Staff expressed the opinion that Oshima, embittered by the events, would hardly be able to do any fruitful work between Tokyo and Berlin in reorienting friendly German-Japanese relations. This would remain the unaltered objective of the Army and could be carried out when the Foreign Minister's attempt at a settle- 1 Document No. 198. * Masayuki Tani. * Not found. 238 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY ment with America failed. The Army expects this all the more since the present revolt of about 300 officials in the Foreign Ministry must in the long run impair the Foreign Minister's power of action. Orr No. 213 409/214482 The Foreign Minister to the Legations in Estonia, Latvia, and Finland Telegram MOST URGENT BjRRLiN, October 7, 1939. (1) To Tallinn, No. 257 (2) To Riga, No, 328 (8) To Helsinki, No. 318 Exclusively for the Minister personally. Supplementing our telegrams No. 241 to (I), 1 No. 303 x to (2) and No. 305 to (3), 2 1 am communicating the following to you in strict secrecy and for your personal information only : During the Moscow negotiations with the Soviet Government the question of delimiting the spheres of interest of both countries in Eastern Europe was discussed in strict confidence, not only with reference to the area of the former Polish state, but also with reference to the countries of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland. At the same time the delimitation of the spheres of interest was agreed upon for the eventuality of a territorial and political reorganization in these areas. The borderline fixed for this purpose for the territory of the former Polish state is the line designated in article 1 of the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28 and publicly announced. Otherwise, the line is identical with the German-Lithuanian frontier. Thus it follows that Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland do not belong to the German sphere of interest in the sense indicated above. You are requested to refrain, as heretofore, from any explanations on this subject THE FOREIGN MINISTER 1 Document No. 184. Not printed (1569/379910). OCTOBER 1939 239 No, 214 121/119553-54 Memorandwm*. ~by an Official of the Political Department BERLIN, October 7, 1939. The author of the letter to the Führer, 1 Dr. Fritz Spieser, is one of the leading personalities of the so-called autonomist movement and the consciously Volksdeutsch elements in Alsace-Lorraine. His views seem to be backed by a numerically not very strong but still notable and, above all, very active portion of the Alsatians and the Alsatian youth movement. His address to the Führer ought to be given some weight because it represents the first initiative of this kind coming from the population of Alsace, which today holds French citizenship. As the address shows, however, Dr. Spieser, as do a number of other very prominent Alsatian autonomists, resides at present outside the borders of France, i. e., in Germany.2 As regards the substance of the address, it must be noted that to accept his proposals would be out of the question. After the Führer's exceedingly categorical statement on the problem of Alsace-Lorraine in his speech yesterday, 3 this problem cannot be opened up if there should still be any chance of putting an end to the present state of wax* between Germany and France before the outbreak of serious hostilities. It is impossible to tell today how the Alsace-Lorraine problem will appear if the war should develop into a life-and-death struggle between Germany and France. Herewith to the Director of the Political Department through the Deputy Director. V. RrNTTELEST * 1 Not printed (121/119557-64). The author of this letter, after presenting a long indictment of French rule in Alsace-Lorraine, requested Hitler's protection for "this hard-pressed ancient German border province." In case of a German victory, Alsace-Lorraine ought to be returned to Germany outright : even if France, under the impact of the German victories in the East, should decide to withdraw from the war, Germany at least ought to insist that a plebiscite be held on the question whether Alsace-Lorraine should remain under Prance or become independent, "perhaps in the shape of a Protectorate like Bohemia and Moravia or merely like Slovakia, e. g., strongly dependent on Germany economically. . . .*' 3 The letterhead indicates that the letter was sent from an address in East Prussia. 8 In his Reischstag speech of Oct. 6 (see Editor's Note, p. 227) , Hitler had made the statement that ever since France had returned the Saar Territory to Germany there had been no further German demands on France, nor would there be any in the future. "I have refused even to raise the issue of Alsace-Lorraine, not on account of any pressure brought to bear on me, but for the reason that this is not at aU a problem that could ever again interfere with Franco-German relations." 4 Marginal note : "Please postpone the matter. The Foreign Minister requests that it be submitted again in the event that full-scale hostilities with France are resumed in the near future." (W[eizsacker], [October] 12. 240 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 215 1793/403541-42 The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Finland Telegram BERLIN, October 7, 1939. No. 322 Sent October 81 : 00 a. m. zu Pol, VI 2250 * and 2251.2 For the Minister. With reference to your telegrams Nos. 270 2 and 271. I. For guidance in conversations: The Finnish Minister called on me today and in accordance with his instructions expressed apprehension regarding the impending Soviet Russian-Finnish negotiations, asking whether we knew the Russian demands on Finland, I replied that we had no information whatever about them. The meaning of the invitation to Moscow could probably only be that the Soviet Union had certain wishes vis-&-vis Finland. I did not believe, however, that there was any occasion for serious anxiety. The Minister said in conclusion that we should maintain our good will toward Finland, whereupon I wished him a happy outcome of the negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Finnish Minister also inquired, on instructions, about the significance of the fact that Finland was not mentioned in the Führer's speech. I replied that Finland was in very good company, since for example, Rumania, Bulgaria, Japan, Spain, and Luxembourg were not mentioned either. Therefore, no significance could be attributed to the fact that Finland was not mentioned. II. For your information : In view of the present situation we cannot possibly intervene in the impending Russian-Finnish arguments. 1 Pol. YI 2250 (telegram No. 271) : Not printed (1793/408538). In this telegram Bliicher reported that immediately after Hitler's speech of Oct. 6, Erkko had asked him why Finland had not been mentioned and whether Finland ha.d been discussed during Kibbentrop's visit to Moscow the previous week. 'Document No. 206. OCTOBER 1930 241 No. 216 91/100078-79 The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry Radio Telegram 1 SECRET DTJBLIX, October 8, 1939. Kb. 85 of October 7 Received October 8 12 : 50 p. m. The declaration of Irish, neutrality and, according to past observation, the careful, consistent adherence to it, have the support of the great majority of the Irish population, despite the undermining efforts of certain pro-English circles. It has visibly strengthened Irish national self-consciousness. It has also caused the Irish Republican Army,2 without basically changing its attitude, to recognize the danger of premature activity and to stand by inactive for the time being, although supposedly determined to intervene if the neutral attitude is abandoned. The IRA is said to be continuing acts of sabotage in England, but otherwise to be confining its cooperation exclusively to the Irish in America. The arrest of nearly 100 of its members in Ireland went off without incident. The Irish Army is supposedly ready to defend neutrality in all directions, in spite of the presence of pro-British elements. The feeling with reference to our pact with Russia, especially in view of the sympathy for Catholic Poland which has had a fate similar to Ireland's, is to a large extent anti-German but at the same time strongly anti-British ; certain pro-German trends exist particularly in the country, where the German radio is especially effective. The Irish press is strictly controlled, but the British press gets through. The Catholic Church is obeying the Government's appeal for a neutral stand. The personal attitude of the Government toward me is definitely friendly. The leading British statesmen and officials, probably Eden too, are said not to have any objections to Irish neutrality; other British groups with a certain amount of influence do object, however, so that the position of the Irish Government has become somewhat more difficult in London. Previous bad experience on the part of the British in British-Irish conflicts, as well as regard for America and the Dominions, may impede the consideration of possible steps against 1 The telegrams from the German Legation in Dublin during this period, besides being written in extremely condensed telegraphic style, contain many garbled words and groups. * The Irish Republican Army, a secret, semi-military organization having as its object the union of Northern Ireland with Eire and the separation of Ireland from the British Commonwealth. It had engaged in widespread terrorist activities both in Ireland and in Great Britain and in June 1939 the Government of Eire had declared the IRA an unlawful organization. 242 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY Ireland. However, there Is fear of British demands for Irish harbors and airports especially if the war situation should become more acute although there do not appear to be any concrete indications to that effect so far. The further danger of possible utilization of economic difficulties, especially as regards raw materials intended for important Irish industries (group garbled) negotiations with England are in progress on this score at the present time.3 John Maffey, who has just been named the first British diplomatic representative to Ireland, 4 was educated partly in Germany, is a former Under Secretary of State for the Colonies and Governor General of the Sudan, and the author of reports on the Ethiopian conflict that were favorable to Italy. The first impression is good ; thus there is hope of useful mediation, but on the other hand there is concern on the part of nationalist circles. The Government is hoping that he will be appointed Minister, which would signify the recognition sought by Ireland of her special position with reference to the Commonwealth. Irish neutrality is said to be watched very closely in the United States of America; conversely, a possible abandoning of American neutrality would constitute a threat to Irish neutrality. We should continue to support consolidation of Irish neutrality and independence on a broad national basis, which is also important in its effect on the Dominions, India, and America as symptom of the loosening of the ties of Empire. Consequently : 1. Any active interference in Irish internal conflicts, which could only do harm at the present time, should be avoided. 2. Submarines should avoid Irish territorial waters, or at least where this is avoidable [unavoidable?] the greatest caution should be exercised. 3. The greatest possible consideration should be accorded Ireland in the blockade even with reference to imports of raw materials from countries other than England, if necessary in return for the assurance that they will not be re-exported. I am reserving the details on this point. 4. The Irish question should be handled very carefully by the radio and the press; that is, in so far as possible, only facts should be given without direct exploitation for propaganda against England. It should be kept in mind that Ireland strictly rejects (2 groups garbled) belonging to the Empire and recognizes only a loose connection with, it in matters of foreign policy. I confirm reports 18SO, 1845, and 1868 5 of September 12, (group garbled) and September 25, which were sent via America. HEMPEL 3 Because of the garbled state of the text the meaning here is uncertain. 4 Sir John Maffey's title was "British Representative in Ireland." * These dispatches have not been found. OCTOBER 1939 43 No. 217 2931/566993-94 Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department October 8, 1939. zu Pol. VIII 1645.1 My view regarding the Chinese suggestion for German mediation in the Japanese-Chinese conflict is as follows : 1. The preliminary question is whether at the present time it is in the interest of Germany to bring about peace between China and Japan. As long as there was hope of getting Japan to conclude an alliance with Germany, the question could be answered in the affirmative without further ado. There was then an immediate possibility that, after the adjustment with the Soviet Union which we sought, Japan would turn resolutely against England. The present attitude of Japan does not indicate that this objective will be attained in the near future. As things stand today there is no very clear danger, to be sure, but nevertheless there is a possibility that in the course of a long German- British-French war Japan might also line up on the other side. From this viewpoint it would be to our interests for Japan to continue to tie up her forces in China. Naturally Japan will be further weakened by Chinese entanglements, so that her value as a possible ally will thereby be reduced. As long as Japan's attitude is as ambiguous as it is today, however, this consideration could scarcely be decisive. 2. If the mediation or the "good offices" of a third party come into question, then German action would be better for us than that of a third power, for example the United States. Such action should^ of course, never assume the aspect of an interference in Japanese policy. But this possibility is eliminated from the very start. 3. The essential question regarding mediation or any similar action is whether Japan is prepared to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek or not. Parallel with this is the question whether the Soviet Union will abandon Chiang Kai-shek or continue to support him. There are no indications either that Japan will come to terms with Chiang Kaishek or that the Soviet Union is abandoning him. Consequently, at the moment the only questions on which Japan could be sounded out would be : (a) Whether Japan is willing to come to an understanding with Chiang Kai-shek at all, and (b) Whether she would welcome our good offices. I believe that at the present time the answer from Tokyo would be in the negative, which would then bring the entire action to a standstill. In the present situation, such a step by Germany would only cause annoyance in Japan. I therefore believe that for the present we should refrain even from a cautious feeler on this point. Submitted herewith to the State Secretary.2 1 Pol. VIII 1645: Document No. 201. a Marginal note : "Director Political Department : It is my view also that we ought to let this matter rest. W[eizsacker], Oct. ID." 244 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 218 F2/O&L8 The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union SECRET Moscow, October 8, 1939. MR. AMBASSADOR : I liave the honor hereby to confirm x that in connection with the Secret Additional Protocol, 2 concluded on September 29 [SB], 1939, between the U. S. S. K. and Germany, concerning Lithuania, the following understanding exists between us: 1) The Lithuanian territory mentioned in the Protocol and marked on the map attached to the Protocol shall not be occupied in case forces of the Bed Army should be stationed [in Lithuania] ; 2) It shall be left to Germany to determine the date for the implementing of the agreement concerning the cession to Germany of the above-mentioned Lithuanian territory. Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the expression of my highest consideration. W. Moixxrow A See document No. 196. The letter printed here repeats verbatim, except for the customary formal differences, Schulenburg's letter of the same date to Molotov (F2/0317). a Document No. 159. No. 219 10S/111684: The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT Moscow, October 9, 1939 12 : 30 a. m. No. 493 of October 8 Received October 9 3 a. m. Witii reference to your telegram No. 518 of October 7.1 Molotov stated this evening at 9 p. m. that since October 1 no meeting had taken place 2 with the Turkish Foreign Minister and that the outcome of the negotiations cannot as yet be surmised. Molotov expressed the view that in all likelihood a mutual assistance pact with Turkey would not be concluded. But under all circumstances the interests of Germany and the special nature of German-Soviet relations would be taken into account. Molotov explained that the Soviet Government was pursuing the aim of inducing Turkey to adopt ftill neutrality and to close the Dardanelles, as well as to aid in maintaining peace in the Balkans. SOHOTJ&NBTJRG a Document No. 211. 'The words "taken place" were garbled in transmission. They are taken from the draft in the Moscow Embassy files C37Q/207803-Q4) . OCTOBER 1939 245 No. 220 8129/E582031-3S The Charge cPAffawev m the United States to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 491 of October 9 WASHINGTON, October 9, 1939 4: 35 a. m. Received October 10 6 : 30 a. m. Pol. IX 2106. Official circles here expect that in the event the arms embargo is repealed by Congress Germany will lodge a protest against this unneutral act committed after the outbreak of war. The probable American reply to such a protest is being anticipated in the inspired press as follows : 1. Under international law neutrals have the same right as belligerents to modify their laws during a war in order to adapt them to a new situation. 2. Repeal of the arms embargo was, as a matter of fact, introduced in Congress before the outbreak of war. The decision to repeal after the outbreak of war therefore constitutes a confirmatory act. 3. Germany herself set a precedent (note of April 4, 1915) * when she asked the United States 8 months after the outbreak of the World War to abandon its position and change its neutrality policy. What matters for the immediate appraisal of the situation is primarily the spirit in which the arms embargo is repealed. If the advocates of repeal were confronted with the clear-cut question whether the embargo would also be repealed if such a step were to benefit Germany, they would have to answer "no." The debates in Congress between isolationists and interventionists actually evade the real issue, since the interventionists, out of regard for public opinion, are still reluctant to admit openly that they let themselves be guided less by a concern for American interests than by a desire to assist England. Every American argument to validate the repeal of the embargo is weakened by the fact that prior to the time the threat of a war between Germany and England arose, the same Administration and the same Congressmen who are now fighting the embargo with all possible means, time and again gave unqualified praise to the existing law and the arms embargo in particular and described it in superlatives as the surest means for keeping America out of a European war. In August 1936 (Chautauqua speech) Eoosevelt pointed out, recalling the experiences of the World War, that the export of arms with all its possible consequences was delusive economically and a 1 The note is printed in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, Supplement: The World, War (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1928), pp. 157-158. 246 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY threat to America's peace politically. Hull and Pittman publicly stated only this year that any change in the neutrality law after the outbreak of war "would be against the rules of the game." The overwhelming majority in Congress considered that fixing American neutrality policy in peacetime was the surest means for averting America's involvement in a European war. These same statesmen and politicians now show no compunction about abandoning their former principles when it is a question of helping England. We are undoubtedly justified in regarding a repeal of the embargo as an unfriendly and unneutral act, because it contradicts traditional American policy in all points. In its reply 2 to the note referred to under [paragraph] 3, as also in the instruction to the American Embassy in Vienna,3 the American Government during the World War explicitly took the position that from the standpoint of international law it could not be asked or expected to change its neutrality policy after the outbreak of war. With respect to any steps that might be undertaken by us it should be borne in mind that, after the creation of additional production facilities and provision for American armament requirements, it will in actual practice take considerable time for a repeal of the arms embargo for the benefit of the Allies to take full effect; moreover, the wide circulation given by press and radio to the report cited above about the anticipated German protest is obviously calculated to prove the correctness of the American argument that the effect of the embargo would be to discriminate in favor of Germany, with her supposedly superior armament industry, against the Allies. THOMSEW * Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, Supplement: Tne World War, pp. 160-162. tf., pp. 794r-798. No. 221 4(95/233366 Memorand^Mn 1>y the State Secretary St.S No. 793 BERT-IN, October 9, 1939. The Finnish Minister had announced a visit today to the Foreign Minister. On the latter's instructions I received M. Wuorimaa this afternoon. He presented the following facts : By virtue of the developments in the Baltic States, Russia had now penetrated so far into the Baltic that the balance of power there had been upset, and predominance threatened to pass to Russia. Germany's desinteressement had attracted attention in Finland, since there was reason there to assume that Russia intended to make demands on Finland identical with those made on the Baltic States. OCTOBER 1939 247 The Finnish Government had requested of Wuorinaaa that he find out whether Germany remains indifferent to Russia's forward thrust in this direction and, should that prove not to be the case, to learn what~ stand Germany intends to take. The Minister added that, on her part, Finland had tried her best during the last few weeks to regulate her commercial relations with Germany and maintain them on a normal basis and to carry out the policy of neutrality desired also by Germany. I answered the Minister in the sense of the enclosed instructions to Helsinki.1 Wuorimaa asked me to call him if we had anything further to add. From the words of the Minister it could be inferred that the Finnish Government was rather disturbed over the Russian demands and would not submit to oppression as did Estonia and Latvia. As regards this attitude on the part of the Minister I merely said that I hoped and wished that Finland might settle matters with Russia in a peaceful manner. WEIZSACKER 1 Document No. 225. No. 222 888/242223 Memorandum l)y the State Secretary St.S. No. 794 BERLIN, October 9, 1939. The Italian Ambassador called on me this afternoon and inquired about the status of the peace action. I returned the question and asked to hear his opinion. Attolico stated the following : The reaction of the enemy countries up to now was not very favorable. One should not become impatient, however, but should let time have its effect. First, Chamberlain would have to make a public statement. This statement would probably not be purely negative. Then the moment would have arrived for further diplomatic efforts in order to prepare the ground more thoroughly. Attolico did not have any sort of instructions. He also told me clearly that Rome would not make a move so long as we did not express a wish to that effect, for Ciano had left here with the impression that an initiative by Rome was not desired here for the time being. Furthermore, it had been arranged here that the reaction of other countries to the Führer's speech would first be awaited, and not until then would Berlin and Rome confer once more. Thus Rome was waiting for us, but would surely be glad to act if we wished it. WEIZSACELER 248 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 225 1793/408557 Memorandum 6y the State Secretary St.S. No. T95 BERLIN, October 9, 1939. Pol. VI 2303. The Swedish Minister called on me today to tell me that a very serious situation would arise in the Baltic region if Eussia were to make demands on Finland which threatened the independence and autonomy of Finland. The Minister wished to inform me of the preceding with reference to the close relations between Sweden and Finland. It should not be forgotten that, in contrast to Estonia and Latvia, strong and vigorous forces were in power in Finland, who would not submit to Russian oppression. I replied to the Minister that nothing was known to me about the probable Russian demands on Finland. To my knowledge the word Finland had not been mentioned during the visit of the Eeich Foreign Minister to Moscow. The situation was that we had not put forth any claims to any interests east of the known line. I should suppose, however, that Russia would not set forth any too far-reaching requests regarding Finland and that, therefore, a peaceable solution could be found. WEIZSACKER Nuremberg document 062-C Exhibit GB-10S No. 224 Fuhrer's Directive CHEPSACHB BERUCN, October 9, 1939. TOP SECRET MILITART OKM AI Op. 283/39. The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacfot OKW No. 172/39 g. K Chefs. WFA/L By officer only DIRECTIVE No. 6 FOB THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 1. If it should become apparent in the near future that England, and, under England's leadership, also France, are not willing to make an end of the war, I am determined to act vigorously and aggressively without great delay. 2. If we wait much longer, not only will Belgium and perhaps also Dutch neutrality be lost, to the advantage of the Western Powers, OCTOBER 1930 249 but the military strength of our enemies will grow on an increasing scale, the neutrals* confidence in a final German victory will dwindle, and Italy will not be encouraged to join us as a military ally. 3. Therefore I give the following orders for further military operations : a. Preparations are to be made for an attacking operation on the northern wing of the Western Front through the areas of Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland. This attack must be carried out with as much strength and at as early a date as possible. b. The purpose of this attacking operation will be to defeat as strong a part of the French operational army as possible, as well as the allies fighting by its side, and at the same time to gain as large an area as possible in Holland, Belgium, and Northern France as a base for conducting a promising air and sea war 1 against England and as a protective zone for the vital Ruhr area. c. The timing of the attack depends on the readiness of tanks and motorized units for use this must be speeded up by every possible effort, also on the weather conditions then prevailing and the weather prospects ahead. 4. The Luftwaffe is to prevent the Anglo-French air force from attacking our own Army, and, if necessary, to give direct support to the Army's advance. In this connection, it will also be essential to prevent the establishment of the Anglo-French air force in Belgium and Holland, as well as British troop landings there.2 5. The Naval Command must concentrate for the duration of this attack entirely in giving direct and indirect support to the operations of the Army and Luftwaffe. 6. Apart from these preparations for starting the attack in the West according to plan. Army and Luftwaffe must be ready at any time and with increasing strength, to meet an Anglo-French invasion of Belgium as far forward on Belgian territory as possible, and to occupy as much of Holland as possible in the direction of the West Coast.3 7. The camouflage used for these preparations must be that they are merely precautionary measures in view of the threatening concentration of French and English forces on the Franco-Luxembourg and Franco-Belgian borders. 8. I request the Commanders in Chief to give me, as soon as possible, detailed reports of their plans on the basis of this directive and 1 Marginal note in Raeder's handwriting: "No" [NicJit]. 2 Marginal note in Fricke's handwriting: "It will also be up to the Luftwaffe to cut the supply lines of those English troops which have already landed. The employment of U-boats in the Channel will soon cease because of heavy losses." 'Marginal note in Fricke's handwriting: "This kind of procedure would be more desirable in every respect." 250 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY to keep me currently informed, via the OKW, of the state of the preparations. 4 ADOLF HITLER 4 Gen Keitel on Oct. 15, recorded that certain questions of OKH regarding plans for war in the West had been discussed with the Ftihrer. It had been decided that protection of the Ruhr through air defenses as far forward as possible in Netherlands territory was of importance for the conduct of the war as a whole and that this consideration should be taken into account by the Army in its planning. Such planning would be based on proposed occupation of Netherlands territory to the Grebbe-Maas line with additional areas as necessary (Nuremberg document 062-C, exhibit GB-106). No. 225 The State Secretary to the Legation in Finland Telegram No* 326 BERLIN, October 9, 1939. Sent October 10 12 : 00 noon, Pol. VI 2827. Witt reference to our telegram No. 322.1 The Finnish Minister, who will calj today at the Foreign Ministry, is to receive the following answer : Our relationship to the three Baltic States rests, as is known, on the nonaggression pacts ; our relationship to Denmark likewise. Norway and Sweden have declined nonaggression pacts with us, since they do not feel endangered by us and since they have hitherto not concluded any nonaggression pacts at all. Finland, to be sure, has such a pact with Russia, but declined our offer nevertheless. We regretted this circumstance, but were and are of the opinion that our traditionally good and friendly relations with Finland do not require any special political agreements. Given this absence of problems in German-Finnish relations it is very easy to understand why in his utterances of Octbber 6th concerned for the greater part with our neighbors the Führer did not mention Finland at all, just as he did not mention many other greater and smaller states. From this it only follows that between us there are no points of difference. In Moscow, where in the negotiations of the Reich Foreign Minister German-Russian relations were discussed in broad political outline and where a treaty of friendship came into being, the definitive line of demarcation was fixed, as you know. West of this line lie the German interests, east of it we have registered no interests. We are 1 Document No. 215. OCTOBER 1939 251 therefore not informed as to what requests Russia intends to make of Finland. We presume, however, that these requests will not be too far-reaching. For this reason alone a German stand on the question becomes unnecessary. But in view of the developments described earlier, we would hardly be in a position, in any case, to intervene in the Russo-Finnish conversations. WEIZSACKER No. 226 1793/408553 The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST tjBGENT HELSINKI, October 10, 1939 5 : 31 p. m. No. 284: of October 10 Received October 10 7 : 30 p. m. Pol. VI 2300. The excitement which has prevailed here for a week in connection with further developments in Finnish-Russian relations has greatly increased during the last few days. After Russia's action in the Baltic countries they are preparing for the worst. Mobilization is continuing on an increasing scale. Evacuation of hospitals and schools for military purposes has begun. The German school wi.ll be closed tomorrow and be used as quarters for the military. The public is in a state of panic ; many are leaving Helsinki and going to West Finland. The banks are having difficulty in coping with mass withdrawals. Partly as a result of encouragement through Anglo- French propaganda by word of mouth, the conviction has already become nearly universal that Germany has sold Finland to Russia. Anti-German sentiment is steadily increasing. The excitement (group garbled) [has] already led to hostile acts by individuals against Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche ; in numerous cases it has resulted in dismissals. Appeals for help are being pressed on me from all sides. Political and military leaders understand that we cannot give any armed assistance as in 1918 ; they only desire that we may not leave them entirely without support and counsel in Moscow. I request that the possibility be considered of granting this wish in one way or another, without departing from our basic policy. It is said that American and Swedish official demarches in Moscow in behalf of Finland are impending. Bl/CJCEOBR 260090 54 252 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 227 Minister in Finland to the Foreign* Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT HELSINKI, Get )-5 I 31 p. m. No. 285 of October 10 Received October 10 6 : 30 p. m. Pol. VI 2289. The Foreign Minister submitted to me a question formulated as follows : "Will Germany refrain from disturbing Sweden if Sweden should come to the aid of Finland militarily ? " Please send a telegraphic reply immediately. No. 228 8485/E59683S The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST TOGEOT HELSINKI, October 10, 1939 1 : 47 p. m, No. 286 of October 10 Received October 10 8 : 20 p. m. Pol. VI 2293. Any promise not to prevent Sweden from supporting Finland militarily should, in my personal opinion, be made only on the condition that Sweden guarantee the continuation of ore deliveries and refrain from, any measures giving the British and French access to the Baltic. BlAJCHJSB No. 229 6S5/242495 The Legation in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 271 of October 10 SOFIA, October 10, 19399 : 00 p. m. Received October 11 2 : 00 a. m. For the Air Ministry, Attach^ Group. I am telegraphing in advance the following important points from my two-hour conversation with the King : There is extreme concern over difficulties in connection with the transport through Yugoslavia of the promised war material, 1 and also over the possibility of obtaining supplies later. * On Sept. 9, Richthofen had telegraphed that transports of war material t(> Bulgaria had been "sabotaged" in transit through Yugoslavia OCTOBER 1939 253 The general political situation in the Balkans calls urgently for military strengthening of Bulgaria* In my opinion this is the only way the peace here can be maintained if the war should be prolonged. The King proposed that further transports and later deliveries of supplies be routed via Rumania, since interference is less likely to be expected there. The King is afraid that if it should be impossible to eliminate the difficulties very soon he would be compelled to obtain the most urgently needed war material from Russia, a step that the Bang would like to avoid on account of the danger of becoming exposed to political influences. SCHOENEBECK a RlCKTHOFEN* 1 Lt. Col. von Schoenebeck, German Air Attach^ in Bulgaria. No. 230 1793/408550 TJie Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST TTRGENT HELSINKI, October 10, 1939 9 : 30 p. m. No. 287 of October 10 Received October 10 12 midnight. Pol. VI 2291. All indications are that if Russia does not confine her demands to islands in the Gulf of Finland, Finland will offer armed resistance. The consequences for our war economy would be grave. Not only food and timber exports, but also indispensable copper and molybdenum exports from Finland to Germany would cease. For this reason I suggest you intercede with the Russian Government to the effect that it should not go beyond a demand for the islands. ?{ BLfTCHER No. 231 588/242225-26 The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST XJKGBNT ROME, October 10, 1939 11 : 50 p. m. No. 663 of October 10 Received October 115 : 45 a. m. The following is worth noting from today's conversation with Ciano : 254 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 1. Ciano asked once again that the negotiations on the South Tirol be brought to a conclusion as soon as possible. 1 For political reasons the Duce attached great importance to having a final agreement reached during my present stay in Rome and having the agreement signed before my departure. Ciano pointed out in this connection the impression which the prospective swift resettlement of Germans from Latvia made on public opinion in Italy. I rejected this comparison^ stressing the entirely different circumstances. I emphasized that a swift settlement of the South Tirol question depended mainly on the Italian authorities concerned abandoning their petty treatment of justified German wishes with regard to the implementation of the transaction. Ciano promised to exert his influence in this sense. 2. After conversations with Ambassador Giannini and the appropriate Ministers, I asked Ciano once more to do his utmost to ensure a maximum increase of Italian raw material deliveries to Germany and to have the Italian Government expedite in all possible ways the transit of foreign ship cargoes through Italy to Germany, without exaggerated legalistic considerations or exaggerated demands for foreign exchange from us. I pointed out what a bad impression it would mafce in authoritative quarters in Germany if just at the critical moment at the beginning of the war the Italian deliveries of raw materials should decrease or we received the impression that Italy was not doing everything that was in her power to facilitate transit. Ciano promised to make his political influence felt with regard to these points, too. Because of its particular importance for the German war economy, I have also simultaneously had the question brought directly to the attention of the Duce by other Ministers concerned in a more unofficial form, especially with regard to transit deliveries of copper, tin, nickel, rubber, and fats. 3. Moreover, I carried out with Ciano the Foreign Minister's instructions to request that Italy adopt a more energetic attitude vis-&-vis England with regard to ship searches and control points, drawing up of black lists, etc. I pointed out that it was not possible to carry through the above-mentioned transit deliveries without vigorous political defense against British encroachments. Furthermore, the attitude of other countries on the European continent not involved in the war would be decisively influenced by Italy's conduct. After all, the Italian Government itself had already suggested via Attolico that it assume somewhat the role of a leader in this fight against British 1 The teclmical and financial arrangements for implementing the German-Italian agreement of June 23, 1939, on South Tirol (see vol. vi, document No. 562) had run into difficulties ; on Oct. 4 conversations had been resumed in Rome on tliis subject, with Olodius charged with their conduct on the German side. See also document No, 275 and footnote. OCTOBER 1939 255 encroachments. Ciano answered that the Duce and he were willing in principle to stiffen the Italian stand against the British conduct of naval warfare and to exert their influence in the same direction on the neutral states. He only wished to await for a few more days the development of the political situation after the Führer's speech, and would then continue the discussion with me. He added that naturally one must avoid permitting Italy herself to be stamped as a neutral by virtue of joint action with the neutrals. As in the past, the Duce laid great emphasis on the fact that Italy was not a neutral power. He himself, Ciano, was fully convinced that sooner or later the moment would come for Italy herself to enter the war. I answered that in our deliberations about more vigorous steps by Italy against the British blockade we, too, naturally proceeded on the supposition that these would not take such a form as to underline Italy's neutrality, but on the contrary would give proof of Italy's resolve not to submit to the blockade, but to combat it with all possible political and economic means. 4. During the conversation Ciano mentioned the fact that England and France had tried at first to place large orders in Italy for war equipment, including guns, tanks, and more than 1,000 airplanes. Italy had naturally refused. CLODITTS MACKEKSE3S* No. 232 B18/B005090 The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland Telegram No. 328 BERLIN, October 10, 1939. Euro RAM 522, For the Minister. According to a report received here, [former] President Svinhufvud is said to be planning to come to Germany on his own initiative in order to win support for Finnish policy against Soviet Russia. Please take appropriate steps to prevent any trip by the President, pointing out that Germany is not concerned with Kusso-Finnish problems; Germany can only recommend a direct Kusso-Finnish understanding. BIBBEOTROP 256 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 233 B2iyB005138 The State Secretary to the Embassyin the United States Telegram No. 428 BERLIN, October 10, 1939. zu Pol. II 3950.1 With, reference to your telegram No. 482 of October 7.2 You are requested to maintain extreme reserve with respect to presa reports there about the possibility of an American mediation and, if necessary, to say that you have no instructions. The German press also will express no opinion on the matter. WEIZSACKER 1 Pol. II 3950 : Not found. * Document No. 209. No. 234 51/3898-900i Circular of the Foreign Ministry l October 10, 1939. W V 2766 II. With reference to our letter W V 2580 of October 4, 1939.2 In the course of the negotiations carried on with the Danish Government by the German Legation in Copenhagen according to instructions, an agreement concerning the treatment of Danish food ships sailing to England has been reached on the basis of the German proposals ; it is to go into force on Wednesday, October 11, at 6 : 00 a. m. The following can be said on the various points of the settlement reached : 1. Denmark has accepted our basic standpoint, which is that we are dealing with a de facto situation that can be abrogated at any time. We ourselves merely agreed that, subject to emergency measures which we might be forced to take because of action by the enemy, we would give the Danes sufficient notice before ending the present arrangement, but that we could not at this time bind ourselves to any definite period. 2. The Danes assured us that full agreement has been reached with England regarding the question of fodder imports to Denmark. The Danish-English negotiations now going on regarding this point are concerned only with questions of formulation relating to the period for giving notice. They say England has accepted the Danish standpoint according to which even now, during the Anglo-Danish ne- 1 Copies were sent to the principal military and economic offices concerned with economic warfare. * Not found. OCTOBER 1939 257 gotiations, England is releasing all goods destined for Denmark, in particular fodder. 3. At the. request of the Danes we agreed that the term "food" should include not only the usual staples but also certain luxury goods such as canned food, condensed milk, meat, and beer; on the other hand, Denmark agreed to see that only foods are shipped in one cargo. 4. The Danes promised to submit a general list of the ships which are available for transporting foods, and to inform us immediately of any change in this list; they also promised to mark the ships in a special way. The Danes have in the meantime informed us of the markings and the information has been passed on to the Naval High Command. Moreover, the Danes will inform the German Legation in time of the names, cargoes, and dates of departure. 5. At Danish request we abandoned our stipulation that the ships in question leave from only one port of departure. 6. It was agreed with regard to the three Danish food ships already brought to Hamburg that these ships will be released as a special German favor. The cargoes are to remain in Germany, however, and will be paid for by us via the German-Danish clearing account. In return the Danes gave the assurance that food acquired by Germany in this way will not be counted as part of the normal food exports from Denmark to Germany, so that the acquisition of these foods has the effect of an increase in our food imports from Denmark. By order: WDEHL No. 235 7433/E539982-88 Unsigned Note October 10, 1939. Subject: Conversation with B faron] d[e] HCopp].1 B[aron] d[e] R[opp] first took the position that the outbreak of war between England and Germany was inevitable because of the chauvinistic attitude of the English people. He was convinced that the result would be only the decline of the West, of the Aryan race, and the era of the bolshevization of Europe, including England. I thereupon asked him first just to let me express my purely personal opinion and then later to explain my mission. In my opinion, the question was an entirely different one, namely, whether the Aryan race would in future be represented by the two nations jointly or only by Germany. The German nation was determined to accept the fight forced upon it by England. B. d, R. was amazed to learn that all the hatred was directed against England. I told him that the German people were now convinced that, while invoking God, freedom, and otherwise prostituting ethical questions, 1 See document No. 203. 258 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY England thought only of money and that for this reason Germany had for decades not been able to find peace. In the German view, there was no question at all as to whether Germany or England would triumph, but simply of the time that would be needed to force the British Empire to its knees. They were of the opinion that the attempts to reach an understanding with England had finally come to an end after six years of interminable effort. Although I was now speaking with him at the direction of Christian,2 in order to make one more attempt to save the British Empire, I was convinced that this step on the part of Germany was completely unpopular. It was being taken only from the very broad perspective of the preservation of the strength of the Aryan race and the general significance of Europe. It was fortunate for the Aryan race and for Europe that we had the Führer, who was in a position and had the power to guide the will of the people in Germany. The question was only whether the British nation has already become too old to realize its duties. B. d. R. declared that the Germans were making a mistake if they considered the English nation superannuated. I told him that British policy was undeniably superannuated and that I, too, hoped and believed that the English nation would still prove to have vitality. But it had to give the answer to this now, for, if blood really started flowing, the die would finally have been cast. I sincerely desired the preservation of the British Empire because in the European area the German nation had such tasks to fulfill as the representative of the Aryan race, that I did not wish it to my children and grandchildren, to these generations, namely, to have to assume also the tasks of the English nation. His anxiety concerning the bolshevization of Europe was entirely unfounded. I was convinced that, just as Poland had fallen much more rapidly than I had expected, so the British Empire would also collapse very much more rapidly than the world considered possible today, because of our new weapons, with which England would very soon become acquainted. Germany, even after several years of war with England, was still strong enough to meet any danger she feared from the East. The Vistula-San line was actually predestined to create an even stronger eastern wall than our present West Wall ; from there it would be possible to advance offensively at any time. I believed, however, that we were so strong that we did not even need to go to the trouble of constructing an eastern wall. He must also not forget that, after the collapse of England, France would fall in line very quickly. She was today being only artificially goaded on by England to assume the tasks of her previous history, and for this she was much too tired already. * This refers apparently to Rosenberg. OCTOBER 1939 259 B.d.R. thought he perceived difficulties in Germany in the fact that the political swing in German policy toward Russia could not be made comprehensible to the German people. He still recalled how last year at Nuremberg Bolshevist Russia had been called the seat of infection that had to be eradicated. I told him that many of our foes are getting themselves worked up about this. That was probably because they could not understand that the German nation had through National Socialism obtained a new ideology and a new faith. A person who believed, in a way that was comparable only to belief in a religion, needed no explanation, but rested in this belief. He must also not forget that the Führer had not achieved power through the entire German people, but through a minority, though a fanatical one, which did not even comprise all party members. This minority had believed in the Führer and continued to follow and believe in him. Those of them who also reasoned it out clearly were convinced that we were no longer the nation of the so-called "Deutsche Michels? who pursued a goal just to give the opponent every opportunity to set traps for him on the way. It was first only a matter of finally breaking the power of the rootless forces which managed the democracies. He must also not forget that Stalin had now ousted the Jews from all posts. I know from our negotiators in Moscow that, to their amazement, they found only non- Jews still acting as negotiations partners while in previous years only Jews functioned as such. Also he must not forget tliat the German people had always had great sympathy for the Russian people and that Christian had therefore been bitterly assailed by many Germans outside the movement as the exponent of the irreconcilable attitude toward Soviet Russia. It was also incomprehensible to me why the British believed they could conquer us by economic means. In order not to create unnecessary tension since I spoke very strongly I emphasized the fact that I was a citizen of Hamburg and therefore believed that I knew England well also through my trips abroad. I had always known the Englishman to be a careful calculator, but now I was always reading that the world with its raw materials was open to England and France and also that Germany had no gold. Well, what was the actual situation? ! In 1914, Germany's industrial capacity was a third less than that of England and France combined. Today she was stronger than the two countries and even without Poland and Moravia in the ratio of 33 to 37. Germany did not lack even 20 percent of her supplies. It was also to be taken into account that as of Sepember 1 of this year the tremendous peacetime projects, construction, etc., were stopped and that the raw materials needed for them from abroad therefore no longer needed to be imported. All deliveries to countries overseas, moreover, were stopping. Germany could therefore 260 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY concentrate on the countries of Europe that were important to her and within easy reach in making deliveries in payment of raw materials. Also, Germany's great anxiety about the shortage of labor was relieved for the same reasons. Surprisingly small forces were needed for the Army. It had to be remembered that in 1914 we had had over 3400 kilometers of front, while today we had in the West only 250 kilometers, which, moreover, were so strongly fortified that they required a correspondingly smaller number of troops. As a result, ev&a on September 1, when the armies still had to be employed in Poland, no mobilization had been necessary. He would be able to convince himself in Germany itself that the best age classes, between 25 and 35, were still entirely civilians in the Reserve. In the matter of raw materials we were also in a position to start exporting on a large scale because we had what was worth much more than gold the raw materials from which the most important raw materials could be derived, whether it was gasoline, rubber, or other things. I mentioned coal and our gain through Poland, lumber in connection with Poland, Finland, and Russia, potatoes as feed. We were therefore not only in a position to feed our people adequately for years to come, but would also be able to supply the neutral countries with the raw materials vital to them, and thereby create a bloc in Europe that would be able to supply itself adequately. The industrial capacity of Germany was also very great and the requirements of the Army, because of the small front, were by no means comparable to those of the World War, so that as a result, Germany was already in a position now to concentrate her entire industry on exports. It was therefore not surprising that now, since the 1st of September of this year, instead of offering delivery terms up to two years as heretofore, we could, to the amazement of the neutrals, make immediate deliveries. Moreover, all the conditions now exist that will make it possible to develop the Four Year Plan at an entirely different tempo, since the stoppage of the peace-time construction projects. What, on the other hand, is England's situation? England had to import nearly 70 percent. The pound was not backed by gold. B. d. R. shared my view on this entirely. Credits, as in the World War, were also entirely unlikely. England, like Germany, therefore, had to pay for her imports in counter-deliveries. But the trouble here was the lack of self-sufficiency and the small industrial capacity of England. I therefore failed to understand how the sensible Englishman could think that the blockade of Germany would be successful, instead of merely considering whether or not the blockade of Germany with its new weapons would enable England economically to wage war any longer. OCTOBER 1939 261 It must therefore become clearer and clearer to the sensible Englishman that in view of all the difficulties already existing in the way of the preservation of the British Empire, he was committing suicide if he risked his whole Empire for the sake of Poland. The distribution of forces was also so unequal that even for the average Englishman it must now become clear that this was, indeed, not an English policy at all, but the policy of the rootless elements which alone could profit by a war even if the Empire fell in the process. Poland surely must be a serious warning. B. d. R. thereupon stated that he could now say frankly that in England it had only been expected that Poland would resist for three weeks. I then stated that the policy of England had thereby become even more incomprehensible to me. I would like to wish that, for the sake of the strength of the Aryan race, the English nation at the very last moment would come to its senses. It had to realize, however, that it was in Germany's power to decide whether the British Empire was to be preserved or not and that with the exception of Christian and the F. she considered it a settled fact that the end of the British Empire had now come. On the streets of Berlin people were, indeed, saying that China was falling to Japan, British India to Russia, Africa to Germany, etc. The only hope, therefore, was Christian, who from very broad perspectives was advocating the preservation of the Empire. B. d. It. stated that he realized this fully and continued, saying that he expected nothing of Ribbentrop, whose name I had never mentioned. Meanwhile the telegram had arrived from Fred in London saying that he considered a talk with leading Germans premature at present. Although I had stated at the first conversation that if the die had now been cast, the last word had been spoken, I stated that I naturally did not wish to assert that it would never again be possible. B. d. R. therefore gave me the following statement which I should like to present to Christian : The British Air Ministry was of the same view as we had discussed it. It by no means wished to be a party to the present policy of England of waging the war to the finish. There were too many British Empire experts in the Ministry not to know the dangers to the Empire itself. It [the Ministry] was not yet strong enough today, however, to assert itself. There was no practical value in convincing Chamberlain alone, since he was dependent upon the exponents who today wished a war to the finish. But the Air Ministry believed that it would constantly gain in political power at home. It was convinced that the war would be decided by the Luftwaffe. It therefore depended on the Air Ministry to explain to the British Government that, in view of the losses it had sustained, it no* longer 262 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY found itself in a position of being able to continue the war. But it was necessary first to await the first clash and the resulting losses. He hoped that in the interest of the Aryan race, Germany's Luftwaffe would be so victorious as to create this basis. It was horrible to think that on both sides it was just the most valuable forces that would be lost in the process. He thought, however, that it would be desirable, if the war began now, to review the contact in four to six weeks. He also asked that contact continue to be maintained. He wished to remain in Switzerland for the following reason : Mr. Daniels, the former Times correspondent, whom Christian knew, had, since September 1 of this year, assumed the post of Press Attache at the British Legation in Bern, in order in this way to participate again in politics. Daniels was of the same opinion as we, even if he could not say so officially. He was, therefore, also of the opinion that the war was madness for England and had to be ended in shortest order. Daniels had excellent connections with the Foreign Office and was now, as Press Attache, also constantly posted as to present developments. It was arranged that if B. d. R. considered a new discussion of the situation expedient, he should write to the previously used address about "excursions" ["Aus-ftuff&nP']. If Fred wired him, however, that the Air Ministry now felt strong enough to be justified in hoping that it would prevail and the conditions were therefore created for his going to Berlin, he would write about "snow." As far as he personally was concerned, he was prepared to go to Berlin at once. But he took the position that he could come only if he had prospects of success in London. He also advised that German propaganda should hit England in her weakest spot. It was, indeed, not so much the question of inconsistency in England's proclaiming that she wished to raise Poland up again without declaring war on Russia. The English nation could be persuaded that Russia Tiad taken only non-Polish territory. England, however, now declared as her war aim the destruction of the regime in Germany. If England attained this goal, however, it would be necessary to ask the Englishman whether, then, it was Kaiser Wilhelm II or Bruning who would return? This thought was totally absurd. The successor could only be Bolshevism. If Germany became Bolshevist, however, so would, in short order, Europe and the whole of England. Therefore even if the war aim were completely achieved at tremendous sacrifice on the part of England, she would only accomplish her own downfall. I took cognizance of this without mentioning that probably out of consideration, for Russia we could not employ such propaganda at all. In conclusion, B. d. R. told me the following : You may be right, indeed, in saying that this war of the rootless OCTOBER 1939 263 elements against Germany is in reality not at all a war between English and German interests. I too believe now that the question is still only whether or not the British Empire can be preserved in the interest of the Aryan race. No. 236 229O/48338S The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry Telegram TOP SECBET ROME, October 10, 1939. No. 664 Sent October 11 12 : 20 a. m. Also for the High OcKoanmnd of the Wehrmacht. Today I had a look into the secret survey of Italy's reserves of liquid fuels5 which is accessible only to the Ministers concerned and the military chiefs. The total stocks including residues amounted to 930,000 metric tons on October 8. Of this 25,000 tons is aviation gasoline, 119,000 tons is automobile gasoline, and 260,000 tons is heavy oil for Diesel engines. The Navy is not included in the figures ; it has its own stocks, and according to trustworthy assurances by a member of the Government has sufficient supplies for a year. However, the supply of the Army from the above-mentioned stocks is assured for a month at the most, in the opinion of experts. CLODIUS No. 237 84/24105>-06 The Embassy in the Soviet Union, to tJie Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 09 of October 11 Moscow, October 11, 1939 5 : 31 p. m. Received October 11 11 : 10 p. m. The following is a comprehensive report on the negotiations so far and on the current situation : * x ln telegram No. 498 of Oct. 4 (1369/357067-68), Ribbentrop instructed Schulenburg to inform Molotov of Ms decision to send Ambassador Ritter to be present with Schnurre at the opening of the economic negotiations. Schulenburg was also instructed to notify Molotov of the German desire for prompt agreement on an immediate program to last about 6 months. An economic delegation headed by Hitter and Schnurre arrived in Moscow on Oct. 7. A list of Oct. 17 showed it to include 37 members, representing the Foreign Ministry, the Ministries of Transport, Food, and Economics, the Reichsbahn, the Chief of Transportation for the Wehrmacht, the Hamburg America Line, the Reichsgruppe Industrie, I. G. Farben, the Benzolverband, the Otto Wolff firm, the Reich Grain Office, the Deutsche Werft at Hamburg, the Ruhrchemie, the Gutehoffnung iron works, the Stahlunion-Export, the Flachshandel, the Theodor Thorer firm, and the Wotirag Company (1369/357054). 264 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 1. We submitted our proposals in general form and with, more em* Shasis on the political aspect to Molotov Sunday night, and in all etail to Mikoyan, on Monday night. Mikoyan gave us a tentative and partial reply Tuesday night. 2 The over-all impression left by this initial response is that the other side is willing on the whole to make a serious effort to meet our proposals, but their attitude with respect to the total volume is not yet satisfactory. 2. As regards the listed metals and the rubber, the other side is prepared to buy the specified quantities for us abroad. Preliminary instructions concerning the purchases and the chartering of the required cargo space in Japanese, American, and Dutch vessels have already gone out. The other side is to be told that purchases from America should be shipped via Murmansk. They believe that some caution must be exercised here. The payment for the purchases abroad, however, will necessitate sharp discussions* 3. As regards the purchases of raw materials and foods in Russia proper, during the first phase of the agreement the other side wants to maintain the level of maximum Russian deliveries in the past, but has intimated that the question of larger deliveries in a subsequent phase is open. The other side explains this on the grounds that they want to avoid promises they are not absolutely sure at present they will be able to keep. We havelndicated that the past maximum is insufficient and have reserved the right to maintain our proposals in further discussions of separate points. 4:. As regards particular points, the tentative reply shows that we can probably count on approximate fulfillment of our demands for feed grains. With respect to the delivery of Russian ores, the other side wants to study their own requirements before making any statement regarding our proposals. Platinum will be delivered in the full quantity requested. No statement has yet been made regarding our proposals for German compensatory deliveries. There seems to be interest in the hydrogenation plant. 5. Concerning transit shipments from Iran, Afghanistan, and the Far East, all necessary instructions have already been issued to the competent local Russian agencies that the quantities specified by us must be forwarded without delay. The other side has again stressed that this transit is being permitted only as an exception and only to Germany. Therefore please bring this to the attention of the interested German firms once more and [have them] desist from further circular letters regarding transit. Our first inquiries indicate that the shipment of soybeans on the trans-Siberian railroad will cause no particular difficulties.8 3 Detailed memoranda of these conversations have not been found. "According to a memorandum of Oct. 31, the German delegation in Moscow sought at first to arrange for a margarine factory in Manchuria in order to reduce freight charges by shipping only the finished product, but gave up this project when it appeared that satisfactory freight rates on soybeans could be obtained (1369/357015-16). In an exchange of letters between Schnurre and Mikoyan on Oct. 30 and Nov. 1, 1939 (1369/356980-81), the Soviet Government agreed to grant until Dec. 1, 1940, a 50 percent reduction in freight rates on all soybean shipments from the Far East. OCTOBER 1939 265 6. The connecting railroad Rumania Cernau^i Rumdnien Czernowitz] will not be converted to a different gauge for the time being. 4 7. The experts who have arrived here have been put in touch with the competent Russian authorities for commercial negotiations. 8. A separate telegraphic report concerning several secret points will follow.6 RlTTBR SCHULBNBURG 4 On Oct. 3, Clodius had noted the following : "The Foreign Minister requests that care be taken in the negotiations at Moscow to insure that the tracks of the railway line to Rumania via Lw6w are not changed over to the Russian gauge." (1369/357058) * Not found. No. 238 73/52085-86 The Minister in Hwigary to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 421 of October 11 BUDAPEST, October 11, 1939 6 : 25 p. m. Keceived October 11 11 : 10 p. m. The Foreign Minister told me confidentially that the inner Cabinet Council, composed of the Regent, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of War, the Minister of the Interior, and the Chief of the General Staff, had decided to fortify the Hungarian frontier against Russia and Rumania by three lines [of fortifications], the third to run along the Tisza River. For political reasons the fortifications were to be built as covertly as possible and they were a defensive measure against the Russians. The frontier with Rumania was to be fortified in order to conceal the true purpose and also [to guard] against the eventuality that the Russians might overrun Rumania and then attack Hungary from the East. At this session of the Cabinet Council the Regent had gravely emphasized that Hungary had the greatest interest in an early German victory, which would avert chaos. The Foreign Minister asked me to point out to the Reich Foreign Minister that he had kept the promise given to him to bring about a detente in Hungarian-Rumanian relations.1 The Hungarian Minister to Berlin being ill, Csdky repeats herewith once more the request of the Chief of the General Staff 2 regarding the release of German arms shipments to Hungary. 1 See document No. 30. * General Henrik Werth. 266 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY The Foreign Minister further requests that the Polish soldiers and civilians interned here, at least the women and children, be taken over as soon as possible, in so far as their homes are in the German sphere of interest. Such removal of propagandists injurious to us is also in our interest (cf. dispatch No. 1404 of October 7) . 3 The Hungarian Minister to Moscow would present the same request with reference to Poles from the Russian sphere of interest. The Foreign Minister added that the Hungarian Minister in Moscow would shortly propose the conclusion of a good-neighbor agreement between the Soviet Union and Hungary for the purpose of regulating border traffic and similar questions. So far the Soviet Union had not requested the agrement for the Minister to Budapest ERDMANNSDOBFF 8 Not found. No. 239 406/214504 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST UKGENT Moscow, October 11, 1939 6 : 43 p. m. TOP SECRET Keceived October 11 11 : 20 p. m. No. 510 of October 11 For the Foreign Minister personally. Potemkin told me today that he was instructed to express to me the astonishment of Stalin and Molotov at the fact that we were evidently promoting a panicky emigration of the Germans from Latvia and Estonia. Such a "flight" by the Germans would of necessity seriously compromise the action of the Soviet Government. There was no occasion for precipitating the matter, since the Germans were threatened neither economically nor in any other way. Potemkin asked me to communicate this to my Government at once.1 SCHUUENBUKG 'In a further telegram of Oct. 13, Sehulenburg reported: "Potemkin has just approached me again with the urgent instruction to tell me that the concern of the Soviet Government because of the evacuation of the Germans from Latvia and Estonia is becoming ever greater ; in the harbor of Riga there are at least ten German ships, German schools are being closed, German physicians are leaving in droves, etc. Potemkin reminded me of his demarche of the day before yesterday, and requested me to learn the attitude of the Reich Government." (406/214509) OCTOBER 1939 267 No. 240 1850/422691-92 The State Secretary to the Legation in Finland Telegram TJBGENT BEKLTN-, October 11, 1939. Sent October 12 6 : 15 a. m. No. 330 zu Pol. VI 2322.1 For the Minister personally. With reference to your telegrams 284, 285, 286, 287.2 1. We have no indications that the Soviet Union will make demands on Finland that would necessarily result in military complications. We are therefore of the opinion that it is first necessary to wait and see what demands Moscow will make. The suggestion made in Helsinki that we bring influence to bear on the Russian Government to keep it from going beyond a demand on Finland for islands, cannot, therefore be followed. 2. We request that you avoid, as in the past, any commitments such as would be involved in a reply to the question put by the Finnish Foreign Minister regarding our attitude toward Sweden. You are therefore requested not to return to the matter of your own accord ; if the Foreign Minister should speak to you about the matter again, please confine yourself to pointing out that we do not consider that any basis for such a question exists. 3. For your information : As you know, our obligations under the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union preclude any kind of support of a third power in the event that the Soviet Union should become the object of military action on the part of this power. If we should now make a declaration such as desired with respect to Sweden it would amount to a stiffening of Finnish and Swedish resistance against the Soviet Union, which would disturb German- Soviet relations. "W EJIZSACKER 1 Pol. VI 2322: 8485/596831. 'Documents Nos. 226, 227, 228, and 2&0. 260090 54 23 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 241 B18/B003097 Memorandum* ly an Official of the Foreign Minister^ Secretariat , October 11, 1939. The Foreign Minister has agreed to the evacuation of Reichsdeutche and Volksdeutsche from Finland, in so far as they themselves wish it. 1 Respectfully submitted to the State Secretary. SCHMIDT *A telephone message from the Legation in Finland at 4:30 p. m., Oct. 11, summarized in a memorandum of that date by Hiigel of Political Division VI (B18/B003092-93), stated that the situation in Finland had suddenly hecome much more tense. Evacuation of Swedish nationals had begun ; the Finnish Government intended to leave Helsinki ; and there was danger of attack upon Oerman nationals by Finnish Communists. Bliicher therefore requested instructions as to possible evacuation of Germans from Finland should this be necessary. No. 242 463/225930-ai Memorandum, of the Foreign Ministry'1 1. On October 3 the Spanish Ambassador expressed the willingness of the Spanish Government to offer its good offices as mediator.2 The Spanish Foreign Minister announced to our Ambassador on October 10 that the Spanish Government is completely and entirely at our disposal in respect to the peace question. 3 2. The Italian Ambassador stated again on October 9 that Eome would certainly be glad to act if we so desired.* 3. The Dutch Minister in Ankara told Herr von Papen as early as October 1 that his Government was prepared to mediate in case an official request to that effect was put forward. In that event the Queen of the Netherlands would act jointly with the King of tha Belgians. 5 1 At the top of this unsigned and undated document Siegfried added, in handwriting, the title "Offers of mediation by neutrals, as of October 11, 1939." la the margin WeizsUcker wrote "Attolico" opposite paragraph (2), "Zech" opposite "our Minister" in (3), and "Andresen" opposite (4) . * See document No. 186. 'Not printed (463/225919). 4 See document No. 222. Papen telegraphed on Oct. 1 (463/22578T) that the Netherlands Minister, Dr. Philips C. Visser, had asked him to inform Ribbentrop "that it was psychologically of the greatest importance to make a peace offer through a third party, but that the Führer ought to avoid for the time being a declaration, having the character of finality, in the Reichsta*." Later on the same day Papen sent another telegram (463/225788) saying that Visser had just visited him again to announce that he had now received more detailed instructions: "His Govern OCTOBER 1939 269 On October 7 the Dutch Foreign Minister suggested to our Minister B that a skillful person be sent as mediator (preferably an Italian) ; it is of decisive importance, he believes, that something in this direction be done as quickly as possible. The Dutch Foreign Minister told Professor Bruns at about the same time that the Netherlands Government would at any time be glad to render services in initiation of negotiations. 7 4. According to confidential information from Oslo on October 6 the King of Norway would be interested in having his good offices employed as mediator.8 5. The former President of Finland, Svinhufvud, has told our Minister in Helsinki that he is working for a peace appeal by the Northern states, and that he believes the King of Sweden would be most suited to head such an effort.9 According to the report from Oslo referred to under [paragraph] 4, such a disposition to act as mediator apparently exists in Sweden, too. 6. It appears that still more feelers are being put out by way of Sweden, the details of which are not known to the Foreign Ministry. ment was willing to mediate in case an official wish was expressed. In this circumstance the Queen would act in conjunction with the King: of the Belgians. The Minister added that he would certainly not have received this instruction if his Government had not first made soundings to see if England were prepared to negotiate/' In a telegram of Oct. 3 (463/225827), Papen reported another conversation with Visser on the same subject. Visser said he had had comprehensive talks with the British Ambassador concerning the Dutch peace demarche. Knatchbull-Hugessen had told him "that, since British public opinion would regard any peace offers publicly proposed by us [the Germans] as a capitulation and would reject them, only a confidential diplomatic demarche by way of a third power could lead to success. For tactical reasons the first offer should be put in general terms without details, so that concessions which Germany was. prepared to make could be used psychologically for the influencing of public opinion." The British Ambassador said that he was in touch with London on these questions. e Document No. 210. T Viktor Bruns, director of the Institute of Public Law of Foreign Countries and International Law in the University of Berlin. No report of this conversation has been found. 8 In a letter of Oct. 6 to Weizsacker, Joh. H. Andresen, former leader of the Conservative party in Norway, asked whether Germany would be interested in a peace effort by Norway and Sweden, either from "the highest quarters" or more privately (2165/470553-55). Weizsacker replied on Oct. 12 that the possibility of making use of the good offices of third parties was being given "due consideration" by Berlin (2165/470556-57). Further details concerning efforts by Andresen and other influential Norwegians to make an effective peace move at this time are given in reports which Ulrich Noack, a German historian attached to the Legation in Oslo, sent to the Cultural Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry (2973/579502-05, 579508-11). Noack has published extracts from these reports and other material as well in his book, Nonoeffen gwtechen Friedensvermittlung und Fremdhvrr&ehaft (Krefeld, 1952). 1 * No report on this conversation has been found. 270 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 7. It is said that the TJ. S. citizen, Davis, in connection with the Four Year Plan, is striving for the United States to act as mediator.10 10 William Rhodes Davis, a businessman with long experience of dealing with German government agencies regarding the sale of Mexican oil, had a meeting with President Roosevelt on Sept. 15. He informed the President that he had received word from an associate with access to Goring that the latter heped Roosevelt would use his influence to see if a mediated peace might be achieved. Davis had been asked to come to Rome for talks with high German officials and he proposed to- do so. Roosevelt replied that he would be interested to hear what information Davis might bring back, but that he could take no position unless a proposal for mediation came through official channels. According to Davis's own account, he saw Goring in Germany on Oct. 1, 2, and 3. He then returned to the United States and wrote two lengthy reports, dated Oct. 11 and 12, to President Roosevelt. His request to be received at the White House was denied but he was received on Oct. 12 by Assistant Secretary of State A. A. Berle, and Pierrepont MofEat, a high official of the Department of State. In his report to the President, Davis said he had been informed that his talks with GSring would be kept secret from the Foreign Ministry, but that Hitler and Rosenberg knew of them (Department of State, File No. 800.20211 Davis, William Rhodes). No records of the GSring-Davis conversations have been found in the archives of the Foreign Ministry. No. 243 3S2/202T88-91 The Ambassador in Belgium to the Foreign Mvrdstry A 1420 BRUSSELS, October 11, 1939. Pol. II 4039. Subject : The political situation and mood in Belgium. With, reference to our telegrams Nos. 253 of October 5 and 270 of October 8.1 The shifting of the main weight of the Belgian home defense to the northern and eastern frontiers of the country, on which a number of reports have already been made, inevitably brings up the question whether a change in the political attitude of the Belgian Government has set in. After a careful examination of the situation, I believe that I can without reservation answer this question in the negative. From the current reports of the Embassy, it is well known that the Belgian Government, from its own conviction of the necessity and expediency of maintaining peace for the country and strengthened by the wish of the King, has adhered to the straight line of the neutrality policy since the outbreak of the war. Although from the German point of view the attitude of public opinion and the sentiment of the people have been quite unsatisfactory, and although there have occasionally been deviations by individuals such as the telegram of Max, the Mayor of Brussels, to the Mayor of Paris or the volunteering of the 76-year-old Socialist Deputy, Hubin, for service in the French Army there has never been any reason seriously to doubt the sLa- 1 Neither printed (141/127296 and 141/127300-O1). OCTOBER 1939 271 cerity of the Government policy and the people's love of peace. Nor has there so far been any change in this respect. The statement by Pierlot 2 to the Belgian journalists, which I am enclosing herewith, confirms this. Although the part that deals with foreign policy is only a paraphrasing of well-known arguments, it is, as all previous statements, completely directed toward the continuation of the neutrality policy. All other official and semi-official statements are along the same line. But all reports from other sources as well corroborate the view that it is the desire of the Government to keep otit of the conflict and maintain neutrality even in the face of great economic sacrifices. The shifting of the Belgian troops cannot, therefore, be regarded as an indication of a change in the political attitude of Belgium. It does, of course, signify a change in the appraisal of the general political situation by the Belgian Government. In the opinion of Government circles here the conclusion of the Polish campaign represents a break in the course of the war that is important also for the attitude of the belligerents toward the neutral region of the Low Countries. At the outbreak of the war it was thought here that the French and British Armies might still march through Belgium and possibly Holland, since France and England would have to try to bring effective help to their Polish ally, and in order to do so would, in view of the impregnability of the Siegfried position, have to consider the roundabout way via Belgium and Holland. This danger was, however, never taken very seriously here, since it did not seem credible that France, in view of her moral standing and political wisdom, would break her solemn promise. Since Poland has been defeated and there is no longer any Polish Army, it is believed that also France and England no longer have any reason for an offensive operation, especially since they believe they can win the war with the blockade. On the other hand, however, Germany's interest in the possession of Belgium and Holland is said to have increased enormously, since such possession would furnish a base for fighting England and make it possible to outflank the Maginot Line. This view is also reinforced by the conviction, spread in Belgium under the influence of British propaganda, that Germany will not be able to withstand the blockade very long and will have to try to break it by a powerful offensive tlirust against the Western Powers. Finally, the prevalent distrust of Germany in Belgian public opinion is also an important factor. The memories of the last war have not yet been forgotten here. Tinder the influence of all these factors the view has developed here during 1 Hubert Pierlot, Premier of Belgium. In Pierlot's statement to the press on Oct. 7, he expressed the belief that Belgium could remain neutral, but was taking every precaution by foreseeing the worst. See the New York Times, Oct. 8, 1939, p. 38. 272 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY the last fortnight that Belgium is much more seriously threatened on the north and east than on the south. In the public opinion of the country this changed appraisal of the situation has so far found only a weak and infrequent expression. All official statements, too, scrupulously avoid showing any partiality or even expressing the idea that a threat to Belgium is seen as coming only from the German side. Actually, the fear of Germany is very widespread, however, and extensive circles believe that the events of 1914 might be repeated. The two ways in which Belgian neutrality might be violated by England and France or by Germany would find the Belgian people in very different moods and states of psychological preparedness for war. An attack by the Anglo-French side, which no one here expects any more, would be regarded by the people as a very deplorable and tragic event. An attempt would probably be made to resist such an incursion with military force, but presumably it would be very feeble and inadequate, while an invasion by Germany would encounter the highest degree of psychological preparedness for defense on the part of the whole Belgian people both Walloons and Flemings. The few friends whom we have here in this country, especially among the Flemish nationalists, would in such a case break with us in indignant disillusionment and join ranks with all the others. Hence, as uncertain and hesitant as a Belgian military front against France and England would be with respect to sentiment and morale, so united would it be vis-k-vis Germany. The violation of a most solemn assurance given at the beginning of the war that the neutrality of Belgium would be respected would cause a passionate hatred to break out and make the entire nation march unitedly against the old enemy of the .World War. VOX Bt7lX3W-SCHWrANTB No. 244 58&/24222,7}-29 The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT BOMB, October 12, 1939 12 : 50 a. m. TOP SECRET Received October 12 10 : 50 a. m. No. 675 of October 11 Count Ciano asked me to call on him this evening in order to inform me by instruction of the Duce, as he repeatedly emphasized of an incident which, though not the only one of its kind, was the worst, and was characterized as such by the Duce when he saw the police report submitted to him; it cast a glaring light on the overheated OCTOBER 1939 273 atmosphere in the Alto Adige. According to this report unknown Germans, who had escaped in the darkness, attacked two unarmed Italian soldiers yesterday evening and beat one of them half to death, while the second, less seriously wounded, had been able to get away. If one also considered the many cases in which volksdeutsch soldiers on active service had secretly left their troop units an offense punishable by death in the present state of mobilization, but which the Government had been very lenient about the whole picture of the situation appeared so threatening that the Duce was requesting the Führer to give orders as quickly as possible that all of the controversial questions be swept aside and the negotiations here on the emigration be brought to a close, in order to end a state of affairs in which the Volksdeutsche considered themselves as no longer subject to the Italian laws and not yet under those of Germany, and thus committed excesses which became more dangerous by the day especially since the rumor was being spread among the population that the political situation might change any day to such an extent that the whole repatriation action would be nullified. To my objection that quite to the contrary we had xip to now observed a really exemplary discipline among the Volksdeutsche,1 Count Ciano replied by referring to the reports to the contrary lying before him. One only had to imagine what the effect would be abroad, and also on the mood in Italy, if it should even come to an open shooting fray some day. Furthermore, the removal of 100,000 Volksdeutsche from Latvia, which had been accomplished within a few days, had proved, after all, how quickly such a movement could be carried through. Count Ciano did not reply to my very pointed reference to the fact that he could hardly consider the two actions parallel; he even reverted to this argument toward the end of the conversation. Surely, he said, we would not push into the foreground questions of the transfer rate, regarding which an agreement had already been reached for the first billion, or the carrying away of household effects "down to the doorknobs," thereby making an agreement impossible. It was also impossible to postpone the date of registration beyond June 1940 2 without delaying implementation ad infinitum. He therefore wished to request most urgently that the German Foreign Minister, acting out of political considerations, issue the necessary instructions for a quick settlement of the question, which *In a telegram of Oct. 6 to the Landesgruppenleiter in Italy (119/119183), State Secretary Bohle, Head of the Auslandsorganisation, had ordered a ban on all public activities of Party groups and German nationals in South Tirol. Ortsgruppen were to limit themselves to business meetings without speeches. a In telegram No. 652 of Oct. 8 (591/244759-60) -Clodius had referred to June 30, 1940, as a suitable date for the completion of registration. The Foreign Ministry reply, telegram No. 721 of Oct. 9 (591/24476a) stated that, in its view, registration could not be completed before Dec. 31, 1940. 274 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY was in the mutual interest a request which the Duce was also directing to the Führer. Ciano indicated that he would also instruct Bocchini 8 to use his influence in the same sense vis-it-vis the EeichsFührer- SS, who is staying with him as his guest. 4 In agreement with Clodius I am of the opinion that, quite apart from our own interest in quickly winding up the negotiations, we should point out to the Italians in answering the Duce's request that in carrying through this action, which involves very great sacrifices on our part, we believe we can expect from them very generous treatment of the separate questions. MACKEN'SEN Arturo Bocchini was chief of the Italian police. Following complaints by Bocchini to Himmler that German authorities were obstructing the removal of the German minority from the South Tirol, the two met at Tremezzo on Lake Oomo, Oct. 11-13, 1989, to review the basic agreement of June 23, 1939. It was agreed a) that the purpose of the original agreement had been "a lasting and fundamental ethnic solution," 6 ) that under simplified procedures the closing date for opting would be Dec. 31, 1939, c) that the Italians would desist from political arrests in the area, d) that no propaganda for or against resettlement was to be allowed, and e) that both sides would in future "really cooperate in a cordial, open, and comradely manner." This summary is based on a long memorandum of Dec. 12, 1939, by Bene, German Consul General at Milan; not printed (F7/0507-0481 ; Fl/0247-0254). 4 On Oct. 11, the Italian Embassy in Berlin presented a note to the Poreign Ministry on the same subject (4537/B144318). It stated in part: "Minister Clodius is making difficulties in Home which are greatly delaying execution of the agreement, while it is absolutely necessary to hasten a decision. A very serious psychological condition has developed in the Alto Adige: the Tirol Germans believe that they are beyond the reach of Italian sovereignty ; naturally this cannot be tolerated. . . . The friendly attention of the German Government is therefore drawn to a situation in the Alto Adige which will admit of no further delays, and which can give rise to serious incidents." No. 245 8333/E5I8&83&-40 The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign, Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT EOME, October 12, 1939 12 : 05 p. m. TOP SECRET Received October 12 1 : 50 p. m. No. 677 of October 12 Pol. 2244 g. In yesterday's conversation Count Ciano voiced his opinion on the general situation to the effect that he scarcely believed in a peaceful solution any more, while the Duce still believed in certain possibilities, without, to be sure, having any basis for this other than his own feeling. Ciano had carried away from Berlin the strongest possible impression as the result of the assurance and strong determination with which the Führer had spoken to him about the course of events. Circles here had already been very deeply impressed in this respect at Salz OCTOBEB 1939 275 burg. 1 The impressions of those days, however, had been considerably surpassed. As I knew, he was of a rather critical nature, but he could not rid himself of this impression and emphasized it in all his conversations, even with the French and British Ambassadors, both of whom, by the way, held very moderate views. He had also spoken to them emphatically of the military strength of the Reich as the Führer had described it to him at length and in detail in the course of the conversation. He could not remember ever having heard so clear and precise an exposition during the many years in which he had listened to situation reports by high military persons. On the basis of this he had told the Ambassadors that the Führer, in his opinion, by no means rejected a peaceful settlement; if this could not be achieved, however, he would strike with tremendous violence, and it appeared rather doubtful to Ciano whether any opponent would be able to cope with it. He had also told the Ambassadors that he believed that the Fuhrer's Reichstag speech was actually his last word. If this word failed to evoke sufficient response, for which the Führer would wait for a limited period of time, he would seek a solution by other means ; and he would find it with the same certainty with which he had found it in the Polish question, in which his predictions had been borne out accurately and almost to the day. Ciano told me in addition that he assumed there would be another conference before the final decision, perhaps patterned after the last Berlin meeting or perhaps in the form of a meeting between the Führer and the Duce. He did not expect Daladier's speech of the day before yesterday z to have any influence on the development of the situation. MACKENSEN 1 This is a reference to Ciano's talks with Hitler on Aug. 12-13, 1939, See vol. vn, documents Nos. 43 and 47. * The text of Daladier's broadcast to the nation on Oct. 10 in reply to Hitler's speech of Oct. 6 is given in International Conciliation, No. 354 (New York, November 1939), pp. 525-528. No. 246 4.631/225953-54 Circular of the Acting Director of the Press Department Telegram en clair BERLIN, October 12, 1939. e. o. P. 13526. Chamberlain's speech 1 is an outrageous affront to Germany. With incredibly scurrilous insults to the German Reich and its policy, a On Oct. 12, Prime Minister Chamberlain replied in the House of Commons to the German proposals contained in Hitler's speech of Oct. 6 (see Editors' Note, p. 227). For the text of Chamberlain's speech, see Par. Deb., 5th ser. H of C, vol. 352, 563-568. 276 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY Chamberlain rejected in his speech the hand of peace held out to him by the Führer. It is obvious that Chamberlain did not wish to understand the Führer's generous action and the proposals inspired by his sense of responsibility. Whereas Germany desires peace and the Führer makes constructive proposals for the establishment of a peaceful and secure Europe, Chamberlain and his clique have chosen war. In his speech he did not plead the case of the people but that of a small clique which makes war its business. This afternoon Chamberlain thrust aside the hand of peace offered by Germany, not only before the House of Commons but before the entire world, and thus gave his reply to the appeal which the Führer directed to all nations in his speech of October 6 when he said: "May those peoples and their leaders who are of the same mind make now their reply, and let those who consider war to be the best solution reject my outstretched hand." Chamberlain and his henchmen have made their choice in favor of the latter. After this speech by the English Prime Minister the German people can no longer entertain any doubt that no matter what we do, no matter what we say, and no matter what offer we make, Chamberlain and Britain's warmongers, under the cloak of hypocritical phrases, are bent on exterminating the German nation. Chamberlain's speech reveals the true meaning of the English war aim, and it is : war to annihilation against the German people and the German Reich. The English Prime Minister's speech is founded on lies and culminates in the lie. And while he accuses German policy of breaking its word he forgets that the world knows that England's world empire is built on nothing but force and the broken word.2 England wanted the war. The English Prime Minister even asserts that Germany has rejected all attempts at restoring peace in the recent past. He asserts for instance, contrary to his better knowledge, that Germany declined Mussolini's mediation proposal; but it is an established fact that Mussolini's generous mediation effort was wrecked by England after it had already been accepted by France, and that as a result the French people were driven into the most senseless war of all time. After Chamberlain's speech the German people know what their enemies are after. The experience of Versailles has taught the German people what England's will to annihilate can bring to pass, and they therefore know the road they must take in. order to frustrate this determination of their enemies. DR. SCHMIDT The German text originally read "Luytf' but was changed to "Wortbruch." OCTOBER 1939 277 No. 247 495/223342 Memorandum ~by the State Secretary CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, October 12, 1939. St.S. No. 800 The Bulgarian Minister, supplementing his recent conversation with the Foreign Minister, informed me today of the following: The suggestions recently made by Molotov to the Bulgarian Government concerning a Eusso-Bulgarian agreement were not clear at first. Later it became evident that Molotov was thinking of a Eusso-Bulgarian mutual assistance pact in the event of an attack by a third power. This suggestion was rejected in Sofia. To my question why Bulgaria had not accepted it, Draganov offered as his own conjecture the following : Up to now Bulgaria had never concluded any treaty of alliance of this kind, not even with Germany, with which she had close ties of long standing. Probably his Government did not, for this reason, wish to depart from this principle, nor, above all, conclude a mutual assistance pact with Kussia first. Draganov then went on to say that the Bulgarian Government had made the following counterproposal : Bulgaria was ready to conclude a treaty of nonaggression or friendship with Kussia if Moscow would present concrete proposals of this kind. A reply to this has not as yet reached Sofia. I thanked the Minister for his information and promised to transmit it to the Foreign Minister. WEIZSAOKER No. 248 F2/0848-45 The Commander in Chief of the Na/&y to the Foreign Minister TOP SECRET MIUTARY BBRUtf, October 12, 1939. B. No. 1 Ski. I c 86 g.Kdos EM 48 g Es. Mr DEAR MINISTER : With reference to my recent oral statements, I am presenting in the following the wishes of the naval warfare people regarding Eussian assistance. I shall proceed at this time on the assumption that the Eussian neutrality though interpreted generously in our favor will remain in force in relation to the Western Powers. 278 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY If in this connection new developments favorable to us should occur, it would then become necessary to frame new plans for cooperation. The naval warfare people seek the following objectives: I. Improving the conditions for naval warfare ~by submarines and surface forces in foreign waters. It would greatly facilitate operations by surface forces and sabmarines in foreign waters if Russia were to place at our disposal suitable ports, such as Murmansk and Vladivostok, as supply and repair bases. The use of these ports is desired for the following purposes : 1. Outfitting and dispatching of Russian supply ships (fuels, provisions) for cruisers and submarines with a view to extending their endurance at sea. The supplying of German naval units could be effected in the following manner: a} Russian naval escort for the supply ships to areas where cruisers or submarines would receive them, (More strain on Russian neutrality.) "b ) Sailing of unescorted supply ships under prearranged orders in such way that they would Be nominally seized by cruisers or submarines and subsequently released after delivery of fuel and provisions. (Less strain on Russian neutrality.) c) Meeting at prearranged locations of German tenders for replenishing their supplies. 2. Supplying of cruisers, submarines, and auxiliary vessels with fuels and provisions in ports directly. Ammunition and other supplies would be shipped from Germany. This would relieve the German naval units of the necessity of breaking through the mined and guarded zone at the outlets from home waters each time in and out. 3. Reconditioning of the machinery of cruisers and submarines in ports in northern Russia and the Far East, using Russian shipyards. For periods of several weeks. Transfer of additional specialists from Germany would be arranged. 4. Refitting of German steamships as auxiliary cruisers and their outfitting for commerce raiding. 5. Protection of the outlying sea areas of the ports in question against the activity of enemy naval forces and submarines. 6. Continous transmission of information from the Russian intelligence organizations on the naval forces and merchant traffic of the enemy. II. Other possibilities for facilitating the conduct of German, naval operations: 1. The provision of an escort service for German supply transports along the Norwegian coast, which in certain cases might have to fly the Russian flag, could eventually contribute greatly toward easing the tasks of German naval warfare. 2. Cessation of all direct and indirect Russian deliveries to the enemy countries. OCTOBER 1939 279 I regard it as very important to secure the maximum cooperation of the Russian Government so as to improve the Navy's opportunities for sea warfare most effectively. I request that clarification in principle of the points mentioned be secured through diplomatic channels as soon as possible. Particularly urgent, to my mind, is clarification of points I (2) and (3) (Outfitting and reconditioning of naval units in Russian ports) . Once an agreement in principle has been reached, the technical details could be agreed upon by the two Navies through attache channels. Heil Hitler I RAEDER Grand Admiral [EDITORS' NOTE. State Secretary von Weizsacker at his trial at Nuremberg stated that on October 12, 1939, he submitted to the Foreign Minister a memorandum entitled "Military-Political Action after the Failure of the Present Peace Action." This memorandum advised against intensification of the war in the West and particularly against an offensive through Belgium. Weizsacker submitted in evidence at Nuremberg a typewritten draft of the memorandum which he had kept and this appears in translation in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuernberg, October 191-April 1949, volume XII, pages 1203-1205, as Weizsacker Document 370, Weizsacker Defense Exhibit 122. The document has not been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry. Weizsacker stated that Ribbentrop summarily rejected his suggestions on this occasion.] No. 249 58a/242236 The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT ROME, October 13, 1939 12 : 00 noon. TOP SECRET Received October 13 1 : 40 p. m. No. 681 of October 13 With reference to last night's telephone instructions to me from the Foreign Minister,1 As instructed, I informed Count Ciano this morning, emphasizing that the Foreign Minister was particularly anxious to have the Italians, also clearly and unequivocally brand as an untruth the lie repeated in *No record of this telephone conversation has been found.
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OCTOBER 1939 281 No. 251 Ul/1273071 The Embassy in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT BRUSSELS, October 13, 1939 8 : 00 p. m. No. 282 of October 13 Received October 14r 12 : 30 a. m. For the Air Ministry, Attach^ Group. From today's conversation * with the Chief of the Belgian General Staff the following is worthy of note : On his own initiative the Chief of the General Staff turned the conversation to the implementation of Belgian neutrality. I pointed out that in Holland rumors about the shifting of Belgian troops from the French to the Dutch and German borders were causing uneasiness. The Chief of the General Staff replied that this was actually not altogether true, since it was only a question of an exchange of troops in the course of a slow mobilization process. He expressly emphasized that Belgium was firmly resolved to maintain neutrality and would not only fire on any intruder, no matter from where he came, but would fight him energetically and regard him as an enemy. He took the opportunity, for his part, to express his concern over reports he had received about the concentration of German armored troops and motorized forces in the region of Cologne, which he called the Eeichenau Army. The concentration of a normal number of troops for the defense of the West Wall had been regarded by Belgium as an obvious defense measure. Armored and motorized troops were, however, evidently intended for a war of movement. I pointed out that being a member of the Luftwaffe I knew nothing about these occurrences, but would, if he so desired, forward the report. He requested me to do so and in conclusion emphasized once more that Belgium would not give up her determination to remain neutral. The Military Attache here will be informed upon his return. WENNINGER BTJLOW 1 Between Lt. Gen. Wenninger, the German Air Attach^ in Belgium, accredited also to the Netherlands, and the Belgian Lt. Gen. EL M. van den Bergen.
282 DOCUMENTS ON GBEMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 252 116/66658-60 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Telegram SECBET BERLIN, October 13, IMMEDIATE ZU Kult B Sp6Z. 68-01 11.10.39. No. 554 With reference to your telegram No. 510.1 Please make the following reply to M. Molotov and M. Potemkin: 1. The assertion that the emigration of the Germans from the Baltic .countries initiated by us seriously compromises the action of the Soviet Government is incomprehensible to us. Such a connection between the two actions is asserted only by English propaganda, which is of course interested in disturbing the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union and for this purpose constantly treats events in the Baltic countries in a most tendentious manner. 2. There cannot be the slightest question of any panicky emigration or flight. On the contrary, the resettlement is being carried out by us in a perfectly calm and orderly manner and will presumably extend over a period of months. We are carrying on negotiations in the matter with the Latvian and Estonian Governments and are regulating by agreement questions of citizenship and property esr these matters are being dealt with in a generous, rat manner.2 3. We are carrying out the action in accordance with the agreements made in Moscow, it does not grow out of the fear that the Germans might in any way be endangered by the Soviets ; rather, it is a necessity for us to populate with Germans the many deserted farms, stores, and workshops in the occupied area. In the interest of an early restoration of economic life there we are anxious to have at least a part of the Germans emigrate from the Baltic countries even this winter. 4. To the Baltic Governments we described the evacuation as being a result of the program developed by the Fuhrer in his last speech in the Reichstag and expressly emphasized that it has no connection with the new agreements between these Governments and the Soviet Government. * Document No. 239. * On Oct. 16, a German-Estonian Protocol on evacuation of the German element was signed (400/214522), but on Oct. 26, Frohwein wired that a biU had been introduced in the Estonian Parliament restricting the removal of economic assets from the country (406/214525r-26). This action brought considerable argument regarding application of the Protocol. On Dec. 30, 1939, the Estonian Government agreed to extend for 3 months (i. e., until Mar. lt 1940) the period for evacuation by approximately 1,000 Germans who had volunteered for resettlement (Frohwein telegram No. 389, dispatched Dec. 31: 406/214568-69). The evacuation was not completed within the stipulated time limit, and in telegram No. 242 of July 13, 1940, Frohwein reported that his Legation still had 400 requests for transfer (406/214647) . x3 treaty Providing for the resettlement of Latvians claiming German nationality was signed by Germany and Latvia on Oct. 30, 1939 (1272/342047-69). Art rv of this treaty provided that the evacuation be completed by Dec. 15, 1939. in tele ram No. 416 of Dec. 16 that this had been accomplished
OCTOBER 1939 283 Thereupon appropriate semi-official explanations of the true meaning of the resettlement were also published in the press by the Latvian and Estonian Governments on October 8 and 9. 5. Moreover, the Soviet Government should really welcome the entire" action from its point of view as well. We are thereby removing an element which might possibly in the future have disturbed our relations with the Baltic countries and consequently also with the Soviet Union. It is a well-known fact that the attitude of the Latvian and Estonian population is in some instances quite hostile toward the Germans living there. This could have led to all sorts of difficulties in the future. The evacuation is thus a clear indication that we are taking seriously Germany's political disinterestedness in the Baltic countries as agreed upon in Moscow.3 I further request you to point out to M. Molotov on this occasion that we expect the Soviet Government to agree to a similar resettlement of the Germans from the former Polish areas in the Soviet sphere of interest. The following principles should therefore be followed in the matter : 1. The question of membership in the German Volksgruppe should be given a broad interpretation. 2. The action should be carried out at an early date in the interest of resettling the deserted farms in our sphere of interest. 3. Formalities should be confined to an absolute minimum. 4% Livestock, agricultural effects, and personal belongings should be taken along at once. 5. A reichsdeutsch concern should be set up to act as custodian for all assets not taken along ; the concern would assume all the indebtedness of departing individuals to public and private parties, and would settle their obligations. VON RlBBENTROP *In a telegram of Oct. 14 (406/214514), reporting on the execution of this instruction, Schulenburg stated that Molotov showed himself "somewhat relieved." Molotov declared that the Soviet Government had that day published a Tass dispatch to prevent false interpretation of the German measures, and emphasized that his Government saw no need for hasty resettlement. No. 253 73/52087 The State Secretary to the Legation in Hungary Telegram No. 424 BEBMK, October 13, 1939. With reference to your telegram No. 421.1 1. You are requested to observe extreme reserve there on the subject of Hungarian-Russian relations and possible military measures on the part of Hungary against Russia and to make no statements in the matter whatsoever. 1 Document No. 238.
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No. 255 463/225978 The Charge OCTOBER 1939 287 suit in making additional enemies for us, without our as yet possessing the submarines necessary to defeat England. On the other hand, the Navy has very persuasive reasons for its stand in urging the opening of unrestricted submarine warfare. It therefore appears necessary to me that the OKW be asked for certain specialized information before a decision is made. In my opinion the following should be asked. a. When does the Navy wish to open unrestricted submarine warfare? 5. What declared areas does it propose? (Notification of neutrals is necessary.) c. What are the present monthly figures on sinkings and those to be expected in the future? d. >oes the Navy intend to make exceptions with reference to sinking as regards passenger vessels and certain neutrals (e. g., Russian trade to England, Danish food ships, etc.) ; and what steps will the Navy take to ensure that such ships will be spared ? I request that I be authorized to direct an inquiry to this effect to the OKW at once.2 WEIZSACKER 3 See document No. 270. No. 257 F2/0347 ; P2/0346 ; F2/0840 The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Telegram TOP SECRET BERUJST, October 14? 1939. No. 568 [Sent October 1512 : 15 a. m.] .* For the Ambassador personally. On the occasion of the conversations in Moscow the Soviet Government, as the Embassy knows, showed itself well disposed toward our wish for a certain measure of assistance to our Navy by the Soviet Union for the duration of the war.2 This idea will soon have its first 1 From the copy in the Moscow Embassy (4191/E072496-97). *No documents have been found on naval discussions during Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow Sept. 27-29, 1939, but "Ftthrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945," JBrassey's Naval Annual, 1948, p. 43, includes the following from a Hitler-Raeder conference of Sept. 23: "7. The Chief, Naval State, raises the question of Russian and Italian cooperation on the following points: (a) cession of submarines to the German Navy, (&) equipment of auxiliary cruisers (Murmansk), (c) permission for German warships to use Russian ports. "The Ftthrer will ask the Foreign Minister to clarify these questions on his next visit to Moscow. The Italians will certainly be very cautious. Japan will presumably keep her promises regarding permission to use Japanese ports and equipment of German ships."
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practical application in one aspect as a result of the discussions there regarding the refitting of Iller as an auxiliary cruiser in a Russian port. 8 These discussions, according to the Naval High Command, have also already dealt informally with further wishes, such as the reconditioning of German vessels in Soviet ports. The Naval High Command sets great value upon a far-reaching cooperation of the Soviet Government in this question, with a view to effectively improving the Navy's opportunities for sea warfare. The points primarily concerned are the following : 1. Supplying of cruisers, submarines, and auxiliary vessels with fuel and provisions in Russian ports, with the ammunition and other supplies being shipped from Germany. 2. Reconditioning of cruisers and submarines, especially their machinery, using Russian shipyards. 3. Outfitting and dispatching of Russian supply ships (fuel, provisions) for cruisers and submarines, so as to extend their endurance at sea. Please discuss this matter with Molotov immediately. In doing so, the conversation should be framed in such a way that you are not bringing up anything new or unexpected ; instead, you should refer to the Foreign Minister's conversations in Moscow and the negotiations about the conversion of Iller into an auxiliary cruiser as well as the wishes set forth on that occasion, which are not known here in full detail. In discussing the question of which ports are concerned, please mention Murmansk and some Far Eastern port to be agreed upon later. It is important that such ports are selected as afford adequate railroad connections for the shipping of ammunition, supplies, and repair material. As regards point (2) it is also necessary that the ports have shipyard facilities and, if possible, docks. Please make a telegraphic report on your conversation. It would then be left to decide with Molotov which details will subsequently be handled by yourself, and which by the Naval Attach^.4 WBIZSACKBR * In telegram No. 431 of Sept. 23, Schulenburg reported as follows : "Molotov informed me today that the Soviet Government agrees to our proposal to convert motor ship Iller into an auxiliary cruiser and will assist us in this matter" (4191/E072502). The conversion was presumably carried out at Murmansk. Schulenburg replied in a telegram of Oct. 17 as follows : "Before starting to carry out this instruction I think I must wait for the return of Naval Attach^ von Baumbach, who is now in Berlin to discuss these questions. I suggest that you get in touch with Baumbach, who wishes to leave on Wednesday [Oct. 18], at the Eden Hotel" (51/33910). Meanwhile, Raeder had reported to Hitler on Oct. 16 ''that the Bussians have placed at our disposal a well-situated base west of Murmansk. A repair ship is to be stationed there." ("FUhrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945," Brassey's Naval Annual, 1948, p. 52). No immediate sequel to Schulenburg's telegram has been found.
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No. 260 1571/380194H9& The ^Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry Telegram MOST URGENT HOME, October 16, 1939 1 : 10 a. m. SECRET Received October 16 6 : 05 a. m, No. 692 of October 15 With reference to our telegrams Nos. 663 * and 676.2

I. Another thorough discussion with Minister of Commerce Quarneri on the question of obtaining raw materials via Italy revealed that Italy is insisting unconditionally that with the British control growing constantly more strict the security of Italy's own vital supplies of raw materials must not be jeopardized by an attempt to route shipments of raw materials to Germany via Italy. Another member of the Government, too, who at first had a very affirmative attitude and had promised me to discuss the matter with the Duce, has now said that it is not possible to support Germany at the moment because of the danger to Italy's own supplies.

II. I thereupon told Ambassador Giannini that I would now have to give my Government a final report to the effect that the certain expectation of the German Government that Italy's nonparticipation in the war would facilitate the supplying of raw materials to Germany was incorrect, and in any case Italy was not willing at the present time to aid Germany in this particularly important field. Considering the serious impression which this report would make on the leading political and military authorities, I desired before sending my report that the Italian Foreign Minister once more expressly confirm the fact that the Italian stand was final. In reply Ciano sent word to me that although he would like to continue the conversation with me regarding the Italian attitude toward the British blockade, he had to state in advance that the negative Italian stand in the question of raw-material supplies could not be changed, at least for the moment.

III. The authoritative Italian offices are aware of the significance for us of their refusal ; in particular, Guarneri and Giannini urgently requested understanding for the Italian attitude, which was dictated by the direst necessity. It was the unavoidable duty of the Italian

* Document No. 231. *Not printed (588/242230-31). Clodius reported in this telegram of Oct. 11 that Ambassador Giannini, Director of Commercial Affairs in the Italian Foreign Ministry, had told him that Italy would not be able to transship to Germany the previously agreed quantities of raw materials from overseas sources. The reason given was the intensified British blockade, which now required a declaration on imports of oil, rubber, and nonferrous metals that these would not be transshipped to Germany.
OCTOBER 1939 291

Government not to endanger Italy's supply of the most important raw materials, and this was also in the German interest ; as soon as the present emergency was overcome, the Italian Government would do everything to aid us.

IV. With the strong concentration of Italian imports of raw materials in relatively few firms and the dependence of these firms on the Government, the delegation sees no prospect in these circumstances of obtaining any significant quantities of raw materials through Italy covertly. In particular, the possibility of supplies from Spain is thereby also made impracticable. Attempts to conclude at least individual small transactions will be continued.

I shall also continue to urge that the Italians at least refuse, as even the Oslo States have done, to give British authorities pledges against re-exporting goods.8

292 DOCTTMEiNTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
as soon as possible by telephone whether you agree to the Soviet proposal. I informed Shkvartsev of the contents of telegraphic instruction No. 572, stressing expressly the need for secrecy, and asked him to inform Molotov so that he might at once give me the reply on my forthcoming visit, No. 262 141/127308-09 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Belgiwm Telegram No. 374 BERLIN, October 16, 1939, For the Ambassador personally. With reference to your telegram No. 282.1 I request that you bring up the following with the Belgian Foreign Minister, 2 not as a special demarche, but on the occasion of your next call, which you should make as soon as possible : 1. In his conversation with Air Attach^ "Wenninger, the Chief of the Belgian General Staff referred to reports he had received to the effect that German armored troops and motorized units, which he called the Reichenau Army, were concentrated in the region of Cologne. He asked the Air Attach^ to forward this information to Berlin. With reference hereto you have been instructed to state that actually there has been no concentration of German armored troops and motorized units in the region of Cologne, and that, consequently, the reports which the Chief of the Belgian General Staff has received are completely false. 2. On the other hand, we have definite and reliable reports that France, for her part, has concentrated motorized units on the Franco- Belgian border. 3. In view of this situation it has naturally surprised us that Belgium has proceeded to transfer Belgian troops from the Belgian- French to the Belgian-German border. That there has actually been such a transfer is attested by all the reports we have received ; nor was it denied, after all, by the Chief of the Belgian General Staff in his conversation with the 'German Air Attach^, when he merely called the Air Attaches reference to these transfers "not altogether true." 4. On this occasion you should also call attention to the fact that during the last few weeks the Belgian press, in contrast to the press of the other neutral countries, has shown a pronounced anti-German tone and vied with the inflammatory attitude of the British and the French press. 1 Document No. 251. a Paul Henri Spaak.
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OCTOBER 1939 295 nothing to gain by it. Now he was convinced, however, that this war had to be fought to a finish. He could describe Chamberlain as nothing else than mad. Naturally, he would restore the Polish state, for he did not want that riff-raff \G-escKmeis8\ the Poles within his own borders, but never again would Poland become a threat to Germany. He had no demands to make of the West aside from the colonies which were of no value to England herself. He now compared at some length the relative strength of Germany and England, and concluded that Germany had enormous superiority. And in such circumstances England believed that Germany should beg for forgiveness ! ! Hedin wondered what the French really were fighting for. They were England's slaves and faced ruin. The Fuhrer: "France will sacrifice her national strength." There were many Frenchmen who thought the same but they were not allowed to speak out. Hedin : If he succeeded in preventing the war, future generations would venerate [ 296
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OCTOBER 1939 299 The general attack of the British group failed because of the strong resistance offered by the Army and activist circles friendly to us. "With an objectivity and loyalty that deserves the highest recognition they allowed themselves to become convinced of the necessity for Germany's action and its advantage against the common foe, England, and for their part attacked the indecisiveness of Japan. To be sure the Hiranuma Cabinet fell, undermined by 70 fruitless conferences on the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact, but its successor did not represent the pro-British group. In a bitter struggle with Court circles, the Army achieved a middle-of-the-road Cabinet, whose leader, General Abe who at the same time took over the post of Foreign Minister was understood to be amenable to the influence of the Army. On September 5 this neutral Abe Cabinet presented the memorandum with regard to Japan's nonintervention [in the war]. II. Policy Since Begirwiing of tTie War In view of the attitude Japan had declared toward Europe it was clear from the start that she could not announce any ostrich policy for the Far East, for she is in the position of being compelled to confront the Great Powers in the China conflict* Every Japanese Government describes it as the main task of its foreign policy to end the China conflict as soon as possible. This compels it to proceed against the Marshal's last sources of strength, his support by England and Russia, and obliges it further to assure the Wang Ching-wei Government of early recognition by the Great Powers in order to make it viable. Moreover, the injury done to trade by the war will force Japan to abandon her reserve. It suffices to call attention in this connection to the shortage of freight space, tlxe interference by British naval warfare, and America's threatening attitude in the question of the expiring commercial treaty. By its first acts, the Abe Cabinet showed its disposition to profit actively by the European conflict. The memorandum mentioned above gives the belligerent Powers the advice to withdraw their forces from the parts of China occupied by Japan* Japan has therefore started to exert pressure on the British and French, the only ones involved, in order to weaken their position in China. In the truce of Nomonhan,3 Japan declared her intention to restore to normal her relations with Russia, and the Army pursued this further in a publication emphasizing the friendly atmosphere between the Japanese and Russian officers conducting negotiations. Both measures were promising indications that the "nonintervention" of the Abe Cabinet would in practice be directed at a settlement 8 See document No. 77, footnote 2. 260090 54 25-
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with Russia, and pressure against England and France in China. Apparently the influence which the Army has secured upon the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister was at work; a last manifestation of the old striking power of the Army it has since then not again succeeded in influencing the policy of the Cabinet further in our direction. From two sides the pro-British camp (whose driving power, it now clearly emerges, is from the persons closest to the throne), and the Government of the United States of America opposition arose which was directed primarily against a settlement with Russia. The pro-British camp recognized the dangers of the truce of Nomonhan when the Army and large groups of the population welcomed it most joyfully. It might again bring Japan closer to Germany, and the zealous effort at outlawing the latter would collapse if Japan followed the German example toward Russia. In this way, moreover, Japan would by necessity be driven gradually into the anti-British front Court circles proceeded to take carefully calculated countermeasures, first by having the press minimize the truce and deny any friendly influence on the part of Germany and, shortly after, getting the Minister of the Interior to issue a secret decree forbidding further press reports regarding negotiations with Soviet Russia. After the Soviet Army had moved into action against Poland the day after the truce and displayed an increasing activity in Europe, a general agitation began in the principal newspapers of Japan, aimed at instilling fear of Soviet Russia, which, with her growth in power and her "notorious untrustworthiness" would increasingly become a communistic and military threat to the Far East. This agitation also overshadowed appreciation of the incomparable triumph of the German Wehrmacht in Poland, which naturally also made a deep impression in Japan. The Government of the United States had perhaps not entirely by chance acted in harmony with the pro-British camp in Japan. In a demarche about which we have learned nothing, it must have expressed its displeasure at the Japanese rapprochement with Soviet Russia. In any case, the Japanese press hastily published a statement by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, minimizing the truce of Nomonhan and denying German influence in it. By strengthening the fleet and air force in Hawaii the Government of the United States gave to its attitude un emphatic note of warning and seems also to have answered with a sharp protest the Japanese memorandum relative to withdrawal of the belligerent forces from China, which
OCTOBER 1939 301 was communicated to it by way of information.4 If one sums up these individual measures, one is forced to the conclusion that the Government of the United States has undertaken the task of relieving the Western Powers in the Far East and vigorously espousing their interests. In this connection, the imminent expiration of the commercial treaty is especially disquieting to the Japanese. America's attitude provided Court circles with the opportunity of carrying out a number of far-reaching changes in personnel, with the purposes of removing the Cabinet from the influence of the Army, of purging the Army of politics through the compliant Minister of War by radical changes in all key positions, and of removing the supporters of anti-Comintern policy from the service of the Foreign Ministry. Included in this category is, first of all, the appointment of a Foreign Minister, which was forced upon the Minister President and for which Admiral Nomura was selected because of good personal relations with America, allegedly after the Army had opposed the appointment of Ambassador Shigemitsu from London. The new Foreign Minister was hailed by the principal newspapers as one who would lead the way to general settlement with America, and thus Japanese policy was given a second main task besides that of ending the Chinese conflict. It remains to be seen whether an attempt is thus to be made to bring Japan closer to the Western Powers by way of America. No direct rapprochement with England is thus far discernible even if indications are increasing that England is revising her attitude in China. Today's special report 5 on the organization of the Wang Ching-wei Government discusses in detail events in China and the necessary German countermeasures. III. Outlook for the Future If one reviews the Japanese attitude since the beginning of the war, there appears a brief attempt to widen the policy of friendship with Germany into an adjustment with Russia and to draw closer to the anti-British front. In a large-scale counterattack, Court circles, armed with increased power, brought this movement to a halt and put settlement with America first. A thorough purge carried out in the Cabinet, the Army, and the Foreign Ministry, especially of the supporters of the German alliance policy, is supposed to guarantee this new orientation for a long period. 4 Secretary of State HnU discussed the Japanese memorandum with Ambassador Hprinouchi on Sept. 7 and again on Sept. 15. See his memoranda of conversations in Foreign Relations of the United States. Japan, 1931-1941, vol. n, pp. 12-14, 15-19. 5 Not printed (8137/E582155-62) .
302 DOCUMENTS ON GETRMAJST FOREIGN POLICY What are the prospects of success for this policy? To answer the most critical question at once, I consider the danger very slight that Japan will he brought into the war on the side of England by way of America. There are no German possessions in the Pacific that represent worth-while military objectives and that could be offered to Japan such as Tsingtao and the South Sea territories in 1914. War aimed at Eussian possessions, such as Vladivostok, would be predicated on the entry of Russia on the German side, but this would surely deter Japan from entering the war, for the experience of Nomonhan has, according to reliable reports, demonstrated a formidable superiority of Russian arms and military technique. Japan will not regard as adequate British compensation in China or Hong Kong, for these may fall to her in the course of the war anyway. Also military or economic pressure applied jointly by America and England can hardly be made so effective as to constrain Japan, which is always intent upon exploiting the war situation in order to invade the sphere of her Pacific neighbors. A psychological deterrent is the fact that hostility toward England is so intense in the Army and in activist circles of the population that for the foreseeable future acts of terrorism might be expected against any collaboration with England. The question remains whether settlement with America can be effected and whether it will prevent a settlement with Russia. An agreement with America, on trade is, as I have repeatedly reported, a vital question for Japan. The policy of Court circles, therefore, means to large groups in industry and in the Navy a prospect of realizing an old dream. Extremely embittered popular feeling in America, however, and the 600 American demands arising out of the China conflict stand in the way of its realization. These culminate ill the preservation of the Nine Power Pact, which would mean practically the abandonment of Japan's China policy, and thus put the greatest difficulties in the way of Japan's most urgent aim, the speedy and successful termination of the China war. The attempt at a settlement has therefore been rendered extremely difficult by circumstances and is very much impeded by the clique policy of Court circles, which have always been especially hated in the radical groups of the population and have this time exposed themselves to an extraordinary degree. It should be recalled that the bloody events of February 1936 6 were directed against these same Court circles. In this situation, continued efforts toward a settlement with Russia simultaneously or in lieu of a settlement with America will by On Feb. 26, 1936, within a few days of an election victory by the moderate Okada Cabinet, a group of young officer extremists led a regiment of troops in -an uprising against the Cabinet. The mutineers held control of central Tokyo for 3 days and assassinated several members of the government.